He219
02-19-2004, 06:30 PM
THE BATTLE OF ÇANAKKALE (http://battlecruiseryavuz.hypermart.net/canakkale/section_1.htm)
1915: British and French warships began a bombardment of the Turkish forts guarding the Dardanelles. This first bombardment proved a significant misjudgement, precisely because of its success; the Turks and their German advisers realised how inadequate the defences in the area were, and put in hand efforts to reinforce them that would later cost the allies serious losses. - MoD
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The British fleet which was first going up the Dardanelles. Flagship HMS Superb, HMS Temeraire, HMS Lord Nelson, HMS Agamemnon.
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Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty
Battles: The First and Second Naval Bombardment of the Dardanelles, 1915 (http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/dardanelles_feb15.htm)
With Winston Churchill having (as First Lord of the Admiralty) succeeded in securing War Cabinet backing for action in the Dardanelles (see overview for details), he lost no time in implementing a blueprint for a purely naval bombardment of the Dardanelles Straits in February 1915.
A purely naval bombardment of the Straits had long been recognised in professional naval circles as a most difficult undertaking. Some eight years earlier, in 1907, a British study had concluded that an attack upon the Straits was feasible only so long as the operation was a combined naval/ground undertaking.
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However Churchill, impatient for action, demanded that Sir Sackville Carden - the British naval commander in the Mediterranean - provide him with a proposal for a naval-only offensive upon the Straits. Carden obliged - although without appending a personal endorsement of the plan - and it was this plan that Churchill brought to the British War Cabinet in mid-January 1915.
The Straits - 65km in length and 7km in width aside from 'The Narrows' where the banks were as little as 1,600 apart - were overlooked by steep and heavily fortified cliffs (the Gallipoli peninsula to the northwest and the coast of Asia Minor to the south). Navigation through the wildly varying current was additionally deemed problematic.
Carden's plan was three-fold. He recognised that simple bombardment of the overlooking Turkish fortresses was impractical. For one thing, naval artillery could not be expected to achieve the necessary steep trajectory required to knock out the forts.
He proposed instead that the forts' outer guns should first be neutralised via long-range gunfire, the battleships out of effective range of the fortress guns. This accomplished an Allied fleet would progress further up the Straits (to The Narrows) to enable medium-range artillery to destroy shore batteries while minesweepers wiped out probable minefields blocking their path. The final phase envisaged the destruction of the inner forts.
Success would provide a path to Constantinople, thereby knocking Turkey out of war, and - importantly - open a supply lane to the Sea of Marmora and Britain's ally Russia.
Such was Carden's plan. Grave problems remained. Even should the naval bombardment prove successful the absence of ground troops would prevent the British from gaining command of the shorelines - and in the absence of supplies from the shore the naval fleet would necessarily have to return home to refuel and restock.
Nevertheless Churchill's plan was formally approved by the War Cabinet at the end of January 1915. The British war minister, Lord Kitchener, ordered that the only available division of infantry be placed in readiness should the naval endeavour prove successful.
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The First Sea Lord, Admiral John Fisher, was initially mute in his opposition to the exercise (in which he had no faith), but his opposition was to grow over time and ultimately lead to both his and Churchill's resignation.
Meanwhile the French government, in the form of incoming naval minister Jean Augagneur, was reluctant to cede the possibility of a purely British naval success in the Mediterranean.
Ignoring professional advice therefore Augagneur committed four French pre-dreadnoughts to add to the British fleet. He further came to an understanding with Churchill that should the expedition give signs of failure the 'demonstration' would be abandoned without loss of prestige.
Churchill was optimistic however. A previous demonstration of naval force by Carden on 2 November, using long-range guns (and ordered by Churchill), had inflicted notable damage upon the outer Turkish forts - chiefly as a consequence of lucky targeting. Nevertheless it served as encouragement to Churchill - and, to a lesser extent, to Carden.
Churchill set a date of 19 February for the opening of the naval bombardment. The combined British and French fleet consisted of the new battleship Queen Elizabeth, 3 battlecruisers, 16 pre-dreadnought (including four French vessels), 4 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 6 submarines, 21 trawlers plus the seaplane carrier Ark Royal. Overseeing the effort was Carden.
Pounding the outer fortresses Cape Helles and Kum Kale from long-range on 19 February the British and French attack proved ineffective in the face of an efficient Turkish defensive system and poor Allied gunnery, although greater damage was inflicted than the bombarding naval forces realised. Unbeknown to the Allies the Turkish defenders were also critically short of ammunition.
A renewed bombardment from closer range the following week (following a pause for adverse weather), on 25 February, was similarly unsuccessful. While the outer forts were themselves seized by marines the Allied force could not effective silence the 24 Turkish mobile batteries that poured shellfire from the heights and served as highly effective protection for the elaborate minefield defence set in place in The Narrows.
Without neutralising the minefield the fleet could not move forward: and without destroying the mobile batteries the minefields were adequately protected. While stage one of Carden's plan had therefore been accomplished serious difficulties impeded an advance to the second stage.
Still, the relative lack of progress of the first two naval bombardment attempts did not deter Churchill from ordering Carden to try again, this time via a determined effort to force The Narrows and remove the minefield threat. This duly took place on 18 March 1915 amid heavy failure.
In the meantime plans were afoot in London for the despatch of an expeditionary ground force under Sir Ian Hamilton, thereby fully committing Allied resources to the region.
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Journalist Henry Nevinson on the Anglo-French Setback at the Dardanelles, 18 March 1915 (http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/dardanelles_nevinson.htm)
Orders for washing and clean clothes (to avoid septic wounds) were issued on February 18th, and next morning, in clear and calm weather, "General Quarters" was sounded. The firing began at eight, and the first scene in the drama of the Dardanelles Expedition was enacted.
The main forts to be destroyed were four in number; two on either side the entrance. One stood on the cliff of Cape Helles, just to the left or southwest of the shelving amphitheatre afterwards celebrated as V Beach. Another lay low down, on the right of the same beach, close in front of the medieval castle of Seddel Bahr, where still one sees lying in heaps or scattered over the ground huge cannonballs of stone, such as were hurled at Duckworth's fleet more than a century before.
Upon the Asiatic side stood the fort of Kum Kali, at the very mouth of the strait, not far from the cliff village of Yenishehr, and separated from the plain of Troy by the river Mendere, near neighbour to the Simois and Scamander conjoined. About a mile down the, coast, close beside Yenishehr village, is the remaining fort of Orkhanieh.
None of these forts was heavily armed. The largest guns appear to have been 10.2 inch (six on Seddel Bahr, and four on Kum Kali), and when our squadron drew their fire their extreme range was found to be 12,500 yards.
Throughout the morning of February 19th, Admiral Carden concentrated his bombardment upon these forts at long range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he had silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced six ships to closer range in the afternoon, and then the reply came in earnest, though the shooting was poor.
At sunset he withdrew the ships, though Kum Kali was still firing. In evidence, he admitted that "the result of the day's action showed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight."
It was a lesson repeated time after time throughout the campaign. The big naval shells threw up stones and earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm. But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether on earthworks or trenches, usually disappointing. For naval guns, constructed to strike visible objects at long range with marvellous accuracy, have too flat a trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which devastates earthworks and trenches.
It was with heavy howitzers that the Germans destroyed the forts of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this obvious difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill's expectation of crushing the Dardanelles defences by the big guns of the Queen Elizabeth and the Inflexible was frustrated.
Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and heavy sea (a common event at this season, which might have been anticipated), Admiral Carden renewed the bombardment on February 25th, employing the Queen Elizabeth, Irresistible, Agamemnon, and Gaulois.
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HMS Queen Elizabeth
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HMS Inflexible bombarding Turkish positions
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HMS Agamemnon in Mudros Bay, Dardanelles
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The French Battleship, Bouvet
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Gaulois
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Charlemagne
The Queen Elizabeth, firing beyond the enemy's range, assisted in silencing the powerful batteries on Cape Helles, and though the Agamemnon was severely struck at about 11,000 yards' range, the subsidiary ships Cornwallis, Vengeance, Triumph, Albion, Suffren, and Charlemagne stood in closer, and by the evening compelled all the outer forts to cease fire.
Next day landing parties of marines were put ashore to complete their destruction; which they did, though at Kum Kali they were driven back to their boats with some loss. The story that marines had tea at Krithia and climbed Achi Baba for the view - places soon to acquire such ill-omened fame - is mythical.
But certainly they met with no opposition on the Peninsula, and if a large military force had then been available, the gallant but appalling events of the landing two months later would never have occurred. Had not the War Council persisted in the design of a solely naval attack, even after their resolve had begun to waver, a large military force might have been available, either then, or to cooperate with a similar naval movement only a week or two later.
Stormy weather delayed further attack till March 4th, when a squadron, including the Triumph, Albion, Lord Nelson, and Ocean, passed up the strait to a position beyond the village of Erenkeui, conspicuous upon a mountainside of the Asiatic coast, and bombarded Fort Dardanus.
The fort stands upon Kephez Point, which projects as though to defend the very entrance of the Narrows. Over the top of the promontory the houses and mosques of Chanak and Kilid Bahr could be plainly seen, where those towns face each other across the narrowest part of the passage.
Of the eight lines of minefield drawn across the strait, five lay between Kephez Point and Chanak. Day and night our mine-sweeping trawlers were engaged upon them, and considerable praise must be given to the courage and endurance of their crews, who for the most part had been North Sea fishermen before the expedition.
Their service throughout, whether for mine-sweeping or transport, was of very high value. It almost justified the remark made to me by a skipper whom I had met before on the Dogger Bank: "If the Kaiser had knowed as we'd got trawlers, he would never have declared war!"
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A Turkish heavy gun. An 11 inch gun placed in a
fortress at Kilitbahir
A similar advance to engage the forts at Dardanus, and, after those were thought to be silenced, the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, was made next day, and again, in stronger force, on March 6th. At the same time, on the 6th, the Queen Elizabeth, stationed off Gaba Tepe on the outer coast, flung her vast shells clear over the Peninsula into the Chanak forts, her fire being directed by aeroplanes.
She was supported by the Agamemnon and Ocean, and there were high hopes of thus crushing out the big guns defending the Narrows, some of which were believed to be 14-inch. Nevertheless, when the four French battleships advanced tip the strait on the following day (March 7th), supported at long range by the Agamemnon and her sister ship Lord Nelson, the Chanak forts replied with an effective and damaging fire.
It was impossible to say when a fort was really out of action. After long silence, the Turkish and German gunners frequently returned and reopened fire, as though nothing had happened. In his evidence, Admiral Carden stated that when the demolition parties landed after the bombardment of the outer forts, they found 70 per cent of the guns apparently intact upon their mountings, although their magazines were blown up and their electrical or other communications destroyed.
Still worse than these disappointing results was the opportunity left to the enemy of moving, not only bodies of men, but field-guns and heavy howitzers from one point of the Peninsula and Asiatic coast to another, and opening fire upon the ships from concealed and unexpected positions. Our landing-parties of marines also suffered considerably from the advantage thus given to the enemy, as happened to a body which landed at Kum Kali for the second time on March 4th.
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Selahattin Adil Pasha, the Commander
of the Çanakkale fortifications.
All such dangers and hindrances would have been removed if the navy had been supported by sufficient military force to occupy the ground behind the ships as they advanced.
Mr. Churchill, though striving to restrain his impatience, strongly urged Admiral Carden to press forward the naval attack with the utmost vigour. In a telegram of March 11th he wrote: "If success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may be decided, and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak... We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognize clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support."
To this Admiral Carden replied that he considered the stage for vigorous action had now been reached, but that, when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be opened at once, so as to secure communications.
On March 15th Mr. Churchill, still anxious not to allow his impatience to drive him into rashness, telegraphed again that, though no time was to be lost, there should be no undue haste. An attempt to rush the passage without having cleared a channel through the mines and destroyed the primary armament of the forts was not contemplated.
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Marshall Liman von Sanders. The
Commander of the 5.th Army
The close cooperation of army and navy must be carefully studied, and it might be found that a naval rush would be costly without military occupation of the Kilid Bahr plateau. On these points the Admiral was to consult with the General who was being sent out to take command of the troops. To all of this Admiral Carden agreed. He proposed to begin vigorous operations on March 17th, but did not intend to rush the passage before a channel was cleared. This answer was telegraphed on March 16th. But on the same day the Admiral resigned his command owing to serious ill-health.
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The armored cruiser Barbaros was torpedoed and
sank by British submarine E-11
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Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim
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Yavuz opens fire with her 11 in. guns
Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in command, was next day appointed his successor. He was five years younger, was, of course, fully cognizant of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though strongly urged by Mr. Churchill to act on "his independent and separate judgment," and not to hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying on the prearranged scheme was not so much his confidence in success as his fear lest a withdrawal might injure our prestige in the Near East; and, secondly, his desire to make the best he could of an idea which he regarded as an order.
"The order was to carry out a certain operation," he said, "or to try to do it, and we had to do the best we could." If the ships got through, he, like many others, expected a revolution or other political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he saw that transports could not come up, and that the ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora for more than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run the gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral Duckworth did in 1807.
In his telegram accepting the command, however, he made no mention of these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing the minefields after silencing the forts.
Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very first day after receiving his command (March 18th) he undertook the main attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favourable - no mist and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively.
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HMS Queen Elizabeth, was the most powerful ship
of the whole fleet with her 38 cm. guns and thick
armor.
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HMS Queen Elizabeth was the flagship of Alled Fleet
The first blow was given by the four most powerful ships - Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson, and Agamemnon - which poured heavy shell at long range into the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, while the Triumph and Prince George bombarded Fort Dardanus on the Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it upon the Peninsula.
This bombardment lasted from about 11 a.m. till 12.30 p.m., and all six ships found themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied positions upon both shores.
At about 12.30 the second squadron, consisting of the four French ships, came up into action, advancing beyond the former line in the direction of Kephez Point. Though suffering considerably (chiefly owing to their inability to manoeuvre in such narrow waters, thus presenting very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy's guns), the ten ships maintained the bombardment for about an hour (till nearly 1.30). The enemy's forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many of them, at all events, had been destroyed.
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German U-Boat & Turkish Patrol Boat at the Dardanelles during
the battle of Çanakkale
Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six British ships (Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Majestic, and Albion), were brought up, with the design of advancing first through the Narrows, so as to insure a clear passage for the greater ships which made the first attack.
At the same time the four French ships, together with the Triumph and Prince George, were ordered to withdraw, so as to leave more room for the rest. During this manoeuvre, all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire again, their silence having been due, not to destruction, but to the absence of the gunners, driven away by the gases or terror of our shells.
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French battleship Bouvet sinks after hitting a sea mine
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French Battleship FNS Bouvet Goes Under the Waves
Most of the ships suffered, and as the Bouvet moved down channel with her companion ships, she was struck by three big shells in quick succession. The blows were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting in her magazine, or to a torpedo fired from the Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty report said, to a mine drifting down the current.
In two or three minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, carrying nearly the whole of her crew to the bottom. The cries of the men dragged down with her, or struggling in the water as they were swept downstream, sounded over the strait.
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HMS Irresistible, sunk in the Naval Attack of 18 March
At 2.30 the bombardment of all the forts was renewed, but they were not silenced. At 4 o'clock the Irresistible drew away with a heavy list. Apparently she also was struck by a mine adrift; but she remained afloat for nearly two hours; and nearly all her crew were saved by destroyers, which swarmed round her at great risk to themselves, since they offered a crowded target.
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HMS Ocean, sunk in the Naval Attack of 18 March
A quarter of an hour after she sank, the Ocean was struck in a similar manner (6.50 p.m.) and sank with great rapidity. Most of her crew, however, were also saved by destroyers near at hand. Many of the other ships were struck by shells.
The Inflexible and Gaulois suffered especially, and only just crawled back to be beached, the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit Island. At sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved once more that, in an attack upon land forts, ships lie at a great disadvantage. In this case the disadvantage was much increased by the narrowness of the waters, which brought the ships within range of howitzer and other batteries hidden upon both shores, and also gave special opportunity for the use of mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored right across the channel in successive rows.
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HMS Swiftsure opens fire on Turkish ground
batteries located at Arıburnu
Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at once. Perhaps he thought that English people are given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship. Admiral de Robeck shared this view. It was suspected at the Admiralty that the ammunition in the forts was running short, and, at a much later date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said: "If the English had only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles, they could have got to Constantinople; but their delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."
That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy was not to blame. The British military leaders decided in favour of a land attack.
A great analysis: The Naval Attack (http://www.canakkale.gen.tr/eng/navalmid.html)
The British acting with the concept "the one rules the seas, rules the world", believed that it was possible to open the Dardanelles "by ships only". Before The Naval Attack was instituted, First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill asked the officer commanding the Aegean, Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden.
Carden stated that he believed the Dardanelles could be forced, given sufficient warships and minesweepers, in a three stage plan; first a neutralisation of the Turkish forts guarding the entrance, then a clearing of the Turkish minefields, and finally a drive into the Sea of Marmara. This plan persuaded the War Council despite Lord Fisher's doubts. The British Navy was proud of its ammunitions, technology, and surely, its victorious history, full of uncountable successes. It was impossible for the frayed, collapsing Ottoman Empire to withstand this invincible armada supported by French warships.
Allied Armada's naval attack began on 19 February 1915. Until 13 March 1915, they continuously bombarded the Turkish forts and opened a way for the minesweepers. However, they had confronted with the Turks' tough resistance. The Turkish gunners did not bother to reply the Allies' bombardment. This showed that, to open the Dardanelles was not that easy and the Allies could have cleaned only the first five miles of the strait.
Until 18 March the Allied Armada destroyed Seddulbahir and Ertugrul forts located on the European shore and Kumkale and Orhaniye forts located on the Asiatic shore. It seemed that the entrance was now clear but the future was still uncertain. Nobody guessed what was going to happen on 18 March 1915.
On 17 March 1915, Admiral de Robeck was in charge to proceed the plan in place of Admiral Carden. In respect of Carden's plan, the Allied Fleet appeared in the entrance in the morning of 18 March. De Robeck himself commanded the Fleet's most powerful squadron.
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In bright sunshine and without the possibility of surprise, de Robeck in HMS Queen Elizabeth led the first wave up the channel at 10:30. Queen Elizabeth's target was Mecidiye fort, HMS Lord Nelson was going to bomb the Namazgah fort and HMS Inflexible's object was Hamidiye fort. This was called as "A Line" and it was begun to be proceeding at 11:30. De Robeck's most powerful ships commenced to bombard the central forts.
Meanwhile, Allied Fleet had entered the fire line coming from Kumkale. Turkish hotwizers began to fire, but their guns could not cover the distance and the gunners failed to reach the ships. At midday, Allied Fleet had destroyed the Cimenlik and Hamidiye forts. De Robeck signalled his second wave to go in closer, Guepratte's French squadron, Bouvet, Charlemagne, Gaulois and Suffren with HMS Triumph and Prince George.
This step of the plan was called as "B Line". Guepratte led his squadron through the British line and subjected the shore defences. Under Turkish gunners' heavy fire, the squadron had reached the B Line. After a mutual bombardment, the Allies had succeeded to stop the middle forts but the central forts continued to fire. Two British ships, HMS Triumph and HMS Prince George had taken their positions in A Line and they targeted Mesudiye and Yildiz forts.
Turkish forts on the European shore were under a fierce fire. Most of the bombshells had hit them and destroyed the telephone lines. Moreover, Mecidiye fort stopped with the death of its gunners.
If the allies could have succeeded the second step of the plan, second squadron commanded by Colonel Hayes Sadler would have moved and replaced the third squadron. De Robeck signalled the French to retire for his third wave of advance, Ocean, Irresistible, Albion, Vengeance, Swiftsun and Majestic.
As the French ships led by Suffren had their return, wheeled away to make room for the second squadron, something unexpected had happened, around 14:00. French ship Bouvet following immediately Suffren hit a mine and within two minutes had disappeared entirely, with the loss of almost all her crew. As the steamboats immediately arrived to rescue the crew, they only could save 20 people's lives. At 12:30, Gaulois hit a mine but she could have left the strait with a serious stroke. At 15:30, Inflexible hit a mine not far from the grave of Bouvet.
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The little "giant" ship Nusrat - "From the point of view of the continuation of the battle and the future of the world, the mines laid by Nusrat had very definitive results.." - Sir Winston Churchill
Despite severe damage, she could have arrived to the island of Imros. Shortly afterwards, Irresistible hit a mine; out of control she was near the Asiatic shore to attract the attention of Turkish gunners and her crew was taken off. On 8 March, Turkish minelayer Nusret had surreptitiously laid a line of mines parallel to the Asiatic shore, and now these mines were unexpectedly destroying the Allied Armada. As De Robeck had realised that the Turks had laid mines to the channel, he abandoned the attack. At 18:05, while the second squadron was withdrawing, HMS Ocean hit a mine and she exploded. Despite a heavy fire, her crew was evacuated.
The events in 18 March confused the Allies. Churchill's opponents like Lord Fisher had turned out to be right, it was impossible to open the strait "by ships only". Nevertheless, de Robeck and Churchill were still insisting that a renewed push would succeed. They began to renovate the plans for another naval expedition to Istanbul.
The following related story is one of the greatest U-Boat tales in history. I first read about this in an old book called 'Knights of the Debths' (Ritter der Tiefe):
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U-21
Commanded by Captain Otto Hersing throughout the entire war, U-21 (http://www.numa.net/expeditions/u-21_1.html) was part of the third Half Flotilla (2nd Flotilla) stationed in Heligoland at the outbreak of war in August, 1914. The U-boats were stationed there in anticipation of an Allied naval drive into the Heligoland Bight, which failed to materialize.
U21's first war patrol began on 8th August and was designed to intercept Royal Navy warships escorting troop convoys to France, it was curtailed after U21 was forced back to base by adverse weather conditions. A second unsuccessful repeat of this patrol lasted from 15th to 19th August, this time no targets presenting themselves for U21.
It was during the boat's third patrol while patrolling North of St. Abbs Head in search of Royal Navy targets that Hersing stumbled across HMS Pathfinder patrolling the Scottish North Sea Coast off St. Abb's Head in the Firth of Forth. A single bow torpedo fired at a range of 1600 yards pierced the cruiser's flank, puncturing and igniting a boiler. This in turn sprayed red-hot shrapnel through the bulkhead into the ship's magazine. The resultant explosion sank HMS Pathfinder* within four minutes, only 11 of her 350 crew surviving. This was the second ship ever sunk by a submarine, and the first in which the attacking submarine successfully escaped. (*Clive Cussler and NUMA also discovered the HMS Pathfinder in 1984.)
On November 23, Hersing stopped the French merchant ship Malachite; an examination of the ship's papers revealed that she was bound from Liverpool to Le Havre with contraband, and she was sunk by gunfire. Germany's policy of "restricted" commerce warfare was aimed at keeping neutral countries from siding with Britain, and Hersing observed the letter of the law, even as he sank three ships in the Irish Sea barely twenty miles from Liverpool on January 30, 1915.
On April 25, 1915the day that Australian and New Zealand forces landed at GallipoliU-21 departed Wilhelmshaven and sailed around Scotland bound for the eastern Mediterranean. On 5 June 1915 U21 was transferred to the Mediterranean to be based at Constantinople as part of the U-Mittelmeer Division eventually alongside four UB boats and three UC minelayers (transferred overland by rail). After refueling from a Hamburg-Amerika Linie freighter in the lee of Cape Finisterre, Spain (the fuel turned out to be useless), U-21 slipped by Gibraltar on May 6. In doing so U21 became the first U-boat to ever penetrate the Mediterranean and also the first submarine to refuel at sea near Spain. Although spotted by aircraft near Gibraltar during his transit of the narrow Straits and evading several British and French patrols, U-21 made the Adriatic port of Cattaro (Kotor) on May 13 with only 1.8 tons of fuel, enough for about half a day's steaming. A week later she sailed for Gallipoli.
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HMS Triumph
Hersing made his presence felt to the Royal Navy on 25 May at noon. After two hours stalking the battleship HMS Triumph (http://www.warship.get.net.pl/WBrytania/Battleships/1904_Swiftsure_class/_Triumph_photos.html) near Gaba Nepe, which was engaged in bombarding Turkish shore positions, a single torpedo passed through the ship's anti-submarine nets and ripped a hole in her side. The ship capsized before going under. Hersing again escaped, this time by diving under the capsized wreck before it sank.
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HMS Majestic
Two days later U21 sank another battleship, HMS Majestic (http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/hms_majestic.htm), off Cape Helles. Another single torpedo after hours of patiently waiting for the correct moment to strike and the battleship went down in 150 feet of water. This time Hersing suffered some retaliation, Air Commodore Swanson circling above in his flimsy aircraft spotted the U-boat and dropped several hand held bombs before U21 escaped by diving under the French battleship Henry IV and making for the Dardanelle's. Swanson again detected the U21 later in the day when Hersing had surfaced, but the British aircraft had no more bombs left to throw.
Narrowly escaping from an underwater maelstrom in the Dardanelles that dragged her down 100 feet, U-21 sailed into Istanbul on June 5. The Kaiser awarded U-21's crew the Iron Cross First Class and the Pour le Mérite to Hersing, for whom the British offered a £100,000 bounty. A month later, U-21 sank the French transport Carthage, but she was almost lost when forced to submerge in the midst of a minefield.
Hersing only made one more sortie from Constantinople, emerging to sink the French transport Carthage on July 4th, before proceeding to the Adriatic after finding his return route to Turkey blocked. Once in the Adriatic, U21 was transferred to the Deutsche U-Flotilla Pola, based at Cattaro. Her next major success was the February 8 sinking of the French cruiser Amiral Charner, with the loss of 334 of 335 crew, and in April the destruction of the British merchantman City of Lucknow, about sixty miles east of Malta. Later Hersing returned to the North Sea, joining the IIU-Flotille, High Seas Fleet, on March 4, 1917.
U21 survived the war and was due to be handed over to the Royal Navy, sailing from Kiel to Harwich after the Armistice had been signed. While under escort, Hersing ordered the boat's valves opened and despite British attempts to prevent it's sinking, U21 was successfully scuttled in the North Sea. During her career she had sunk 36 ships for 78,712 tons.
The U21 is mainly remembered as the first submarine to sink an enemy ship and survive. The first submarine to sink an enemy ship, of course, was the CSS Hunley, also discovered by Clive Cussler and NUMA.
The U21 was ordered in 1911 and commissioned in 1913. She was built by Kaiserliche werft at the Imperial shipyard in Danzig. Her displacement was 650 tons surfaced; 837 tons submerged. The boat's length was 210.476 feet and her beam was 20.01 feet
1915: British and French warships began a bombardment of the Turkish forts guarding the Dardanelles. This first bombardment proved a significant misjudgement, precisely because of its success; the Turks and their German advisers realised how inadequate the defences in the area were, and put in hand efforts to reinforce them that would later cost the allies serious losses. - MoD
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The British fleet which was first going up the Dardanelles. Flagship HMS Superb, HMS Temeraire, HMS Lord Nelson, HMS Agamemnon.
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Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty
Battles: The First and Second Naval Bombardment of the Dardanelles, 1915 (http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/dardanelles_feb15.htm)
With Winston Churchill having (as First Lord of the Admiralty) succeeded in securing War Cabinet backing for action in the Dardanelles (see overview for details), he lost no time in implementing a blueprint for a purely naval bombardment of the Dardanelles Straits in February 1915.
A purely naval bombardment of the Straits had long been recognised in professional naval circles as a most difficult undertaking. Some eight years earlier, in 1907, a British study had concluded that an attack upon the Straits was feasible only so long as the operation was a combined naval/ground undertaking.
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However Churchill, impatient for action, demanded that Sir Sackville Carden - the British naval commander in the Mediterranean - provide him with a proposal for a naval-only offensive upon the Straits. Carden obliged - although without appending a personal endorsement of the plan - and it was this plan that Churchill brought to the British War Cabinet in mid-January 1915.
The Straits - 65km in length and 7km in width aside from 'The Narrows' where the banks were as little as 1,600 apart - were overlooked by steep and heavily fortified cliffs (the Gallipoli peninsula to the northwest and the coast of Asia Minor to the south). Navigation through the wildly varying current was additionally deemed problematic.
Carden's plan was three-fold. He recognised that simple bombardment of the overlooking Turkish fortresses was impractical. For one thing, naval artillery could not be expected to achieve the necessary steep trajectory required to knock out the forts.
He proposed instead that the forts' outer guns should first be neutralised via long-range gunfire, the battleships out of effective range of the fortress guns. This accomplished an Allied fleet would progress further up the Straits (to The Narrows) to enable medium-range artillery to destroy shore batteries while minesweepers wiped out probable minefields blocking their path. The final phase envisaged the destruction of the inner forts.
Success would provide a path to Constantinople, thereby knocking Turkey out of war, and - importantly - open a supply lane to the Sea of Marmora and Britain's ally Russia.
Such was Carden's plan. Grave problems remained. Even should the naval bombardment prove successful the absence of ground troops would prevent the British from gaining command of the shorelines - and in the absence of supplies from the shore the naval fleet would necessarily have to return home to refuel and restock.
Nevertheless Churchill's plan was formally approved by the War Cabinet at the end of January 1915. The British war minister, Lord Kitchener, ordered that the only available division of infantry be placed in readiness should the naval endeavour prove successful.
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The First Sea Lord, Admiral John Fisher, was initially mute in his opposition to the exercise (in which he had no faith), but his opposition was to grow over time and ultimately lead to both his and Churchill's resignation.
Meanwhile the French government, in the form of incoming naval minister Jean Augagneur, was reluctant to cede the possibility of a purely British naval success in the Mediterranean.
Ignoring professional advice therefore Augagneur committed four French pre-dreadnoughts to add to the British fleet. He further came to an understanding with Churchill that should the expedition give signs of failure the 'demonstration' would be abandoned without loss of prestige.
Churchill was optimistic however. A previous demonstration of naval force by Carden on 2 November, using long-range guns (and ordered by Churchill), had inflicted notable damage upon the outer Turkish forts - chiefly as a consequence of lucky targeting. Nevertheless it served as encouragement to Churchill - and, to a lesser extent, to Carden.
Churchill set a date of 19 February for the opening of the naval bombardment. The combined British and French fleet consisted of the new battleship Queen Elizabeth, 3 battlecruisers, 16 pre-dreadnought (including four French vessels), 4 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 6 submarines, 21 trawlers plus the seaplane carrier Ark Royal. Overseeing the effort was Carden.
Pounding the outer fortresses Cape Helles and Kum Kale from long-range on 19 February the British and French attack proved ineffective in the face of an efficient Turkish defensive system and poor Allied gunnery, although greater damage was inflicted than the bombarding naval forces realised. Unbeknown to the Allies the Turkish defenders were also critically short of ammunition.
A renewed bombardment from closer range the following week (following a pause for adverse weather), on 25 February, was similarly unsuccessful. While the outer forts were themselves seized by marines the Allied force could not effective silence the 24 Turkish mobile batteries that poured shellfire from the heights and served as highly effective protection for the elaborate minefield defence set in place in The Narrows.
Without neutralising the minefield the fleet could not move forward: and without destroying the mobile batteries the minefields were adequately protected. While stage one of Carden's plan had therefore been accomplished serious difficulties impeded an advance to the second stage.
Still, the relative lack of progress of the first two naval bombardment attempts did not deter Churchill from ordering Carden to try again, this time via a determined effort to force The Narrows and remove the minefield threat. This duly took place on 18 March 1915 amid heavy failure.
In the meantime plans were afoot in London for the despatch of an expeditionary ground force under Sir Ian Hamilton, thereby fully committing Allied resources to the region.
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Journalist Henry Nevinson on the Anglo-French Setback at the Dardanelles, 18 March 1915 (http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/dardanelles_nevinson.htm)
Orders for washing and clean clothes (to avoid septic wounds) were issued on February 18th, and next morning, in clear and calm weather, "General Quarters" was sounded. The firing began at eight, and the first scene in the drama of the Dardanelles Expedition was enacted.
The main forts to be destroyed were four in number; two on either side the entrance. One stood on the cliff of Cape Helles, just to the left or southwest of the shelving amphitheatre afterwards celebrated as V Beach. Another lay low down, on the right of the same beach, close in front of the medieval castle of Seddel Bahr, where still one sees lying in heaps or scattered over the ground huge cannonballs of stone, such as were hurled at Duckworth's fleet more than a century before.
Upon the Asiatic side stood the fort of Kum Kali, at the very mouth of the strait, not far from the cliff village of Yenishehr, and separated from the plain of Troy by the river Mendere, near neighbour to the Simois and Scamander conjoined. About a mile down the, coast, close beside Yenishehr village, is the remaining fort of Orkhanieh.
None of these forts was heavily armed. The largest guns appear to have been 10.2 inch (six on Seddel Bahr, and four on Kum Kali), and when our squadron drew their fire their extreme range was found to be 12,500 yards.
Throughout the morning of February 19th, Admiral Carden concentrated his bombardment upon these forts at long range, and they made no reply. Hoping that he had silenced or utterly destroyed them, he advanced six ships to closer range in the afternoon, and then the reply came in earnest, though the shooting was poor.
At sunset he withdrew the ships, though Kum Kali was still firing. In evidence, he admitted that "the result of the day's action showed apparently that the effect of long range bombardment by direct fire on modern earthwork forts is slight."
It was a lesson repeated time after time throughout the campaign. The big naval shells threw up stones and earth as from volcanoes, and caused great alarm. But the alarm was temporary, and the effect, whether on earthworks or trenches, usually disappointing. For naval guns, constructed to strike visible objects at long range with marvellous accuracy, have too flat a trajectory for the plunging fire (as of howitzers) which devastates earthworks and trenches.
It was with heavy howitzers that the Germans destroyed the forts of Liege, Namur, and Antwerp, and, owing to this obvious difference in the weapons employed, Mr. Churchill's expectation of crushing the Dardanelles defences by the big guns of the Queen Elizabeth and the Inflexible was frustrated.
Nevertheless, after a few days of driving rain and heavy sea (a common event at this season, which might have been anticipated), Admiral Carden renewed the bombardment on February 25th, employing the Queen Elizabeth, Irresistible, Agamemnon, and Gaulois.
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HMS Queen Elizabeth
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HMS Inflexible bombarding Turkish positions
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HMS Agamemnon in Mudros Bay, Dardanelles
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The French Battleship, Bouvet
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Gaulois
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Charlemagne
The Queen Elizabeth, firing beyond the enemy's range, assisted in silencing the powerful batteries on Cape Helles, and though the Agamemnon was severely struck at about 11,000 yards' range, the subsidiary ships Cornwallis, Vengeance, Triumph, Albion, Suffren, and Charlemagne stood in closer, and by the evening compelled all the outer forts to cease fire.
Next day landing parties of marines were put ashore to complete their destruction; which they did, though at Kum Kali they were driven back to their boats with some loss. The story that marines had tea at Krithia and climbed Achi Baba for the view - places soon to acquire such ill-omened fame - is mythical.
But certainly they met with no opposition on the Peninsula, and if a large military force had then been available, the gallant but appalling events of the landing two months later would never have occurred. Had not the War Council persisted in the design of a solely naval attack, even after their resolve had begun to waver, a large military force might have been available, either then, or to cooperate with a similar naval movement only a week or two later.
Stormy weather delayed further attack till March 4th, when a squadron, including the Triumph, Albion, Lord Nelson, and Ocean, passed up the strait to a position beyond the village of Erenkeui, conspicuous upon a mountainside of the Asiatic coast, and bombarded Fort Dardanus.
The fort stands upon Kephez Point, which projects as though to defend the very entrance of the Narrows. Over the top of the promontory the houses and mosques of Chanak and Kilid Bahr could be plainly seen, where those towns face each other across the narrowest part of the passage.
Of the eight lines of minefield drawn across the strait, five lay between Kephez Point and Chanak. Day and night our mine-sweeping trawlers were engaged upon them, and considerable praise must be given to the courage and endurance of their crews, who for the most part had been North Sea fishermen before the expedition.
Their service throughout, whether for mine-sweeping or transport, was of very high value. It almost justified the remark made to me by a skipper whom I had met before on the Dogger Bank: "If the Kaiser had knowed as we'd got trawlers, he would never have declared war!"
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A Turkish heavy gun. An 11 inch gun placed in a
fortress at Kilitbahir
A similar advance to engage the forts at Dardanus, and, after those were thought to be silenced, the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, was made next day, and again, in stronger force, on March 6th. At the same time, on the 6th, the Queen Elizabeth, stationed off Gaba Tepe on the outer coast, flung her vast shells clear over the Peninsula into the Chanak forts, her fire being directed by aeroplanes.
She was supported by the Agamemnon and Ocean, and there were high hopes of thus crushing out the big guns defending the Narrows, some of which were believed to be 14-inch. Nevertheless, when the four French battleships advanced tip the strait on the following day (March 7th), supported at long range by the Agamemnon and her sister ship Lord Nelson, the Chanak forts replied with an effective and damaging fire.
It was impossible to say when a fort was really out of action. After long silence, the Turkish and German gunners frequently returned and reopened fire, as though nothing had happened. In his evidence, Admiral Carden stated that when the demolition parties landed after the bombardment of the outer forts, they found 70 per cent of the guns apparently intact upon their mountings, although their magazines were blown up and their electrical or other communications destroyed.
Still worse than these disappointing results was the opportunity left to the enemy of moving, not only bodies of men, but field-guns and heavy howitzers from one point of the Peninsula and Asiatic coast to another, and opening fire upon the ships from concealed and unexpected positions. Our landing-parties of marines also suffered considerably from the advantage thus given to the enemy, as happened to a body which landed at Kum Kali for the second time on March 4th.
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Selahattin Adil Pasha, the Commander
of the Çanakkale fortifications.
All such dangers and hindrances would have been removed if the navy had been supported by sufficient military force to occupy the ground behind the ships as they advanced.
Mr. Churchill, though striving to restrain his impatience, strongly urged Admiral Carden to press forward the naval attack with the utmost vigour. In a telegram of March 11th he wrote: "If success cannot be obtained without loss of ships and men, results to be gained are important enough to justify such a loss. The whole operation may be decided, and consequences of a decisive character upon the war may be produced by the turning of the corner Chanak... We have no wish to hurry you or urge you beyond your judgment, but we recognize clearly that at a certain period in your operations you will have to press hard for a decision; and we desire to know whether, in your opinion, that period has now arrived. Every well-conceived action for forcing a decision, even should regrettable losses be entailed, will receive our support."
To this Admiral Carden replied that he considered the stage for vigorous action had now been reached, but that, when the fleet entered the Sea of Marmora, military operations on a large scale should be opened at once, so as to secure communications.
On March 15th Mr. Churchill, still anxious not to allow his impatience to drive him into rashness, telegraphed again that, though no time was to be lost, there should be no undue haste. An attempt to rush the passage without having cleared a channel through the mines and destroyed the primary armament of the forts was not contemplated.
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Marshall Liman von Sanders. The
Commander of the 5.th Army
The close cooperation of army and navy must be carefully studied, and it might be found that a naval rush would be costly without military occupation of the Kilid Bahr plateau. On these points the Admiral was to consult with the General who was being sent out to take command of the troops. To all of this Admiral Carden agreed. He proposed to begin vigorous operations on March 17th, but did not intend to rush the passage before a channel was cleared. This answer was telegraphed on March 16th. But on the same day the Admiral resigned his command owing to serious ill-health.
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The armored cruiser Barbaros was torpedoed and
sank by British submarine E-11
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Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz Sultan Selim
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Yavuz opens fire with her 11 in. guns
Rear-Admiral Sir John de Robeck, second in command, was next day appointed his successor. He was five years younger, was, of course, fully cognizant of the plans, and expressed his entire approval of them. Yet it appears from his evidence that though strongly urged by Mr. Churchill to act on "his independent and separate judgment," and not to hesitate to state objections, his real motive in carrying on the prearranged scheme was not so much his confidence in success as his fear lest a withdrawal might injure our prestige in the Near East; and, secondly, his desire to make the best he could of an idea which he regarded as an order.
"The order was to carry out a certain operation," he said, "or to try to do it, and we had to do the best we could." If the ships got through, he, like many others, expected a revolution or other political change in Turkey. Otherwise, he saw that transports could not come up, and that the ships could not remain in the Sea of Marmora for more than a fortnight or three weeks, but would have to run the gauntlet coming down again, just as Admiral Duckworth did in 1807.
In his telegram accepting the command, however, he made no mention of these considerations, but only said that success depended upon clearing the minefields after silencing the forts.
Indeed, he had small time for any considerations. For on the very first day after receiving his command (March 18th) he undertook the main attempt to force the Narrows. The weather was favourable - no mist and little wind. The scheme was to attack in three squadrons successively.
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HMS Queen Elizabeth, was the most powerful ship
of the whole fleet with her 38 cm. guns and thick
armor.
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HMS Queen Elizabeth was the flagship of Alled Fleet
The first blow was given by the four most powerful ships - Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible, Lord Nelson, and Agamemnon - which poured heavy shell at long range into the forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr, while the Triumph and Prince George bombarded Fort Dardanus on the Asiatic coast, and Fort Soghandere, opposite to it upon the Peninsula.
This bombardment lasted from about 11 a.m. till 12.30 p.m., and all six ships found themselves exposed to heavy fire from the forts, and from hidden howitzers and field-guns in varied positions upon both shores.
At about 12.30 the second squadron, consisting of the four French ships, came up into action, advancing beyond the former line in the direction of Kephez Point. Though suffering considerably (chiefly owing to their inability to manoeuvre in such narrow waters, thus presenting very visible and almost fixed targets to the enemy's guns), the ten ships maintained the bombardment for about an hour (till nearly 1.30). The enemy's forts then fell silent, and it was hoped that many of them, at all events, had been destroyed.
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German U-Boat & Turkish Patrol Boat at the Dardanelles during
the battle of Çanakkale
Accordingly, the third squadron, consisting of six British ships (Irresistible, Vengeance, Ocean, Swiftsure, Majestic, and Albion), were brought up, with the design of advancing first through the Narrows, so as to insure a clear passage for the greater ships which made the first attack.
At the same time the four French ships, together with the Triumph and Prince George, were ordered to withdraw, so as to leave more room for the rest. During this manoeuvre, all or nearly all the guns in the forts opened fire again, their silence having been due, not to destruction, but to the absence of the gunners, driven away by the gases or terror of our shells.
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French battleship Bouvet sinks after hitting a sea mine
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French Battleship FNS Bouvet Goes Under the Waves
Most of the ships suffered, and as the Bouvet moved down channel with her companion ships, she was struck by three big shells in quick succession. The blows were immediately followed by a vast explosion. It is disputed whether this was due to a shell bursting in her magazine, or to a torpedo fired from the Asiatic coast, or, as the Admiralty report said, to a mine drifting down the current.
In two or three minutes she sank in deep water just north of Erenkeui, carrying nearly the whole of her crew to the bottom. The cries of the men dragged down with her, or struggling in the water as they were swept downstream, sounded over the strait.
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HMS Irresistible, sunk in the Naval Attack of 18 March
At 2.30 the bombardment of all the forts was renewed, but they were not silenced. At 4 o'clock the Irresistible drew away with a heavy list. Apparently she also was struck by a mine adrift; but she remained afloat for nearly two hours; and nearly all her crew were saved by destroyers, which swarmed round her at great risk to themselves, since they offered a crowded target.
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HMS Ocean, sunk in the Naval Attack of 18 March
A quarter of an hour after she sank, the Ocean was struck in a similar manner (6.50 p.m.) and sank with great rapidity. Most of her crew, however, were also saved by destroyers near at hand. Many of the other ships were struck by shells.
The Inflexible and Gaulois suffered especially, and only just crawled back to be beached, the one at Tenedos, the other at Rabbit Island. At sunset the fleet was withdrawn. It had been proved once more that, in an attack upon land forts, ships lie at a great disadvantage. In this case the disadvantage was much increased by the narrowness of the waters, which brought the ships within range of howitzer and other batteries hidden upon both shores, and also gave special opportunity for the use of mines drifting on the rapid current, or anchored right across the channel in successive rows.
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HMS Swiftsure opens fire on Turkish ground
batteries located at Arıburnu
Mr. Churchill wished to renew the attempt at once. Perhaps he thought that English people are given to exaggerate the loss of a battleship. Admiral de Robeck shared this view. It was suspected at the Admiralty that the ammunition in the forts was running short, and, at a much later date, Enver Pasha is reported to have said: "If the English had only had the courage to rush more ships through the Dardanelles, they could have got to Constantinople; but their delay enabled us thoroughly to fortify the Peninsula, and in six weeks' time we had taken down there over 200 Austrian Skoda guns."
That delay of six weeks was fatal, but the navy was not to blame. The British military leaders decided in favour of a land attack.
A great analysis: The Naval Attack (http://www.canakkale.gen.tr/eng/navalmid.html)
The British acting with the concept "the one rules the seas, rules the world", believed that it was possible to open the Dardanelles "by ships only". Before The Naval Attack was instituted, First Lord of the Admiralty Churchill asked the officer commanding the Aegean, Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden.
Carden stated that he believed the Dardanelles could be forced, given sufficient warships and minesweepers, in a three stage plan; first a neutralisation of the Turkish forts guarding the entrance, then a clearing of the Turkish minefields, and finally a drive into the Sea of Marmara. This plan persuaded the War Council despite Lord Fisher's doubts. The British Navy was proud of its ammunitions, technology, and surely, its victorious history, full of uncountable successes. It was impossible for the frayed, collapsing Ottoman Empire to withstand this invincible armada supported by French warships.
Allied Armada's naval attack began on 19 February 1915. Until 13 March 1915, they continuously bombarded the Turkish forts and opened a way for the minesweepers. However, they had confronted with the Turks' tough resistance. The Turkish gunners did not bother to reply the Allies' bombardment. This showed that, to open the Dardanelles was not that easy and the Allies could have cleaned only the first five miles of the strait.
Until 18 March the Allied Armada destroyed Seddulbahir and Ertugrul forts located on the European shore and Kumkale and Orhaniye forts located on the Asiatic shore. It seemed that the entrance was now clear but the future was still uncertain. Nobody guessed what was going to happen on 18 March 1915.
On 17 March 1915, Admiral de Robeck was in charge to proceed the plan in place of Admiral Carden. In respect of Carden's plan, the Allied Fleet appeared in the entrance in the morning of 18 March. De Robeck himself commanded the Fleet's most powerful squadron.
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In bright sunshine and without the possibility of surprise, de Robeck in HMS Queen Elizabeth led the first wave up the channel at 10:30. Queen Elizabeth's target was Mecidiye fort, HMS Lord Nelson was going to bomb the Namazgah fort and HMS Inflexible's object was Hamidiye fort. This was called as "A Line" and it was begun to be proceeding at 11:30. De Robeck's most powerful ships commenced to bombard the central forts.
Meanwhile, Allied Fleet had entered the fire line coming from Kumkale. Turkish hotwizers began to fire, but their guns could not cover the distance and the gunners failed to reach the ships. At midday, Allied Fleet had destroyed the Cimenlik and Hamidiye forts. De Robeck signalled his second wave to go in closer, Guepratte's French squadron, Bouvet, Charlemagne, Gaulois and Suffren with HMS Triumph and Prince George.
This step of the plan was called as "B Line". Guepratte led his squadron through the British line and subjected the shore defences. Under Turkish gunners' heavy fire, the squadron had reached the B Line. After a mutual bombardment, the Allies had succeeded to stop the middle forts but the central forts continued to fire. Two British ships, HMS Triumph and HMS Prince George had taken their positions in A Line and they targeted Mesudiye and Yildiz forts.
Turkish forts on the European shore were under a fierce fire. Most of the bombshells had hit them and destroyed the telephone lines. Moreover, Mecidiye fort stopped with the death of its gunners.
If the allies could have succeeded the second step of the plan, second squadron commanded by Colonel Hayes Sadler would have moved and replaced the third squadron. De Robeck signalled the French to retire for his third wave of advance, Ocean, Irresistible, Albion, Vengeance, Swiftsun and Majestic.
As the French ships led by Suffren had their return, wheeled away to make room for the second squadron, something unexpected had happened, around 14:00. French ship Bouvet following immediately Suffren hit a mine and within two minutes had disappeared entirely, with the loss of almost all her crew. As the steamboats immediately arrived to rescue the crew, they only could save 20 people's lives. At 12:30, Gaulois hit a mine but she could have left the strait with a serious stroke. At 15:30, Inflexible hit a mine not far from the grave of Bouvet.
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The little "giant" ship Nusrat - "From the point of view of the continuation of the battle and the future of the world, the mines laid by Nusrat had very definitive results.." - Sir Winston Churchill
Despite severe damage, she could have arrived to the island of Imros. Shortly afterwards, Irresistible hit a mine; out of control she was near the Asiatic shore to attract the attention of Turkish gunners and her crew was taken off. On 8 March, Turkish minelayer Nusret had surreptitiously laid a line of mines parallel to the Asiatic shore, and now these mines were unexpectedly destroying the Allied Armada. As De Robeck had realised that the Turks had laid mines to the channel, he abandoned the attack. At 18:05, while the second squadron was withdrawing, HMS Ocean hit a mine and she exploded. Despite a heavy fire, her crew was evacuated.
The events in 18 March confused the Allies. Churchill's opponents like Lord Fisher had turned out to be right, it was impossible to open the strait "by ships only". Nevertheless, de Robeck and Churchill were still insisting that a renewed push would succeed. They began to renovate the plans for another naval expedition to Istanbul.
The following related story is one of the greatest U-Boat tales in history. I first read about this in an old book called 'Knights of the Debths' (Ritter der Tiefe):
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U-21
Commanded by Captain Otto Hersing throughout the entire war, U-21 (http://www.numa.net/expeditions/u-21_1.html) was part of the third Half Flotilla (2nd Flotilla) stationed in Heligoland at the outbreak of war in August, 1914. The U-boats were stationed there in anticipation of an Allied naval drive into the Heligoland Bight, which failed to materialize.
U21's first war patrol began on 8th August and was designed to intercept Royal Navy warships escorting troop convoys to France, it was curtailed after U21 was forced back to base by adverse weather conditions. A second unsuccessful repeat of this patrol lasted from 15th to 19th August, this time no targets presenting themselves for U21.
It was during the boat's third patrol while patrolling North of St. Abbs Head in search of Royal Navy targets that Hersing stumbled across HMS Pathfinder patrolling the Scottish North Sea Coast off St. Abb's Head in the Firth of Forth. A single bow torpedo fired at a range of 1600 yards pierced the cruiser's flank, puncturing and igniting a boiler. This in turn sprayed red-hot shrapnel through the bulkhead into the ship's magazine. The resultant explosion sank HMS Pathfinder* within four minutes, only 11 of her 350 crew surviving. This was the second ship ever sunk by a submarine, and the first in which the attacking submarine successfully escaped. (*Clive Cussler and NUMA also discovered the HMS Pathfinder in 1984.)
On November 23, Hersing stopped the French merchant ship Malachite; an examination of the ship's papers revealed that she was bound from Liverpool to Le Havre with contraband, and she was sunk by gunfire. Germany's policy of "restricted" commerce warfare was aimed at keeping neutral countries from siding with Britain, and Hersing observed the letter of the law, even as he sank three ships in the Irish Sea barely twenty miles from Liverpool on January 30, 1915.
On April 25, 1915the day that Australian and New Zealand forces landed at GallipoliU-21 departed Wilhelmshaven and sailed around Scotland bound for the eastern Mediterranean. On 5 June 1915 U21 was transferred to the Mediterranean to be based at Constantinople as part of the U-Mittelmeer Division eventually alongside four UB boats and three UC minelayers (transferred overland by rail). After refueling from a Hamburg-Amerika Linie freighter in the lee of Cape Finisterre, Spain (the fuel turned out to be useless), U-21 slipped by Gibraltar on May 6. In doing so U21 became the first U-boat to ever penetrate the Mediterranean and also the first submarine to refuel at sea near Spain. Although spotted by aircraft near Gibraltar during his transit of the narrow Straits and evading several British and French patrols, U-21 made the Adriatic port of Cattaro (Kotor) on May 13 with only 1.8 tons of fuel, enough for about half a day's steaming. A week later she sailed for Gallipoli.
http://www.warship.get.net.pl/WBrytania/Battleships/1904_Swiftsure_class/Triumph_03.jpg
HMS Triumph
Hersing made his presence felt to the Royal Navy on 25 May at noon. After two hours stalking the battleship HMS Triumph (http://www.warship.get.net.pl/WBrytania/Battleships/1904_Swiftsure_class/_Triumph_photos.html) near Gaba Nepe, which was engaged in bombarding Turkish shore positions, a single torpedo passed through the ship's anti-submarine nets and ripped a hole in her side. The ship capsized before going under. Hersing again escaped, this time by diving under the capsized wreck before it sank.
http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/images/hmsmajestic4.jpg
HMS Majestic
Two days later U21 sank another battleship, HMS Majestic (http://www.battleships-cruisers.co.uk/hms_majestic.htm), off Cape Helles. Another single torpedo after hours of patiently waiting for the correct moment to strike and the battleship went down in 150 feet of water. This time Hersing suffered some retaliation, Air Commodore Swanson circling above in his flimsy aircraft spotted the U-boat and dropped several hand held bombs before U21 escaped by diving under the French battleship Henry IV and making for the Dardanelle's. Swanson again detected the U21 later in the day when Hersing had surfaced, but the British aircraft had no more bombs left to throw.
Narrowly escaping from an underwater maelstrom in the Dardanelles that dragged her down 100 feet, U-21 sailed into Istanbul on June 5. The Kaiser awarded U-21's crew the Iron Cross First Class and the Pour le Mérite to Hersing, for whom the British offered a £100,000 bounty. A month later, U-21 sank the French transport Carthage, but she was almost lost when forced to submerge in the midst of a minefield.
Hersing only made one more sortie from Constantinople, emerging to sink the French transport Carthage on July 4th, before proceeding to the Adriatic after finding his return route to Turkey blocked. Once in the Adriatic, U21 was transferred to the Deutsche U-Flotilla Pola, based at Cattaro. Her next major success was the February 8 sinking of the French cruiser Amiral Charner, with the loss of 334 of 335 crew, and in April the destruction of the British merchantman City of Lucknow, about sixty miles east of Malta. Later Hersing returned to the North Sea, joining the IIU-Flotille, High Seas Fleet, on March 4, 1917.
U21 survived the war and was due to be handed over to the Royal Navy, sailing from Kiel to Harwich after the Armistice had been signed. While under escort, Hersing ordered the boat's valves opened and despite British attempts to prevent it's sinking, U21 was successfully scuttled in the North Sea. During her career she had sunk 36 ships for 78,712 tons.
The U21 is mainly remembered as the first submarine to sink an enemy ship and survive. The first submarine to sink an enemy ship, of course, was the CSS Hunley, also discovered by Clive Cussler and NUMA.
The U21 was ordered in 1911 and commissioned in 1913. She was built by Kaiserliche werft at the Imperial shipyard in Danzig. Her displacement was 650 tons surfaced; 837 tons submerged. The boat's length was 210.476 feet and her beam was 20.01 feet