fantassin
01-08-2004, 07:04 AM
MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA: Iraq report undermines Bush doctrine
By Stephen Fidler in London
Financial Times; Jan 08, 2004
Intelligence failures in the run-up to war with Iraq and evidence that US intelligence bowed to political pressures in assessing the threat posed by Iraq undermine a critical element of the Bush administration's national security doctrine, according to a report to be published today by a Washington think-tank.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that the US intelligence structure cannot sustain the doctrine of pre-emptive war as outlined in the administration's 2002 National Security Strategy document.
The doctrine places heavy reliance on strong intelligence that a future threat exists. But in the case of Iraq, US intelligence was clearly unable to provide accurate information necessary for reliably acting in the absence of an obvious imminent threat.
The Carnegie report recommends that the doctrine that attempts to justify the US going to war unilaterally in the absence of an immediate threat should be eliminated.
It calls for a top-level bipartisan committee to be convened to examine the intelligence record. If it confirmed the politicisation of intelligence suggested by the Carnegie study, Congress should consider professionalising the post of Director of Central Intelligence, perhaps along the lines of the chairman of the Federal Reserve, who, once nominated and confirmed by the Senate, cannot be removed from office by the administration during his fixed term.
The report says that the National Security Strategy's dismissal of the suggestion that "rogue states" can be influenced by deterrence should be re-examined in the light of the evidence from Iraq. On the contrary, it said the evidence showed that the constraints provided by the pre-war policy of sanctions, weapons inspectors and military action did work to stop the effective development of Iraqi weapons programmes.
An article in yesterday's Washington Post provides some support of this position.
It describes nascent efforts to develop long-range missiles and to develop viruses, but neither of these appear to have left the drawing board. The evidence suggests there was no reconstituted nuclear programme, as alleged by vice-president **** Cheney in August 2002, when he said: "We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons."
It provides new evidence to support the theory that western intelligence and United Nations inspectors were told the real extent of Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction back in 1995 by the most senior defector from Iraq during the 1990s - General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law. Gen Kamel defected in 1995 and was killed when he returned to Iraq.
Intelligence agencies assumed Gen Kamel had held information back when speaking to his debriefers. But a six-page letter found since the war - from the head of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, Hossam Amin, to the president's son, Qusay - suggest he told all, the Post said. Moreover, the letter says that Iraq destroyed its entire stock of biological weapons in 1991.
The article also suggests a possible explanation of why, despite a lack of success with weapons programmes, Saddam Hussein refused to yield to weapons inspectors and why western intelligence agencies continued to believe Iraq harboured such weapons. Defectors arriving in the west in the late 1990s may have distorted the picture significantly, but the article suggests the Iraqi leader was also being deceived by his scientists about the state of the programmes.
At the same time there were efforts to deceive Iraq's neighbours. "My operating hypothesis has been that Saddam Hussein was focused on the region and on how he would look to his regional rivals," said Joseph Cirincione, head of the Carnegie's non-proliferation project.
By Stephen Fidler in London
Financial Times; Jan 08, 2004
Intelligence failures in the run-up to war with Iraq and evidence that US intelligence bowed to political pressures in assessing the threat posed by Iraq undermine a critical element of the Bush administration's national security doctrine, according to a report to be published today by a Washington think-tank.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that the US intelligence structure cannot sustain the doctrine of pre-emptive war as outlined in the administration's 2002 National Security Strategy document.
The doctrine places heavy reliance on strong intelligence that a future threat exists. But in the case of Iraq, US intelligence was clearly unable to provide accurate information necessary for reliably acting in the absence of an obvious imminent threat.
The Carnegie report recommends that the doctrine that attempts to justify the US going to war unilaterally in the absence of an immediate threat should be eliminated.
It calls for a top-level bipartisan committee to be convened to examine the intelligence record. If it confirmed the politicisation of intelligence suggested by the Carnegie study, Congress should consider professionalising the post of Director of Central Intelligence, perhaps along the lines of the chairman of the Federal Reserve, who, once nominated and confirmed by the Senate, cannot be removed from office by the administration during his fixed term.
The report says that the National Security Strategy's dismissal of the suggestion that "rogue states" can be influenced by deterrence should be re-examined in the light of the evidence from Iraq. On the contrary, it said the evidence showed that the constraints provided by the pre-war policy of sanctions, weapons inspectors and military action did work to stop the effective development of Iraqi weapons programmes.
An article in yesterday's Washington Post provides some support of this position.
It describes nascent efforts to develop long-range missiles and to develop viruses, but neither of these appear to have left the drawing board. The evidence suggests there was no reconstituted nuclear programme, as alleged by vice-president **** Cheney in August 2002, when he said: "We now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons."
It provides new evidence to support the theory that western intelligence and United Nations inspectors were told the real extent of Iraq's programmes of weapons of mass destruction back in 1995 by the most senior defector from Iraq during the 1990s - General Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein's son-in-law. Gen Kamel defected in 1995 and was killed when he returned to Iraq.
Intelligence agencies assumed Gen Kamel had held information back when speaking to his debriefers. But a six-page letter found since the war - from the head of Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate, Hossam Amin, to the president's son, Qusay - suggest he told all, the Post said. Moreover, the letter says that Iraq destroyed its entire stock of biological weapons in 1991.
The article also suggests a possible explanation of why, despite a lack of success with weapons programmes, Saddam Hussein refused to yield to weapons inspectors and why western intelligence agencies continued to believe Iraq harboured such weapons. Defectors arriving in the west in the late 1990s may have distorted the picture significantly, but the article suggests the Iraqi leader was also being deceived by his scientists about the state of the programmes.
At the same time there were efforts to deceive Iraq's neighbours. "My operating hypothesis has been that Saddam Hussein was focused on the region and on how he would look to his regional rivals," said Joseph Cirincione, head of the Carnegie's non-proliferation project.