USSR's Great Patriotic War (WWII) - amazing flash website

[Igor01]

Possibly the best Russian online multimedia resource on WWII - now in English!

Today, the Internet allows us to tell the old story in a new way, to put in plain words what this war represented for our grandfathers. By using a multimedia map of the war, we attempted to combine historic facts with archival materials and personal accounts shared with us in recent times, without any bias or judgment. We strived not only to present a coherent picture of the events, but also to instigate a dialogue between generations – remember, the personal accounts included in this project are but a tiny part of what the veterans can tell us.

LINK (http://english.pobediteli.ru/)

[Telnyashka]

AWESOME!

[Lokos]

I see you've posted the English version of the Russian flash site I posted a long time ago.

;)

Lokos

[Igor01]

Yeah, the Russian version was online since April, and I knew the site's creators were working on the English translation. The English version just went live on Sep. 2.

I hope they make the Engish site available for download and convenient offline viewing like they did with the original Russian one.

[Belrick]

I find some of hard to stomach. Its a great thing to recognise that the veterans of the GPW played the major part in defeating Hitler but you have to remember they also played the role of subjugating half of europe and proping up the evil regime of Stalin.

[suvorov]

Thank you Igor01!It's great to see the very few flash works dedicated to the Russian contributions.

[Telnyashka]

I find some of hard to stomach. Its a great thing to recognise that the veterans of the GPW played the major part in defeating Hitler but you have to remember they also played the role of subjugating half of europe and proping up the evil regime of Stalin.

I find it hard to stomach the agent orange bombing of Vietnam.

[Kitsune]

Simply watch it and enjoy. And afterwards, to restore the balance, do this:

http://www.bcaplan.com/cgi/museum1.cgi











(Stalinists be warned: this website may be bad for your blood pressure).

[Telnyashka]

Simply watch it and enjoy. And afterwards, to restore the balance, do this:

http://www.bcaplan.com/cgi/museum1.cgi











(Stalinists be warned: this website may be bad for your blood pressure).

wow morons way to hijack a perfectly good thread with your rhetoric left over cold war anti soviet union crap.

get over it, USSR was an enemy then, so shut the **** up alkready jesus...

[Belrick]

Poor widdle soviets. Fancy giving the butchers and oppressors of millions grief. Tsk tsk, shame on us.
To punish us please choose one of the following:

A: Deny us basic consumer goods as your economies so cr@p you cant make anything.
B: Take away our rights as members of a sovereign nation and enforce your will upon us by force of arms.
C: Make us disappear along with any family member or neighbour that mentions our disappearance.

[Son_Of_Suvorov]

Simply watch it and enjoy. And afterwards, to restore the balance, do this:

http://www.bcaplan.com/cgi/museum1.cgi

Cool! I got 37.5%. That Ayn Rand quote at the end really helped the authenticity! I guess I was wrong all along about the irresponsible, sensationalist historically revisionist accounts by self-serving "western" historians with an agenda to sell books! Thank you for enlightening me!

[Lokos]

Poor widdle soviets. Fancy giving the butchers and oppressors of millions grief.

Do not hijack this thread with your rubbish.

Lokos

[Smok]

Funny. Why that war starts in 1941? It is easier not to say about backstabbing Poland on 17 IX 1939 or attacking Finland?

[Igor01]

Funny. Why that war starts in 1941? It is easier not to say about backstabbing Poland on 17 IX 1939 or attacking Finland?

Why not look even further back and say that 1938 annexation of Chechoslovakia (which Poland didn't mind taking part in) was the starting point?

Why also not examine the events of the late 1930's when Poland was screwd by the arrogant and shortsighted policies of her government? Why not reminisce on the call for "Push to Kaunas!" and the war preparations against Lithuania that effectively screwed up any attempts to forge a strong anti-Nazi alliance and save Chechoslovakia? Let's not also forget the political campain for Poland to acquire colonies and Poland-wide religious masses to bless the idea.

Poland is in no position to claim a position of moral superiority and the current attempts to arrogantly teach others how to be "civilized" are quite laughable.

Having said that, I think this thread is better off locked.

[Smok]

Why not look even further back and say that 1938 annexation of Chechoslovakia (which Poland didn't mind taking part in) was the starting point?


Because it was our land which was attacked by Czechs during Polish-Bolsheviks war. So we just took it back.


Why also not examine the events of the late 1930's when Poland was screwd by the arrogant and shortsighted policies of her government? Why not reminisce on the call for "Push to Kaunas!" and the war preparations against Lithuania that effectively screwed up any attempts to forge a strong anti-Nazi alliance and save Chechoslovakia? Let's not also forget the political campain for Poland to acquire colonies and Poland-wide religious masses to bless the idea.


OMG! I didn't know that it is possible to fit so many lies in so short text. War preparation against Lithuania?? You probably heard about Pilsudski's words "War or peace" but you don't understand that.
Alliance with Czechoslovakia? We wanted to made anti-nazi and anti-soviet alliance. Our prime minister Beck told "we can attack Germany when they attack Czechoslovakia". But politicals form Czechoslovakia decided to surrender not to fight.
Colonies? Yes - there were plans to build a colony but noone could find free place on earth for it.


Poland is in no position to claim a position of moral superiority and the current attempts to arrogantly teach others how to be "civilized" are quite laughable.

Having said that, I think this thread is better off locked.

[Igor01]

Why not look even further back and say that 1938 annexation of Chechoslovakia (which Poland didn't mind taking part in) was the starting point?


Because it was our land which was attacked by Czechs during Polish-Bolsheviks war. So we just took it back.

I suppose since this logic works for you to justify the takeover of the Techen area, it would in turn work just as well justifying the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine and Belorussia, after all "it was our land which was attacked by Poles during Polish-Bolsheviks war. So we just took it back."


Why also not examine the events of the late 1930's when Poland was screwd by the arrogant and shortsighted policies of her government? Why not reminisce on the call for "Push to Kaunas!" and the war preparations against Lithuania that effectively screwed up any attempts to forge a strong anti-Nazi alliance and save Chechoslovakia? Let's not also forget the political campain for Poland to acquire colonies and Poland-wide religious masses to bless the idea.


OMG! I didn't know that it is possible to fit so many lies in so short text. War preparation against Lithuania?? You probably heard about Pilsudski's words "War or peace" but you don't understand that.
Alliance with Czechoslovakia? We wanted to made anti-nazi and anti-soviet alliance. Our prime minister Beck told "we can attack Germany when they attack Czechoslovakia". But politicals form Czechoslovakia decided to surrender not to fight.
Colonies? Yes - there were plans to build a colony but noone could find free place on earth for it.



Still unwilling to admit that Poland contributed greatly to the events that unleased the WWII?

Polish ambassador about his talk to the French foreign minister:

"I noted that... I remember the unheard-of behaviour of the French diplomacy during the resolution of this vitally important problem for Poland. We also remember well the impression that in that important for Poland moment France not only didn't side with us, but on the contrary, neglecting our interests was more concerned about the question of allowing passages to Soviet troops in the case of a war with Germany. In this situation any new attacks by the French press would be more than undesirable.

At this point the French foreign minister attempted to assure me that France would still recommend to Lithuania to make peace with us, to which I replied that I did not want to begin a discussion on that topic, because this would have been to difficult and and that I would have liked to forget about this instead."

What he's saying is that Poland's government didn't care about the fact that Germany was rising and beginning her conquest of Europe, all they wanted was a land grab in Lithuania (there was already a hysterical press campaign in Poland calling for a crusade on Kaunas) using the fact that the great powers were busy with containing Germany. when the French tried to reason with the Poles, they didn't even want to talk about it.

When in 1938 Poland began concentrating troops near the Chechoslovakian border, USSR told Warsaw that it was prepared to afford Chechoslovakia protection against a Polish invasion. The Poles didn't go to the French or the English to complain but instead straight to the Germans.

Polish ambassador's to Berlin report about his meetings with Ribbentrop, von Moltke and Goering in October of 1938:

"In the event of Polish-Chechoslovakian armed conflict the government of Germany will keep it's friendly stance towards Poland. In the event of Polish-Soviet conflict the government of Germany will assume more than a friendly stance towards Poland. He (von Moltke) clearly indicated that the government of Germany will afford us assistance.

Then I was invited to meet with general-fieldmarshall Goering.. and he specifically emphasized that in the event of Soviet-Polish conflict the Polish government can count on the assistance from German government. It is absolutely inconcievable that Reich would not help Poland in her struggle with the Soviets.

In the afternoon Ribbentrop informed me that the Chaunceller (Hitler) today during breakfast ... gave a favorable remark about Poland's policy.

I must note that our actions were accepted here as a sign of strength and independence, which is an unbreakable guarantee of our good relations with the government of the Reich. "

Ribbentrop about his consulations with Beck (Polish foreign minister) in early 1939:

January 6, 1939, Warsaw.

I asked Beck whether they (the Polish government) have given up on the aspirations of Marshall Pilsudsky towards Ukraine. He answered, smilingly, that they have already been in Kiev once and that without a doubt such aspirations are still alive today.

Then I thanked Mister Beck for his invitation to visit Warsaw. The date has not been set yet. We've agreed that I and Mister Beck will yet again think through all the detals of the prospective treaty between us and Poland"

January 26, 1939, Warsaw.

... Then I spoke to mister Beck again regarding the policy of Poland and Germany towards the Soviet Union and in this relation about the question of Greater Ukraine; I again offered cooperation between Poland and and Germany in this respect.

Mister Beck admitted that Poland has aspirations regarding Soviet Ukraine and access to the Black see, he also pointed out to the dangers that a treaty between Poland and Germany directed against the Soviet Union would bring about. However, he, while speaking on the future of the Soviet Union, expressed an opinion that USSR will either fall apart as a result of an internal desintegration or, to avoid such an outcome, would gather its forces and strike first.

I pointed out to Mister Beck on the passive nature of his position and also stated that it would be reasonable to preempt the outcome that he is foretelling and attack the Soviet Union with a propaganda war. In my opnion, as I said, joining the Ani-Comintern pact Poland would gain since her security would be strengthened by getting in the same boat with us.

Mister Beck said that he will seriously consider this proposal."

When the masks came off and it was clear that Poland became the next target for the Nazis, the French suggested that Poland and France include USSR in the defence treaty so that Poland would allow the Soviet troops a narrow corridor in case of a war so the Soviets can help the French and the Poles repel the German invasion.

The Poles rejected the offer categorically. The reason was simple: the Poles believed that Germans were bluffing that they would not have the guts to attack Poland who would have time for mobilization while she was allied with France and Great Britain. After this the Germans would have no choice but to attack the USSR through the Baltics and Romania.

The US ambassador to France reported to his government about the French Prime Minister's posistion on August 18, 1939 (my translation):

"He considers it highly unreasonable on the part of the Poles to reject the Russian offer of military assistance. He realized that the Polish do not want Red Army to enter Polish territory, however as soon as German armies invade, the Polish government should be happy to receive assistance from anybody who can offer it.

He would be happy to send two French divisions to Poland and is convincned that it would be possible to get a British division for Poland so that the support wouldn't be exclusively Russian but International.

Moreover, he can receive from the Soviet government the most absolute guarantees regarding their evacuation from the Polish territory, and Franc and Great Britain would provide absolute assurance for these guarantees."

As you can see it must have been more than just the fear of Soviet occupation since France and Britain would guarantee this wouldn't happen. The real reason was to try to direct the German push towards USSR through the Baltics and Romania and when according to the Polish plans the USSR would collapse, it was aspiring to, just like you said, "creating a federation or a confederation of Polish, Belarusian and Ukrainian states".

The Poles held the keys to their own security and the French tried to urge them in the strongest possible terms to accept Russian help even after the Soviet-German treaty was signed so that it would help to transform the spirit and the letter of the treaty.

French Foreign Minister on August 22, 1939 asks the French ambassador to Warsaw to "attempt in the most urgent manner to convince Rydz-Smigly to eliminate the last remaining obstacle that is blocking a signing of three-sided treaty in Moscow.

Please insist specifically on this, emphasising in the strongest terms possible that Poland does not have neither moral no political right to refuse this last attempt to save the peace.

In conclusion, firmly remind, that France, that always was friendly towards Poland, provided significant credits, sent military materiel, afforded every kind of assistance, now has the right to demand from Poland to consider all the graveness of a refusal."

Rydz-Smigly considered and... well we all know what happened then. Cry me a river now lamenting how Poland was "abandoned" and backstabbed, help was offered many times and the Polish government had every opportunity to save their country and peace in Europe.

My point: the Polish government aspired to use the newly emering European crisis (which they wholeheartedly helped create) to their own gain, they've deliberately blocked all efforts to not allow the partition of Chechoslovakia, they've gladly participated in the annexation themselves together with Nazis, they've aspired to take back Kaunas (while the big boys are busy with Hitler and Austria) and planned to grab Ukraine and gain Black Sea access as the spoils of war between Germany and USSR.

After the war broke out and Poland ceased to exist as a country and was being prepared for extermination as a nation according to the German Generalplan Ost. The Soviets sacrificed 600.000 lives to kick the Germans out of Poland which saved the country and her people from becoming nothing but a mention in some history books, so please have some respect and keep your lamenting about 1939 to yourself.

[Lokos]

I don't understand the attitude of Poles in regards to the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland in September 1939. By the time the Soviets struck (17th), the fall of Poland was a foregone conclusion. Stalin made a political decision and carried it through. What is so difficult to fathom? In order to have 'backstabbed' you, the Soviets first had to have been in a position of trust. At what point the Polish government trusted the Soviet leadership or even made attempts at cordial relations is currently unknown to me.

Poland and the Soviet Union were enemies. How can you be backstabbed by an enemy?

Lokos

[Drako]

I don't understand the attitude of Poles in regards to the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland in September 1939. By the time the Soviets struck (17th), the fall of Poland was a foregone conclusion. Stalin made a political decision and carried it through. What is so difficult to fathom? In order to have 'backstabbed' you, the Soviets first had to have been in a position of trust. At what point the Polish government trusted the Soviet leadership or even made attempts at cordial relations is currently unknown to me.

Poland and the Soviet Union were enemies. How can you be backstabbed by an enemy?

Lokos

Don't want to be involved in any rants again, but we had a non-aggression pact with USSR. Now I'm outta here.

[Rafal Sawicki]

Hello!

I don't understand the attitude of Poles in regards to the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland in September 1939. By the time the Soviets struck (17th), the fall of Poland was a foregone conclusion.

First of all, the fall of Poland was a result of nazi-soviet pact.

Stalin made a political decision and carried it through. What is so difficult to fathom? In order to have 'backstabbed' you, the Soviets first had to have been in a position of trust. At what point the Polish government trusted the Soviet leadership or even made attempts at cordial relations is currently unknown to me.

Maybe because it was hard to believe, why such an antinazi country like USSR was able to support the nazi efforts to conquest Europe? Off course, these two totalitarian regimes were quite similiar, so their "marriage" should be expected...

[Kitsune]

@Lokos:

Point is that Hitler would not have attacked Poland in the first place if not for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. That (quite understandably) made him believe that France and Britain would do nothing (since the only fair reaction would have been a declaration of war against both, Germany and the Sovietunion, which they simply could not afford to do).
This encouragement from Stalins side seems to have been quite deliberate, since any war in Europe was highly likely to be advantageous for the Sovietunion.
So Stalin contributed to the outbreak of the war. That Poland was not that innocent vitcim as which some seem to portray it, but a nation with quite some power aspirations itself is another matter of course.

:|

[Igor01]

Don't want to be involved in any rants again, but we had a non-aggression pact with USSR. Now I'm outta here.

Poland had a 1925 treaty with Chechoslovakia but readily threw it away in 1938, so what's your point?

[Igor01]

@Kitsune:

No doubt, the German-Soviet non-agression treaty allowed Hitler to make a move in Poland, however the treaty didn't come out of nowhere. The West was conducting a decidedly unfriendly policy towards the USSR and preferred to see Hitler push into the Soviet Union rather than enter into defence alliances with the Soviets.

[the following is from this article (http://washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050410-020719-1127r.htm)

Did the Soviet Union have an alternative to signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939? Yes, it did, if only the Western democrats had left it a choice. There was a chance to stop the Nazi expansion even after the Munich 1938 collusion of British and French leaders with Hitler. Why was it missed?

Here is what Western sources say. On May 16, 1939, the British Cabinet discussed the memorandum of the British Chiefs of Staff, which said that the agreement on mutual assistance with France and the Soviet Union would constitute a solid front of substantial strength against aggression. The absence of such an agreement would amount to a diplomatic defeat, with serious military consequences. If Britain, rejecting an alliance with Russia, pushed it towards striking a deal with Germany, it would make a gross mistake of vital significance.

But Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax believed that political arguments against an agreement with the Soviet Union outweighed military considerations in favor of it. The stand of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was even more categorical: He would sooner resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets.

During sessions that day and later, the cabinet decided to maintain a semblance of contacts with Moscow so as to prevent Russia from establishing any ties with Germany. If the logic of events forced Britain to enter into a commitment, the cabinet should be ready not to honor it. "We must ensure ourselves a free hand, so as to be able to tell Russia that we are not obliged to enter in the war because we do not accept its interpretation of the facts," said Lord Chancellor John Simon.

Adm. Sir Reginald Drax, head of the British delegation at the military talks in Moscow in August 1939, received instructions to the effect that the British government "is unwilling to enter into any detailed commitments which are likely to tie our hands in all circumstances."

Here are two facts that will clarify the situation. The Soviet government knew about discussions in the British corridors of power and Chamberlain's attempts to find a modus vivendi with Hitler. Both London and Moscow knew that Hitler issued a directive in April 1939 that said that the war against Poland should begin not later than on Sept. 1.

How should the Soviet leadership have reacted to the British intrigues? Britain and France already had non-aggression agreements with Germany: Could the Soviet Union have rejected the non-aggression pact offered to it by Germany in that situation?

French Ambassador in Moscow P.E. Naggiar wrote in an Aug. 5, 1939, telegram to Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet that the blame for the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks and the Soviet Union's rapprochement with Germany lay on the Western powers and Poland.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, overhauled the picture of World War II. Shortly before the fateful day, London and Washington were discussing their possible reaction. The British expected to win, without depleting British reserves to come to the Soviets' assistance, about eight weeks for preparing to repel the Germans' landings on the British Isles.

The U.S. State Department (Secretary of State Cordell Hull Directive, June 14, 1941) prohibited any attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet government and urged caution regarding any steps the Soviet government might take toward the United States. British criticism led to changes in the directive's wording, which was formalized by June 21, 1941 in the following form: "We must not make promises, and must avoid any commitments regarding our future policy in respect of the Soviet Union or Russia. Above all, we must not make any agreements that might later create the impression that we did not do our best if the Soviet Government were to leave the country in case of defeat and we did not recognize the Soviet Government in exile or refused to recognize the Soviet Ambassador in Washington as the representative of Russia."

But the statement made by Democratic Sen. Harry S. Truman of Missouri (New York Times, June 24, 1941) was even more cynical: "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible."

Truman had many supporters. On June 29, 1941, former President Herbert Hoover spoke of inexpediency of hurrying to enter the war. According to him, it would be better to wait until the end, when the other nations would be sufficiently exhausted to surrender to the military, economic, and moral might of the United States.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially assumed a wait-and-see stand. The State Department, the country's generals, and the intelligence community assured him that the Soviet Union would not last more than four to-12 weeks, and America should rapidly strengthen its military positions before Germany extricated itself from the Russian bog. At a June 24, 1941 press conference, Roosevelt promised nothing more than to provide all possible assistance to Russia. It appears that he thought sufficient the statement made by Winston Churchill on June 22, 1941, when the British prime minister spoke of his intention to "give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people" because the danger facing Russia is "therefore our danger and the danger of the United States."

At first, the Allies limited their assistance to a political and psychological handshake. The Soviet-British agreement on joint action in the war against Germany signed on July 12, 1941, did not greatly improve the situation.

A Soviet military mission led by Gen. Filipp Golikov was sent to London to coordinate the efforts of the two powers in the common war. The Foreign Office instructed the chiefs of staff to show a cordial attitude to the Russians, entertaining the mission members in order to create an atmosphere of friendship, yet avoiding discussions of the essence of the problem.

These positions of the Western democracies was sharply criticized in the United States and Britain, including by former British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George, Lord Beaverbrook, Sir Stafford Cripps and the American military. The generals tried to convince FDR in 1941 that a second front should be opened without delay, not so much to help the Soviets as to defeat Germany, exploiting the fact that Hitler had moved almost all of his forces to the East, thereby exposing the Atlantic coast from the North Cape to the Pyrenees. But at that time the argument was purely hypothetical, as the United States had not yet entered the war.

No serious researcher will read into the policies of Roosevelt and Churchill the intention to complicate the Soviet Union's difficult situation in 1941. The top leaders of the United States and Britain simply did not believe that the Soviet Union would survive, and hence abstained from investing in their partner in the anti-Nazi struggle.

From early September and until the winter of 1941, Churchill did not rule out the possibility of making a separate peace with Germany, arguing that a public statement had been made that no talks would be held with Hitler or the Nazi regime. ... But it would be going too far to say that we would not negotiate with Germany controlled by its army, the British prime minister went on to say. It is impossible to predict what kind of government may come to power in Germany when its resistance is weakened and it is forced to negotiate.

The United States and Britain were biding their time until the Red Army launched a counter-offensive outside Moscow. In October 1941, they presumed that the Soviet Union would have to wage a war on two fronts. Roosevelt wrote to Churchill on Oct. 15, 1941, that he thought the Japanese were moving north, thereby giving the two countries two months' respite in the Far East.

On Oct. 16, Adm. Harold Stark wrote to Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, that a war between Japan and the Soviet Union was highly probable.

Life taught the two countries a lesson, though the White House did not immediately review its military and political decisions after Pearl Harbor. Prominent U.S. historian Maurice Matloff wrote that absolutely nothing was done until the fall of 1943 to directly coordinate the Western strategy and plans with the plans of the Soviet Union.

The defeat of the Germans outside Moscow in winter of 1941-1942 buried the doctrine with which Hitler had begun the war for global domination. After that, ending the war on acceptable conditions for Germany could be ensured only by political, and not by military methods, the Nazi leader admitted. Had the Western Allies supported the Soviet Union's military efforts by opening a second front in Europe in spring, summer or fall 1942, Berlin would have surrendered by Christmas.

Did the United States and Britain have the necessary reserves for a landing? The answer was provided by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who wrote in a memo of March 25: "The main goal of our first major offensive must be Germany, which should be attacked in the West." The general tried to prove that there were all the prerequisites required for this. He convinced President Roosevelt of the acceptability of his plan and the need to enlist the cooperation of London.

Roosevelt admitted during talks with Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov in Washington that "creating a second front in Europe in 1942" was "an urgent task." The agreement was sealed in a joint communiqué.

But the president clearly underestimated the iron grip of Churchill. Unable to make the Soviet Union the priority partner, Roosevelt yielded to Churchill's plan of landing not in Normandy but in North Africa, disregarding the opinion of his generals. Eisenhower said the day when Roosevelt changed plans from Europe to Africa was the grimmest day in history.

There are different explanations as to why the American leader sided with Churchill. In September 1942, even the Soviet leaders were not sure that the Red Army would overpower the Wehrmacht. So, we can understand the pessimism in London and Washington. The Battle of Stalingrad (August, 1942-February, 1943) became the touchstone not only for Japan and Turkey, which had been preparing to attack the Soviet Union in case of German success, but also for the Western Allies.

U.S. Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall wrote in his report, "The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific" (1945): "In those hours (1942) Germany and Japan came so close to complete domination of the world that we do not yet realize how thin the thread of Allied survival had been stretched. In good conscience this Nation can take little credit for its part in staving off disaster in those critical days."

Secretary of State Hull agreed with Marshall, writing in his memoirs in 1948 that we should always remember that the Russians' heroic struggle against Germany probably saved the Allies from a separate peace. Such a peace would have humiliated the Allies and opened the door to another Thirty Years War.

The meaning of that separate peace was not disclosed then or now, and it is not clear how the skin of the Russian bear was divided. But what Churchill said in October 1942, before the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, offers food for thought: He called for stopping the barbarians as far to the east as possible.

The Allies missed the chance to rout Germany in 1942. But maybe Stalingrad brought them to their senses? In their joint letter of Jan. 26, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill assured Stalin: "We have decided ... on the operations which are to be undertaken by the Americans and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We believe that these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. ... We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany with a view to achieving an early and decisive victory in the European theater."

Stalin asked his Western partners for information about the planned operations in this area (the opening of a second front in Europe) and the proposed time frame. He received the answer 10 days later: "The timing of this attack (across the English Channel) must, of course, be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that time," the operation in North Africa, and the landing in Sicily and Eastern Mediterranean. They no longer wrote about drawing the Germans away from the Russian front and did not describe 1943 as the year when Germany would be defeated.

In March, the Allies made one more condition -- that "the enemy should weaken sufficiently." And lastly, they informed Moscow in June that the Western powers would provide aviation support in 1943, postponing the opening of the second front until spring 1944 or later. "When signs of Axis weakness become apparent in any quarter, actual attacks and threats of attack will easily and quickly be translated into successful operations," Roosevelt wrote.

Understandably, the task of weakening the enemy "sufficiently" was entrusted to the Soviet Union.

What was happening in the meantime? From 1942, contacts between the secret services of Britain and the United States and influential quarters in Germany became systematic and deep. Churchill's agents met with Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, in France, and the admiral is also rumored to have met with William J. Donovan, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, in Spain and Turkey. They did not discuss the weather, I presume, but ways to contain the Soviet Union within its pre-war borders. In short, they were preparing the ground for cooperation between the Western powers and the Nazi generals who wanted to succeed Hitler.

In the summer of 1943, the OSS studied the possibility and expediency of turning the entire might of the still strong Germany against the Soviet Union (Donovan Memo, Aug. 20, 1943). The British and U.S. chiefs of staff met to discuss if Germans would help Anglo-American troops to enter the territory of Germany so as to repel the Russians. (See paragraph 9 of the protocol on military considerations regarding Russia of the chiefs of staff meeting, kept in the U.S. National Archives.)

In the summer of 1943, the Battle of Kursk was still going on, but the Western Allies were already thinking of dissolving the anti-Hitler coalition and opening not a second front against Nazi Germany but a joint Anglo-American-German front against the Soviet Union. During the Quebec Conference on Aug. 14-24, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill decided to land Allies forces in Normandy (Operation Overlord) and simultaneously to start preparing another operation code-named Rankin.

According to Rankin, groups in Germany that collaborated with the Americans and British would stage a coup, terminate the Western front and help the troops of the Western powers to occupy Germany and all other territories controlled at that time by Germany in the north, west, east and south of Europe. The plan was not carried out, but this is quite another story.

So, could the war in Europe have ended in 1943? I am sure that it could have. But this did not happen because the United States, and especially Britain, wanted to outplay the Soviet Union, not in the war against Nazi Germany but in creating a postwar order. The costs did not worry London and Washington in the least.

It is difficult to calculate how many people died at the front, in concentration camps, and behind the lines in 1944-1945. Auschwitz started working to its full capacity in late 1943-early 1944, and mass executions in Sachenhausen, Buchenwald, Maidanek, Dachau and other death camps began at the same time. Up to 500,000 died in bombing raids on Germany. The total, irreplaceable losses of the Soviet Army amounted to over 4 million in 1943-1945, including about 2.5 million in the last two years of the war. At least 1.5 million Soviet citizens died in occupation as a result of the Germans' "scorched earth" policy. Taken together, procrastination over ending the war cost Europe and other countries 8 million to 10 million human lives.

And one more thing. Hardly had the ink dried on the Yalta Agreements when an attack was launched against the anti-Nazi coalition behind Roosevelt's back in the United States and under the guidance of Churchill in Britain. The British prime minister ordered that the German trophy weapons be kept for a potential war against the Soviet Union. Roosevelt warned his opponents that faithful implementation of the Tehran and Yalta decisions "will determine the fate of the United States, and I think therefore of the world, for generations to come. ... There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict."

Did Churchill heed this warning? Alas, no. In April, and possibly even in late March, he instructed his chiefs of staff to design Operation Unthinkable, which provided for a war against the Soviet Union waged by a new coalition of American, British and Canadian forces, the Polish expeditionary corps, and 10 to 12 Wehrmacht divisions that had been interned by the British and were kept with their weapons in a castle in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark. The war was planned for July 1, 1945. The British declassified documents about these plans in the late 20th century. Before that, they denied the existence of such plans as shameless Soviet propaganda.

Winston Churchill's career did not have an honorable conclusion. Operation Unthinkable contradicted the desire of the U.S. military leaders to see the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan in order to force Japan to surrender without shedding too much American blood. This is the only reason why the plan was mothballed.

[Musashi]

Why not look even further back and say that 1938 annexation of Chechoslovakia (which Poland didn't mind taking part in) was the starting point?
Because it was our land which was attacked by Czechs during Polish-Bolsheviks war. So we just took it back.
I suppose since this logic works for you to justify the takeover of the Techen area, it would in turn work just as well justifying the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine and Belorussia, after all "it was our land which was attacked by Poles during Polish-Bolsheviks war. So we just took it back."
Igor, my friend...
could you tell us when Western Ukraine was Russian or Soviet before 1939? Did you learn history or just alternative history? Did not it belong to Austro-Hungary after the partitions of Poland? Please improve your knowledge before you start to write something like that above. It's just a friendly remark, because you are an intelligent man and I like you.
Regarding Belarus... Belarus was a state in union with Poland until Russian tsar decided to partion Poland in 1772-1795. This part of Commonwealth was called "the Grand Duchy of Lithuania", but in fact majority of its people were Belarussians and the official language was Oldbelarussian. These people had equal rights to the Poles and contributed greatly to the wars against Duchy of Moscow.

[Smok]

Igor01

You take only these parts of history which fits your vision of world.
The truth is:
1. On 5 XI 1918 Poland and Czechoslovakia signed pact that some teritorial problems will be solved in diplomatical way and status quo will be remained until diplomatical solution.
2. In the end of 1918 Russia attacked Poland.
3. When Poles were fighting with Russia Czechs broken pact and conquered part of our teritory (26 I 1919) but France demanded that election in that area (if people want to be in Poland or Czechoslovakia). In 1920 that teritory was splited without election.
4. Poland had very bad relations with Lithuania and one day Pilsudski told "War or peace". Lithuania decided to stay in peace and normal diplomatical relations were made.
5. When Hitler became Fuhrer Poland wanted to declare war wit Germany to kick out Hitler. But France didn't want to do it and Poland was to weak to win that war alone.
6. Later - in the end of 30's Poland was trying to make central european military alliance with Czechoslovakia and other countries. But plan wasn't accomplished because of uninteresment of Czechoslovakia.
7. So when plans to make aliance witch other countries were destroyed we started to find new ways to make our country safe. Before we signed alliance pact with GB and France we were making "polityka siedzenia na dwóch stołkach" - "political of siting on two chairs" - we were trying to have good relations with Russia and Germany. And all your quotes of Beck or Rydz-Smigly were from that period.
8. Poland never wanted to regain all our teritories from XVIII century (that were plans of some politicals). We wanted to make indenpendent Ukraine but it was found imposible to made.
Is it more clear now?

[Igor01]

Igor, my friend...
could you tell us when Western Ukraine was Russian or Soviet before 1939? Do you learn history or just alternative history? Did not it belong to Austro-Hungary after the partitions of Poland? Please improve your knowledge before you start to write something like that above. It's just a friendly remark, because you are an intelligent man and I like you.
Regarding Belarus... Belarus was a state in union with Poland until Russian tsar decided to partion Poland in 1772-1795. This part of Commonwealth was called "the Grand Duchy of Lithuania", but in fact majority of its people were Belarussians and the official language was Oldbelarussian. These people had equal rights to the Poles and contributed greatly to the wars against Duchy of Moscow.

Thanks for the opportunity to carry out an intelligent conversation Musashi, I've always enjoyed having discussions with you :)

You are right of course, I should have explicitly made this important distinction when talking about "Western Ukraine" even though not all of it was under Austro-Hungarian control before WWI. Rovno, Wolyn was part of the Russian Empire, and areas like Chernovtsy and Transcarpathia were transferred to other newly formed states after the Vienna accord. And one could argue that since Poland was part of the Russian Empire, the takeover of Western Belorussia was a non-issue (if one uses the logical argument "it was ours before, we just had to take it back") :)

I am just trying to demonstrate that the logical argument like "yes, we (Poland) did have a treaty with them (Chechs) but we used their moment of weakness and took back what was rightfully ours to protect our national interests" should be either applied to the Soviet takeover of Western Ukraine and Belarussia or not used at all. The Soviets claimed that it was necessary to assume control of those areas not so much to "back-stab" Poland but rather to protect the population that was predominantly Ukrainian, Rusin (Ruten) and Belorussian. Not to mention the masses of Jews fleeing east to escape the Nazis.

While I understand that a Pole is rightfully feeling pain at seeing his country crumble during that tragic year, the historical evidence indicates that Poland set herself up for this with the unwise policies of her government in the late 30's. Even though what USSR did was certainly not a friendly act towards Poland, it was a cruel necessity of a nation at the time of war and not much different from what Poland herself did in 1938 towards Chechoslovakia.

[Brzeczyszczykiewicz]

I think that some people here (no matter the side, Polish or Russian) are following a similar logic: It's good when we do it, but it's bad when somebody else does it :)

[Musashi]

Igor, my friend...
could you tell us when Western Ukraine was Russian or Soviet before 1939? Do you learn history or just alternative history? Did not it belong to Austro-Hungary after the partitions of Poland? Please improve your knowledge before you start to write something like that above. It's just a friendly remark, because you are an intelligent man and I like you.
Regarding Belarus... Belarus was a state in union with Poland until Russian tsar decided to partion Poland in 1772-1795. This part of Commonwealth was called "the Grand Duchy of Lithuania", but in fact majority of its people were Belarussians and the official language was Oldbelarussian. These people had equal rights to the Poles and contributed greatly to the wars against Duchy of Moscow.

Thanks for the opportunity to carry out an intelligent conversation Musashi, I've always enjoyed having discussions with you :)
I can tell you I am extermely rude in fact, especially if somebody gives me a reason to be so. However, when I talk with foreigners I realize I represent my country and I try to be gentle unless they are trolls. I don't want to be rude "by default", because the foreigners would think all the Poles are like me. You have an explanation, I was sincere at least, hehe p-)


You are right of course, I should have explicitly made this important distinction when talking about "Western Ukraine" even though not all of it was under Austro-Hungarian control before WWI. Rovno, Wolyn was part of the Russian Empire, and areas like Chernovtsy and Transcarpathia were transferred to other newly formed states after the Vienna accord.
You have a map of Austro-Hungary from 1914. Lvov (my grandpa lived there) and Tarnopol/Ternopil (my grandma lived there) belonged to Austro-Hungary. Both my grandparents were taught German, not Russian at school.
http://www.croatia-in-english.com/images/maps/aus-hung.jpg
The map of Austro-Hungarian Galizia:
http://www.jewishgen.org/Galicia/assets/images/gal-map3.gif

And one could argue that since Poland was part of the Russian Empire, the takeover of Western Belorussia was a non-issue (if one uses the logical argument "it was ours before, we just had to take it back") :)
Non-issue? So what was before? Let's look:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/pl/9/93/PolWaz.gif
Do you have a map of before "my before". Had it been Belarus or Ukraine Russian before? I don't think so.
I am just trying to demonstrate that the logical argument like "yes, we (Poland) did have a treaty with them (Chechs) but we used their moment of weakness and took back what was rightfully ours to protect our national interests" should be either applied to the Soviet takeover of Western Ukraine and Belarussia or not used at all.
As Smok explained you, Czechoslovakia had also used our moment of weakness just 17 years before.
Even though what USSR did was certainly not a friendly act towards Poland, it was a cruel necessity of a nation at the time of war and not much different from what Poland herself did in 1938 towards Chechoslovakia.
Not much different? I see 2 big differences.
1) Poland did not intend to destroy Czechoslovakia as a state, while the USSR intended to destroy Poland. We did not sign any treaties with Germany directed against any country. I cannot say the same about the USSR. You will not see a joint Polish-German parade in Czechoslovakia and you can see photos of a Soviet-German joint parade in Brest-Litovsk.
Please see these excellent photos:
http://www.histdoc.net/pic/brest-litowsk.jpg


Wait, you have a gallery here (http://www.pilieciai.lt/minerva/album_personal.php?user_id=112).

2) The second difference is: as the territory of Zaolzie was 200 square kilometers, Poland took 0,14% of Czechoslovakian territory, while the Soviet Union took 52% of Polish territory. Is not it a difference for you? :) It IS difference - mathematics cannot be cheated :) There is a difference between 200 square kilometers and approx. 200000 square kilometers. Even preschoolers know it :lol:

Regards,
Krzysiek

[Igor01]

I think that some people here (no matter the side, Polish or Russian) are following a similar logic: It's good when we do it, but it's bad when somebody else does it :)

My point precisely, I don't take any particular pride in the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and Belorussia. Clearly, for the Poles it was a tragedy. However as we all know too well the actions of war and peace are not not governed by morals but rather by selfish interests of countries or their ruling elites, morals and explanations are handily invented and altered post-factum to justify any action.

There's no point in crying "bloody murder!" while remembering the Soviet takeover of 1939 and completely ignore 1920's Polish invasion of Ukraine or even the Polish attempts to install their ruler in the Kremlin in early 17th century or their enthusiastic participation in Napoleon's Grand Armee :) That's just what contries and rulers do occasionally and trying to claim a position of moral superiority for any one country is an excersize in futility.

[Igor01]

Igor01

You take only these parts of history which fits your vision of world.
The truth is:
1. On 5 XI 1918 Poland and Czechoslovakia signed pact that some teritorial problems will be solved in diplomatical way and status quo will be remained until diplomatical solution.
2. In the end of 1918 Russia attacked Poland.
3. When Poles were fighting with Russia Czechs broken pact and conquered part of our teritory (26 I 1919) but France demanded that election in that area (if people want to be in Poland or Czechoslovakia). In 1920 that teritory was splited without election.
4. Poland had very bad relations with Lithuania and one day Pilsudski told "War or peace". Lithuania decided to stay in peace and normal diplomatical relations were made.
5. When Hitler became Fuhrer Poland wanted to declare war wit Germany to kick out Hitler. But France didn't want to do it and Poland was to weak to win that war alone.
6. Later - in the end of 30's Poland was trying to make central european military alliance with Czechoslovakia and other countries. But plan wasn't accomplished because of uninteresment of Czechoslovakia.
7. So when plans to make aliance witch other countries were destroyed we started to find new ways to make our country safe. Before we signed alliance pact with GB and France we were making "polityka siedzenia na dwóch stołkach" - "political of siting on two chairs" - we were trying to have good relations with Russia and Germany. And all your quotes of Beck or Rydz-Smigly were from that period.
8. Poland never wanted to regain all our teritories from XVIII century (that were plans of some politicals). We wanted to make indenpendent Ukraine but it was found imposible to made.
Is it more clear now?

There are just too many inaccuracies and factual mistakes in your post to make a quick response. Unfortunately I don't have time to address them now but I'll try to get back to you on these points later.

[Musashi]

I think that some people here (no matter the side, Polish or Russian) are following a similar logic: It's good when we do it, but it's bad when somebody else does it :)
My point precisely, I don't take any particular pride in the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and Belorussia. Clearly, for the Poles it was a tragedy. However as we all know too well the actions of war and peace are not not governed by morals but rather by selfish interests of countries or their ruling elites, morals and explanations are handily invented and altered post-factum to justify any action.
I agree.
There's no point in crying "bloody murder!" while remembering the Soviet takeover of 1939 and completely ignore 1920's Polish invasion of Ukraine[...]
It was not invasion, but Polish troops clashed with the Soviets after collapse of Russian empire. They moved westwards and Poles moved eastwards. Pilsudski wanted to establish Ukrainian state, with a capital in Kyiv.
[...]or even the Polish attempts to install their ruler in the Kremlin in early 17th century
Come on, Igor. It was not attempt, but a fact. Poles installed a ruler in the Kremlin, for short, but installed anyway.
After the battle of Klushin Russian boyars were astonished by a Polish success. They opened gates of Moscow and offered a Polish king's son to be a Russian tsar if he had converted to Orthodox Christianity. Polish king wanted to be enthroned himself and did not agree to convert. Anyway there was a Polish ruler in Moscow for IIRC 1-2 years. Then the Moscowites were strong enough to slaughter the Polish garrison of Kremlin. According to a Polish magazine there is a inscription on the walls of an Orthodox Church in Moscow "The Almighty Lord, save us from typhus, Tatars and Poles".

[...]or their enthusiastic participation in Napoleon's Grand Armee :)
100,000 out of 600,000 is pretty enthusiastic. But tell me, what you will expect if somebody enslaved you, was organizig "trips" to Siberia, was arresting you for speaking Polish, etc. p-)
That's just what contries and rulers do occasionally and trying to claim a position of moral superiority for any one country is an excersize in futility. It's undeniable.

[Igor01]

Krzysiek, there's nothing wrong in getting a little lively while defending your country's honour in an internet forum :) I know you've showed that zeal occasionally in the axishistory forum and I certainly don't mind that since I've been guilty of this myself more than once :)

I like talking to you because our conversations never get out of hand and we both seem to to differentiate the civility towards the opponent from a disagreement towards the opponent's opinion.

Regarding your points, please refer to Brzeczyszczykiewicz's post above and my reply, I don't mean to be disrespectfully short, just don't have the time for any extended replies right now.

[Musashi]

No problem, mate :)
Tell me what is your nick on Axis History Forum.

[vi]

aw crap, sorry for the repost in "photos and vids" :oops:

[Igor01]

The “The Victors: Soldiers of the Great War” web project has won an award of the UN World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in the e-Cultrure category.

LINK (http://www1.wsis-award.org/absolutenm/templates/ContentWSANews.asp?articleid=691&zoneid=11)

Good job!

[Taekwondo]

Finland wasn't taking part in annexing parts of Czechoslovakia. SU attacked without provocation and while negotiations were still going and the work for the takeover of the country were started immediately after the nazi-bolsevik pact. No wonder it is a bit hard for us to swallow any ideas of russian liberators up here either...and no wonder the war was quickly "forgotten" almost completely by the soviet authorities.

[Kilgor]

@Kitsune:

No doubt, the German-Soviet non-agression treaty allowed Hitler to make a move in Poland, however the treaty didn't come out of nowhere. The West was conducting a decidedly unfriendly policy towards the USSR and preferred to see Hitler push into the Soviet Union rather than enter into defence alliances with the Soviets.

[the following is from this article (http://washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050410-020719-1127r.htm)

Did the Soviet Union have an alternative to signing a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939? Yes, it did, if only the Western democrats had left it a choice. There was a chance to stop the Nazi expansion even after the Munich 1938 collusion of British and French leaders with Hitler. Why was it missed?

Here is what Western sources say. On May 16, 1939, the British Cabinet discussed the memorandum of the British Chiefs of Staff, which said that the agreement on mutual assistance with France and the Soviet Union would constitute a solid front of substantial strength against aggression. The absence of such an agreement would amount to a diplomatic defeat, with serious military consequences. If Britain, rejecting an alliance with Russia, pushed it towards striking a deal with Germany, it would make a gross mistake of vital significance.

But Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax believed that political arguments against an agreement with the Soviet Union outweighed military considerations in favor of it. The stand of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was even more categorical: He would sooner resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets.

During sessions that day and later, the cabinet decided to maintain a semblance of contacts with Moscow so as to prevent Russia from establishing any ties with Germany. If the logic of events forced Britain to enter into a commitment, the cabinet should be ready not to honor it. "We must ensure ourselves a free hand, so as to be able to tell Russia that we are not obliged to enter in the war because we do not accept its interpretation of the facts," said Lord Chancellor John Simon.

Adm. Sir Reginald Drax, head of the British delegation at the military talks in Moscow in August 1939, received instructions to the effect that the British government "is unwilling to enter into any detailed commitments which are likely to tie our hands in all circumstances."

Here are two facts that will clarify the situation. The Soviet government knew about discussions in the British corridors of power and Chamberlain's attempts to find a modus vivendi with Hitler. Both London and Moscow knew that Hitler issued a directive in April 1939 that said that the war against Poland should begin not later than on Sept. 1.

How should the Soviet leadership have reacted to the British intrigues? Britain and France already had non-aggression agreements with Germany: Could the Soviet Union have rejected the non-aggression pact offered to it by Germany in that situation?

French Ambassador in Moscow P.E. Naggiar wrote in an Aug. 5, 1939, telegram to Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet that the blame for the failure of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet military talks and the Soviet Union's rapprochement with Germany lay on the Western powers and Poland.

Germany's attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, overhauled the picture of World War II. Shortly before the fateful day, London and Washington were discussing their possible reaction. The British expected to win, without depleting British reserves to come to the Soviets' assistance, about eight weeks for preparing to repel the Germans' landings on the British Isles.

The U.S. State Department (Secretary of State Cordell Hull Directive, June 14, 1941) prohibited any attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet government and urged caution regarding any steps the Soviet government might take toward the United States. British criticism led to changes in the directive's wording, which was formalized by June 21, 1941 in the following form: "We must not make promises, and must avoid any commitments regarding our future policy in respect of the Soviet Union or Russia. Above all, we must not make any agreements that might later create the impression that we did not do our best if the Soviet Government were to leave the country in case of defeat and we did not recognize the Soviet Government in exile or refused to recognize the Soviet Ambassador in Washington as the representative of Russia."

But the statement made by Democratic Sen. Harry S. Truman of Missouri (New York Times, June 24, 1941) was even more cynical: "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning, we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible."

Truman had many supporters. On June 29, 1941, former President Herbert Hoover spoke of inexpediency of hurrying to enter the war. According to him, it would be better to wait until the end, when the other nations would be sufficiently exhausted to surrender to the military, economic, and moral might of the United States.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially assumed a wait-and-see stand. The State Department, the country's generals, and the intelligence community assured him that the Soviet Union would not last more than four to-12 weeks, and America should rapidly strengthen its military positions before Germany extricated itself from the Russian bog. At a June 24, 1941 press conference, Roosevelt promised nothing more than to provide all possible assistance to Russia. It appears that he thought sufficient the statement made by Winston Churchill on June 22, 1941, when the British prime minister spoke of his intention to "give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people" because the danger facing Russia is "therefore our danger and the danger of the United States."

At first, the Allies limited their assistance to a political and psychological handshake. The Soviet-British agreement on joint action in the war against Germany signed on July 12, 1941, did not greatly improve the situation.

A Soviet military mission led by Gen. Filipp Golikov was sent to London to coordinate the efforts of the two powers in the common war. The Foreign Office instructed the chiefs of staff to show a cordial attitude to the Russians, entertaining the mission members in order to create an atmosphere of friendship, yet avoiding discussions of the essence of the problem.

These positions of the Western democracies was sharply criticized in the United States and Britain, including by former British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George, Lord Beaverbrook, Sir Stafford Cripps and the American military. The generals tried to convince FDR in 1941 that a second front should be opened without delay, not so much to help the Soviets as to defeat Germany, exploiting the fact that Hitler had moved almost all of his forces to the East, thereby exposing the Atlantic coast from the North Cape to the Pyrenees. But at that time the argument was purely hypothetical, as the United States had not yet entered the war.

No serious researcher will read into the policies of Roosevelt and Churchill the intention to complicate the Soviet Union's difficult situation in 1941. The top leaders of the United States and Britain simply did not believe that the Soviet Union would survive, and hence abstained from investing in their partner in the anti-Nazi struggle.

From early September and until the winter of 1941, Churchill did not rule out the possibility of making a separate peace with Germany, arguing that a public statement had been made that no talks would be held with Hitler or the Nazi regime. ... But it would be going too far to say that we would not negotiate with Germany controlled by its army, the British prime minister went on to say. It is impossible to predict what kind of government may come to power in Germany when its resistance is weakened and it is forced to negotiate.

The United States and Britain were biding their time until the Red Army launched a counter-offensive outside Moscow. In October 1941, they presumed that the Soviet Union would have to wage a war on two fronts. Roosevelt wrote to Churchill on Oct. 15, 1941, that he thought the Japanese were moving north, thereby giving the two countries two months' respite in the Far East.

On Oct. 16, Adm. Harold Stark wrote to Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, that a war between Japan and the Soviet Union was highly probable.

Life taught the two countries a lesson, though the White House did not immediately review its military and political decisions after Pearl Harbor. Prominent U.S. historian Maurice Matloff wrote that absolutely nothing was done until the fall of 1943 to directly coordinate the Western strategy and plans with the plans of the Soviet Union.

The defeat of the Germans outside Moscow in winter of 1941-1942 buried the doctrine with which Hitler had begun the war for global domination. After that, ending the war on acceptable conditions for Germany could be ensured only by political, and not by military methods, the Nazi leader admitted. Had the Western Allies supported the Soviet Union's military efforts by opening a second front in Europe in spring, summer or fall 1942, Berlin would have surrendered by Christmas.

Did the United States and Britain have the necessary reserves for a landing? The answer was provided by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who wrote in a memo of March 25: "The main goal of our first major offensive must be Germany, which should be attacked in the West." The general tried to prove that there were all the prerequisites required for this. He convinced President Roosevelt of the acceptability of his plan and the need to enlist the cooperation of London.

Roosevelt admitted during talks with Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov in Washington that "creating a second front in Europe in 1942" was "an urgent task." The agreement was sealed in a joint communiqué.

But the president clearly underestimated the iron grip of Churchill. Unable to make the Soviet Union the priority partner, Roosevelt yielded to Churchill's plan of landing not in Normandy but in North Africa, disregarding the opinion of his generals. Eisenhower said the day when Roosevelt changed plans from Europe to Africa was the grimmest day in history.

There are different explanations as to why the American leader sided with Churchill. In September 1942, even the Soviet leaders were not sure that the Red Army would overpower the Wehrmacht. So, we can understand the pessimism in London and Washington. The Battle of Stalingrad (August, 1942-February, 1943) became the touchstone not only for Japan and Turkey, which had been preparing to attack the Soviet Union in case of German success, but also for the Western Allies.

U.S. Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall wrote in his report, "The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific" (1945): "In those hours (1942) Germany and Japan came so close to complete domination of the world that we do not yet realize how thin the thread of Allied survival had been stretched. In good conscience this Nation can take little credit for its part in staving off disaster in those critical days."

Secretary of State Hull agreed with Marshall, writing in his memoirs in 1948 that we should always remember that the Russians' heroic struggle against Germany probably saved the Allies from a separate peace. Such a peace would have humiliated the Allies and opened the door to another Thirty Years War.

The meaning of that separate peace was not disclosed then or now, and it is not clear how the skin of the Russian bear was divided. But what Churchill said in October 1942, before the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, offers food for thought: He called for stopping the barbarians as far to the east as possible.

The Allies missed the chance to rout Germany in 1942. But maybe Stalingrad brought them to their senses? In their joint letter of Jan. 26, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill assured Stalin: "We have decided ... on the operations which are to be undertaken by the Americans and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We believe that these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. ... We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany with a view to achieving an early and decisive victory in the European theater."

Stalin asked his Western partners for information about the planned operations in this area (the opening of a second front in Europe) and the proposed time frame. He received the answer 10 days later: "The timing of this attack (across the English Channel) must, of course, be dependent upon the condition of German defensive possibilities across the Channel at that time," the operation in North Africa, and the landing in Sicily and Eastern Mediterranean. They no longer wrote about drawing the Germans away from the Russian front and did not describe 1943 as the year when Germany would be defeated.

In March, the Allies made one more condition -- that "the enemy should weaken sufficiently." And lastly, they informed Moscow in June that the Western powers would provide aviation support in 1943, postponing the opening of the second front until spring 1944 or later. "When signs of Axis weakness become apparent in any quarter, actual attacks and threats of attack will easily and quickly be translated into successful operations," Roosevelt wrote.

Understandably, the task of weakening the enemy "sufficiently" was entrusted to the Soviet Union.

What was happening in the meantime? From 1942, contacts between the secret services of Britain and the United States and influential quarters in Germany became systematic and deep. Churchill's agents met with Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, in France, and the admiral is also rumored to have met with William J. Donovan, head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, in Spain and Turkey. They did not discuss the weather, I presume, but ways to contain the Soviet Union within its pre-war borders. In short, they were preparing the ground for cooperation between the Western powers and the Nazi generals who wanted to succeed Hitler.

In the summer of 1943, the OSS studied the possibility and expediency of turning the entire might of the still strong Germany against the Soviet Union (Donovan Memo, Aug. 20, 1943). The British and U.S. chiefs of staff met to discuss if Germans would help Anglo-American troops to enter the territory of Germany so as to repel the Russians. (See paragraph 9 of the protocol on military considerations regarding Russia of the chiefs of staff meeting, kept in the U.S. National Archives.)

In the summer of 1943, the Battle of Kursk was still going on, but the Western Allies were already thinking of dissolving the anti-Hitler coalition and opening not a second front against Nazi Germany but a joint Anglo-American-German front against the Soviet Union. During the Quebec Conference on Aug. 14-24, 1943, Roosevelt and Churchill decided to land Allies forces in Normandy (Operation Overlord) and simultaneously to start preparing another operation code-named Rankin.

According to Rankin, groups in Germany that collaborated with the Americans and British would stage a coup, terminate the Western front and help the troops of the Western powers to occupy Germany and all other territories controlled at that time by Germany in the north, west, east and south of Europe. The plan was not carried out, but this is quite another story.

So, could the war in Europe have ended in 1943? I am sure that it could have. But this did not happen because the United States, and especially Britain, wanted to outplay the Soviet Union, not in the war against Nazi Germany but in creating a postwar order. The costs did not worry London and Washington in the least.

It is difficult to calculate how many people died at the front, in concentration camps, and behind the lines in 1944-1945. Auschwitz started working to its full capacity in late 1943-early 1944, and mass executions in Sachenhausen, Buchenwald, Maidanek, Dachau and other death camps began at the same time. Up to 500,000 died in bombing raids on Germany. The total, irreplaceable losses of the Soviet Army amounted to over 4 million in 1943-1945, including about 2.5 million in the last two years of the war. At least 1.5 million Soviet citizens died in occupation as a result of the Germans' "scorched earth" policy. Taken together, procrastination over ending the war cost Europe and other countries 8 million to 10 million human lives.

And one more thing. Hardly had the ink dried on the Yalta Agreements when an attack was launched against the anti-Nazi coalition behind Roosevelt's back in the United States and under the guidance of Churchill in Britain. The British prime minister ordered that the German trophy weapons be kept for a potential war against the Soviet Union. Roosevelt warned his opponents that faithful implementation of the Tehran and Yalta decisions "will determine the fate of the United States, and I think therefore of the world, for generations to come. ... There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict."

Did Churchill heed this warning? Alas, no. In April, and possibly even in late March, he instructed his chiefs of staff to design Operation Unthinkable, which provided for a war against the Soviet Union waged by a new coalition of American, British and Canadian forces, the Polish expeditionary corps, and 10 to 12 Wehrmacht divisions that had been interned by the British and were kept with their weapons in a castle in Schleswig-Holstein and southern Denmark. The war was planned for July 1, 1945. The British declassified documents about these plans in the late 20th century. Before that, they denied the existence of such plans as shameless Soviet propaganda.

Winston Churchill's career did not have an honorable conclusion. Operation Unthinkable contradicted the desire of the U.S. military leaders to see the Soviet Union enter the war against Japan in order to force Japan to surrender without shedding too much American blood. This is the only reason why the plan was mothballed.

Thats a nice little bit of slanted and revisionist history, by a author who is thinks the poor soviet union was the victim in ww2, from germany and even the allies. Absoutely one sided and makes no mention on the countless times the SU screwed the western allies around.

So, could the war in Europe have ended in 1943? I am sure that it could have. But this did not happen because the United States, and especially Britain, wanted to outplay the Soviet Union, not in the war against Nazi Germany but in creating a postwar order. The costs did not worry London and Washington in the least.

After all, why should the civilized western countries worry when two monsterous dictatorships are killing and weakening each other.


If he wants someone to blame for the war not finishing earlier in europe, he should blame stalin. The purged soviet army was why the germans did so well in the initial invasion, and also stalin's constant refusal to believe that a invasion was imment. Both Britian and US warned the SU they had reliable intelligence that a offensive was to take place.

If the army hadnt been purged, the finnish campaign might not have been the disaster it was, and hitler might have thought twice about attacking Russia. But the finnish campaign gave hitler all the evidence he needed, that the purged red army was a shadow of itself former self. Of course, the soviet leadership did not suffer, the people did and in their millions, but lets all blame the western powers for their offensive that should have come sooner. :roll:

[Lokos]

poor soviet union was the victim in ww2, from germany and even the allies.

And you're going to sit there and tell me it wasn't, knowing full well that 27 million people in the Soviet Union lost their lives as a direct result of that war.

Lokos

[Taekwondo]

poor soviet union was the victim in ww2, from germany and even the allies.

And you're going to sit there and tell me it wasn't, knowing full well that 27 million people in the Soviet Union lost their lives as a direct result of that war.

Lokos

They're as much the cause as the victims. Without the nazis, who do you think would have started the second world war? Stalin only bought time with his arrangement with Hitler, but Hitler struck first.

[Kilgor]

poor soviet union was the victim in ww2, from germany and even the allies.

And you're going to sit there and tell me it wasn't, knowing full well that 27 million people in the Soviet Union lost their lives as a direct result of that war.

Lokos

No, what i tire of is revisionist "authors" such as the one above, blaming everyone else apart from the soviet leadership.

From the moment the CCCP started agressively spreading communism in europe, which was one the main fears that got hitler elected in the first place, right through to the purges and stalin's total arrogance of pre-war intelligence, the soviet leadership has a lot to blame for the millons of their war dead. No, they fire the first shot but they sure as hell are guilty of failing to protect their citizens.

[Kilgor]

poor soviet union was the victim in ww2, from germany and even the allies.

And you're going to sit there and tell me it wasn't, knowing full well that 27 million people in the Soviet Union lost their lives as a direct result of that war.

Lokos

Tell me how far you think the germans would have got if the army wasnt purged lokos ? And stalin listened to his intelligence. A hell of alot of those 27 million people would have survived.

[koutch]

once again the same pattern : hitler was very good and stalin very bad.

[Kilgor]

once again the same pattern : hitler was very good and stalin very bad.

Both were very bad moron :bash:

Show me where i show hitler in a good light ?

[Lokos]

Tell me how far you think the germans would have got if the army wasnt purged lokos ? And stalin listened to his intelligence. A hell of alot of those 27 million people would have survived.

Then disparage Stalin, not the Soviet Union. The two are not one and the same, despite the desperate abstractions of many forum members here.

Stalin = Bad man =/= Soviet Union not a victim of the war. I don't know how to make it any simpler than that.

Lokos

[Lokos]

Tell me how far you think the germans would have got if the army wasnt purged lokos ?

As a side note: pretty far.

The veritable destruction of the officer corps from 1937 to 1941 was only felt as keenly as it was because the Germans chose possibly the most opportune moment to attack that there was ever going to be. The most significant issue was that the entire RKKA was in the process of reorganization, following massive doctrinal shifts since 1937 and the Spanish Civil War. Too many units were simply cadres with few well trained reserves. The Mechanized Corps were massive, unwieldly formations that would have floundered into death's gaping maw regardless of the competence of those at the helm. And, of course, there was the small matter of the logistical nightmare that was the Soviet supply situation before the war began, and that grew steadily worse in the six critical months from June to December, before finally abating by mid 1942.

Finally, the achievement of total strategic surprise (and, yes, much of the fault for that should go to Stalin) by the Germans doomed a Soviet military encamped on the borders and doctrinally primed for offensive action (the defensive was seen by the Soviets as a stop-gap measure intended to facilitate continuous attack).

The cyclical attrition the Soviets suffered from 1941 to 1944 is, basically, one of the reasons for the massive casualty total.

Lokos

[Taekwondo]

Then disparage Stalin, not the Soviet Union. The two are not one and the same, despite the desperate abstractions of many forum members here.

Stalin = Bad man =/= Soviet Union not a victim of the war. I don't know how to make it any simpler than that.



Actually, the Soviet Union was pretty much an image of Stalin, as well as Lenin's. He formulated the ideas of terror and violence as the means of keeping the power, Stalin then did his best to keep things that way (his paranoia certainly helped in that). The SU cannot be kept only as a victim of the war as they were themselves very active in aggressions against their neighbours before the German attack.

[Kilgor]

Tell me how far you think the germans would have got if the army wasnt purged lokos ? And stalin listened to his intelligence. A hell of alot of those 27 million people would have survived.

Then disparage Stalin, not the Soviet Union. The two are not one and the same, despite the desperate abstractions of many forum members here.

Stalin = Bad man =/= Soviet Union not a victim of the war. I don't know how to make it any simpler than that.

Lokos

Would you apply the same rule for third reich germany then ?

Btw, dictatorships are not the result of one man. It is a very simplistic term and does not do the complex political and government structure justice. In both soviet and german dictatatorships there were many other rotten men who carried our their masters will on the people.
There isnt time to explain it here, but the blame for both dictatorships goes beyond just hitler and stalin.

[Kitsune]

@Lokos:

Stalins thinking before the German attack is still mysterious. In November 1940 Molotov alongside a large Soviet entourage had come to Germany and pressured Hitler...the Sovietunion demanded essentially the complete control of Eastern Europe from Germany. Finland should belong to the Soviet sphere (and Sweden be a neutral buffer zone), same for Bulgary, the Germans should let the hands of Rumania, Poland should be redristibuted between the two (the Sovietunion wanted more), the Soviets demanded the control of the seaways out of both the Black and the Baltic Seas. Hitler, who knew that he was in a difficult situation tried to divert the demands.
So why was Stalin so completely surprised when the Germans invaded in Summer 1941, especially when there was mounting evidence of an attack? The shuffling eastward of German troops had not been unoticed by Stlain, the Soviets had an excellent intelligence service. Did Stalin fall for Hitlers disinformation and the claim that those troops were send eastward to be outside of the range of English bombers?

Interesting of course is the Soviet military doctrine and self assessment of their own strength. As had been said, the Red Army was trained completely for offensive warfare (because of Stlains explicit orders). Even something as elementary as a tactical withdrawal had hardly been trained...which would prove to be a terrible mistake when the Wehrmacht attacked. Also, their had been extensive wargames how to conduct an attack on Europe/Germany.
As far as the self asssesment is concerned, the numbers possibly may tell it all. The Soviets had around 25.000 tanks in 1941, compared to about 3500 German ones. Superiority was 7 to1. As far as artillery and fighterplanes were concerned the Soviet superiority was between 4 and 5 to 1. It was similiar with the available infantry reserves. German technical superiority was was by no means crushing, in some fields marginally at best, and, especially concerning tanks, nonexistent.
With that being so, Stalin seems to have believed, with some justification, that a German attack, if dared at all, would be crushed within the first few hundred kilometers of the border...and could then turned to a devastating counterattack that crushed Germany within a few months. With British and French applause and American understanding Stalin would have been able to expand his influence to the Rhine. Or even further.

And that seems to have been the situation. After Molotovs insolent behaviour in Berlin (and Molotov was a very controlled man, not someone who behaved offensively because he had a bad day or something, the idea was obviously to demonstrate Hitler in what situation he was in) there were three possibilties what Hitler could do:
1) He could give in and fulfill the Soviet demands. In that case Stalin could have expanded his influence without firing a shot.
2) Hitler refuses to do anything, show Stalin the finger under the table so to speak. In that case the Sovietunion gains nothing, but looses nothing either, not even options. The option to attack for example...most probably that was planned for 1942 in any case.
3) Hitler answers with an attack. In this case the completely superior Red Army crushes the Wehrmacht with ease and turns the successful defense in an all out attack on Germany. Stalin wins even in this case.

So it is possible that Stalin did not expect Hitler to have the guts for an attack. He is still fighting England, so it would be suicide to attack the Sovietunion, would it not? Possibly that was the reason for the complete Soviet surprise.

There is one other possibility, however. It is possible that Stalin expected Hitler to attack. And that he deliberately played dumb when the Germans amassed their troops near the Soviet border. To have an justification for the conquest of Europe. In that case the only mistake Stalin had made was the wrong assessment of the German attack strength...that this would nearly crush the colossal Soviet force and would turn the whole affair into a fight for the survival of the entire Sovietunion. And even after the Soviets had manadged to turn the tide the conquest of Europe had been delayed for years and the Americans had arrived now on the scene. Too bad.
There is no way of knowing wether this is true, such a plan is something one does not advertise. Stalin may have hidden his true ideas even before his military advisers and generals...

[Lokos]

The SU cannot be kept only as a victim of the war as they were themselves very active in aggressions against their neighbours before the German attack.

Of course the SU was not solely a victim. It was, however, a victim, amongst other things.

Actually, the Soviet Union was pretty much an image of Stalin, as well as Lenin's.

So the Soviet Union was a moustachioed Georgian ex-priest-in-training with a bent toward paranoia?

No individual can be transmorgified into the state. If you go down that route, then you may as well have exterminated ALL Germans during the Second World War, because they ALL must have been Hitler manifest - and therefore ALL were guilty for the Holocausts perpetrated against the Jews and the Soviet nationalities during the SWW.

Would you apply the same rule for third reich germany then ?

Absolutely. The German nation should not have been - and was not - held accountable for the actions of its leaders. I believe this is why some can admire the Wehrmacht without being Nazis themselves.

Btw, dictatorships are not the result of one man. It is a very simplistic term and does not do the complex political and government structure justice. In both soviet and german dictatatorships there were many other rotten men who carried our their masters will on the people.

This is exactly why I advocate blaming Stalin and his weak-willed cronies, instead of peppering the entire Soviet Union with distaste. The SU, as a whole, had a great many admirable qualities about it. And, for the greatest part of its history, it was most certainly NOT the 'Evil Empire' it has been made out to be. Hitler did not taint the German nation in perpetuity. I don't understand why Stalin should have tainted the Soviet Union in such a way.

So why was Stalin so completely surprised when the Germans invaded in Summer 1941, especially when there was mounting evidence of an attack?

Several reasons.

1) The huge quantities of raw material he was giving Hitler basically amounted to his attempt at appeasement. He believed, initially, that the invasion was just a German attempt to create an 'incident' and therefore validate their aggression. This is why the 'No Fire Back' orders were handed out on June 23. He was desperately attempting to buy time for a war he knew was coming - but a war he was not ready for in June 1941.

2) Leading on from the above, Stalin did not expect general war before 1942, especially following the Yugoslav and Greek campaigns. A lot of this was wishful thinking. Certainly, had the Germans waited until 1942, they would have had a significantly more difficult time in invading the Soviet Union. I believe the 'up a creek without a paddle' analogy is suitable to describe that hypothetical situation.

However, I believe the question of strategic surprise is not so much one of how surprised Stalin was, but how surprised the RKKA was on June 22nd. Apart from a few border detachments that began, circumspectly, to take precautions on the 20th and the 21st, the vast Western Military District was wholly unprepared for war. It was not even properly mobilized by the 24th. In the direst of emergencies, the formations of the District were fed into combat piecemeal, as a proper muster and force concentration ceased to be a possibility. The Germans were moving far too quickly.

Did Stalin fall for Hitlers disinformation and the claim that those troops were send eastward to be outside of the range of English bombers?

He knew what was happening. He a) refused to believe it and b) earnestly thought that it was just provocation and an attempt to get more appeasement from the SU.

Interesting of course is the Soviet military doctrine and self assessment of their own strength. As had been said, the Red Army was trained completely for offensive warfare (because of Stlains explicit orders). Even something as elementary as a tactical withdrawal had hardly been trained...which would prove to be a terrible mistake when the Wehrmacht attacked. Also, their had been extensive wargames how to conduct an attack on Europe/Germany.

Indeed. Make no mistake, if Hitler had waited until 1942, it is not Soviet soil the war would have been fought on. Unfortunately for the RKKA, the Germans picked the most maddeningly right time to make the attack.

With that being so, Stalin seems to have believed, with some justification, that a German attack, if dared at all, would be crushed within the first few hundred kilometers of the border...and could then turned to a devastating counterattack that crushed Germany within a few months.

Truth be told, had the war begun in '42 (and I keep saying this, but the emphasis needs to be made), he would probably have been right.

So it is possible that Stalin did not expect Hitler to have the guts for an attack.

This statement and those above it seem to suggest that Stalin and the Soviet Union were in a position of strength, here. That's not a truthful accounting of the facts. Stalin himself abhorred the thought of a general conflagration before 1942. He knew full well that the RKKA was not ready. In all the wargames run by the General Staff, the Wehrmacht handily defeated the 1940-1941 formations of the RKKA. The logistical situation was incredibly bad, the reserves were not properly trained, there had been a planar doctrinal shift that the military was still accustoming itself to and Frunze had yet to gradute the replacements for the 1937-1941 purges.

Stalin appeased Hitler as best as he could right up until the very evening of the war. He went so far as to have Molotov enquire about the possibility of some kind of long-lasting pact between the SU and the GGR.

He is still fighting England, so it would be suicide to attack the Sovietunion, would it not?

Likely one of the reasons for the strategic surprise, yes.

To have an justification for the conquest of Europe.

In a war starting in 1942, I may be tempted to agree with you. In the historical context; no. The Soviets did not believe they had the strength to tackle a Wehrmacht at its apogee in 1941. They were right.

And even after the Soviets had manadged to turn the tide the conquest of Europe had been delayed for years and the Americans had arrived now on the scene. Too bad.

The arrival of the WA in Europe was something Stalin had been clamouring for since 1942. The zones of influence had been worked out long before the actual invasion of France. The myth of the arrival of the WA saving Western Civilization from the Evil Russians is just that - a myth.

Stalin may have hidden his true ideas even before his military advisers and generals...

Not if he wanted them to carry out those ideas.

Lokos

[Kilgor]

This is exactly why I advocate blaming Stalin and his weak-willed cronies, instead of peppering the entire Soviet Union with distaste. The SU, as a whole, had a great many admirable qualities about it. And, for the greatest part of its history, it was most certainly NOT the 'Evil Empire' it has been made out to be. Hitler did not taint the German nation in perpetuity. I don't understand why Stalin should have tainted the Soviet Union in such a way.



Lokos

There is a simple and quite large difference between germany and the soviet union. Third Reich germany was defeated, exposed, and forced at a painful examation of its past horrors. Its leaders were put on trial, concentration camps opened and photographed, and the horrors fully broadcast to the entire world. The old military and government was swept away and in its place a democratic and humanitian state was built.

However the Stalinist soviet union was never forced to examine itself. Stalin died a old man, never having to pay for his murders like many of his henchmen. Yes, some of the camps were opened and some prisoners freed, and "de-stalinisation", but it wasnt a complete reversal of the police state like in germany. A significant stalinist core remained after the leaders death which Khrushchev had to fight. No one could possibly argue that the SU had changed suffiencently enough to be anywhere near a free state like post ww2 germany had become.

[Lokos]

painful examation of its past horrors.

It was the de-Stalinization period that brought to light the enormous cost of Stalin's social and industrial programmes. I believe this can be termed a 'painful examination of... past horrors'.

However the Stalinist soviet union was never forced to examine itself.

It was never forced to, but it did anyway.

Yes, some of the camps were opened and some prisoners freed, and "de-stalinisation", but it wasnt a complete reversal of the police state like in germany.

People often wonder how today's Russian (and Ukrainian and Belorussian) youth and many of the elderly can look back to the Soviet period with tearful regret at its passing. Once you understand that 'police state' =/= evil in the eyes of all people (i.e. once you stop being a cultural imperialist with no understanding of the fact that difference is not bad inherently), then maybe you will comprehend the fact that your world view is flawed.

To accept your premise, I would have to accept that the Soviet Union, as a whole, was 'bad'. And that's just not something I'm going to do.

No one could possibly argue that the SU had changed suffiencently enough to be anywhere near a free state like post ww2 germany had become.

Yes, no one could possibly argue that the SU had become a US satellite during the post-war period, I agree.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Hitler did not taint the German nation in perpetuity. I don't understand why Stalin should have tainted the Soviet Union in such a way.

Some not concering the terms:

"Joseph Stalin" analogous to "Adolf Hitler"

"Sovietunion" analogous to "Nazi-Germany"

"Russia" analogous to "Germany"

The Sovietunion was not just a nation. It was a political system, a dictatorship. One may argue that the Sovietunion in later times may have been not as worse as Nazi Germany. Perhaps. But during Hitler's time, the Sovietunion under Stalin was. That it later became a bit more moderate does not matter. Perhaps Nazi-Germany after Hitler's death would have also been more moderate in later times if it had survived the war. Who knows?
Point is: the word "Sovietunion" stands for a undemocratic system. It never was anything else than that.

The name of the nation however is "Russia". It had existed long before the bolsheviks came to power and will continue to exist long after they have faded to dust.

[Lokos]

One may argue that the Sovietunion in later times may have been not as worse as Nazi Germany.

Sorry, but as long as we are labouring under the assumption that the Soviet Union at any point was as bad as the Greater German Reich, this discussion is over, from my point of view. I reject the very notion part and parcel. Many people perished during Stalin's often inept rule. But their elimination was not condoned by Communism, nor was it conducted on an ideological basis. This difference makes any attempt at equating the Soviet Union and the GGR a joke - a sick, sad joke.

I truly hope that this is not how you really feel, Kitsune. If it is, I'd rather we no longer hold historical discourse, you and I.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

I truly hope that this is not how you really feel, Kitsune.
That is not how I "feel". That is how the facts are. Take anything you want, anything that gives Hitler a claim to be the worst and most evil dictator of all times, that gives him the right to sit in the Supreme Seat of Malice in the Hall of Infamy...and I tell you something worse about Stalin. Or probably two things. (Yes, that includes the killing of 6 million Jews...against that I set the killing of at least the same number of Kulaks by Stalin. And I even keep some other masskillings of his in reserve.)
Whatever it is: absolute number of people killed, highest number of people killed per year, degree of oppression, of cruelty, ruthlessness, militarism, level and speed of armament of his armed forces, agressivity, insidiousness, degree of abject fear and terror created in his suroundings...Stalin beats Hitler hands down. In every conceivable way. During his career he signed nearly 50.000 individual execution orders. He was the worst ever. The ultimate monster. Sorry if you do not like it.
Hitler can vie with Mao and Pol Poth for the second place.


But their elimination was not condoned by Communism, nor was it conducted on an ideological basis. Joker. It was condoned by Stalin. That his personal ideas had not so much to do with the idealism of communists like Rosa Luxemberg needs not to be said. But that changes nothing. Actually Stalin had a lot of these "idealist" Marxist killed...he did not trust them.


If it is, I'd rather we no longer hold historical discourse, you and I.
That comes from your side and I am sorry to hear that. But if that's what you want, I respect your decision.

[Lokos]

But if that's what you want, I respect your decision.

It's what I want, and thank you.

Lokos

[Kilgor]

Sorry, but as long as we are labouring under the assumption that the Soviet Union at any point was as bad as the Greater German Reich, this discussion is over, from my point of view.
Lokos

You reject the view because like many sovietphiles you cannot accept the truth despite overwealming evidence. And im sorry lokos, stalin was worse in "some" cases. The great purge was a political terror that imprisioned and killed hundreds of thousands for the most trivial of reasons of paranoia and suspicion. Anyone who was a threat to stalin was a marked man, even decades later. Hitler of course settled scores such as the Rohm purge, but stalin's terror was on a scale of epic proportions in comparision. Hitler did kill many of the old leaders of the SA, but stalin's purge of communist officals, the military went far beyond what did at the time. That is just one example. Im sure I can think of more if i could be bothered.

History is written by the victors and thats why the SU considered itself the moral authority in ww2. But thats the most perverted case of self rightousness ever.

[koutch]

Perhaps Nazi-Germany after Hitler's death would have also been more moderate in later times if it had survived the war. Who knows?


So are you secretly dreaming of a nazi victory and a nazi Germany?

[Belrick]

What free thinking intellectual westerner doesnt dream of Germany and Russia exhausting themselves and the allies conquering the lot?

The world would be a far healthier and happier place if the Reds had rotted in jail cells or hung from the nearest tree.

[Kilgor]

What free thinking intellectual westerner doesnt dream of Germany and Russia exhausting themselves and the allies conquering the lot?

.

That would have been the ideal outcome of WW2, that both dictatorships, along with japanese and italian fascism could have been put to death.

But the greatest tragedy of ww2, is that the distruction of one murdering dictatorship required the support of the other.



Sorry, but as long as we are labouring under the assumption that the Soviet Union at any point was as bad as the Greater German Reich, this discussion is over, from my point of view. I reject the very notion part and parcel. Many people perished during Stalin's often inept rule. But their elimination was not condoned by Communism, nor was it conducted on an ideological basis

Whilst we are at it, Stalin's pericution of the church and clergy where scores where murdered, imprisoned and thousands of churches destroyed was far worse than hitlers muzzling of religion.

[Lokos]

Generally:

I am sorry, folks, but I will no longer discuss history with anyone who earnestly believes that the Soviet Union was ever as bad as the Greater German Reich. For now, this includes Kilgor and Kitsune. If you share their beliefs, just don't direct your incisive commentary at me, and we'll all get along just fine. I don't want to see it, I don't want to read it. Maybe it is shameless self interest, and I cannot hope to be objective here, but I am utterly glad that the Reich was drained of its life's blood on the steppes of Old Russia. The Stalinists slaughtered perceived enemies of the state - but these enemies were not ideologically defined in terms of race/ethnicity/religious belief or any other true mark of identity. One could become an enemy of the Soviet state, but one was never born one. That is the fundamental difference I am getting it. If you think it superfluous, so be it. I couldn't care less if I tried.

I've seen all the arguments you're putting forth here before, and they're disingenious at best.

The Soviet Union was responsible for many Russian and Slavic deaths, generally. On the other hand, without the absolutely centralized, brutally focused state that existed in 1941, the Slavic East may have become a German colonial empire. The Russians owe their national existence to the Soviet Union, and they understand this. Many of us here would either have been born slaves, or would not have been born at all. And I will not sit here and listen to you tell me all about how the ends never justify the means - because they too often have, and they too often do.

I hope that helps to close this matter on a more permanent basis.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Sry Lokos. Nonsense. Stalin had the Kulaks slaughtered because they were Kulaks and those were born as such. Because free peasants were perceived as a hinderance to the collectivized socialist society he wanted to form. And because just taking their land away wasn't good enough (they could have remembered and continued to to be a problem) he had them killed. And lest their wifes and children could have remembered he chose to have them killed, too. If that isn't ideologically enough for you, I don't know. And that is just one example.
I can't help if that offends you, but it is not my fault after all.

You prefer the Stalinist Sovietunion because of wishful thinking and genaral delusions about its nature, that is my impression.
But choose your poison. Fine with me.

[Lokos]

Stalin had the Kulaks slaughtered because they were Kulaks and those were born as such.

Kitsune, look, just don't comment on matter you are not familiar with. 'Kulaks', indeed. Hah! Someone needs to catch up with post-1985 research into the Great Terror - and it isn't me. Seriously, you're repeating gibberish extolled by the White Russians since 1922. I could explain to you the reasons behind the Ukrainian famine, which factors affected the Soviet decision making process, and how it all makes perfect sense (logically speaking, and in an admittedly cold way - it was never about the 'prosperity' or the 'freedom' of the imaginary 'Kulak' class), if one removes prejudice from the equation, but I have a feeling you're not really ready to be objective here, just as I'm not really ready to be objective at all about the GGR. I have, do, and will continue to heap praise on the RKKA and the Soviet state for breaking the back of that beast.

You prefer the Stalinist Sovietunion because of wishful thinking and genaral delusions about its nature, that is my impression.

I prefer the Soviet Union over what? The Greater German Reich? You bet your ass I do. Any day of the week, and twice on Sundays. And if my reasons aren't clear enough from my last post, that's just too bad.

Lokos

[Kitsune]

Well, as I see it, you are repeating the gibberish extolled by the Reds since 1917. And that you are "continue to heap praise on the RKKA and the Soviet state" is obvious. But i don't feel offended about it.

Thing is, we can discuss that matter (not in this thread anymore, but now and then) like civilized people, or we just do agree to disagree and be silent about it. Offending each other serves no purpose. And a reaction like "if you see things this and that way I punish you by not talking to you anymore" does not either.

So my proposal is that we stop for now and let our emotions cool down, shall we? ;)

[Dima-RussianArms]

Sry Lokos. Nonsense. Stalin had the Kulaks slaughtered because they were Kulaks and those were born as such. Because free peasants were perceived as a hinderance to the collectivized socialist society he wanted to form. And because just taking their land away wasn't good enough (they could have remembered and continued to to be a problem) he had them killed. And lest their wifes and children could have remembered he chose to have them killed, too. If that isn't ideologically enough for you, I don't know. And that is just one example.
I can't help if that offends you, but it is not my fault after all.

You prefer the Stalinist Sovietunion because of wishful thinking and genaral delusions about its nature, that is my impression.
But choose your poison. Fine with me.

Child, take it from someone whose ancestors were "kulaks" - you are delusional and have no clue what you are talking about.

[Kilgor]

Give up kitsune, the sovietphiles will never accept anything other than the blinkered nostalgic viewpoint. They will never accept the horrors and attrocities or offer some lame excuse soviet mouthpiece excuse as to why it happened.

I keep on saying, the SU was never defeated in war and as such was never forced to comprehend the true horrors of its time.

At least the SU is no more, but sad legacy is there are people still around who defend it blindly.

[Kilgor]

I prefer the Soviet Union over what? The Greater German Reich? You bet your ass I do. Any day of the week, and twice on Sundays. And if my reasons aren't clear enough from my last post, that's just too bad.

Lokos

One of the childish arguements also leveled at beevor. "oh because you comment negativily on the soviets you must be a nazi support!"

Im sure kitsune would prefer neither.

[Lokos]

One of the childish arguements also leveled at beevor. "oh because you comment negativily on the soviets you must be a nazi support!"

Nuh-uh.

My criticisms of Beevor are purely historiographical.

Im sure kitsune would prefer neither.

Then what question is he asking me?

They will never accept the horrors and attrocities

Actually, I fully accept that there were horrors and attrocities perpetrated by the Soviet governments under Lenin and Stalin. The thing is, you see, I don't consider them important enough to invalidate the legitimacy of the Soviet state. Is this what you're not getting, here? Neither I, nor Dima, nor any of the other 'Sovietphiles' here are going to accept that line of argument.

What you're doing is akin to what many anti-Americans tend to do. They level accusations at the American government for a) the slaughter of the Native American population b) dropping the nukes on Japanese civilians and c) the million or so dead Vietnamese civilians attributable to the US intervention. The anti-Americans use these accusations as a foundation on which they hope to show that America is an evil, evil land that should not exist.

But, the fact is, no American will accept those arguments. They're the childish ranting of those without the sense to recognise that the only way to defeat an idea is to make the other side accept its own folly in adopting it. And to say that you're not succeeding vis a vis the crimes of the Soviet Union would be an understatement par excellence.

or we just do agree to disagree and be silent about it.

The above is akin to...

And a reaction like "if you see things this and that way I punish you by not talking to you anymore" does not either.

... except that I am not 'not talking to you anymore', but I do refuse to discuss the Soviet Union with you and Kilgor.

Offending each other serves no purpose.

Accept my apologies for any offense caused by my words. It was inappropriate on my part.

Lokos

[tony6]

All I can say is - great site.
Nice work.

[Belrick]

YOu miss the point completely lokos.

Without a shadow of a doubt, human beings living as americans had a vastly superior quality of life to those living under the soviet rule.

Whats terrible for me is that you compare the killing of foreign citizens of whom your at war with to the killing of vast numbers of your own people.

Youve been brainwashed.

[Kitsune]

The thing is, you see, I don't consider them important enough to invalidate the legitimacy of the Soviet state.
That would warrant an explanation. Why do you regard them as "not important enough"?

[Lokos]

That would warrant an explanation. Why do you regard them as "not important enough"?

The slaughter of the Native Americans, Vietnamese civilians and the wholesale destruction of Dresden, Hamburg, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Tokyo (and almost every other major Japanese city) does not invalidate the American system - even though all of the above were morally reprehensible. If the retort is: 'But they had to defeat the Axis!', then mine is 'So did the Soviets! And, before 1941, they [the Soviets] were an international pariah openly despised by all. If one considers the Soviet Union worth preserving, than the actions undertaken to assure that were morally justified, just as the various American "crimes" were.'

Within historical and historiographical consciousness (and in the sphere of everyday reality) the ends too often justify the means for your arguments against the Soviet system to hold weight.

Therefore: Not important enough. There was nothing intriniscally morally bankrupt about the Soviet system. When its leaders were incapable, brutish or tyrannous, so was the Soviet Union. When its leaders were moderate, reasonable and conscious of the wellbeing of the citizenry, the Soviet Union was a country similar to many others and not morally flawed in any inherent way.

And, the next person who brings up 'But the Communists make people poor!' gets a slap in the face. Get an education, for crying out loud. Being poor is not morally wrong.

Without a shadow of a doubt, human beings living as americans had a vastly superior quality of life to those living under the soviet rule

This was also the case under the Tsarist system. What's your point? It is not a crime to be without wealth, especially since that is as much a matter of contextuality as it is a construction of an impracticable socio-economic system.

Whats terrible for me is that you compare the killing of foreign citizens of whom your at war with to the killing of vast numbers of your own people.

Ho-ly ****. So Hitler killing sixteen million Soviet citizens (just the civilians - counting soldiers the figure hits twenty seven million) was morally more justifiable than Stalin's decisions causing the deaths of between two and five million Soviet citizens? You can be quiet now.

Youve been brainwashed.

Yes, damn this tertiary education of mine. It's given me all sorts of crazy ideas. Like objectivity. And a relativist outlook.

:roll:

Lokos