Operation Anaconda

[ariweiner]

A good overview of Operation Anaconda with pics that I've never seen anywhere else:

http://www.defesanet.com.br/docs/anaconda/

[NcDeuce]

Task Force Rakkasan, eh?

[mustamato]

http://www.defesanet.com.br/docs/anaconda/sld008.htm

1.) Picture stolen from ciriello.com
2.) That is not a 82 mm

[Va_Dinger]

A good overview of Operation Anaconda with pics that I've never seen anywhere else:

http://www.defesanet.com.br/docs/anaconda/


Oustanding photos of Al-Qaeda infantry in the field. I've never seen such good photograghs.

[hood]

Good stuff. We've got some photos from TF Rakkasan in the user submitted section also.

[MVSpartan117]

I liked that :)

[NcDeuce]

http://www.specwarnet.com/americas/army_mh60_preflight.jpg

Enduring Freedom, ;)

[Argyll]

I belive the Taliban complex was the one Assaulted by the SAS

[The Dane]

A really good report on the operation:
http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf




Introduction

In his memoirs,

American Soldier, former U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander General Tommy Franks, USA, (Ret.) portrayed Operation Anaconda, as an
“absolute and unqualified success,” but one in which the original U.S. military battle plan “didn’t survive first contact with the enemy.”General Franks’ apt portrayal provides the framework for this case study of Operation Anaconda, which took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan during early March 2002.


The goal of Operation Anaconda was to root out enemy Taliban and al Qaeda forces that had gathered in this valley following their earlier defeats in the initial three months of the war in Afghanistan. In order to achieve this goal, U.S. commanders crafted a complex and sophisticated battle plan involving a “hammer and anvil” attack by U.S. and friendly Afghan ground forces into the valley. This battle plan unraveled on the first day when enemy resistance proved fiercer than originally anticipated and friendly Afghan forces failed to carry out their march into the valley, thereby leaving deployed U.S. infantry forces to face the enemy alone. Success was achieved when U.S. forces switched tactical gears by calling on air strikes, in larger numbers than originally planned, to work with the ground forces to suppress and destroy the enemy.


Originally planned as a three-day battle with light combat, Operation Anaconda turned out to be a seven-day battle with intense combat and was officially terminated only after 17 days. Operation Anaconda, which lasted from March 2–18, was successful because up to several hundred enemy fighters were killed and the rest fled the Shahikot Valley, leaving it in the control of U.S. and allied forces. U.S. casualties totaled eight military personnel killed and over 50 wounded. Success was achieved because the U.S. military showed a capacity to adapt by employing joint operations and modern information networks to surmount a surprising and difficult challenge.


As a result, this battle was the last time that year that enemy forces chose to engage U.S. forces in major combat in Afghanistan. In the aftermath, nonetheless, came controversies about several issues, including original intelligence estimates, the U.S. command structure, the initial reliance upon friendly Afghan forces, the armament of U.S. Army light infantry forces, and networked air-ground coordination of air strikes against enemy positions.


In the months after Operation Anaconda, many of the problems encountered there were corrected by the U.S. military, and they did not reappear when Operation Iraqi Freedom, the invasion of Iraq, was launched in early 2003. Even so, the events of Operation Anaconda, the biggest pitched battle of the Afghanistan war, deserve to be remembered, as do its positive and negative lessons for modern-era force operations and defense transformation. The following pages endeavor to recount the battle’s key features, its initial frustrations, and its ultimate success.