Tim Nice But Dim
08-05-2005, 08:05 AM
Reinventing the Counterinsurgency Wheel (http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/jul05/strickland-jul05.htm)
Maj Adam Strickland, USMCR
Just as early philosophers sought answers to questions concerning the essence of life, for over two thousand years military strategists and theorists have sought answers to the most basic questions on warfare. To this end, men such as Sun Tzu in the 4th Century B.C.E. with The Art of War, and General Carl Von Clausewitz in the 19th Century A.C.E. with On War completed works that remain the standards by which all military thought emanates and is compared, and from which nearly every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine are taught. Similarly, men such as General Sir Frank Kitson[1], Sir Robert Thompson[2], Ernesto Guevara[3], and Chairman Mao Zedong[4] each completed seminal works on insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 1930s, 60s and 70s that should be utilized in the same manner and with the same respect as Clausewitz; however, receive little attention from military theorists and concept writers today. As the military struggles with the application of limited resources against a seemingly endless demand for troops and leaders prepared for the rigors of counterinsurgency operations, countless persons have been tasked to investigate the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) as the military services struggle to produce new COIN doctrine[5] for our troops engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as no one would dare assert that they could articulate conventional military theory better than Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, no one should assume that any document produced will be more helpful or well-articulated than those already available by Thompson, Kitson, etc. on insurgency and counterinsurgency, and thus cease all efforts to reinvent the wheel and needlessly expend limited resources...
Maj Adam Strickland, USMCR
Just as early philosophers sought answers to questions concerning the essence of life, for over two thousand years military strategists and theorists have sought answers to the most basic questions on warfare. To this end, men such as Sun Tzu in the 4th Century B.C.E. with The Art of War, and General Carl Von Clausewitz in the 19th Century A.C.E. with On War completed works that remain the standards by which all military thought emanates and is compared, and from which nearly every soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine are taught. Similarly, men such as General Sir Frank Kitson[1], Sir Robert Thompson[2], Ernesto Guevara[3], and Chairman Mao Zedong[4] each completed seminal works on insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 1930s, 60s and 70s that should be utilized in the same manner and with the same respect as Clausewitz; however, receive little attention from military theorists and concept writers today. As the military struggles with the application of limited resources against a seemingly endless demand for troops and leaders prepared for the rigors of counterinsurgency operations, countless persons have been tasked to investigate the fundamentals of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) as the military services struggle to produce new COIN doctrine[5] for our troops engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Just as no one would dare assert that they could articulate conventional military theory better than Sun Tzu or Clausewitz, no one should assume that any document produced will be more helpful or well-articulated than those already available by Thompson, Kitson, etc. on insurgency and counterinsurgency, and thus cease all efforts to reinvent the wheel and needlessly expend limited resources...