Luno
10-15-2005, 10:30 AM
When I did read about the thread “Russian special forces assault police station” i remember reading an article on the FOI (Defence Research Agency) page about terrorism and that’s it is nearly impossible to stop operations like that.
Here is the article
We are always going to be surprised
(From Framsyn Magazine 3-2005)
The terrorist attacks of September 11, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the attack on Pearl Harbour are example of events which took the world by surprise. In the future we will be better equipped to detect certain threats and to reduce their effects. The problem remains, however, of getting politicians and the security services to think “out of the box”.
The problem of early warning is a factor of dramatically growing importance in today’s world.
If you search Google for the concept “early warning” today, you will get some 17 million hits, and this number is growing at the rate of 2-3 million every year. The majority of these relate to medicine, meteorology or the economy. Where systems to deal with hostile acts, that is to say human-generated threats, are concerned, the search yields a little over a hundred – which by any standards seems to be a reasonable number.
History is littered with examples of early warning failures, especially where military or other hostile attacks are concerned: Pearl Harbour, Yom Kippur, Afghanistan, Kuwait and September 11, to name just a few. Other events of major significance to the global community provide examples where there was little or no advance warning: the first Sputnik, India’s nuclear weapon test and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The terrorist attacks of 11 September have been described as being more significant from a warning point of view than Pearl Harbour, the reasoning being that September 11 showed that an enemy could strike anywhere in the United States and in this way affect the whole nation in a strategic sense.
Successes on the increase
Failures appear to be many and successes few. This picture, however, is not wholly true. Successes often remain unknown for various reasons, mainly to do with secrecy and protecting sources. In certain cases a warning of intent is a practical impossibility. During the Cold War we had a permanent warning signal regarding the Soviet Union’s capabilities and intentions but we have no way of knowing whether or when a dictator like North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is going to attack a neighbouring country. This is an illustration of the concept of “secrets”, which are capable of being unlocked, and “mysteries” which are virtually impossible to penetrate. Where warning is concerned, terrorism leads us back to the Cold War. The threat is permanent, but can now be unleashed globally. Matching countermeasures must be developed and this has led to major changes for most of the world’s intelligence services. The result has been increased investment in cooperation, the development of technology and the use of human sources.
The American professor Richard K Betts, a doyen among experts in this field, sums up his view of the concept of early warning in these words: We will always be surprised. He maintains, moreover, that it is a natural feature of the intelligence process. We have reached the age of surprise.
One definition seems apt: early warning exists only if it can be followed by an early countermeasure. In other words, if the signal is there in the literal sense, but is not followed up, there is no early warning. The United States intelligence community predicted in good time, in a National Intelligence Estimate, the violent collapse of Yugoslavia but other events overshadowed the message which was consequently lost with the well-known result.
Compartmentalised thinking is an obstacle
When a early warning is not recognised or heeded, the cause is often narrow or negative thinking. But most failures in this respect have their origin in the nature of the intelligence process. History has shown that the information is usually somewhere in the system but that the analysis has been either inadequate or faulty. From experience we can divide the reasons for this into either structural or analytical causes.
Among the more important structural explanations is the relationship between the intelligence organisations and politicians or decision makers. Research has consistently identified this as the greatest single problem. The lack of a common language, compartmentalised thinking, the inability to ask the right questions and to recognise the limitations of the intelligence service’s ability to produce a timely warning, all belong in this category.
Among the analytical explanations are cognitive rigidity or “group think”, the fear of being different or giving false alarms, the so-called “cry-wolf syndrome”. The converse picture: as the philosopher Karl Popper concluded, cognitive consistency leads to irrational consistency when we attempt to explain away new and contradictory information. Politicians are therefore seldom interested in information which calls for a sudden change of course, which frequently results in a defensive avoidance of difficult decisions. On the other hand, the Iraq war shows that unduly close relations can lead to the politicising of the interpretation and utilisation of the intelligence product.
Common to both the problem categories is the fact that a Devil’s advocate is needed in the process, both to test the robustness of the analytical process and to provide thinking “out of the box”. A sound and effective early warning function should, moreover, be based on the cumulative compilation of the picture rather than on the latest news. The knowledge that we consider that we possess today does not imply understanding of new knowledge that we may acquire in the future. In other words, humility and fantasy both play important roles.
In today’s world, warning systems have of necessity become increasingly globalised, sophisticated and threat-adaptive. Terrorists can, for example, finance their activities through engaging in criminal activities in one country in preparation for terrorist action in another country while, at the same time, living in a third. Forewarning of economic instability, which can lead to civil war and perhaps genocide in the third world, is another example. NATO has, for instance, gone to great pains to identify such warning signs. The future probably lies in the development and interlinking of different warning systems since threats are becoming increasingly interrelated.
False feeling of security
Since the close of the 19th century, indicator lists have been seen as providing an important, even essential, method of warning and they have been drawn up in large numbers. They do, however, have the disadvantage that they have limited applicability and can engender a false sense of security.
For example, Israel has frequently found the system impossible to use in practice. The threat has remained constantly at a very high level and, in principle, all indicator lamps are permanently lit. Various NGOs maintain up-to-date indices containing warning signals for instability, the danger of genocide, famine and starvation and civil conflict, focusing particularly on regions threatened by instability. Through an extensive knowledge of the area, well-developed feelers and direct links to various western governments, the system has in some instances been successful in bringing about not only early warning but a timely response as well. Today an increasing number of think tanks are studying methods of early warning and the tempo at which research is being generated in the universities is brisk.
We are going to continue to be surprised. That is in the nature of things. But through increased cooperation, both nationally and internationally, combined with a better appreciation of the lessons to be learned from past failures, we can improve the likelihood of detecting certain threats and, above all, of reducing their effects if the threats are realised. The instruments at our disposal to manage this situation are becoming more numerous but the way ahead as we seek to achieve better early warning is a long one, and time unfortunately is quite often on the side of the attacker.
Here is the article
We are always going to be surprised
(From Framsyn Magazine 3-2005)
The terrorist attacks of September 11, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the attack on Pearl Harbour are example of events which took the world by surprise. In the future we will be better equipped to detect certain threats and to reduce their effects. The problem remains, however, of getting politicians and the security services to think “out of the box”.
The problem of early warning is a factor of dramatically growing importance in today’s world.
If you search Google for the concept “early warning” today, you will get some 17 million hits, and this number is growing at the rate of 2-3 million every year. The majority of these relate to medicine, meteorology or the economy. Where systems to deal with hostile acts, that is to say human-generated threats, are concerned, the search yields a little over a hundred – which by any standards seems to be a reasonable number.
History is littered with examples of early warning failures, especially where military or other hostile attacks are concerned: Pearl Harbour, Yom Kippur, Afghanistan, Kuwait and September 11, to name just a few. Other events of major significance to the global community provide examples where there was little or no advance warning: the first Sputnik, India’s nuclear weapon test and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The terrorist attacks of 11 September have been described as being more significant from a warning point of view than Pearl Harbour, the reasoning being that September 11 showed that an enemy could strike anywhere in the United States and in this way affect the whole nation in a strategic sense.
Successes on the increase
Failures appear to be many and successes few. This picture, however, is not wholly true. Successes often remain unknown for various reasons, mainly to do with secrecy and protecting sources. In certain cases a warning of intent is a practical impossibility. During the Cold War we had a permanent warning signal regarding the Soviet Union’s capabilities and intentions but we have no way of knowing whether or when a dictator like North Korea’s Kim Jong Il is going to attack a neighbouring country. This is an illustration of the concept of “secrets”, which are capable of being unlocked, and “mysteries” which are virtually impossible to penetrate. Where warning is concerned, terrorism leads us back to the Cold War. The threat is permanent, but can now be unleashed globally. Matching countermeasures must be developed and this has led to major changes for most of the world’s intelligence services. The result has been increased investment in cooperation, the development of technology and the use of human sources.
The American professor Richard K Betts, a doyen among experts in this field, sums up his view of the concept of early warning in these words: We will always be surprised. He maintains, moreover, that it is a natural feature of the intelligence process. We have reached the age of surprise.
One definition seems apt: early warning exists only if it can be followed by an early countermeasure. In other words, if the signal is there in the literal sense, but is not followed up, there is no early warning. The United States intelligence community predicted in good time, in a National Intelligence Estimate, the violent collapse of Yugoslavia but other events overshadowed the message which was consequently lost with the well-known result.
Compartmentalised thinking is an obstacle
When a early warning is not recognised or heeded, the cause is often narrow or negative thinking. But most failures in this respect have their origin in the nature of the intelligence process. History has shown that the information is usually somewhere in the system but that the analysis has been either inadequate or faulty. From experience we can divide the reasons for this into either structural or analytical causes.
Among the more important structural explanations is the relationship between the intelligence organisations and politicians or decision makers. Research has consistently identified this as the greatest single problem. The lack of a common language, compartmentalised thinking, the inability to ask the right questions and to recognise the limitations of the intelligence service’s ability to produce a timely warning, all belong in this category.
Among the analytical explanations are cognitive rigidity or “group think”, the fear of being different or giving false alarms, the so-called “cry-wolf syndrome”. The converse picture: as the philosopher Karl Popper concluded, cognitive consistency leads to irrational consistency when we attempt to explain away new and contradictory information. Politicians are therefore seldom interested in information which calls for a sudden change of course, which frequently results in a defensive avoidance of difficult decisions. On the other hand, the Iraq war shows that unduly close relations can lead to the politicising of the interpretation and utilisation of the intelligence product.
Common to both the problem categories is the fact that a Devil’s advocate is needed in the process, both to test the robustness of the analytical process and to provide thinking “out of the box”. A sound and effective early warning function should, moreover, be based on the cumulative compilation of the picture rather than on the latest news. The knowledge that we consider that we possess today does not imply understanding of new knowledge that we may acquire in the future. In other words, humility and fantasy both play important roles.
In today’s world, warning systems have of necessity become increasingly globalised, sophisticated and threat-adaptive. Terrorists can, for example, finance their activities through engaging in criminal activities in one country in preparation for terrorist action in another country while, at the same time, living in a third. Forewarning of economic instability, which can lead to civil war and perhaps genocide in the third world, is another example. NATO has, for instance, gone to great pains to identify such warning signs. The future probably lies in the development and interlinking of different warning systems since threats are becoming increasingly interrelated.
False feeling of security
Since the close of the 19th century, indicator lists have been seen as providing an important, even essential, method of warning and they have been drawn up in large numbers. They do, however, have the disadvantage that they have limited applicability and can engender a false sense of security.
For example, Israel has frequently found the system impossible to use in practice. The threat has remained constantly at a very high level and, in principle, all indicator lamps are permanently lit. Various NGOs maintain up-to-date indices containing warning signals for instability, the danger of genocide, famine and starvation and civil conflict, focusing particularly on regions threatened by instability. Through an extensive knowledge of the area, well-developed feelers and direct links to various western governments, the system has in some instances been successful in bringing about not only early warning but a timely response as well. Today an increasing number of think tanks are studying methods of early warning and the tempo at which research is being generated in the universities is brisk.
We are going to continue to be surprised. That is in the nature of things. But through increased cooperation, both nationally and internationally, combined with a better appreciation of the lessons to be learned from past failures, we can improve the likelihood of detecting certain threats and, above all, of reducing their effects if the threats are realised. The instruments at our disposal to manage this situation are becoming more numerous but the way ahead as we seek to achieve better early warning is a long one, and time unfortunately is quite often on the side of the attacker.