View Full Version : British Fighting Square
M1A2U2
12-28-2005, 01:16 PM
I need info on the victorian biritsh fighting square simliar to the one seen in the movie The Four Feathers. I just need to know the components of it and what was were. Thanks
Maine Finn
12-28-2005, 02:08 PM
You could try here. (http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0850458498/qid=1135796825/sr=8-5/ref=sr_8_xs_ap_i5_xgl14/103-8981072-9411060?n=507846&s=books&v=glance) It's only a book and might not be what you're looking for, but who knows?
GeraldDuval
12-28-2005, 02:11 PM
The square is an old Napoleanic infantry tactic used to defeat charging cavalry. Horses, unline people, will not charge a solid wall of bayonets, forcing them around the sides and (ideally) into overlapping zones of fire from other squares. Marshal Ney's charge at waterloo is an excellent example of how square formations are best used.
Against infantry or artillery, the square was useless as it drops the regimental firepower to a quarter of what it should be. The square is also nearly immobile.
When Cavalry is combined with artillery, against a purely infantry force, teh square is a deathtrap, see waterloo as well. I beleive the iniskilling regt. was put to this fate, suffering horrific casualties.
Gordon
12-28-2005, 02:14 PM
http://www.britishbattles.com/waterloo/images/hougoumont/hougoumont-burning.jpg
French cavalry attacking a British square
i'll add some more when i have time.
M1A2U2
12-28-2005, 02:18 PM
what about as it was used in Sudan?
oldsoak
12-28-2005, 05:03 PM
Square would have been used in Sudan because it offers all round fire power against
blokes who will attempt to surround you or come at you from any direction. Soldiers would have been shoulder to shoulder. Bear in mind the only comms would have been someone shouting or a chap on horseback amid lots of black powder smoke. Spacing is pointless if it gets hand to hand when there is more of them than there is of you.
HanauJager
12-28-2005, 05:55 PM
what about as it was used in Sudan?
The square was used extensively in the Sudan during the early Anglo-Egyptian campaigns of 1883-84 and later the British campaign in 1885 to relieve Gordon in Khartoum. The square was often made up of either one or two regiments, or of several companies as was seen during the battle of Abu Klea (the British square on that occasion was made up of several companies and asorted units comprising the Camel Corps). Sometimes there was one large square such as at the battle of El Teb, or two smaller ones such as at the battle of Tamai.
As for the battle tactics with the square, obviously the British wanted to engage as far away as possible to better use their technical advantage. Now in the movie The Four Feathers, the British wait to a rediculous range before they engage, this is not necessarily historically accurate. However, in the real battle of Abu Klea the range was relatively short (the men could not engage immediately as they were screened by skirmishers), but the slaughter was terrific. The corners of the square are the weakest points as few rifles can be brougt to bear. Often, RA 7pdr guns or 'machine guns' (gatlings, or gardner guns) were posted on the corners. This is what allowed the square to be broken at Abu Klea as the gardner jammed, and the shifting Camel Corps units couldn't reform fast enough to plug the gap.
There was also another weakness with the square. The square was notoriously ponderous in the attack. At the Battle of Tamai (Graham vs. Osman Digna), the 1st square moved towards a ravine, the 42nd Foot (comprising the front face) moved quicker than the rest of the square and a large gap developed, in which the Dervishes quickly exploited, thus breaking the square.
I'd say the square was a relatively effective formation in the Sudan. It reigned supreme against the Zulu at the battle of Ulundi in 1879, yet it's weaknesses were brought to light in the Sudan. On several occasions Egyptian (The Hicks and Baker disasters), and British (Tamai, Abu Klea) squares were broken. Yet on other occassions such as at the battle of Tofrik, a small rallying square (made up of 1/2 bttn of the Berkshires) managed to hold back a large part of the Dervish assault. The square was a great formation out in the open which could allow British firepower to be brought to bear, but it had it's weaknesses.
ElHombre
12-28-2005, 06:17 PM
a somewhat less involved answer:
the square was best used against opponenets whose main tactics were to run screaming at the british with spears (or charging from horseback with lances and sabers). as the square put severe limits on mobility, it could become a large target for artillery (which wasn't much of a concern when afcing typical colonial opponents the brits faced).
i do note that the US army never used squares (except maybe impromptu ones such as Little Big Horn) during the indian wars due to the indians use of guerilla tactics. the square was also (mis-) used during the ACW, although artillery made short work of them.
Lt-Col A. Tack
12-28-2005, 09:35 PM
Brings to mind a poem by Kipling (http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/verse/volumeXI/fuzzywuzzy.html)
So ’ere’s to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your ’ome in the Soudan;
You’re a pore benighted ’eathen but a first-class fightin’ man;
An’ ’ere’s to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, with your ’ayrick ’ead of ’air—
You big black boundin’ beggar—for you broke a British square!
from “Fuzzy-Wuzzy”
(Soudan Expeditionary Force)
edit: fixed link
HanauJager
12-28-2005, 10:09 PM
The 'Fuzzy-Wuzzie's' of Kipling's poem are from certain tribes (the Beja and Hadendowa) of eastern Sudan. To better understand why they were called Fuzzy-Wuzzy's: "They wore their hair long and in elaborate styles, frizzed and stiffened so that it stood out six or eight inches from each side of the head, then parted over each ear and around to the back of the head, the hair below the parting being brushed downwards and outwards, that above the parting upwards; then a long wooden pin or stick was run through the top part of the hair." Hence a 'Fuzzy-Wuzzy'.
The poem that Kipling wrote most likely implies either the battle of Abu Klea or Tamai. For those who are not familiar with Abu Klea, it was a very desperate affair. The Camel Corps/Desert Column was made up of about 2,000 men (significantly less at Abu Klea), and they were heavily outnumbered by about 11,500 Dervishes. As already mentioned, the action was close, the infantry opening up at about 100 yards to allow their skirmishers to flee back to the square. However, to clear a field of fire for the Gardner gun, several companies were wheeled back. When the gun jamed (another famous Kipling poem), the gun was quickly overrun while the companies tried to reform. What ensued was utter chaos as the square was deeply penetrated, however the Dervishes ran into a wall of camels in the center of the square. The companies on the other side of the square turned about and fired volley's into this mass (hitting of course some of the men on the other side). The action lasted only 5-10 minutes, but there were 1,100 dead Dervishes on the field. 72 Brits had been killed with 112 wounded. A very short but hot engagement. Imagine being with one of the Guards Camel companies, a few thousand screaming warriors charging at you while you hurridly attach your sword bayonet to your jamming Martini-Henry rifle. I find the nerve and bravery displayed on both sides to be just amazing.
ogukuo72
12-28-2005, 10:22 PM
A square was a tactical formation against calvary and enemies employing enveloping attack tactics when not behind fortification.
Basically, it allows the troops to cover both flanks and the rear, at the expense of fire-power in any one direction. It also substitutes the security of fortification for tactical flexibility - a square could quickly be re-deployed into standard lines for maximum firepower in one direction or in columns for the attack.
But squares sacrifice the security of fortification for this tactical flexibility. While it was not so easy to redeploy troops from behind fortifications in the heat of battle into line for maximum firepower or into columns for the attack, even minimal fortification provided great security for the colonial troops, such as what happened at Rourke's Drift. The hasty fortification of biscuit tins and mealie bags were enough for a hundred troops to hold off 4,000 Zulu warriors.
The Battle of Isandlwana provided object lesson of what happens when out-numbered colonial troops did not take elementary precautions. The British troops were divided into different parts over a fairly large areas to be defeated in detail. The British troops were surprised and had to fight where they were, near their tents and away from the supply wagons, which not only contained their ammunition supply but also could have formed rudimentary fortifications. These defensive mistakes allowed the Zulu to exploit their greater numbers to the fullest, and gave them an undeserved reputation for military efficiency. As it was, even in victory, the Zulu military was crippled by the heavy losses incurred.
This was hardly surprising, as many of the colonial enemies that the British faced did not have sophisticated attack formations and tactics. They would use what is so graphically described in the movie "Zulu" as "the loin and the horns". Basically, the natives would seek to use their superior numbers to attack from the front and the flanks in a bid to overwhelm the British.
Military amateurs might compare this technique to Hannibal's maneuvre at Cannae, but they would be wrong. Hannibal's maneuvre was sophisticated in that it attempted to fix the enemy on the front. He would only commit his reserves to attack the flanks when the enemy had become committed to this fight, and thus lost his tactical flexibility. The attacks against the enemy on his flanks and rear would then be launched. The enemy could no longer redeploy to counter the new situation.
In a colonial situation, it was the British that was sophisticated in their tactics. Besides having weapons of great tactical firepower (breech-loading Martini-Henry rifles), the British troops were highly flexible tactically due to the subdivision of their units. The troops could be fought in line at the beginning, with designated units to refuse their flanks when the natives got too close and threaten the ranks. A square could be formed quickly by redeploying the regiments accordingly, with regiments to the front continuing to pour hot fire on the enemy. With this kind of flexibility, and with the firepower of the weapons, the natives could not be victorious unless the British make some sort of mistake.
Lt-Col A. Tack
12-28-2005, 11:00 PM
Thanks HanauJager and ogukuo72. Very Informative.
wiking
12-29-2005, 03:32 AM
The square was used on the advance? i allways thought the square was a strictly stationary defensive formation that should never be used while advancing. Possible, but difficult.
"fuzzy-wuzzies" rofl Corporal Jones in Dad's army rofl brilliant show.
"Give 'em the old cold steel, they don't like it up 'em you know"
oldsoak
12-29-2005, 09:30 AM
IIRC the idea of using it on the advance is that you dont waste time getting troops out of marching order into defensive formation. They just close up and load up. It does need constant supervision to maintain good order though.
A lot of the colonial wars were carried out in largely unmapped territory wth very little meaningful intelligence about the land or the enemy. It ws very often a case of maps being made as the army marched or after the colonial prescence had been established.
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