Oddball
08-22-2005, 03:38 PM
Western Air Command and the Japanese Balloon Campaign
by Major Mathias Joost
Introduction
The Second World War witnessed the creation and implementation of many unusual weapons by both sides. The Japanese balloon campaign of December 1944 to April 1945, launched against the western part of North America, continues to hold fascination for many people. Yet, the official Canadian military reaction to the balloons has not been studied. The characteristics of balloons and the American response to these threats have been covered in a number of US publications, while Canadian publications have merely focused upon either the number of balloons shot down or the nature of their construction.
It is perhaps at the operational level that the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) response to the threat is most interesting. Caught between tactical requirements, coordinating operations with the other services on the west coast, and responding to the orders of Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ), Western Air Command (WAC) reacted overall in an effective manner, albeit sometimes in a highly original fashion.
This Command had numerous concerns with respect to the balloons, including the gathering of intelligence about them, since understanding the nature of the threat could better enable development of effective countering actions. It was initially believed that they had been designed to start forest fires, or that they posed a biological hazard threat, designed to either threaten humans or livestock.
Secondly, there was the issue of detecting and reporting the balloons, and then managing the response. Related to this were questions as to whether civilian pilots should be informed, and how could WAC ensure the accuracy both of balloon reports received and then of reports sent to higher headquarters. Thirdly, WAC’s actions had to conform, not only to the directives and requirements of AFHQ, but to the needs of the regional Joint Service Committee (JSC), the committee composed of representatives of the three services on the west coast and mandated to coordinate matters of common concern.
Of all the concerns, that of the WAC’s relationship with the other Pacific-based forces is perhaps the most important. The Command could not operate in isolation, thereby ensuring that its actions would have an impact on the other services on the west coast. Therefore, how WAC reacted to the balloon threat from its earliest period is of great interest.
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol6/no2/08-History2_e.asp
by Major Mathias Joost
Introduction
The Second World War witnessed the creation and implementation of many unusual weapons by both sides. The Japanese balloon campaign of December 1944 to April 1945, launched against the western part of North America, continues to hold fascination for many people. Yet, the official Canadian military reaction to the balloons has not been studied. The characteristics of balloons and the American response to these threats have been covered in a number of US publications, while Canadian publications have merely focused upon either the number of balloons shot down or the nature of their construction.
It is perhaps at the operational level that the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) response to the threat is most interesting. Caught between tactical requirements, coordinating operations with the other services on the west coast, and responding to the orders of Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ), Western Air Command (WAC) reacted overall in an effective manner, albeit sometimes in a highly original fashion.
This Command had numerous concerns with respect to the balloons, including the gathering of intelligence about them, since understanding the nature of the threat could better enable development of effective countering actions. It was initially believed that they had been designed to start forest fires, or that they posed a biological hazard threat, designed to either threaten humans or livestock.
Secondly, there was the issue of detecting and reporting the balloons, and then managing the response. Related to this were questions as to whether civilian pilots should be informed, and how could WAC ensure the accuracy both of balloon reports received and then of reports sent to higher headquarters. Thirdly, WAC’s actions had to conform, not only to the directives and requirements of AFHQ, but to the needs of the regional Joint Service Committee (JSC), the committee composed of representatives of the three services on the west coast and mandated to coordinate matters of common concern.
Of all the concerns, that of the WAC’s relationship with the other Pacific-based forces is perhaps the most important. The Command could not operate in isolation, thereby ensuring that its actions would have an impact on the other services on the west coast. Therefore, how WAC reacted to the balloon threat from its earliest period is of great interest.
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol6/no2/08-History2_e.asp