XASA
01-07-2004, 04:12 PM
Marines to Offer New Tactics in Iraq
Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover From Army
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, January 7, 2004; Page A01
As the Marine Corps prepares to take over occupying much of western Iraq from the U.S. Army, it is planning a fresh approach that emphasizes restraint in the use of force, cultural sensitivity and a public message that the new troops aren't from the Army, according to an internal Marine document and interviews with top officers.
The working plan for Marines moving into the Sunni Triangle includes more interaction with Iraqis and a premium on respect for peaceable civilians. Marines will be taught a few words of Arabic, counseled on religious etiquette and ordered never to wear sunglasses when talking to Iraqis.
In a tactic reminiscent of the U.S. presence in Vietnam, platoons of Marines will live among the people in many Sunni towns and villages to facilitate training of the Iraqi police and civil defense forces, according to the document. To emphasize to Iraqis that the Marines arriving in Fallujah and other centers of resistance are a new crowd, the Marines are considering wearing green camouflage uniforms for their initial 45 days of patrolling instead of the dessert cammies worn by the Army.
Army officers and other military professionals who have seen the document summarizing the Marines' approach viewed it as an implicit criticism of the Army's tactics and results in the Sunni heartland west of Baghdad. Some called it unfair and ill-advised second-guessing. But others viewed it as a constructive attempt to learn from the hardships and mistakes of the Army in western Iraq, historically Saddam Hussein's power center and more recently the hub of the resistance that has hobbled U.S. efforts to rebuild the country.
Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, the commander of the Marine Corps force scheduled to deploy soon to Iraq, said in a telephone interview that he doesn't see the Marine approach as a criticism of the Army. Rather, he said, the planning document reflects intense discussions and "the free competition of ideas in the world." The document was a summary of points made at a two-day Marine planning session last month in California.
"We don't see any difference in our appreciation of the situation from the 82nd Airborne," he said, referring to the Army paratroop division now in the area that the Marines will move into. "We believe very strongly that the 82nd Airborne has it right, not only in the estimate of the situation but also in their concept of operations and in their tactics."
But, speaking on the condition of anonymity, other Marine officers criticized the Army approach.
"I'm appalled at the current heavy-handed use of air [strikes] and artillery in Iraq," one said. "Success in a counterinsurgency environment is based on winning popular support, not blowing up people's houses."
Mattis, commander of the 1st Marine Division, based at Camp Pendleton, Calif., said he intends to pursue a two-track effort. One track will be aimed at capturing or killing what Mattis considers to be a small minority who are determined to fight the U.S. presence. He said he would employ some novel and aggressive tactics. At Mattis's request, The Washington Post is not printing information about those tactics.
The other track, he said, focuses on diminishing support for the resistance among the populace in western Iraq.
Among other things, Mattis plans to revive the Vietnam War's Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), small Marine units that lived among villagers and helped train them to defend themselves. The notes from the Marine planning conference state, "Idea is that this Platoon, similar to Vietnam, will live and work with Police and ICDC," a reference to the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps that the U.S. occupation authority is creating to conduct some security functions.
These small units resemble an armed version of the Peace Corps, with training in such areas as cultural sensitivities and night patrolling. Details about how to use them are still being worked out and are likely to vary from town to town, one Marine officer said.
Retired Army Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., a historian of the Vietnam War, wrote that the CAP program represented a major difference between the Marine and Army approaches in Vietnam. While the Army tended to emphasize "search and destroy" operations in which they swept through an area and moved on, he wrote, the Marines settled on "clear and hold" operations in which CAPs stayed on land they held. CAPs are widely seen by historians as "one of the few success stories in Vietnam," noted John Miller, who fought in the war and wrote a book about it.
Marine officers said they are also aiming for more restraint in the use of force and intend to limit the use of heavy weapons, using bombs and weapons as a last resort. That contrasts with Army operations, in which airstrikes and artillery were sometimes used to intimidate at the outset of confrontations.
The Sunni Triangle, the parts of the Tigris and Euphrates valley north and west of Baghdad, has been where most attacks on U.S. troops have occurred over the past six months. The 4th Infantry Division, headquartered in Tikrit, has occupied its northern part. The 82nd Airborne now operates in its western section.
Some officers in both the Marines and the Army argue that the U.S. occupation there got off to a terrible start in April when several U.S. units moved through Fallujah.
At the end of that month, an Iraqi mob clashed with Army troops, resulting in shooting that killed 13 Iraqis and wounded scores more.
The western part of the Sunni Triangle is seen by many in the Army as the toughest ground in Iraq. Indeed, some Army officers who were interviewed expressed concern that any conciliatory Marine tactics would fail in the face of car bombings and armed mobs.
Retired Army Col. Lloyd Matthews said he found the Marine discussions somewhat distasteful. "It is hardly advisable in joint operations to denigrate the tactics of the sister service that preceded you in the trenches and to suggest that you are going to do a lot better," he said.
Matthews, a former editor of Parameters, the Army's premier professional journal, was also skeptical about whether the Marine CAP program would be viable in the hostile Sunni Triangle environment. "CAPs work only when they operate in a broadly secure environment," he said.
Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., commander for operations in the area the Marines will move into, declined to comment on the Marines' plan. But in a Baghdad news conference yesterday, Swannack, commander of the 82nd Airborne, said his soldiers "have turned the corner. . . . We're on a glidepath toward success as attacks against . . . [82nd Airborne] forces have decreased almost 60 percent" in a month.
Some Army officers in Iraq said the Marines' plan shows they are simply trying to capitalize on lessons learned in Iraq.
"I like the Marine approach, and I think it'll succeed," said Army Lt. Col. David J. Poirier, military police commander in Tikrit. "I love our Army, and I will not criticize it, but war is not free of mistakes, and I believe that some of the insurgency is due to families acting out against American forces for deaths occurring as a result of collateral damage."
Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover From Army
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, January 7, 2004; Page A01
As the Marine Corps prepares to take over occupying much of western Iraq from the U.S. Army, it is planning a fresh approach that emphasizes restraint in the use of force, cultural sensitivity and a public message that the new troops aren't from the Army, according to an internal Marine document and interviews with top officers.
The working plan for Marines moving into the Sunni Triangle includes more interaction with Iraqis and a premium on respect for peaceable civilians. Marines will be taught a few words of Arabic, counseled on religious etiquette and ordered never to wear sunglasses when talking to Iraqis.
In a tactic reminiscent of the U.S. presence in Vietnam, platoons of Marines will live among the people in many Sunni towns and villages to facilitate training of the Iraqi police and civil defense forces, according to the document. To emphasize to Iraqis that the Marines arriving in Fallujah and other centers of resistance are a new crowd, the Marines are considering wearing green camouflage uniforms for their initial 45 days of patrolling instead of the dessert cammies worn by the Army.
Army officers and other military professionals who have seen the document summarizing the Marines' approach viewed it as an implicit criticism of the Army's tactics and results in the Sunni heartland west of Baghdad. Some called it unfair and ill-advised second-guessing. But others viewed it as a constructive attempt to learn from the hardships and mistakes of the Army in western Iraq, historically Saddam Hussein's power center and more recently the hub of the resistance that has hobbled U.S. efforts to rebuild the country.
Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, the commander of the Marine Corps force scheduled to deploy soon to Iraq, said in a telephone interview that he doesn't see the Marine approach as a criticism of the Army. Rather, he said, the planning document reflects intense discussions and "the free competition of ideas in the world." The document was a summary of points made at a two-day Marine planning session last month in California.
"We don't see any difference in our appreciation of the situation from the 82nd Airborne," he said, referring to the Army paratroop division now in the area that the Marines will move into. "We believe very strongly that the 82nd Airborne has it right, not only in the estimate of the situation but also in their concept of operations and in their tactics."
But, speaking on the condition of anonymity, other Marine officers criticized the Army approach.
"I'm appalled at the current heavy-handed use of air [strikes] and artillery in Iraq," one said. "Success in a counterinsurgency environment is based on winning popular support, not blowing up people's houses."
Mattis, commander of the 1st Marine Division, based at Camp Pendleton, Calif., said he intends to pursue a two-track effort. One track will be aimed at capturing or killing what Mattis considers to be a small minority who are determined to fight the U.S. presence. He said he would employ some novel and aggressive tactics. At Mattis's request, The Washington Post is not printing information about those tactics.
The other track, he said, focuses on diminishing support for the resistance among the populace in western Iraq.
Among other things, Mattis plans to revive the Vietnam War's Combined Action Platoons (CAPs), small Marine units that lived among villagers and helped train them to defend themselves. The notes from the Marine planning conference state, "Idea is that this Platoon, similar to Vietnam, will live and work with Police and ICDC," a reference to the new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps that the U.S. occupation authority is creating to conduct some security functions.
These small units resemble an armed version of the Peace Corps, with training in such areas as cultural sensitivities and night patrolling. Details about how to use them are still being worked out and are likely to vary from town to town, one Marine officer said.
Retired Army Col. Harry G. Summers Jr., a historian of the Vietnam War, wrote that the CAP program represented a major difference between the Marine and Army approaches in Vietnam. While the Army tended to emphasize "search and destroy" operations in which they swept through an area and moved on, he wrote, the Marines settled on "clear and hold" operations in which CAPs stayed on land they held. CAPs are widely seen by historians as "one of the few success stories in Vietnam," noted John Miller, who fought in the war and wrote a book about it.
Marine officers said they are also aiming for more restraint in the use of force and intend to limit the use of heavy weapons, using bombs and weapons as a last resort. That contrasts with Army operations, in which airstrikes and artillery were sometimes used to intimidate at the outset of confrontations.
The Sunni Triangle, the parts of the Tigris and Euphrates valley north and west of Baghdad, has been where most attacks on U.S. troops have occurred over the past six months. The 4th Infantry Division, headquartered in Tikrit, has occupied its northern part. The 82nd Airborne now operates in its western section.
Some officers in both the Marines and the Army argue that the U.S. occupation there got off to a terrible start in April when several U.S. units moved through Fallujah.
At the end of that month, an Iraqi mob clashed with Army troops, resulting in shooting that killed 13 Iraqis and wounded scores more.
The western part of the Sunni Triangle is seen by many in the Army as the toughest ground in Iraq. Indeed, some Army officers who were interviewed expressed concern that any conciliatory Marine tactics would fail in the face of car bombings and armed mobs.
Retired Army Col. Lloyd Matthews said he found the Marine discussions somewhat distasteful. "It is hardly advisable in joint operations to denigrate the tactics of the sister service that preceded you in the trenches and to suggest that you are going to do a lot better," he said.
Matthews, a former editor of Parameters, the Army's premier professional journal, was also skeptical about whether the Marine CAP program would be viable in the hostile Sunni Triangle environment. "CAPs work only when they operate in a broadly secure environment," he said.
Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., commander for operations in the area the Marines will move into, declined to comment on the Marines' plan. But in a Baghdad news conference yesterday, Swannack, commander of the 82nd Airborne, said his soldiers "have turned the corner. . . . We're on a glidepath toward success as attacks against . . . [82nd Airborne] forces have decreased almost 60 percent" in a month.
Some Army officers in Iraq said the Marines' plan shows they are simply trying to capitalize on lessons learned in Iraq.
"I like the Marine approach, and I think it'll succeed," said Army Lt. Col. David J. Poirier, military police commander in Tikrit. "I love our Army, and I will not criticize it, but war is not free of mistakes, and I believe that some of the insurgency is due to families acting out against American forces for deaths occurring as a result of collateral damage."