British operations in Sierra Leone

[TarwarWarrior]

Hey all!

I was wondering if anyone here has a good source of info and pics on the operations carried out by the British Army in Sierra Leone in 2000.

So far I have managed to find the one link:

http://britains-smallwars.com/main/index1.html

It has some really solid info and was looking for more along these lines. Anything you can suggets would be great - thanks much in advance!

-TW, out!-

[2RHPZ]

Sierra Leone

1 PARA Battle Group (BG) during Operation PALLISER in Sierra Leone 8-26 May 00.

1 PARA had been held at 5 days Notice To Move as the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (ABTF) since 1 Sep 99 (shortly after returning from Op AGRICOLA - the Entry into Kosovo operation Jun-Aug 99) and at 24-48 hours Notice To Move as SPEARHEAD since 1 Mar 00. The majority of the Battalion had recently returned from Easter Leave on 2 May 00 while A Coy Gp had deployed to Jamaica on an Overseas Training Exercise on 30 Apr 00.

The BG was first alerted for a possible Non Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) in Sierra Leone on Fri 6 May 00. The battalion's shortfalls, including the absent A Coy Gp, were addressed by backfilling from 2 PARA. The Battle Group moved to the Operational Mounting Centre (OMC) at South Cerney on Sat 6 May 00 and began to deploy on Sun 7 May 00, moving by air to a Forward mounting Base (FMB) at Dakar in Senegal and then onwards to secure Lungi Airport as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for a NEO. The Battle Group (BG) was complete at the FOB by 2330 hours on Mon 8 May 00, 64 hours after the first notice of contingency planning.

The first telephone call came at 0730 on Fri 6 May 00 and was taken at home by the 21C. The Battalion Orderly Sergeant received an urgent message for the CO or 21C to telephone the SDO LAND. This led to the 21C hurrying into work in order to make a subsequent telephone call to DACOS G3 Ops LAND, 'm which the Battalion was alerted to the possibility of a deployment to Sierra Leone for a NEO operation. After an initial introduction the SO I, who was to become the Battalion's point of contact in LAND for the next 48 hours? A 25-niinute conversation followed during which the 21C worked hard to "sell" the 1 PARA Battle Group as the solution to the problem. The potential rivals were SF and the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG). based on 42 Cdo RM embarked in HMS OCEAN, which was 'm Marseilles and could reach Sierra Leone waters in 12 days time. At this stage the emphasis was very firmly on contingency planning for the use of the SPEARHEAD Lead Element (SLE) as one of a number of options being considered.

Planning continued fitfully throughout the day. Initially, there was doubt that the PJHQ's contingency planning would develop into an operation but as the day progressed the possibility of deployment increased. At 1030 the 21C received a telephone call explaining that the situation in Sierra Leone was confused and deteriorating as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) advanced on Freetown.

A Zambian battalion, part of the UN Mission to Sierra Leone (UNMASIL), was reported to have surrendered. There were fears of a general collapse of UNAMSIL and the capture of Freetown by the RUF leading to a threat to the safety of some 1000 Entitled Persons (EP). The Cabinet had met the previous day but did not wish to take unilateral action that nu'ght precipitate the collapse of UNAMSIL.

At 1710,the 21Cwas informed that the operation was called PALLISER. Freetown's airport on the northern side of the Sierra Leone River at Lungi was judged to be vulnerable. At 1400 on Sat 8 May 00, the CO convened the first full O Group with all the supporting commanders invited to be present. The CO introduced the meeting and then handed over to the IO who began to give an in country brief The Battalion received a formal Notice to Move from LAND and wanted to know how quickly the BG could be ready to emplane. It was becoming very clear that the situation in theatre was deteriorating rapidly. The meeting broke up in turmoil as officers rushed to telephones to alert their units to the new timescale.

At 1615 on Sat 8 May 00, the CO directed that the BG was to deploy to the OMC at South Cerney. Shortly afterwards, at about 1700, a message was received from LAND directing the Battalion to move to OMC at best speed. The night at OMC was spent on battle preparation for the forthcoming operation. The key logistic requirement was for ammunition out of the SPEARHEAD pack.

In May 00 the rebel forces broadly comprised two groups: the RUF under the command of Foday Sankoh and the AFRC under Jonny Paul Koromah. The RUF traditionally come from the northern tribes and their main grievance had been their lack of representation in government. This had been addressed at Lome when, apparently at British insistence, Sankoh, then being held by Nigerian ECOMOG forces as a convicted prisoner awaiting execution, was freed and installed as the Minister of Mineral Resources in the Sierra Leone Government. Sankoh had been appointed to oversee the wealth of the Country and,particularly the diamond mines. The AFRC are largely comprised of remnants of the old Sierra Leone Army (SLA).

UNAMSIL was established to oversee the implementation of the Lome peace Agreement and a process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Unfortunately, the international community were slow to meet the UN's call for troops. In May 00 UNAMSIL forces were significantly under their mandated strength and the quality of the troops that had been provided was judged to be poor. Furthermore, UNAMSIL was in disarray and their morale was extremely fragile as a result of the setbacks they had suffered at the hands of the RUF.

The situation in theatre was uncertain. A well armed (including captured UN APCs and weapons) and successful RUF offensive had the potential to overwhelm INAMSIL and capture Freetown so threatening the safety of 1300 UK and other nationals for whom HMG had accepted responsibility.

The BG was tasked to secure Lungi Airport as a FOB and conduct a NEO. C Coy Gp 91 (102 troops in one C-130 Mk 1) was inserted to secure the FOB at Lungi Airport at 1915 hours on Sun 7 May 00 with orders being given inflight en-route to the objective. CO's Tac HQ and D Coy Gp moved forward from the FMB to the FOB on Mon 8 May 00 arriving at 1030 hours before moving by Support Helicopter at 1900 hours to secure, the Aberdeen Peninsula and the Evacuee Assembly Area (EAA) at the UN HQ. The balance of the BG was complete at the FOB by 2330 hours on Mon 8 May 00, 64 hours after the first telephone call.

The operation began with the insertion of C Company who packed 102 troops into a C-130 Mark 1 at Dakar for a TALO style landing at Lungi Airport. The following morning, the CO together with D Company Group flew forward from Dakar into Lungi and that evening were inserted onto the Aberdeen Peninsula by two CH-47 Chinook helicopters of 7 Sqn RAF.

By 12 May 00 it became possible to scale down the NEO effort. A figure of 353 EPs had been evacuated by 12 May 00 and another 65 Senegalese nationals were evacuated on 13 May 00. A figure of 453 registered EPs remained in Freetown.

[Red]

I was very happy that the brits intervened because that whole UNAMSIl mission was a clustermess,the Nigerian commanders were on the take from the RUF,there was always backbiting between the ECOMOG contingent wich i was part of and the rest of the UN package.The Brits did a really good job there

[iflu]

then rebels learned there are two EXTREMELY dangerous things u should never deal with. one is mad dog, athother is british...british para proved they r tuff guys.

[cut]

http://www.countrybookshop.co.uk/images/jackets/1999/184413394X.jpg