Oddball
12-08-2005, 07:35 PM
The Falklands : Harrier ‘Mud Movers’
Alfred Price
RAF Harriers were originally sent to the Falklands configured for air defence duties. Attrition of the Navy’s Sea Harriers was lower than anticipated, and so the RAF’s GR. Mk 3s were switched to interdiction sorties. They made an enormous contribution to the British victory, despite remaining unsung and overshadowed by the more glamorous Sea Harriers.
‘Without prior notice you are to modify the aircraft of your ground-attack squadron, and train your pilots, to operate in the air-to-air fighting role from an aircraft carrier though no carrier will be available for training and none of your pilots has previous experience in carrier flying. Then re-deploy 10 aircraft with spares and ground crews to a remote island 4,000 miles from your base. Do all of this within 3 ½ weeks of the order to start. On the next day six of your aircraft are to land on the deck of a container ship anchored off the island; these will remain on deck for a two-week voyage to the operational area, during which no engine runs or anything other than minor servicing will be possible. Once in the operational area the aircraft will take off from the container ship and land on an aircraft-carrier nearby. After one day to familiarize itself with carrier operating procedures, your squadron is to go to into action. The unit will fly between six and 12 attack missions on each day the weather allows, with a total of 126 tasked missions during a 3 ½ week period. You will have only 18 ground servicing specialists to keep your aircraft flying; all battle damage must be repaired using only the facilities available on the carrier. If aircraft are lost in action, replacements must be flown 3,800 miles from the remote island to the aircraft-carrier with no land diversions along almost the entire route.’
If that order had been given to the commander of a ground-attack squadron anywhere in the world on 1 April 1982, he would probably thought it an April fool’s joke. Almost certainly his reply, in whatever language, would have been a curt ‘impossible’. Yet this was the task given to Wing Commander Peter Squire, the commander of No.1 Squadron of the Royal Air Force, though at the time nobody stated the requirement with that degree of clarity.
During the preparations for the military operation to retake the Falkland Islands following the Argentine invasion in April 1982, the shortage of BAe Sea Harrier naval fighters was a major worry to the British planners: only 30 Sea Harriers had been built, and one of those had been lost in an accident a year earlier. Yet the British naval task force depended on these ‘jump jets’ to provide its air cover; but if there were large-scale air battles against the numerically superior Argentine air forces, it seemed inevitable that Sea Harriers would be lost and the force would be further depleted. The only other source of jump jets was from the Royal Air Force though its Harriers were configured, and the pilots trained, for the roles of ground-attack and battlefield reconnaissance.
There were some rapid studies on the practicability of operating RAF Harriers in the air-to-air fighting role from aircraft-carriers, and these showed that the idea was feasible. No.1 Squadron based at Wittering near Stamford thus received orders to prepare for the operation. In less than a month its pilots had to learn the almost entirely new disciplines of airborne interception and aircraft-carrier deck operations.
While the pilots were retraining, the Harriers earmarked to go south had to be modified for the new role. The changes required fell into two categories: those necessary for the aircraft to operate from the deck of a carrier; and those to fit them for the newly acquired air-to-air fighting role. Some of the changes in the first category were relatively minor: fitting of lashing rings to the outrigger wheel legs, drilling of holes in the airframe in strategic places to allow salt water to run out, minor changes to the nose wheel steering mechanism and the nozzle control system. Rather more involved was the fitting of a transponder to each aircraft, to produce a distinctive blip on the carrier’s radar; and changes to the Harrier’s inertial navigation equipment so it could be aligned on the moving deck of a ship.
None of these changes was particularly difficult, but most of them had to be designed from scratch before prototype installations could be built and tested, and the modifications had all to be completed within three weeks.
The initial contingent of Harrier GR. Mk3 s flew out to Ascension Island in early May, and six landed on the container ship Atlantic Conveyor which transported them to the South Atlantic as deck cargo. On 18 May the ship joined up with the British Task Force off the Falklands and the jump jets transferred to HMS Hermes, which was to be their main operating base throughout the conflict.
Sea Harrier losses during the conflict were lower than had been feared, so in the event No. 1 Squadron’s Harriers did not have to go into action in the interception role. Instead they were to fly in their more normal ground attack role, as ‘mud movers’. The Harriers flew their first-ever attack mission late on the afternoon of 20 May, when Peter Squire led his two flight commanders, Squadron Leaders Bob Iveson and Jerry Pook, in a low-level attack on the Argentine fuel dump situated just outside Fox Bay Settlement on West Falkland. The pilots dropped their BL755 cluster bombs accurately on fuel drums, starting a huge fire.
On the following day, 21 May, the squadron was in action in support of British troops which had landed at Port San Carlos during the early morning darkness. Shortly after dawn Jerry Pook and Flight Lieutenant Mark Hare were ordered to attack Argentine helicopters reported by an SAS patrol near Mount Kent, and arrived in the area to find a Boeing Vertol Chinook, two Aerospatiale Pumas and a Bell UH-1 sitting on the ground well apart. The Harriers made repeated strafing runs with 30-mm canon and set fire to the Chinook and two of the Pumas. After the conflict General Menendez stated that the reason why he had made no attempt to launch a counterattack against the British troops coming ashore was that he lacked sufficient helicopters to fly in the necessary troops and weapons. Certainly the losses that morning, and the threat that his helicopter force would suffer further losses if it operated by day, imposed major constraints on the Argentine commander’s freedom of action.
Also that morning No. 1 Squadron suffered its first Harrier loss to enemy action, when Flight Lieutenant Jeff Glover was shot down by ground fire near Port Howard. The pilot ejected and was taken prisoner.
During the days that followed the squadron was in action whenever the weather permitted, striking at targets on East and West Falkland. To achieve surprise the Harriers had to approach their targets at very low altitude, picking their way through the terrain at altitudes down to 100ft or lower. Flight Lieutenant Tony Harper described the tactics used.
We developed our tactics to fit the situation at the time. We would arrive at high level to make the most of our fuel, then let down going away from the target to spoof the Argentine radar operators into thinking we were going somewhere else. Then we relied on the ultra-low flying to bring us back towards the target without being seen by the radars. Whenever we were within about 30 miles of Port Stanley, if we were attacking targets in that area, we would be down at about 100 feet.
Initially we thought there was going to be a high threat of attack from enemy fighters. We very quickly discovered that there was no threat from the air, so at low altitude we stopped flying what we called a mutually supporting formation - in line abreast, with each pilot searching behind the other for enemy fighters. We ended up flying in search formations, almost in line astern, so that the leader could identify the target in time to tell the No. 2 where it was, so that the latter could get his weapons on it in case the leader’s missed.
We never got blasé about the threat from enemy fighters, however. Every morning we were told: their guys are bound to twig some time, and come and have a fight. So we briefed very carefully what we were going to do if we met enemy fighters at high altitude. Basically, we were going to stand our aircraft on their noses, and go straight down to about 500 feet and fight them on our terms down there. If you roll the Harrier on its back and pull back on the nozzles, you will put it into the vertical and go down very quickly indeed.
Attacking targets at high speed and ultra low-low altitude required considerable skill, but the Harrier pilots’ previous training stood them in good stead:
The problem of flying at 600 knots at 100 feet is that it feels as if you are flying through a ‘tunnel’. There is a segment of about 15 degrees either side of the nose of the aircraft where you can see clearly; on either side the ground is just a blur. Because you are looking through that ‘tunnel’ , and you are so close to the ground, you dare not look anywhere else but where you are going. There is no time to look at a map. You certainly cannot look over your shoulder for possible enemy aircraft which may drop in behind you, or cover the rear of your wing man.
On 24 May Tony Harper took part in the Harrier attack on Port Stanley airfield, the most heavily defended target on the island. For this mission two Sea Harriers of No. 800 Squadron were to approach the target from the north east, and toss radar airburst fused bombs to explode over the anti-aircraft gun positions and distract the defenders; and immediately afterwards two pairs of Harriers of No. 1 Squadron were to run in from the north west and west to attack the runway with parachute-retarded 1,000ib bombs.
The 24th: my first big one, take off 1855Z (1555 local time) against Port Stanley. I was Bob Iveson’s No.2. As we came in we saw mushrooms of smoke in the sky, from the Sea Harriers’ VT (radar airburst) fused bombs. We did not go through the target area particularly fast on that raid because we were trying to bomb as accurately as possible; we flew at about 480-500 knots, almost ‘tunnel vision’ speed. We ran in to attack from the north west, going across the runway towards the control tower. I followed Bob in, he was offset to one side, about half a mile in front and 45 degrees out of my left. He was to straddle the runway about half way up, I was briefed to try and straddle the runway about a quarter of the way up. In fact I got my nearest bomb on the western edge, just off the end.
During my attack run I saw somebody standing on the control tower ‘at the end of the tunnel’ pointing something at me with flashes coming out of it. But I was not seriously fired at, it was exciting without being dangerous.
Following Bob Iveson and Tony Harper, Wing Commander Peter Squire and Flight Lieutenant Mark Hare made their attacking runs on the airfield but achieved no greater success. As is so often the case in air warfare, bravery in action did not compensate for weapons which were unsuitable for the task.
Afterwards we were angry that we had not inflicted any serious damage on the runway and might have to go and do the attack again. But then we wondered about the futility of attacking a runway with the sort of weapons we had. If you are going to attack a runway you need a weapon that will impact at a steep angle and not go off until it has gone through the surface; and parachute-retarded 1,000 pounders don’t do that, they go off as soon as they hit.
The most noteworthy single action by No. 1 Squadron during the conflict came on the late afternoon of 28 May, when Squadron Leader Peter Harris led a three-aircraft attack on Argentine artillery whose fire had halted the advance on Goose Green by men of the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment. As they approached the target area the Harrier pilots received their final briefing over the radio, and were told to hit the enemy guns on the promontory at Goose Green immediately to the east of the settlement: 105-mm howitzers and 35-mm anti-aircraft guns operating in the direct-fire role. Peter Harris described his attack:
As we ran in at 50 to 100 feet the whole area was as one would expect a battlefield to look. We could not see any people, but there was a lot of smoke and several fires burning. Target acquisition was easy because the promontory at Goose Green is such a unique feature. I could see some activity, though at high speed it was impossible to identify it exactly, and dropped my cluster bombs on the easternmost point. As I let go my bombs I saw activity to my right so I told Tony Harper to put his cluster bombs there; he just had time to realign his attack and put his bombs to the right of mine and about 300 yards behind.
As Harper left the target Jerry Pook ran in from the north and fired two pods of 2-in (50.8-mm) rockets, a total of 72 weapons, on the part of the promontory not covered by the bursts of the exploding cluster bomblets. The attack came as a complete surprise to the Argentines and the pilots saw no return fire.
One of those watching the attack was Major Chris Keeble, who had taken command of the paratroop battalion earlier in the day after the death of Colonel ‘H’ Jones:
They came streaking in, one behind the other; each dropped bombs, some on the tip of the peninsula and others at the entrance of the isthmus. Then I heard the cluster bomblets going off, their explosions merging together; it looked as if some hit the sea - there was an effect like throwing gravel into water. Then came the rockets which were most effective, they hit the tip of the peninsula where the 35-mm guns were. The attack gave a great boost to the morale of our troops. I think some of them thought the Harriers had come in a bit too close for comfort, but that is war.
Peter Harris’s attack was a textbook example of a close air support mission: a hard-hitting surprise attack against a target of great importance to the enemy, launched at a crucial time in the land battle and whose results were clearly seen by the ground troops, so strengthening the resolve of those on one side and demoralising those on the other. With most of his supporting artillery weapons knocked out, and the near-certainty of repeat attacks by Harriers if his force continued fighting, the Argentine commander saw his position to be hopeless and ordered his men to surrender on the following morning.
No. 1 Squadron lost two Harriers to ground fire on 27 and 30 May though their pilots, Bob Iveson and Jerry Pook, were able to eject safely. That left only three ground-attack Harriers on the carrier, and necessitated a reinforcement from Ascension Island. On 1 June Flight Lieutenants Murdo Macleod and Mike Beech flew Harriers to the carrier in 8 hour 25 minute non-stop flights covering 3,800miles, supported by Bae Victor tanker aircraft. It was a dramatic demonstration of flying skill by the two pilots, neither of whom had previously landed a Harrier on a ship. A further pair of Harriers flew from Ascension to the Hermes on 8 June.
Once the beach-head at Port San Carlos was secure, men of the Royal Engineers began laying aluminium matting for a Harrier operating strip near the settlement. It was no easy task, as Wing Commander Fred Trowern, the senior RAF liaison officer ashore, recalled:
It was made by hand, from plates each about 10 feet long and 2 feet wide, slotted together. The helicopters flew them in, in bundles, then they had to be laid out by hand. The individual strips were damned heavy - it was as much as two men could do to lift one - and if you were not careful you could cut yourself on the edges. It was hard physical labour, carried out while the area was liable to attack from the air and the weather was cold, wet and very miserable.
The engineers completed the operating strip within a week, working on unprepared ground without any heavy equipment, and the first Harriers and Sea Harriers landed there on 5 June.
During the final 10 days of the conflict, up to the Argentine surrender on 14 June, No. 1 Squadron flew daily attack missions in support of British troops advancing on Port Stanley. During this period the unit flew more sorties making contact with the enemy than any flying units engaged in the conflict, on either side. This phase ended with a couple of attacks with Paveway laser-guided bombs which scored direct hits on enemy troop positions, immediately before the Argentine surrender.
During its 3 ½ weeks of operations No. 1 Squadron flew a total of 126 tasked attack and reconnaissance sorties. As well as imposing major limitations on Argentine surface operations and helping bring about the collapse in morale which led to their final surrender, the Royal Air Force jump-jets enabled the Sea Harriers to concentrate on the all-important fleet air-defence role.
Alfred Price
RAF Harriers were originally sent to the Falklands configured for air defence duties. Attrition of the Navy’s Sea Harriers was lower than anticipated, and so the RAF’s GR. Mk 3s were switched to interdiction sorties. They made an enormous contribution to the British victory, despite remaining unsung and overshadowed by the more glamorous Sea Harriers.
‘Without prior notice you are to modify the aircraft of your ground-attack squadron, and train your pilots, to operate in the air-to-air fighting role from an aircraft carrier though no carrier will be available for training and none of your pilots has previous experience in carrier flying. Then re-deploy 10 aircraft with spares and ground crews to a remote island 4,000 miles from your base. Do all of this within 3 ½ weeks of the order to start. On the next day six of your aircraft are to land on the deck of a container ship anchored off the island; these will remain on deck for a two-week voyage to the operational area, during which no engine runs or anything other than minor servicing will be possible. Once in the operational area the aircraft will take off from the container ship and land on an aircraft-carrier nearby. After one day to familiarize itself with carrier operating procedures, your squadron is to go to into action. The unit will fly between six and 12 attack missions on each day the weather allows, with a total of 126 tasked missions during a 3 ½ week period. You will have only 18 ground servicing specialists to keep your aircraft flying; all battle damage must be repaired using only the facilities available on the carrier. If aircraft are lost in action, replacements must be flown 3,800 miles from the remote island to the aircraft-carrier with no land diversions along almost the entire route.’
If that order had been given to the commander of a ground-attack squadron anywhere in the world on 1 April 1982, he would probably thought it an April fool’s joke. Almost certainly his reply, in whatever language, would have been a curt ‘impossible’. Yet this was the task given to Wing Commander Peter Squire, the commander of No.1 Squadron of the Royal Air Force, though at the time nobody stated the requirement with that degree of clarity.
During the preparations for the military operation to retake the Falkland Islands following the Argentine invasion in April 1982, the shortage of BAe Sea Harrier naval fighters was a major worry to the British planners: only 30 Sea Harriers had been built, and one of those had been lost in an accident a year earlier. Yet the British naval task force depended on these ‘jump jets’ to provide its air cover; but if there were large-scale air battles against the numerically superior Argentine air forces, it seemed inevitable that Sea Harriers would be lost and the force would be further depleted. The only other source of jump jets was from the Royal Air Force though its Harriers were configured, and the pilots trained, for the roles of ground-attack and battlefield reconnaissance.
There were some rapid studies on the practicability of operating RAF Harriers in the air-to-air fighting role from aircraft-carriers, and these showed that the idea was feasible. No.1 Squadron based at Wittering near Stamford thus received orders to prepare for the operation. In less than a month its pilots had to learn the almost entirely new disciplines of airborne interception and aircraft-carrier deck operations.
While the pilots were retraining, the Harriers earmarked to go south had to be modified for the new role. The changes required fell into two categories: those necessary for the aircraft to operate from the deck of a carrier; and those to fit them for the newly acquired air-to-air fighting role. Some of the changes in the first category were relatively minor: fitting of lashing rings to the outrigger wheel legs, drilling of holes in the airframe in strategic places to allow salt water to run out, minor changes to the nose wheel steering mechanism and the nozzle control system. Rather more involved was the fitting of a transponder to each aircraft, to produce a distinctive blip on the carrier’s radar; and changes to the Harrier’s inertial navigation equipment so it could be aligned on the moving deck of a ship.
None of these changes was particularly difficult, but most of them had to be designed from scratch before prototype installations could be built and tested, and the modifications had all to be completed within three weeks.
The initial contingent of Harrier GR. Mk3 s flew out to Ascension Island in early May, and six landed on the container ship Atlantic Conveyor which transported them to the South Atlantic as deck cargo. On 18 May the ship joined up with the British Task Force off the Falklands and the jump jets transferred to HMS Hermes, which was to be their main operating base throughout the conflict.
Sea Harrier losses during the conflict were lower than had been feared, so in the event No. 1 Squadron’s Harriers did not have to go into action in the interception role. Instead they were to fly in their more normal ground attack role, as ‘mud movers’. The Harriers flew their first-ever attack mission late on the afternoon of 20 May, when Peter Squire led his two flight commanders, Squadron Leaders Bob Iveson and Jerry Pook, in a low-level attack on the Argentine fuel dump situated just outside Fox Bay Settlement on West Falkland. The pilots dropped their BL755 cluster bombs accurately on fuel drums, starting a huge fire.
On the following day, 21 May, the squadron was in action in support of British troops which had landed at Port San Carlos during the early morning darkness. Shortly after dawn Jerry Pook and Flight Lieutenant Mark Hare were ordered to attack Argentine helicopters reported by an SAS patrol near Mount Kent, and arrived in the area to find a Boeing Vertol Chinook, two Aerospatiale Pumas and a Bell UH-1 sitting on the ground well apart. The Harriers made repeated strafing runs with 30-mm canon and set fire to the Chinook and two of the Pumas. After the conflict General Menendez stated that the reason why he had made no attempt to launch a counterattack against the British troops coming ashore was that he lacked sufficient helicopters to fly in the necessary troops and weapons. Certainly the losses that morning, and the threat that his helicopter force would suffer further losses if it operated by day, imposed major constraints on the Argentine commander’s freedom of action.
Also that morning No. 1 Squadron suffered its first Harrier loss to enemy action, when Flight Lieutenant Jeff Glover was shot down by ground fire near Port Howard. The pilot ejected and was taken prisoner.
During the days that followed the squadron was in action whenever the weather permitted, striking at targets on East and West Falkland. To achieve surprise the Harriers had to approach their targets at very low altitude, picking their way through the terrain at altitudes down to 100ft or lower. Flight Lieutenant Tony Harper described the tactics used.
We developed our tactics to fit the situation at the time. We would arrive at high level to make the most of our fuel, then let down going away from the target to spoof the Argentine radar operators into thinking we were going somewhere else. Then we relied on the ultra-low flying to bring us back towards the target without being seen by the radars. Whenever we were within about 30 miles of Port Stanley, if we were attacking targets in that area, we would be down at about 100 feet.
Initially we thought there was going to be a high threat of attack from enemy fighters. We very quickly discovered that there was no threat from the air, so at low altitude we stopped flying what we called a mutually supporting formation - in line abreast, with each pilot searching behind the other for enemy fighters. We ended up flying in search formations, almost in line astern, so that the leader could identify the target in time to tell the No. 2 where it was, so that the latter could get his weapons on it in case the leader’s missed.
We never got blasé about the threat from enemy fighters, however. Every morning we were told: their guys are bound to twig some time, and come and have a fight. So we briefed very carefully what we were going to do if we met enemy fighters at high altitude. Basically, we were going to stand our aircraft on their noses, and go straight down to about 500 feet and fight them on our terms down there. If you roll the Harrier on its back and pull back on the nozzles, you will put it into the vertical and go down very quickly indeed.
Attacking targets at high speed and ultra low-low altitude required considerable skill, but the Harrier pilots’ previous training stood them in good stead:
The problem of flying at 600 knots at 100 feet is that it feels as if you are flying through a ‘tunnel’. There is a segment of about 15 degrees either side of the nose of the aircraft where you can see clearly; on either side the ground is just a blur. Because you are looking through that ‘tunnel’ , and you are so close to the ground, you dare not look anywhere else but where you are going. There is no time to look at a map. You certainly cannot look over your shoulder for possible enemy aircraft which may drop in behind you, or cover the rear of your wing man.
On 24 May Tony Harper took part in the Harrier attack on Port Stanley airfield, the most heavily defended target on the island. For this mission two Sea Harriers of No. 800 Squadron were to approach the target from the north east, and toss radar airburst fused bombs to explode over the anti-aircraft gun positions and distract the defenders; and immediately afterwards two pairs of Harriers of No. 1 Squadron were to run in from the north west and west to attack the runway with parachute-retarded 1,000ib bombs.
The 24th: my first big one, take off 1855Z (1555 local time) against Port Stanley. I was Bob Iveson’s No.2. As we came in we saw mushrooms of smoke in the sky, from the Sea Harriers’ VT (radar airburst) fused bombs. We did not go through the target area particularly fast on that raid because we were trying to bomb as accurately as possible; we flew at about 480-500 knots, almost ‘tunnel vision’ speed. We ran in to attack from the north west, going across the runway towards the control tower. I followed Bob in, he was offset to one side, about half a mile in front and 45 degrees out of my left. He was to straddle the runway about half way up, I was briefed to try and straddle the runway about a quarter of the way up. In fact I got my nearest bomb on the western edge, just off the end.
During my attack run I saw somebody standing on the control tower ‘at the end of the tunnel’ pointing something at me with flashes coming out of it. But I was not seriously fired at, it was exciting without being dangerous.
Following Bob Iveson and Tony Harper, Wing Commander Peter Squire and Flight Lieutenant Mark Hare made their attacking runs on the airfield but achieved no greater success. As is so often the case in air warfare, bravery in action did not compensate for weapons which were unsuitable for the task.
Afterwards we were angry that we had not inflicted any serious damage on the runway and might have to go and do the attack again. But then we wondered about the futility of attacking a runway with the sort of weapons we had. If you are going to attack a runway you need a weapon that will impact at a steep angle and not go off until it has gone through the surface; and parachute-retarded 1,000 pounders don’t do that, they go off as soon as they hit.
The most noteworthy single action by No. 1 Squadron during the conflict came on the late afternoon of 28 May, when Squadron Leader Peter Harris led a three-aircraft attack on Argentine artillery whose fire had halted the advance on Goose Green by men of the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment. As they approached the target area the Harrier pilots received their final briefing over the radio, and were told to hit the enemy guns on the promontory at Goose Green immediately to the east of the settlement: 105-mm howitzers and 35-mm anti-aircraft guns operating in the direct-fire role. Peter Harris described his attack:
As we ran in at 50 to 100 feet the whole area was as one would expect a battlefield to look. We could not see any people, but there was a lot of smoke and several fires burning. Target acquisition was easy because the promontory at Goose Green is such a unique feature. I could see some activity, though at high speed it was impossible to identify it exactly, and dropped my cluster bombs on the easternmost point. As I let go my bombs I saw activity to my right so I told Tony Harper to put his cluster bombs there; he just had time to realign his attack and put his bombs to the right of mine and about 300 yards behind.
As Harper left the target Jerry Pook ran in from the north and fired two pods of 2-in (50.8-mm) rockets, a total of 72 weapons, on the part of the promontory not covered by the bursts of the exploding cluster bomblets. The attack came as a complete surprise to the Argentines and the pilots saw no return fire.
One of those watching the attack was Major Chris Keeble, who had taken command of the paratroop battalion earlier in the day after the death of Colonel ‘H’ Jones:
They came streaking in, one behind the other; each dropped bombs, some on the tip of the peninsula and others at the entrance of the isthmus. Then I heard the cluster bomblets going off, their explosions merging together; it looked as if some hit the sea - there was an effect like throwing gravel into water. Then came the rockets which were most effective, they hit the tip of the peninsula where the 35-mm guns were. The attack gave a great boost to the morale of our troops. I think some of them thought the Harriers had come in a bit too close for comfort, but that is war.
Peter Harris’s attack was a textbook example of a close air support mission: a hard-hitting surprise attack against a target of great importance to the enemy, launched at a crucial time in the land battle and whose results were clearly seen by the ground troops, so strengthening the resolve of those on one side and demoralising those on the other. With most of his supporting artillery weapons knocked out, and the near-certainty of repeat attacks by Harriers if his force continued fighting, the Argentine commander saw his position to be hopeless and ordered his men to surrender on the following morning.
No. 1 Squadron lost two Harriers to ground fire on 27 and 30 May though their pilots, Bob Iveson and Jerry Pook, were able to eject safely. That left only three ground-attack Harriers on the carrier, and necessitated a reinforcement from Ascension Island. On 1 June Flight Lieutenants Murdo Macleod and Mike Beech flew Harriers to the carrier in 8 hour 25 minute non-stop flights covering 3,800miles, supported by Bae Victor tanker aircraft. It was a dramatic demonstration of flying skill by the two pilots, neither of whom had previously landed a Harrier on a ship. A further pair of Harriers flew from Ascension to the Hermes on 8 June.
Once the beach-head at Port San Carlos was secure, men of the Royal Engineers began laying aluminium matting for a Harrier operating strip near the settlement. It was no easy task, as Wing Commander Fred Trowern, the senior RAF liaison officer ashore, recalled:
It was made by hand, from plates each about 10 feet long and 2 feet wide, slotted together. The helicopters flew them in, in bundles, then they had to be laid out by hand. The individual strips were damned heavy - it was as much as two men could do to lift one - and if you were not careful you could cut yourself on the edges. It was hard physical labour, carried out while the area was liable to attack from the air and the weather was cold, wet and very miserable.
The engineers completed the operating strip within a week, working on unprepared ground without any heavy equipment, and the first Harriers and Sea Harriers landed there on 5 June.
During the final 10 days of the conflict, up to the Argentine surrender on 14 June, No. 1 Squadron flew daily attack missions in support of British troops advancing on Port Stanley. During this period the unit flew more sorties making contact with the enemy than any flying units engaged in the conflict, on either side. This phase ended with a couple of attacks with Paveway laser-guided bombs which scored direct hits on enemy troop positions, immediately before the Argentine surrender.
During its 3 ½ weeks of operations No. 1 Squadron flew a total of 126 tasked attack and reconnaissance sorties. As well as imposing major limitations on Argentine surface operations and helping bring about the collapse in morale which led to their final surrender, the Royal Air Force jump-jets enabled the Sea Harriers to concentrate on the all-important fleet air-defence role.