IDF on "territories"

[Javehn]

I would really like to open some proffesional thread about that matter , and clarify couple of things . I saw that Chechnya war thread has been operated in very proffesional manner , and i want to make this one something like that . Now in past i opened that kind of thread , it went pretty well but it died very soon . Instead people continued to post flamatory threads about that matter , and with people that no more no less served in that conflict .
Now , i am pretty shure also , that this thread perhaps gonna follow it's "father" thread , or it will die under political bull**** and flame . So i really don't know if i should open this one . But i saw a lot of people in here , that was really interested , why IDF did this and that . So perhaps for them , it is worth to open this thread .
So , if people are interested , i would like to make it on proffesional level, sort of like Mujahadeen and Chechnya thread , and in first sign of poitical or flamatory bull**** , i am contacting the moderator , and asking him to close the thread .

If you are really interested , please ask different question about IDF conduct (again , please , only one proffesional level , i now it's to much to ask from some people in here , but please try) . To give overall background , i was in IDF sence mid 2000- mid 2003 , passed different courses and routes , and mostly i served as a tanker . I "visited" throw different cities in west bank ,Lebanon border , and in Gaza for a short period . There are also people in here that was part of IDF , like IDFM203 that served in infantry , and if you have some good questions , you can adress them .

Again , for first sign of bull**** , or statements from any kind , i am asking moderator to close the thread . There are people who wants to know , and really willing to learn . Don't spoil it for them . Can i trust that people will have proffesional questions in here ?

[mustamato]

Did IDF as you see it use more violence than necessary sometimes? The reason to why I ask is of course that violence is provocative and is answered by even more violence from the other side.

[Javehn]

Did IDF as you see it use more violence than necessary sometimes as you see it? The reason to why I ask is of course that violence is provocative and is answered by even more violence from the other side.

By violence you mean frequent use of arms fire to resord different situation , that perhaps can be resorded in other means ? That caused by several things :

1) IDF soldiers that operate in cities carrying live ammo , sence they are getting fired at frequently . And it's problematic to change constantly from live ammo to blank , or to bring non lethal units . Imagine you bringing anti demonstration force with water vehicle , and they getting shot at with RPG ? It's very simple identified as war zone , and you can't bring there soldiers that can't fit in the scene . There were developed systems how to use live bullets in a non - lethal way , so soldier don't have to change it's ammo magazine , or weapon - something that takes precios time , and can cost soldiers life (however , soldiers that operate inside the cities , do carry , non lethal meassures , and use them before resording to the life boolets ) .


2) In that type of enviroment , it was prooved that you can't understand who is non-combatant , and who is combatant , and you don't have no "front lines" where you can expect the enemy . Special tactic was developed to that matter , in order to safe soldiers lifes , that can die without a problem in that fighting enviroment :

1)Act always as you just been engaged . 2)Always preserve soldier lifes when you can .

That is the basic moto , and from it , all of the MOUT tactics been developed . So sometimes it seems like IDF soldiers perform violent use of weapons , when he is following this tactic , and his last meaning is to harm someone . This tactic requires setelty , and sometimes soldiers did miscorectly used it . But in almost 99 percent of cases , it been used as professional tool in soldiers hands , saving they lifes .

3) Fighting "fair" is a privilage reserved to "arm chair" generals or people that don't know the basic meaning of fighting , and to outnumber/outfire/outflank the enemy is basic tactical truth . Unless you don't mind to loose great number of soldiers in proccess of fighting , you don't wait until the enemy will aproach to you , and punch you first .

If you have more specific case , bring the case , and i explain why the soldier acted this way (if it is not going against OPSEC regulations) .

[Kicius]

Hmm, it's a rather historical question, and I'dont want to start any BS.

During my study in Academy of National Defense (AON-Rembertów) I heard a story about IDF commandrs (ex-polish ) that were using polish language in radio transmissions to avoid being understood by arabs.

Can't remember if it was 6 days or Yom Kippur war.

Would you be so kind to tell me if it is true or is it another BS.

:roll:

[Javehn]

That's pretty cool "Navahoo" story !! Unfortunatly , i really don't know nothing about this matter . It can be truth , even if it sounds very strange (don't forget the fact , that Soviet Electronic intell subs and ships floated southern to Tiran openings of red sea , and picked up any communication . And as far as i know , polan can be understandable by Russian speakers, or at list can be translated by Soviet Polan speakers , and messaged back to Egypt ) .
IDF developed another code systems to speak on the radio during war , but it was based on hebrew .

[Kicius]

And as far as i know , polan can be understandable

Polish sounds better :D



IDF developed another code systems to speak on the radio during war , but it's based on hebrew

I think it clears the matter.

Thanks for the rapid response ;)

[SeanAshi]

I hope that the IDF isn't buying into this 10 year ceasefire that Hamas has offered, its obivious that Hamas is hurting and they would use that time to rearm and replenish their ranks, Israel, IDF keep up the war on terrorism! And don't let international opinion keep you down, because it is justified, you do not make peace with organnizations who's goal is the destruction of your state, your way of life, your religion, the anti-semitics in Europe can goto hell woot

[One?]

I hope that the IDF isn't buying into this 10 year ceasefire that Hamas has offered, its obivious that Hamas is hurting and they would use that time to rearm and replenish their ranks, Israel, IDF keep up the war on terrorism! And don't let international opinion keep you down, because it is justified, you do not make peace with organnizations who's goal is the destruction of your state, your way of life, your religion, the anti-semitics in Europe can goto hell woot

Israel cannot handle a war, the effects on the economy, tourism etc.. show that. They need a solution.

[SeanAshi]

So called peace with Terrorist groups is not a solution.

[Fox2]

Excuse me for the harsh language, but...

The only thing holding Israel back from grabbing the terrorists by the balls is political pressure.

I agree these things need to be handled with balance and subtlety, but negotiating with the monsters such as hizbollah and hamas is not an option in my opinion.

[alexbmn]

political pressure? Well the Chief of General Staff and honestly the leaders of the Army do not believe that the conflict has a military solution.Basically they were quite surprised that all the half assed measures that they authorised didnt achieve victory and as result they are almost completely pulling back.(Notice the complete lack of responces to any terrorist acts in the last three months) . Basically if you want to know the IDF's non strategy read this.

Column One: It's a war

By Caroline Glick, JPost

(Who says there's no military solution?)

In an address at Haifa University on Tuesday, IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Moshe Ya'alon told his audience, "The dilemma regarding targeted killings [of terrorists] takes into account how the action will impact the public debate. As the chief of staff I have a dilemma: to wait for a terrorist attack in order to be just, or to attack in order to prevent casualties."

Contrast Ya'alon's statement with one made by Mrs. Hagit Mendellevich in a Haifa courtroom on Sunday. Mendellevich's 13-year-old son Yuval was murdered in the suicide attack on bus 37 on Moriah Boulevard in Haifa last March 5. The occasion of her remarks was a petition by the parents of the 17 murdered Israelis to the court to cancel a plea bargain reached by the district attorney with one of the conspirators to the attack. The plea bargain, which the court upheld, erased the charges of conspiracy to murder from his indictment.

In her court testimony Mendellevich said: "Many buses have blown up in recent years in Israel. How many of you remember the attack on Moriah Boulevard? If you don't remember, it is because we have learned to be slaughtered and murdered without a sound. What is the difference between the bus on which my son was murdered and the crematoria where my grandfather and grandmother were murdered? Buses are moving crematoria for those who have no choice but to travel by public transportation. I feel that I have been abandoned by the state and that Israel is the only country that judges crimes against humanity as if they are criminal offenses."

Also in his address on Tuesday, Ya'alon restated his position that the lack of consensus in Israeli society about the nature of the conflict with the Palestinians "makes it difficult to agree on the response; impedes the legitimacy of the application of force and the support for the IDF and its actions."

Colonel (res.), Yehuda Wegman believes that Ya'alon's statements are the result of professional confusion. "The COS gets paid to protect Israeli citizens, not to worry about what people will say about what the IDF does. He is 'just' when he defends Israelis, not when he waits for a massacre in order to justify providing this defense."

Wegman, who commands a reserve armored brigade, caused waves in the defense establishment when in September 2002 he published an article in the defense journal Ma'arachot under the title, "The limited conflict trap." Wegman argued that the major cause for the IDF's failure to end the Palestinian terror onslaught is the refusal of the General Staff to define the current state of armed conflict as a war.

Speaking to The Jerusalem Post this week, Wegman explained, "A decision was made by former Deputy COS Major Gen. Uzi Dayan at the outset of the conflict that Israel would view Palestinian terror as a limited conflict rather than as a war. From that point on, the IDF was left without direction. Its entire war fighting doctrine was unceremoniously discarded.

"Terror and guerrilla wars are a type of actual war and the IDF's fighting doctrine applies equally to these types of warfare as to conventional warfare between armored divisions. The purpose is to defeat the enemy. But when the commanders on the ground are told that this isn't a war, what are they supposed to do? How are they supposed to fight? What is the job of the army here?"

Wegman makes a clear distinction between the IDF's tactical commanders in the field and its strategic leadership on the General Staff. "Israel's tactical command is the best in the world. After a relatively long period of limited engagements with the Palestinians, the field commanders understood that the piecemeal policy of dealing with the terrorists as if they were not waging a war against Israel didn't work. It was the field commanders – the brigade and battalion commanders – who convinced the General Staff to allow IDF forces to go into the refugee camps. The officers in the General Staff insisted that going into the camps would involve hundreds of casualties, that they were unconquerable. It was the tactical forces on the ground that convinced them otherwise and their operations were a world-class success."

The difference between the tactics and strategy are clear when one looks at what is actually being accomplished. The day after Ya'alon gave his address in Haifa, IDF forces killed three terrorists and arrested 30 terror suspects in operations in five refugee camps in Samaria. Among the terror suspects rounded up was Mutaser Abu Aliyoun, a senior Fatah terrorist from Jenin who was involved in numerous attacks, including the murder of three Israelis.

The effectiveness of the IDF's tactical operations was brought home on Thursday with the IDF's publication of comparative statistics on the war from 2001-2003. 2003 saw a 30 percent drop in the number of terror attacks from 2002 (3,831 vs. 5,301) and a 50% drop in fatalities – 213 in 2003 vs. 451 in 2002.

At the same time, the report points to the fact that the Palestinians are developing new tactics for fighting. These include the increased use of women as bombers and bombing accomplices; the use of foreign terrorists to conduct operations in Israel; a rise in the involvement of Israeli Arabs in terrorist attacks; attacks against American targets; attempted assassination of Israeli leaders; use of Palestinians with foreign passports to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad; utilization of underground tunnels to bomb IDF outposts; the attachment of bombs to animals; and the use of ambulances to transport bombers and their accomplices.

Added to the Palestinian operational adjustments is the fact that the Palestinian leadership refuses to take any action against the terrorists and that Palestinian society still supports the terror war. The latter issue was made clear this week when a consortium of Palestinian NGOs refused to sign a US declaration that the aid they receive will not go to terrorists or terrorist organizations. And, so, as Wegman notes, "as we flit from operation to operation, the Palestinians remain committed to carrying out their war until they achieve their goal of defeating Israel."

Wegman rues the IDF's high command's misapprehension of the nature of the armed struggle. "The IDF high command's refusal to accept that Israel is fighting a war makes the ingenious fighting of the forces in the field strategically pointless." In his view, "If Israel continues along this path, we will see a Lebanonization of the war."

In Lebanon, the IDF's acceptance of the view that "there is no military solution" gave Hizbullah complete control over the level of hostilities.
Every time that the IDF managed to cause Hizbullah painful losses, the terrorist organization sued for temporary cease-fires which allowed it to regroup and escalate its attacks. Israel surrendered the initiative. The location and intensity of the fighting was decided by the enemy.

In an interview with Yediot Aharonot two weeks ago, Ya'alon indicated that the IDF is indeed following a similar course with the Palestinians to the one it adopted so abysmally in South Lebanon. Speaking of targeted killing of Hamas commanders, Ya'alon opined, "Since our attack [in September 2003] against the Hamas leadership, they fear for their continued existence and are careful not to provide us a justification for attacking their leadership again," he said.
Wegman believes that the IDF's decision to stop targeting the leaders of Hamas this past fall was a strategic blunder of the first order. "The basis for reaching a decisive conclusion of war is the doctrinal principle of 'concentration of effort.'

The point is to concentrate your forces and resources in a manner that brings about the achievement of superiority that causes the defeat of your enemy." "When we were conducting targeted killings once every couple of weeks, they had no effect. When, in September 2003, the IDF conducted these attacks everyday, Hamas sued for a cease-fire. This showed that the concentration of effort was succeeding. But the war fighting doctrine is also based on the principle of continuous engagement. Rather than continuing the operations until Hamas was defeated, the IDF gave them a reprieve. Again, this is the direct result of the General Staff refusing to accept that this is a war."

In late November, there were a number of articles in the US press referring to assistance and coaching that Israel is providing for the US military forces in Iraq. In everything from erecting roadblocks to conducting arrests of terror suspects in urban areas, the reports noted, the Americans are emulating IDF operational tactics. When questioned about the issue, US Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez explained that the difference between US and Israeli actions is that the US forces in Iraq are engaged in a war.

Commenting from Baghdad on the progress of that war to The Washington Post last month, US Army Brig. Gen. Mark Hertling indicated that the decrease in attacks in December over November "might be due to us having significantly hurt the enemy during the operations; it could be that the thugs and criminals being paid to conduct the attacks are not up for fighting anymore Or, it might mean the enemy is gearing up for another offensive. And that's why it's important that we keep the pressure on with offensive operations."

In his interview with Yediot Aharonot, Ya'alon stated that he looks forward to a Hizbullah-styled cease-fire being reached "within weeks," followed by years of low intensity fighting. In light of this, it would seem that while the US moves ahead towards victory over the terrorist and guerrilla fighters in Iraq in part by adopting IDF operational tactics, the IDF itself will continue to amaze with its tactical achievements while victory slips from its grasp.

[alexbmn]

Amir Oren of Haaretz also does a good job explaining the methods of the IDF.Why they are afraid of taking the fight to the enemy I cannot understand(despite the fact that they have achieved total tactical superiority) Case in point, two years ago Palestinians were certain that the Army was AFRaid of entering West bank Cities,while the Palis in Gaza thought they were hot ****. Well they were proven wrong. Big time

[Ichhabe]

And why FFS did you kids hi jack this thread and yet again turned it in to a ME FLAME PARADE.

Why can't you for once leave the politics, for crying out loud. :bash:

SeanAshi: I hope you're developing a burning itch below the belt for starting it, moron. :bash: :fork:

[Javehn]

Yes , indeed , so much for proffesional thread (not much doubt there , offcorse ) ... Thank you very much , thread was very interesting , and lasted 3 responces without political **** . I will ask moderator to close it now .

Is it really so hard just for once to suck it up , and ask proffesional questions ? I don't understand . Why other threads can be that , and that subject not .Honestly , this forum turned into one big politic crap .

Nice article , Alex

[Kicius]

Oh, Javehn it's not so bad (so far).



this forum turned into one big politic crap .

I'm rather passive here (english skills) but most of the threads are just like you said.

Two more questions if I can.
- I'm not a tanker and maybe it's childish but what are basic IDF rules of using Tanks/APC's in urbanized area?
- Did russian "Grozny experience" influenced this rules/tactics

[Javehn]

Well , as long as you are pessimist (passive rofl ;) ) , then i guess i can be also . Thanks for questions , perhaps it's still early to ask this thread to get locked . By the way , i will try to answer to you as much as i can , but i have to consider also the Operational Security , so i couldn't tell you many things .

1) The basic rules are : Well , as overall i said that the main rule for the entire tactics in Urban areas are : 1) Act always as like you been engaged . That influenced a lot on development of Urban tactic warfare , as tanks as an infantry .
IDF didn't wanted to use tanks inside urban areas until current Intifada (mid 2000) . The first incursions were performed by light forces , light vehicles . But when the firefight intenstity in the cities grown , as the number of incursions IDF performed , tank was initially waited outside the cities , as fire support in case that fire fight errupts , and used for cover and rescue .
Then , it was found , that because of it's optic abillities + it's presice fire + offcorse armor the tanks do have role inside the cities , while working in pare with infantry , and those pluses can overcome the minuses of tanks in the city (elefant in small store , difficulties to defend itseld in close ranges ) . Infantry also changed it's vehicles from light armor , to more bullet proof vehicles , and APC's . Tank weapons were modified in order to fit more inside cities ( bigger number of Machine guns , and use of personal arms from a tank ) , and a tank tactic was modified , to allow close engagements . Also the tactic of combined work between mount infantry and tanks in city was made .

So basicly : The tank role in city is to use it's optic , and presice fire .
Mount Infantry role is to defend tank in close ranges , and basicly do what the tank crue can't , like dismount from the vehicle , check people , and so on . It is mounted on APC's most of the time in order to protect from bullets . The casualties number (APC and soldiers) from RPG /ATGM was rather small , and innefective , so to be mounted inside the vehicle prooved to be more correct . Unlike in Chechnya , for example , where the Chechen Combatants using RPG's , and ATGM very good tacticly right , presice and so on , so to be inside the APC is the wrong thing to do for Russian soldiers .

So , the combination of several vehicles , that every one serves different purpose is called task force . There can be different number of vehicles in task force , according to the job it's supposed to do , but one of the basic is Tank and APC .

About Chechen compain , i don't know how much really there can be learned from first campain (except the fact that sometimes huge balls defeat everything , and perhaps the Special operations ) , but i am shure the lesson where learned from it . One of the reasons , by the way , that IDF didn't wanted to move tanks inside the cities was the lesson learned by Russians in Chechnya ..


There is much more on those things to talk , but it's also much beyond the OPSEC . So , in very overall lines that is pretty much the thing .

Example of task force :
http://www.waronline.org/IDF/pictures/Raids/Jenin/15-18apr02/006.jpg

Another example for different task force :

http://www.waronline.org/IDF/pictures/Raids/Jenin/10-12apr02/014.jpg

[Kicius]

where the Chechen Combatants using RPG's , and ATGM very good tacticly right , presice and so on , so to be inside the APC is the wrong thing to do for Russian soldiers .


It's the main difference, i was thinking about.


i will try to answer to you as much as i can , but i have to consider also the Operational Security , so i couldn't tell you many things .


I don't want to read IDF FM, your answer satisfies me completely. Nice pictures too.

Thanks.

[Javehn]

I don't want to read IDF FM, your answer satisfies me completely. Nice pictures too.

No problem ..


It's the main difference, i was thinking about.

To make something clear - The relative small use of it doesn't mean they don't have the means . To every problem there are several sollutions , and in order to destroy APC/Tank the palestinian fighters said something like this : " Well , it is too risky to use ATGM or RPG , because we are exposing our position on place. It's also too bad to waste those means , because we can miss ..." . Palestinian fighters have very dominant numbers of snipers , and almost 70 percent of them have sniper or hunting scopes on they weapons . And instead of fire ATGM/RPG on the vehicle , you can destroy the vehicle by shooting one single boolet on the man that stand in the hatch , and probably is the commander of the vehicle . Hit the commander , and he entire vehicle is down .
That is they tactic to this matter . They do have pretty wast number of AT means , and they are making limited use of it , because they saving the means for full IDF incursion . During the last IDF wast operation called "Defence Wall" , there was a big number of RPG and ATGM use by Palestinian fighters .

By the way , the tactic of Sniping unfortunatly did worked , and the f***s managed to hit some number of hatched soldiers . The most famous case was when in incursion to Rammalah during operation "Defence Wall" , when Pali sniper managed to hit Tank Officer in his face threw his hatch crack , pretty hard shot !!