New 4 series movie about VDV during the second chechen war.

[RuSoKaR]

Tells about the real events of the end of February of 2000, occurred in the Argun region in Chechnya. The soldiers of the 6th company of 104 paraborne regiments of Pskov
division VDV joined the severe battle with the twenty-fold superior
forces of terrorists. Landing force members did not tremble, they did not step back and carried out task, with the price of its life after intercepting to bandits, being burst open from the environment.

From The decision Of the State Duma RF: Paratroopers returned their young lives for the integrity of our
native land, after destroying more than 700 fighters, and to the end they carried out their debt before the fatherland(motherland). RF Ministry of Defense, having highly estimated the exploit of the soldiers of the 6th company 104- GO of the regiment of the Pskov division airborne troops, introduced entire personnel to the state rewards, including of 12 people to the Title of Hero of Russia.

The main hero of four-series film - captain is numerical. It rejects the calm life with the dear woman and leaves there, where most of all is necessary experienced commander - into the zone
of war shooting in the territory of Chechnya. A feeling of debt occurs most strongly.

The honor of Russian officer dvizhet numerical, which is ready to the end to carry out stated problem, openly meeting dangers and burdens of military life and giving the
example to its subordinate...




Preview
http://www.rutv.ru/v/3802.asf

[RomanS]

My friend alrady has it ready for me. He should be sending it next week to USA here.

[mustamato]

And the name of the series is?

[RuSoKaR]

My friend alrady has it ready for me. He should be sending it next week to USA here.

:cantbeli: you are so lucky, any way you can share it with us? :D :D :D :D :D


It's called Chesti Imey, anyone for the english translation?

[RomanS]

I hope it's not going to be bad, because the preview looked slightly cheesy.
The chehens looked too white
Mark Evtuhin was 15 years younger in real life.

Most the fighting was in the evening.

Here are some photos from the film.
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32553.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32556.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32560.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32561.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32559.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32562.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32564.jpg
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32563.jpg

WOW Lt.Dostavalov's actor looks good, just like him
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32558.jpg

Not sure where in the tragedy this takes place, well I guess I'll find out when I see the movie.
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32613.jpg

Spread out a little guys, I know I know, you gotta get everyone in frame, but.. come on
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32557.jpg

This took place when the sun was almost down, with a lot more fire, and **** going on in the background.
http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32614.jpg

[RomanS]

http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32555.jpg

http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32616.jpg

http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32554.jpg

http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32615.jpg

[RomanS]

http://lazarev-ml.narod.ru/photo/002.gif
http://lazarev-ml.narod.ru/photo/0065.jpg

[RuSoKaR]

I just can wait to see this,

http://www.rutv.ru/p/b_32613.jpg

is that a swimming tank?(PT-something)

[RomanS]

NO thats a BMD

I'm not sure what does BMD and the 6th have to do with each other in this storry.

[RuSoKaR]

me fell so stupido :cantbeli:

[Krivetka]

wow is it hard to write the name of the movie?

[RomanS]

hell, thats a tough one to translate

I too need help on this one.

[mustamato]

hell, thats a tough one to translate

I too need help on this one.

http://www.imdb.com/

Try here, you guys probably know the directors name etc.
There is (usually) the english name of movies as well.

[hist2004]

I found this article written by two US military personal. It probably belongs
in the general discussion area, but it's relevant to the topic. Let me know what you guys think of it and if you feel it's accurate.

ULUS-KERT: An Airborne Company's Last Stand
Sergeant Michael D. Wilmoth, US Army Reserve, and
Lieutenant Colonel Peter G. Tsouras, US Army Reserve, Retired

In four days of desperate fighting, from 29 February to 3 March 2000, a large force of Chechen fighters wiped out a Russian paratroop company in the harsh defiles and ridges of the Argun Gorge in the mountains of southern Chechnya. Although the battle was a catastrophic tactical defeat for the Russian airborne force, the company's stubborn defense to the last man and the concentration of Russian relief forces inflicted a strategic setback on the Chechens. The Russians stumbled into this catastrophe through poor unit leadership, but Russian blood and valor transformed it into victory.
Hatred to the Bone
In Fall 1999, the Second Chechen War began. The Russian Army sought to reimpose the Russian Federation's authority in lawless, breakaway Chechnya. The Russians and Chechens' shared 200-year history had been punctuated by convulsions of blood and cruelty. The First Chechen War, from 1994 to 1996, had ended in the Russian Army's humiliation and left Russia with its highest loss of resources and professionalism since the Soviet Union's demise. The loss of basic combat skills also had been horrific. This second round was the Russian Army's opportunity to show that it had recovered something of its former ability.
Nothing expressed the depth of Russian-Chechen animosity more than the battle cries hurled back and forth across the firing lines during the siege of Groznyy. To the Chechen shouts of "Allah Akhbar!" the Russians would respond, "Christ is Risen!"
After Groznyy fell, Chechen forces regrouped in the rough, mountainous areas of southern Chechnya. By late February, a large Chechen force of from 1,600 and 2,500 fighters had concentrated in the town of Ulus-Kert, where the Abazolgul and Sharo-argun rivers join.1 The area was one in which the Russians had not dared enter during the First Chechen War. This time, they did not hesitate to follow.
A Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) tactical group attacked Chechen forces at Ulus-Kert, forcing them southeast. One of the VDV tactical group's regimental task forces, based on the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment (GPR) of the 76th Guards Airborne Division (GAD), was to block the gorge while the VDV tactical group encircled the Chechens.
Area of Operations
The small town of Ulus-Kert is surrounded by extremely steep, mountainous terrain. Approximately 6 kilometers south of the town and extending far to the southeast are the Dargenduk Mountains. A road leading generally south out of Ulus-Kert and up the northeastern edge of the Dargenduks crosses over a 1,410-meter hill, referred to as Hill 1410. Approximately 1.5 kilometers directly southeast of Ulus-Kert is Hill 705.6. Just about one-half kilometer south of Hill 705.6 is a narrow opening to a small gorge. Three and one-half kil-ometers southeast of Ulus-Kert, on the gorge's easternmost side, is Hill 776. Hill 787 is only 1 kilometer farther south.
A road leading southeast from Ulus-Kert over Hill 705.6 turns south into the gorge. Another road intersects the first then leads to the western edge of the saddle between hills 776 and 787 where it divides into mountain paths crossing the saddle. Hill 787 is approximately 4.3 kilometers north of Hill 1410. At the time of the operation, the weather was foggy and cold, with snow on the ground.
The Chechens planned to escape advancing Russian forces by using the advantage of the mountainous terrain southeast of Ulus-Kert. After slipping through the passes, the fighters could seize the strategic population centers of Makhkety, Elistanzhi, Zaduli, Kirov-Yurt and Vedeno, which provided a west-to-east corridor in relatively low, flat terrain through which remaining Chechen forces could withdraw to Dagestan.2 From Dagestan, they could renew the struggle on more favorable terms.
The VDV tactical group's mission was to counter the Chechen force's objectives by blocking its escape through the mountains then encircling it so artillery and combat air support could be used. Engaging infantry soldiers in direct combat was to be kept to a minimum. The plan to encircle Chechen forces—a common Russian tactic—reflects the Russians' desire to minimize casualties.
The First Chechen War had not been popular with the Russian populace because of the high death rate. Tension was also rife in the Russian command arrangement. Airborne forces felt they were being used as cannon fodder to reduce casualties among motorized infantry troops. Underlying this tension was the old rivalry between Russian airborne forces and ground forces. Historically, the VDV had been a separate service. Briefly in the late 1990s, it had been subordinated to ground forces. Newly appointed commander of Russian airborne forces Colonel General Georgiy Shpak had obtained a reversal of this decision and zealously guarded the VDV's independence.
Shpak streamlined the organization and obtained new missions for it, primarily in peacekeeping operations. By the time operations around Ulus-Kert were under way, the grouping of airborne forces had been subordinated to Colonel General Gennadiy N. Troshev, Commander of the Eastern Grouping of Federal Forces, who reported directly to General of the Army Viktor Kazantsev, who commanded the Operations Group, Joint Grouping of Federal Forces, in the North Caucasus. The arrangement was not a happy one; airborne forces felt they were not being properly supported.3
The Battle Begins
The VDV tactical group was a task force based on divisional parachute regiments augmented with VDV command-level assets, such as reconnaissance subunits. The 104th GPR task force was assigned the mission of blocking Chechen escape routes east through the mountains. 104th GPR, like most Soviet/Russian parachute regiments, had three airborne battalions, an artillery battalion equipped with two S9, 120-millimeter, self-propelled guns and various support assets. Each airborne battalion had three airborne companies numbered sequentially one through nine, with the first, second and third companies composing the 1st Airborne Battalion and so on. Each 104th GPR company was augmented with reconnaissance and/or SPETSNAZ subunits from the VDV command to form company tactical groups.4
Hills 705.6, 776, 787 and 1410 were the main features of the net 104th GPR used to encircle the Chechen force. The VDV tactical group's main body crossed the Sharoargun and Abazolgul rivers, pushing the Chechen force out of Ulus-Kert toward the southeast. 104th GPR's 1st Company, 1st Airborne Battalion, still had not crossed either the Abazolgul or the Sharoargun. An unidentified 104th GPR company was on or near Hill 705.6. 4th Company and an unidentified 104th GPR airborne company, two VDV SPETS-NAZ groups and an elite Federal Security Service (FSB)—successor to the KGB—SPETSNAZ group, known as Vympel, were on Hill 1410. Present at 2d Airborne Battalion Headquarters on Hill 776 were Commander, 2d Airborne Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Niko-layevich Yevtyukhin, and Captain Viktor Romanov, the commander of an artillery battery of the regimental artillery battalion who was heading a forward observer team. 6th Company, commanded by Major Sergey Molodov, was en route to the saddle between Hills 776 and 787. 104th GPR was engaged in positioning companies to block escape routes over the mountains.
The Chechen force, retreating to the southeast of Ulus-Kert along a road leading over Hill 705.6 away from the main advancing body of the VDV tactical group, was looking for the first unguarded or weakly held way over the mountains. The 1,600 to 2,500 fighters wore winter camouflage and were well equipped with various small arms, grenade launchers and mortars. They were supported by a logistics train of hundreds of pack animals.
Day 1, 29 February 2000
Early on 29 February, a 104th GPR airborne company encountered a significant Chechen force on the road leading southeast out of Ulus-Kert. Russian paratroopers engaged the Chechen fighters for control of Hill 705.6. The Russian company, significantly stressed during the fight, gained control of the hill and pushed the Chechen force southeast into the small gorge below. The company was most likely heavily supported by artillery and helicopters, as was the usual Russian operation in this war.
The 104th GPR commander ordered 2d Airborne Battalion elements to block the saddle between hills 776 and 787, which was the next possible path over the mountains for the Chechens. The 2d Airborne Battalion headquarters was already in place on Hill 776. The 2d Airborne Battalion element was to be in place by 1400. In the early morning, 6th Company, including the third platoon, 4th Company, and two reconnaissance groups, probably from the regimental reconnaissance platoon, started on foot toward the saddle.5
6th Company, with the other elements, minus the company's third platoon, arrived by late morning, ahead of schedule. The company commander established a linear defense in the saddle between the hills, fronted by a minefield facing west toward the gorge. The defense focused on the Chechen forces' expected direction of escape. No access routes through the minefield were prepared nor were platoon positions sited to be mutually supportive.6 After establishing company positions, troops began their afternoon meal, leaving their positions and congregating in the open.7
The Chechen force clearly had a better grasp of the situation. The fighters had been listening to 104th GPR communications and used this advantage and good ground reconnaissance to locate 104th GPR subunits and to set ambushes. At 1230, a 6th Company reconnaissance patrol encountered approximately 20 fighters just outside company defensive positions. That the Chechens could approach that close without detection shows that the Russians had conducted no deep reconnaissance of the approaches to the saddle.
The Chechens, armed with automatic weapons, grenade launchers and mortars, reacted quickly, seizing the initiative. The small force was probably followed by a combat element, which would have been consistent with Soviet-style reconnaissance doctrine that places great value on immediately seizing the initiative in any engagement by having a strong combat element close behind the advance reconnaissance ele-ment.8 Chechen reconnaissance elements also worked their way around the Russian position in the saddle and attacked from the rear where there were no defenses.9 With Chechens in the rear and no escape routes through their own minefield, 6th Company pulled back and dug in on Hill 776. Their retreat was so precipitous that they abandoned mess kits still full of food.10
Chechen fighters, laying down constant fire on 6th Company, received reinforcements as the main body arrived. The force encircled 6th Company and sent waves of fighters into the attack.11 By the end of the first day, 6th Company had suffered 31 dead—a 33 percent killed in action (KIA) rate.12 6th Company had barely survived three basic errors: failure to establish an all-around defense; failure to aggressively conduct reconnaisance of the enemy's expected approach route, especially given the Chechen reputation for tactical skill, reconnaisance and working around the flanks; and failure to heed warnings about the Chechen force's approach.13
For some reason, 6th Company did not anticipate with sufficient seriousness and energy the danger it had been assigned to forestall. It seems likely that weak command at the company level was compounded by a lack of timely supervision by the adjacent battalion headquarters.
Day 2, 1 March 2000
Early in the morning on Hill 1410, a reinforcement group of two VDV SPETSNAZ platoons, one Vympel SPETSNAZ group and two airborne companies departed on foot for the saddle. The group encountered several ambushes while traversing terrain as steep as 70 degrees. At approximately 0330, one VDV SPETSNAZ platoon broke through to Hill 787 but was forced to dig in because of stiff Chechen opposition.
The 1st Company was also sent to reinforce 6th Company. While attempting to cross the Abazolgul River northeast of Ulus-Kert, the unit encountered a Chechen ambush force of up to 60 men. Despite repeated attempts to fight through the Chechen ambush, the 1st Company was forced to dig in on the river's bank. At 0300, during a brief lull, 2d Airborne Battalion deputy commander Major Aleksandr Dostovalov, with 4th Company's third platoon, broke through to the encircled company. While relief forces were being held back by ambushes, waves of Chechen fighters continued to assault 6th Company on Hill 776.14 When Romanov's legs were blown off by a mortar round, the battalion commander took over.
While some reports question the lack of artillery and combat air support, others indicate that both where present throughout the four-day engagement. In his report to defense minister Igor Sergeyev, Shpak states that 2d Airborne Battalion "was supported by a self-propelled artillery battalion of the 104th Parachute Regiment and by army aviation."15 The presence of an artillery forward team with 6th Company, which included a battery commander, indicates that artillery support was at least adequate. While Shpak's statement and other reports make it certain that VDV artillery was employed throughout the engagement, it is unclear how effective it was at reducing Chechen numbers. Also unanswered is whether additional artillery assets were employed to support 6th Company.
Press reports also cite use of "Grads"—122-millimeter BM-21 multiple-rocket launchers that VDV units do not have.16 Accounts of other engagements in the southern mountains show that the Russians employed available artillery from a number of units in coordination with army aviation helicopters. These accounts stress that artillery continued to fire when helicopters disappeared with daylight. Only one Russian hel-icopter in the Chechen theater had night capability. This supports Shpak's statement that 6th Company received no aviation support at night. Helicopter support was further limited by foggy conditions during the fighting.17
The Chechens continued heavy attacks on Hill 776 from all directions throughout the early morning. Paratrooper officers showed an unhesitating willingness to sacrifice themselves, a trait the Germans had frequently noted in the grandfathers of the men on the hill. Dostovalov, already wounded, attacked a group of Chechens trying to carry off a wounded soldier and dispatched them with a grenade. Junior soldiers were equally valiant. After Private Aleksandr Lebedev ran out of ammunition, he threw himself and his last live grenade into a group of Chechens who had wanted him to surrender.
At approximately 0500, the Chech-ens breached 6th Company defenses. Cumulative casualties and odds of at least 10 to one were too much for the dwindling Russian force. As Chechens overran Hill 776, fighting became hand-to-hand, and Chechens began shooting wounded Russians. The already wounded battalion commander took over the radio from the wounded Romanov and called in artillery fire on his own position, shouting into the radio, "I call artillery on myself!"18 The Chechens suffered grievously from the artillery, and at 0610, communications with the battalion commander were lost.
As the second day of fighting closed, 6th Company counted another 26 paratroopers killed and many wounded. Counting the 31 men who had fallen the day before, 6th Company had suffered a KIA rate of almost two-thirds—57 out of 90 men.19 Chechen casualties also continued to mount. Repeated human-wave attacks are costly, especially when the defenders are supported by artillery and aviation.
The Chechens had been throwing themselves at Hill 776 to keep open a path for the rest of their force. This movement was interrupted by the arrival of the relief force from Hill 1410. Major Andrey Lobanov, commanding a 45th VDV Reconnaisance Regiment SPETSNAZ group, was with this force. He noted that hundreds of pack animals had already passed by. The Russians moved into the saddle and found 6th Company's abandoned positions and soon encountered a large Chechen group. The Russians retreated to Hill 787 from which they could cover the saddle.
The Russians intercepted the Chechen commander's desperate orders: "Do not engage in battle. Force your way forward."20 With the remnants of 6th Company still holding out on Hill 776 and new Russian forces on neighboring Hill 787, the Chechen escape route was dangerously constricted. The Russians sent a reconnaissance platoon into the saddle to find a better position. Instead, it found an ambush by Arab volunteers, covering an attempt by the main Chechen convoy to escape. Having suffered five wounded, the Russians committed another company, hoping to stop the Chechen escape attempt.21
Day 3, 2 March 2000
Late in the morning, the 1st Company broke through Chechen forces and reached the battle area. However, it could not relieve 6th Company, which was still under close attack. One officer and 32 men were still alive. Deputy company commander Captain Roman Sokolov had arrived in Chechnya barely 13 days before. Wounded in the hand, he organized the survivors' final defense. He placed the six most junior soldiers in the care of Sergeant Andrey Proshev and ordered them to escape. Then, as the Chechens pressed the attack, Sokolov called artillery fire down on his position as a desperate attempt to fend off the enemy. Another 16 paratroopers on Hill 776 were killed in the continuing fighting.22
Day 4, 3 March 2000
The struggle for control of Hills 776 and 787 ended on the fourth day of the fighting. The last 11 paratroopers on Hill 776 were killed.23 The relief force found Proshev's small band of survivors.24 The surviving Chechens, who had not been able to escape over the saddle before the relief's arrival, slipped back down into the gorge pursued by paratroopers and hunted by helicopters. The Russian pursuit took them about 5 kilometers east to the village of Selmentausen where a number of escaping Chechens had concentrated.
Mopping Up
The Chechens won a Pyrrhic victory. Tarrying to bludgeon through 6th Company allowed VDV forces to fight through difficult terrain and Chechen ambushes to close off the main body's escape. Most surviving Chechens were ultimately forced back into the gorge, where troops from 104th GPR took a number of prisoners.
While no 6th Company personnel surrendered or were taken prisoner, the four-day struggle resulted in the death of at least 84 VDV soldiers, including 13 officers. Even after losing its senior officers, 6th Company held its final positions against a much larger force.
Chechen casualties included approximately 400 dead. According to Krasnaya Zvezda, the official newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), this figure was based on radio-intercept data, intelligence reports, eyewitnesses, local residents and captured Chechens.25
The Arab volunteers fighting with the Chechens appeared, in particular, to have suffered severely. Heavy Arab casualties would not be unusual among particularly fanatical units, nor would it be unusual for the Chechens to have pushed the Arabs first into harm's way. Lobanov counted 200 enemy dead on Hill 776 alone, along with 75 Russian paratroopers. Survivor Viktor Sokirko stated, "I took a notebook from the pocket of one of the gunmen with a roster of 100 people; the bullet had hit him right in his heart; it had gone through his Koran."26
The bodies of the 84 fallen VDV troops were evacuated on foot, with combat aviation providing support. It was shaping up to be a bloody month for the Russian Army; it had a total of 156 dead—a higher KIA rate than during the grimmest comparable period in the storming of Groznyy.27
6th Company accomplished its mission. The Chechen force was blocked from escaping the encirclement. More important, Chechen commanders realized that they could not seize strategic population centers in the low terrain and would be forced to stay in the mountains. In the next few days, a number of Chechen fighters surrendered to the Russians. The day after the battle ended, a Chechen field commander surrendered with 73 men, including 30 wounded—the largest surrender to that date. Made up largely of Chechen teenagers, this band had actually escaped over the saddle before the relief arrived on 2 March. It surrendered on the outskirts of Selmentausen. The young men had had enough of war.28
Recriminations
The loss of 6th Company provoked an interservice exchange of recriminations. At a news conference, Shpak bluntly blamed the disaster on the Eastern Grouping of Forces' commander, to whom the airborne troops had been subordinated. Shpak's subordinates added their fire: "It all began back in Dagestan, when Kazantsev sent the airborne troops to their death and protected his own infantry."29 They claimed airborne forces had been stretched too thin and "in isolation from the main forces. . . . [T]he grouping command treats the airborne troops as cannon fodder."30
By the middle of March, cumulative airborne casualties gave ammunition for their charges. Shpak reported that 181 airborne soldiers had been killed and 395 wounded in Chechnya out of a force of about 5,100 men. The total Russian force in Chechnya had averaged about 100,000 and had lost 1,291 Defense Ministry troops and 617 Interior Ministry troops for a total of 1,908, suffering 3,190 and 2,107 wounded. Airborne forces had numbered five percent of the force and suffered 10 percent of the deaths.31
Shpak had a point. While the operational concept of blocking and trapping the Chechens was sound, the net was too weak. 104th GPR was forced to commit individual companies, which could not be easily reinforced, to oppose the breakthrough attempt of a lethal brigade-size unit. The airborne net should have been backed up with larger motorized rifle formations. Shpak's complaints carried enough weight to have the Grouping of Airborne Forces transferred from Troshev's command to the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces—the overall headquarters for operations in Chechnya.
Reconnaissance and Security
Kazantsev, former commander of the Grouping of Airborne Troops in Chechnya, accurately described the situation: "Such heavy losses could have been avoided. Reconnaissance must be carried out more carefully."32 After walking over the battlefield, Lobanov, who fought forward with the relief, also said pointedly, "There is a continual question in my head: Why was there no information that such a horde of gunmen was breaking through?"33 Compounding this failure was the lackadaisical attitude toward the company's security. 6th Company had blinded itself, allowing Chechens the priceless element of surprise. Had 6th Company been properly alerted and ready in proper defenses, it might have been able to hold off the Chechens successfully until relief arrived. One elemental failure cascaded into another, which might explain why the battalion commander suddenly emerged as the defense's motivating force once the disaster unfolded.
However much the Russian official line emphasizes the heroism of 6th Company paratroopers, the results of the official inquiry ordered by President Vladmir Putin was professionally blunt. The force was accused of "slovenliness, laxity and unprofessionalism."34 The force showed a glaring loss of basic tactical skills at the company level during the encounters. Such basic tactical considerations should have been uppermost in the company officers' minds. Whether this was a local aberration or indicates pervasive problems throughout Russian Army elite forces, the VDV's failure poses important questions about Russian capabilities. While the VDV performed credibly and often with distinction in the Second Chechen War, there have been enough blatant exceptions to conclude that even the VDV's skills are no longer of a uniform high standard, despite Shpak's reforms.
Pride of Corps
On the positive side, 6th Company recovered and fought well against enormous odds once it moved to Hill 776 under the effective leadership of the battalion commander and his deputy. Other Russian airborne and SPETSNAZ forces in the area, responding to reinforce 6th Company, fought their way into the area and eventually stopped the Chechen breakout. All this occurred in enormously difficult terrain and weather conditions and against tenacious Chechen resistance. Because the Chechens are notoriously atrocity-****e, especially toward members of the more elite Russian military organizations, fighting to the death makes a necessity.
Media reports consistently indicate that no 6th Company soldiers were taken prisoner. They refused to give up their position, even while knowing they would be overrun and killed. The VDV is known as an elite force composed of soldiers with high morale, discipline and a sense of purpose. Their actions make it clear that this characterization held true. Despite glaring tactical mistakes in security and reconnaissance, the Russian airborne spirit successfully imbued its men with the morale and courage that come with pride of corps.
Despite the bad publicity surrounding the casualty figures in this battle, the Russian Army achieved an important victory. By holding Hill 776 long enough for additional VDV troops to fill the area, 6th Company defeated the Chechen strategy to break out of the mountains and regain the initiative. Chechen fighters, seeing they could not break through Russian lines, were forced to scale back their objectives. Instead of employing relatively large groups against vulnerable population centers, Chechen leaders realized they had to break up into smaller formations to wage war at a much lower level.
But, this was an expensive Russian victory. Russian blood and valor had to make up for the deficit in basic combat skills, an issue larger than one small-unit leadership failure. The entire Russian force has suffered too many similar catastrophies for the fate of 6th Company to be just a tragic exception. Still, there was significant improvement in battlefield performance between the First and Second Chechen Wars, although performance levels still remained low, which reflected how bad things had become. The failure of an elite force such as the Russian airborne shows how fragile and perishable such skills are.
The Aftermath
The battle of Ulus-Kert was quickly enshrined in heroic myth, its theme loudly echoed by Russian media, the Ministry of Defense and the airborne forces themselves. This reflects popular support for the war and the military and a renewal of Russian nationalism. It also served to distract public attention from manifest failures the catstrophe revealed. Certainly the results of the official inquiry commissioned by Putin will never be made public. Nonetheless, he issued a decree decorating all of the fallen paratroopers, with all 13 officers and nine enlisted men receiving Russia's highest medal—Hero of the Russian Federation.35
A memorial service was held on 14 March at the Novopasskiy Monastery in Moscow. The service was conducted by Russian Orthodox Patriarch Alekisy II of Moscow and all Russia, and was attended by Putin, Chief of the Russian General Staff General Anatoliy Kvashnin and national and military leaders. It was an enormous statement of resolve. Likewise, the funeral of most of the Russian dead at their home garrison in Pskov was a heartfelt demonstration of this sentiment. Most of the dead were buried in Pskov where the funeral service was held in the ancient Trinity Cathedral.
Speaking at the funeral, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stated, "This battle for a nameless height was the turning point of the entire Chechen campaign. It was a do-or-die crisis for the fallen, and they chose to follow the paths of their ancestors in similar desperate straits. Just such decisions were made by Russian servicemen on Kulikovo Field, on Lake Chud, at Borodino and at Sevastopol. In the winter of 1941 Panfilov's legendary heroes defended the last line with their lives on the approaches of Moscow. Nowadays the Argun Gorge has been just such a line for the Guards' paratroopers."

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

[Sergei]

It's called Chesti Imey, anyone for the english translation?

The direct translation would be "I have the honour". It is usually said as a salute in the old tsarist Russian military between the officers.

[wreck]

Ok, now this has gone too far. Tried for the whole weekend to get "voina" and "purgatory" through edokey & dc++. Result: <25% of both movies with average speed of 8KB/s :roll: And now these series, it's so wrong :bash:

How in the hell am I supposed to obtain these movies, Russian stop hiding the good stuff p-)

No, seriously. I'm kinda bored on hollywood war movies, reasons are obvious for any objective person. I'd really like to see war movies from other countries, I've seen "the blockpost" (it's actually "checkpoint") and it was good.

[George W. Bush]

LOL You're mad that you can't warez something fast enough. I think there is a word to describe such a person.

[wreck]

LOL You're mad that you can't warez something fast enough. I think there is a word to describe such a person.
Yeah, the word is retard, it also applies to a person not being able to understand text rofl

I'll make this really simple so even you, GWB, can understand it: "I'm frustrated by the fact that it's virtually impossible to obtain the movies which I mentioned"

moron p-)

[ßå$tĮТHÏ¿ð]

LOL You're mad that you can't warez something fast enough. I think there is a word to describe such a person.
Yeah, the word is retard, it also applies to a person not being able to understand text rofl

I'll make this really simple so even you, GWB, can understand it: "I'm frustrated by the fact that it's virtually impossible to obtain the movies which I mentioned"

moron p-)

Same, unfortuneatly these movies never see our soils. It would be nice for a change of pace to see a movie from outside of North American for once.

[16 OBr SpN]

hist2004,

You've posted a great article. It has some incorrect facts, but overall it's very good.

Regards,
16 OBr SpN

[hist2004]

To 16 OBr SpN

Thanks for your response, I wasn't sure about the article because obviously they weren't there and they would have their own agenda.
I also didn't know how fair they would be in their assessment. I have some
questions for you in my thread.

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

[Uninen]

me fell so stupido :cantbeli:

BMD-1 with 73mm gun..

[Shuravie]

Surprisely authors of article are not bullsh#ting...
Tomorrow we'll see this movie on TV. And tonight will be another great movie "In august 1944". About "Smersh", based on my favorite book about WW II "Moment of truth" (or something like that)

[Haiw]

Ok, now this has gone too far. Tried for the whole weekend to get "voina" and "purgatory" through edokey & dc++. Result: <25% of both movies with average speed of 8KB/s :roll: And now these series, it's so wrong :bash:

How in the hell am I supposed to obtain these movies, Russian stop hiding the good stuff p-)

No, seriously. I'm kinda bored on hollywood war movies, reasons are obvious for any objective person. I'd really like to see war movies from other countries, I've seen "the blockpost" (it's actually "checkpoint") and it was good.
You must be doing something wrong then since I managed to get a 2 cd version of Voina quite easily... Only problem is I don't have any subtitles and my knowledge of Russian doesn't go much further than da & njet. :|

[wreck]

You must be doing something wrong then since I managed to get a 2 cd version of Voina quite easily... Only problem is I don't have any subtitles and my knowledge of Russian doesn't go much further than da & njet. :|
Hmm. My line is 512 ADSL and normally I get what I need in decent time. I'd rather have dvds but now I guess I'll just have to keep on d'loading at ****ty rates :| I could use some bad language at this point p-)

[DE_Six]

Same, unfortuneatly these movies never see our soils. It would be nice for a change of pace to see a movie from outside of North American for once.

What do you mean? We get almost as many foreign films as North American ones here. We just don't get those from Russia. :fork:

[Kingpin]

hist2004,

You've posted a great article. It has some incorrect facts, but overall it's very good.

Regards,
16 OBr SpN

Just finished reading. 100% agreed.

[ßå$tĮТHÏ¿ð]

Same, unfortuneatly these movies never see our soils. It would be nice for a change of pace to see a movie from outside of North American for once.

What do you mean? We get almost as many foreign films as North American ones here. We just don't get those from Russia. :fork:

Actually there is alot of movies we dont see, for example Winter War. Im pretty sure Gordon could tell you the bitch of a time I had getting that properly dubbed so I can understand what they are saying. We do miss alot of good movies, we just dont know it.

[Haiw]

Same, unfortuneatly these movies never see our soils. It would be nice for a change of pace to see a movie from outside of North American for once.

What do you mean? We get almost as many foreign films as North American ones here. We just don't get those from Russia. :fork:

Actually there is alot of movies we dont see, for example Winter War. Im pretty sure Gordon could tell you the bitch of a time I had getting that properly dubbed so I can understand what they are saying. We do miss alot of good movies, we just dont know it.
rofl
You could have saved yourself the trouble and just downloaded English SUBTITLES... :P

[Shuravie]

Well... it was 1st serie tonight. Not bad...well see next's

[juhae]

offtopic...


You could have saved yourself the trouble and just downloaded English SUBTITLES... :P
Should you have any pointers to sites with English subtitles to Russian (etc.) movies, feel free to share.

And what comes to the ethics of downloading, I'm sure the people here are among the first to buy the international DVD releases, should such ever come out.

[Haiw]

Haven't found any subs for Russian stuff yet :(
The ones for Winter War were easy to get because they were an 'official' release.

[Groove]

A very good article. Not everybody is that brave like this russians ! They gave all their had - all my respects to them !

Just one question though. Is this the battle already discussed in the forums where 100 Russians killed 1300 chechens and one Arab leader offered 2 million dollars to the russian for retreat ?

Just asking because this article is a little bit different - but as the article mentioned:

The battle of Ulus-Kert was quickly enshrined in heroic myth, its theme loudly echoed by Russian media, the Ministry of Defense and the airborne forces themselves. This reflects popular support for the war and the military and a renewal of Russian nationalism. It also served to distract public attention from manifest failures the catstrophe revealed. Certainly the results of the official inquiry commissioned by Putin will never be made public.

Thx for any info !

Groove

[hist2004]

I found another article on the battle. Please give me your feedback on it.


Ulus-Kert:

The Battle Against Overwhelming Odds
“Ulus-Kert. The name of this Chechen mountain village, the word is a splinter of pain resonating in my heart… I know that in the consciousness of many of my countrymen, who are not indifferent to the fate of Russia and its army, a firm hackneyed image has been formed: they say Russian generals are solely to blame in the deaths of the Pskov desantniki. Journalists, politicians, throw questions and rebukes like grenades at us: why no rescue, why was no assistance given, why were the terrorist leaders allowed to escape retribution.”

Two years ago in a battle against unequal odds in the Argun gorge 84 desantniki perished belonging to 6 Company, 104 (Cherekha) Parachute-Desant Regiment, 76 (Pskov) Division of the Airborne Forces when they held the onslaught of 2,000 boyeviki and killed 700 of them. Within 24 hours of the action at Ulus-Kert rumours had started to spread around Pskov oblast’. The lack of confirmed information added to the anguish of relatives.

Situation Prior to Battle
Federal forces had by the middle of December 2000 started to set about ‘liberating’ the mountainous parts of Chechenya. The Commander OGV (East) Lieutenant General Gennadiy Troshev had already defined the concept of operations for the next phase. The essence of the operation was to use airborne forces with a series of tactical airborne or heliborne desants to capture dominating heights and only after these had been taken would the main forces be brought in to the mountain operation. “We intended to attack the boyeviki not from below, but from above, from the mountains”. Soon afterwards desantniki were landed in the Sharo-Argun gorge in the area of Day. Somewhat later in the south, subunits of 56th Airborne Assault Regiment landed by helicopter in the area of Yalkhoroy with the task of blocking-off the Argun gorge. Measures were also taken to reinforce sectors covered by federal troops in the foothill areas. Sectors with systems of strong points and mined obstacles covered by every available weapon were established in a bid to prevent boyeviki penetrating the sectors and infiltrating down into the Central Plain. So by the beginning of of February 2000, the bandit formations were blocked off in the mountains by a sector covered by federal forces in the north and by tactical heliborne landings in the south, the latter being instrumental with the federal Border Troops in maintaining interdiction of the boyeviki supply line to Georgia and the south. It was now possible to activate the operation for the liquidation of boyeviki in the mountain areas.

February 2000



At the beginning of February 2000, after the ‘liberation’ of Groznyy, the Chechen separatist and Wahhaby extremist bandformirovaniya numbered some 5,000 men in mountain areas.

Gennadiy Troshev “Moya voyna”.

Unless otherwise indicated, quotations and the description of events below are taken from General Troshev’s memoirs.

Chechen and Wahhaby Extremist Formations
Approximate Locations
Argun Gorge. Emir Khattab with up to 2,000 fighters. Khattab had stationed himself and his fighters to the side of Dachu-Borzoy and Zony.

Vedeno rayon. Up to 600 men, overall command being exercised by Shamil’ Basayev; however after his wounds and leg amputation, one of the field commanders deputised for him.

Nozhay-Yurt rayon. Up 800 men under the command of Shirvani Basayev. Itum-Kale and Shatoy rayony. Several groups amounting to 1,000 men under the command of Ruslan Gelayev. Gelayev had led his band to his native village of Komsomol’skoye.

C3 & Tactics
The system of command, control and communication was based on the use of VHF radio

which was vulnerable to intercept and interdiction by federal artillery systems. The boyeviki

also started to use special vehicle-mounted radio-relay rebroadcast systems. To enhance security for command and control they used procedures and code tables, and besides this, they used the old methods of using women and children to convey messages.

In order to hold out in populated points for as long as possible or to hold off the movement

of federal forces, they resorted to the most extreme diverse, artful and cunning methods.

On likely troop movement routes they laid cut-off portions of piping with highly inflammable

liquid into the road bed.

Immediately in front of trenches they fitted out powerful minefields. Mining took place ‘at

two levels’. At the bottom of the hole they laid the first mine, covered over with earth or

clay. On top of it a second mine was laid and all this was then hidden. If the first mine was

found and removed the second one remained to do its work. Boyeviki either left their populated points or visited them at night in small groups, along almost impenetrable terrain.

In order to uncover and locate the system of protection, defence and disposition of weapons

belonging to federal forces, the boyeviki often used dogs with torches fixed to the dogs’

collars, in the hope that such objects would be taken for the movement or activity of people.

For the defence of mountain villages the boyeviki widely used the tactic of operating from an

ambush. Allowing our subunits to pass by, they covertly left bunkers and cellars, opening up flanking and cross fire. Grenade launchers hit our tanks and BMPs from minimal distances of between 60-100 metres.

First and foremost they used snipers in pairs. As a rule they would shoot from prepared openings in the foundations of buildings. Snipers picked out commanders and other officers without difficulty: obvious reconnaissance personel and the presence of radio operator with a radio. It goes without saying that this once again underlines the fact that our troops must be equipped with compact and less bulky means of communication.

Strong Positive Characteristics
The boyeviki have an accumulated six years experience of warfare. They have a nationalreligious

fanaticism which also engenders a preparedness to die for their cause.

There is an implicit subordination to field commanders with a clear-cut organisation

(replacement) of fighters in the zone of operations. They also have access to detachments of

foreign mercenaries and instructors together with comprehensive training and preparation in special camps in the Near East and Central Asian countries.

Other matters include: well developed knowledge and skilful use of terrain; timeous

preparation of populated points and terrain for long-term defence; creation of weapons

caches, ammunition and material means; wide use of vehicles and horse and donkey-drawn

transport; modern weapons and shells (as a rule of foreign manufacture); use of local population (women and children) for reconnaissance tasks; tiered network of control and communication.

Weak Points by January 2000
· Partial loss of morale and demoralisation of detachments which suffered defeat and



destruction on the plains area and in particular after the exodus from Groznyy.

· Loss of support from a significant portion of the population.

· Deeper and more wide-spread disagreements between field commanders.

· Decrease in availability and supply of weapons, ammunition and technical-material



means.

· Difficulties in provision of timely and necessary medical treatment.



On 10 February 2000 federal forces took full control of the rayon centre of Itum Kale. By 19 February engineer work was completed on the construction and improvement of routes to be used for the move forward into the mountains. “Over two months more than 60 km were accomplished, in other words, one kilometre per day.” Conditions were not easy for road building engineers, for problems were encountered in pushing roads through at heights of 1,500-2,500 metres with the added threat of mining. Some 384 mines and 236 explosive devices, including 16 radio-controlled fougasses were found, detonated or dismantled. On 18 February 2000, the first echelon of a special reinforced reconnaissance detachment, consisting of several reconnaissance groups, a surveillanceobservation troop, a mortar platoon, anti-tank, flamethrower and engineer-sapper sections, was dropped on Al’piyskiy mountain. In the course of 72 hours the 30 boyeviki who had dug themselves in on the height were destroyed. The detachment later carried out observation and surveillance, using the data for fire missions and aerial strikes on enemy objects. Justice Ministry sniper pairs armed with 12.7 mm “Vzlomshchik” sniper rifles showed high effectiveness in the area and on the Gumurtaikort ridge.

From a federal perception the turning point in combat operations came on 22 February when they occupied Sel’mentauzen and Makhety, thus putting themselves in a better position to intercept bandit formations operating in the area of Shatoy, in particular movement between boyeviki base locations in Urus-Martan rayon, Shatoy rayon and Vedeno rayon. On 25 February General Troshev announced that “Shatoy rayon is sealed off, the ring is being tightened, sanitising will begin next”. On 27 February it was reported that in the course of the last few days OGV subunits had cut the Argun Gorge in the area of Volch’i Vorota, sealing off Duba-Yurt from the south, and Chishki and Dachu-Borzoy from the north, having “divided the bandit forces into two separate groups with the aim of destroying them piecemeal”.Yukerch-Keloy, some 5 kilometres to the southeast of Shatoy, had been sealed off from the east by airborne forces. Commander of OGV (Centre), Lieutenant General Vladimir Bulgakov estimated that the boyeviki amounted to approximately 2,000 men, though he was more than a little over-confident in saying they “have fortifications but no fighting spirit”. He went on to state that the task of federal forces was to finish off all the remaining bandits in the mountains “to the last bandit, and this task would be resolved in the immediate future”.Russian military maintained that “Chechen boyeviki controlled no more than 1% of the republic”.Amongst the command of the federal forces, there was the widespread belief that the active phase of the operation was nearing completion with federal forces moving on the last fortified stronghold, the populated point and rayon centre of Shatoy in the Argun gorge. “In a word, the euphoria of victory reigned,” which tended to blind the mind of the federal forces to the fact that the boyeviki bands had coalesced.

“The bands of other field commanders, Shamil’ Basayev, Vakha Arsanov, Bagaudi

Bakuyev, the Dzhamaat detachment had tagged themselves onto the Arab
mercenaries. As it became clear, in the area of Ulus-Kert then, around 1,500 well trained boyeviki had been concentrated.”

The Deputy Commander of Russian airborne forces, Nikolay Stas’kov, remarked that: “The operation in Chechnya was going to plan, without forcing events, in the strict observance of the line directed on minimisation of casualties among personnel.”

However, the boyeviki probably hoped to percolate through the cordon formed by the federaly and their resistance could become sharply intensified. In the area of Shatoy only five populated points remained in the hands of the boyeviki: “Bol’shiye and Malyye Varandy, Syukhi, Zony and Yarishmardy”. And yet, “despite the positive statements of the authorities about the most rapid conclusion of the military operation, the situation in Chechnya remained complicated”. However, in the military assessment, the boyeviki had based their hopes on a long drawn out defence of Shatoy and had called the rayon centre their last fortress. The Argun Valley situated between Shatoy and Itum-Kale was notable for its complicated ground relief due limestone rock, where there were not a few recesses and caves. It was here that they expected to find the refuges of the last remaining bandit formations. Many of the boyeviki in Shatoy, which is situated some 60 km from Groznyy, had managed to break out from the federal encirclement and make their way northwards to Komsomol’skoye and Alkhazurovo. Federal artillery carried out fire missions against collections of boyeviki in Syuzhi, Chishki, Khatuni, Benoy and Yarishmardy. Front aviation inflicted rocket-bomb strikes on boyeviki strong points on the outskirts of Vostochnikh-Dattykh, Zony, Maliye Varandy and Lake Galanchez. The actual ‘liberation’ of Shatoy by federal forces on 28 February 2000 was carried out by OGV (Centre) commanded by General Bulgakov with a tactical grouping of 31 Separate Airborne Brigade under the command of Colonel Khasym Tyngizov. Internal troops and OMON servicemen carried out the initial sanitising of the rayon centre. Troops under the command of OGV (West) Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov ‘liberated’ the populated points of Borzoy, Neykhaloy (Nikhaloy) to Vysokogornoye, just to the west of Shatoy.

The choice of location for Emir Khattab to make his break-out from this area was by now severely limited. In order for him to make passage through to Vedeno, “where the Black Arab had a network of small mountain bases” and thence possibly into Dagestan, it was necessary for him to move out towards Sel’mentauzen from above or along the river bed of the Sharo Argun or its tributary the River Abazulgol. At this time of year movement along slippery mountain tracks or trails at night was highly dangerous and consequently slow. General Troshev also made the point that at that time they could not assume that the enemy would risk ‘punching’ his way through to the east with large scale forces. In support of that view it should also be remembered that the boyeviki had only recently suffered significant casualties through Major General Shamanov’s Operation ‘Wolf Hunt’in the mass breakout of boyeviki on 29 January 2000 from Groznyy,when some 1,700 boyeviki lost their lives.

The Battle For Heights 776.0 & 705.6

104 Guards Parachute Desant Regiment

On 28 February 2000, the regimental tactical group of 104th Guards Parachute

Desant Regiment, at the disposal of Commander OGV (East), was given the
following mission: by 1400 hrs on 29 February to complete the move forward to a line 4 km southeast of Ulus-Kert. Part of the regiment was blocking the area of Sel’mentauzen with the aim of preventing a breakthrough by the boyeviki in the direction of Makhety, Kirov-Yurt, Elistanzhi and Vedeno. However, as time was to show, the boyeviki pushed their way through regardless. The dominating feature here is Dargenduk31 which lies to the south of Ulus-Kert and curves gently in a south easterly direction from Ht 1410 to Hts 1682 and 1806 (Mt Petkhoylam). This is the same terrain as the Tsarist General Yevdokimov fought over.

Deployment of 3rd Company
The desantniki of 3rd Company commanded by Senior Lieutenant Vasil’yev occupying dominating heights 5 km to the east of Ulus-Kert were the first to be tested by the boyeviki, who unsuccessfully attempted to punch their way along the River Abazulgol through the company’s organised system of fire. The desantniki had prepared themselves extremely carefully by digging trenches to the full depth, organising all-round defence and a fire system which permited full observation and coverage of the ground to the extent that “such foresight and prudence would be a godsend to them”.They did not have time to consolidate themselves, as lower down the gorge and coming in from the north, a leading detachment of boyeviki was attempting to move into the gorge. Encountering dense automatic fire they hurriedly withdrew. Twice they repeated the attack, but the strong position offered so much resistance that the boyeviki were rolled back, suffering significant casualties. It was probably as a result of this engagement that Khattab decided to avoid the positions of the desantniki by going along the other bank of the river.

Deployment of 6th Company
2nd Battalion subunits had taken no part in the action. They were positioned on dominating heights above the Sharo-Argun gorge. In order to minimise the possibility of boyeviki being able to infiltrate along the mountains between the Sharo-Argun and Abazulgol rivers, the Commander 104th Regiment, Colonel S Melent’yev, ordered the Commander of 6th Company Major S Molodov to occupy yet one more dominating feature, Istykort in the vicinity of Ulus-Kert. However, since the company commander had only just joined the unit the day before and had not yet had the time or the opportunity to get to know his men, it fell to the Commander 2nd Battalion Lieutenant Colonel Mark Yevtyukhin to take charge of the company. As General Troshev remarked, no small experience awaited the desantniki. To meet the deadlines it was necessary to complete a 15 km forced march along slippery, winter mountain tracks, in field service marching order, including carrying the heavy equipment required for the new base camp, tents and stoves, without which “they would not be able to survive winter in the mountains”. Even though they moved as fast as possible they did not make Istykort within the time required. To keep to the narrow tracks along mountain ridges through the old beech forest it was necessary “to go like geese one behind the other” and the equipment would not go easily through the forest. Several men fell down the steep slope with equipment. Much time and strength was spent on hauling men and equipment back to the top. “On these grounds I was forced to hear reproaches: and why was it not possible for the desantniki to be transported by helicopter to the designated area. Actually, the weather conditions would have allowed this, yes our helicopters were working wonders. But it was not possible to execute such an operation: aerial reconnaissance of the old mountain forest did not reveal one single area for landing the desantniki.” According to Vladimir Vorob’yev, a former airborne officer who conducted his own research into the reasons for the deaths of his son and son-in-law, this was the third error on the part of the command, for:

“The march should have been carried out without baggage and only the bare necessities should have been taken… If they had reached the height, consolidated themselves in such a way that no one could smoke them out from there, only then would it be possible to send for the tents.”

It is of interest to note the difference in approach between General Troshev and Colonel Vorob’yev on the question of how much kit should have been taken by the desantniki. General Troshev “by the standards of Russian generals - personally kind and considerate,” was a tankist, whilst Vorob’yev had been an airborne soldier who had seen service in Afghanistan and was a former commander of 104 Regiment, 76 (Pskov) Airborne Division. His views on the conduct of the march are outlined below.

The decision to occupy the dominating height known as Istykort, Ht 705.6, some 4-5 km

from Ulus-Kert was correct, but the desantniki did not take powerful fire support weapons

with them, in fact all that they took were small arms and grenade launchers.The attachment for the radio to ensure security of transmission had not been taken either. The [2nd] battalion had only arrived at the end of January 2000, the soldiers of the [6th]

company of 104th [Regiment] were not battle-hardened in practical terms. On that day, 29

February, the reconnaissance group went ahead under the command of Aleksey Vorob’yev

who had remained in Chechnya for a second tour. We will note also that the desantniki

went to the height immediately after a complex march along the route Dombay-Arzy, that is

without a proper break.

On Ht 776.0 not noticing any traces of the enemy, the recce group went on further [towards

Istykort]. And the company started to climb Ht 776.0. They moved with difficulty, which

was not surprising since each one wore a flak jacket weighing between 22-27 kg (the

Russian Army did not have the money to buy lighter ones), they carried weapons, tents,

stoves, water, food and ammunition. The subunit was stretched out over 5-6 km and did

not cover more than 1 km an hour. “Seen from the position of the 1st Battalion the company

was very sprawled out in a distended column. The march in the mountains, along a narrow

trail was much more complicated than the battalion commander had envisaged.”

The view of a commanding officer of a Commando in the Falklands campaign is of

interest on this point. The Sunday Telegraph 24 March 2002 page 24: “We don’t need food,

just ammunition - and tons of it,” interview of Major General Andrew Whitehead by Olga

Craig on lessons from the Falklands. “The most vital lesson, believe it or not, was in terms

of what constitutes essential equipment. Forget the food, the clothes: you need ammunition

and tons of it. It was firepower which captured Two Sisters. Fresh socks were a luxury. Something to keep you dry and a good sleeping bag are essential. After that it is about carrying as much weaponry as you can. That is what makes the difference in this type of warfare.”

“Guards Lieutenant Colonel Yevtyukin arrived in Chechnya with his
battalion on 31 January 2000. Immediately the battalion was employed in carrying out

tasks on the liquidation of illegal bandit formations. Already on 9 February the battalion

received its first baptism. Moving in a column in the area of the populated point of Dyshne-

Vedeno, a subunit of the battalion fell into an ambush set by the boyeviki. Quickly

orientating himself in the complicated situation the commander in short time competently

organised the defence. The boyeviki’s intention was confounded. In the course of the battle

30 boyeviki were killed and two vehicles were destroyed by the desantniki.” There is also a

point about acclimatisation. Whilst the altitudes in Chechnya do not produce the same problems for operations as in Afghanistan, a requirement still exists to become fit for working at altitudes up to 2,500 metres.

Lieutenant Colonel Yevtyukin reported to Colonel Melent’yev that they [recce group] had

reached Ht 776.0 in order to continue the march to Istykort. The fact was that they would

have to march through most of the night to reach it. The recce group of five men under

Senior Lieutenant Vorob’yev would be the first to get there. The group of five men moved

quickly, and when the [recce group] commander transmitted the message that Ht 776.0 was

clean, they moved on forwards to Ht 705.6.

“It was not until 1100hrs that the first platoon of the company climbed up [Ht 776.0]. Slowly the second platoon hauled themselves up. The third could not reach the summit: the boyeviki fired at it from behind, when the cordon was finally locked”. It was midday on 29 February 2000 when the main body of 6 Company was situated on Ht 776.0. The advance party or recce group of 5 men under the command of Senior Lieutenant Vorob’yev without being burdened with heavy baggage had already reached the height of Isty-Kort or “in military parlance Ht 705.6 m”.40 At about this time, as it was established later, the recce group noticed a forward patrol of some 20 boyeviki at the foot of the mountain, in fact “the first concealed enemy fire position”.Using natural folds and undulations in the terrain the recce group succeeded in closing with the enemy, bombarding them with grenades. This in turn of course broke their cover, revealing their position to the enemy. The desantniki started to beat a hasty retreat back to the company main body on Ht 776.0. The boyeviki immediately set off in pursuit of the five desantniki, trying to ouflank and encircle them. Meanwhile Major Molodov the company commander set out to rescue them from Ht 776.0, but the forces were so unequal that the desantniki were forced to return with the wounded on their shoulders to Ht 776.0. Major Molodov was the first of the desantniki from 6 Company to be killed. At that moment, two numerically similar detachments of boyeviki were moving along the Sharo-Argun and Abazulgol rivers, in an outflanking movement from two sides of Ht 776.0 where the subordinates of Lieutenant Colonel Yevtyukhin were situated. The boyeviki moved in battle formation with two reconnaissance groups each consisting of 30 men, behind them two further detachments, march security, of 50 men each. They moved stealthily under strict orders not to open fire unless ordered. These were in fact the 160 boyeviki under Khattab and Basayev pursuing the groups of Vorob’yev and Molodov. They were finally spotted by the desantniki, though the question remains: how was it that the Command did not know about them?

Intercept of Radio Conversation between Khattab and Basayev
Basayev to Khattab, who is leading the breakthrough: If the dogs [name given by the boyeviki to Internal Troops] are in front it’s possible to negotiate. Khattab: No, it’s goblins [desantniki].

Basayev: Listen, maybe let’s pass round them? They won’t let us go … Khattab: No, we will intercept them.

Comment

It should be remembered that Basayev had just undergone the amputation of a foot and was

also suffering from other wounds after the breakout through the minefield from Groznyy.

Few thought that he would survive the amputation, let alone avoid gangrene setting in.

Note that Basayev knows the behaviour of federal servicemen better than Khattab, leaving

an impression that Internal Troops could be bought, but not the desantniki. In General Troshev’s account of the ensuing action, almost immediately Khattab gave the order to use every type of weapon to prevent the desantniki from digging in. A fierce mortar bombardment began. After the first strike a proposal was made to the desantniki to lay down their weapons and surrender in exchange for their lives, “But not one of the desantniki trembled, they did not lack spirit at that moment in not falling for the enemy provocation … After the refusal to capitulate the desantniki returned to battle with renewed strength.” The cannoneers of 104 Regiment’s artillery discharged:

“1,200 rounds in the area of Ht 776.0 between midday 29 February and early morning of 1 March 2000. Over one night 900 rounds! The paint on the barrels became burnt, recoil mechanisms burst and leaked … The senior member of the artillery observer group of the SP battery, Captain Viktor Romanov, was himself on the same height together with the Kombat [battalion commander] Mark Yevtyukhin and corrected fire from the regiment’s guns. The battery commander Aleksandr Tolstyk throughout the whole 24 hours maintained communication with them and sent shells to where the encircled desantniki directed. V Romanov continued to call for fire even after both his legs had been blown off by a mortar bomb.” In Novaya Gazeta article a slightly different account unfolds, which starts with carrying the wounded and the body of Major Molodov back to Ht 776.0. “A powerful mortar bombardment began. Attention must focussed on the following fact: the mortars beating the height were not only from the position of the boyeviki, but also… from the aul of Sel’mentauzen which was to the rear of 6 Company. Two 120 mm mortars. They continued working until the boyeviki stopped reaching the height. Sensing a grave disparity in the correlation of forces against the company (more than 2,500 boyeviki) the Kombat called for helicopter fire support. After a certain length of time a pair of Mi-24s appeared over the height, but they did not fire a single salvo. They turned round and flew home. There was no forward air controller in the company. In the opinion of [Vorob’yev] even if they had fired unaimed shots they would have scattered the boyeviki.

Another error which compounded all the other deficiencies in tactical skills and basic soldiering was the fact that the Kombat’s radio operator did not appear to have a special attachment which encoded transmissions. Thus, the boyeviki were fully aware of what was taking place on the height. They heard every transmission Lieutenant Colonel Yevtyukin made to Colonel Melent’yev with requests for urgent assistance. On each occasion they heard the reply, “Mark, don’t panic, help will..”

The company was not reinforced. It did not receive artillery support either. Colonel Melent’yev removed the tank company from its fire position which could have provided valuable fire support against the advancing boyeviki, though “several times the [tank company] commander turned to him with this request.” Even if fog and mist precluded the use of army and front aviation, why did Colonel Melent’yev not turn to the artillery howitzer regiment which was located not all that far away, particularly when the regiment heard the battle going on and asked on the radio, “What’s going on? Is assistance required?” All these proposals were turned down. According to General Troshev, the commander of the airborne regimental group, acting to save his encircled soldiers gave the order to 1st Parachute-Desant Company to make their way to the battle area. Having completed the march over mountainous terrain the desantniki were then faced with the task of attempting to cross the mountain river Abazulgol. However, before the attempt could be undertaken they fell into an ambush set by the boyeviki. The desantniki were then forced to consolidate their position on the river bank. Even with fire support from regimental artillery they repeatedly made further attempts to cross the river, but all their efforts were in vain. Fierce fire from the enemy stopped them every time. They were only able to reach Ht 776.0 by the morning of 2 March 2000. Troshev states that the attempts of the military leadership to carry out the operation to relieve the encircled desantniki and evacuate the wounded were unsuccessful due to the fierce fire of the boyeviki and the complicated and difficult mountain conditions in winter. The old beech forest, the superior numbers of boyeviki and the overall dynamics of the battle hampered and restricted the use of helicopters, Troshev went on to say:

“Yes and in general, combat experience shows that to use army aviation and artillery is extremely dangerous. It is easy to destroy aircraft and crews. Therefore the main weight of fire support for the encircled men was thrust on the shoulders of the gunner.”

There were other stories as well, for instance the miraculous progress of the battalion deputy commander, Major Aleksandr Dostavalov, who during the night with a platoon from 4th Company went to assist 6th Company and managed to feel his way round the enemy cordons. How Major Dostavalov and his party managed to avoid the boyeviki encirclement of covering detachments is unknown, for the height was already surrounded by a dense ring. Evidently, the boyeviki “simply did not take into account the audacity of the desantniki for their vigilance had slackened”. It was probably not so much that the boyeviki had ruled out any attempt by the federaly to bring up reinforcements, but that they were tired, maybe even utterly exhausted, their strength sapped by the encirclement and recent breakout from Groznyy, carrying their wounded, trying to escape federal retribution and traversing the mountains to sanctuary in the remoter areas of Dagestan or the Pankisskiy Gorge in Northern Georgia. The obvious route along the tracks from Duba-Yurt or even from Dachu-Borzoy across the high ground via Ht 1006 which would normally have led them to Agushty, Tevzana and Makhketi had already been blocked by federal forces.

As it was, the recce personnel led by Senior Lieutenant Aleksey Vorob’yev and the recce platoon of Dmitriy Kozhemyakin fought fiercely against the bandits. A survivor, Aleksey Komarov, said that it had developed into hand to hand fighting with the bandits: hacking with sappers’ shovels, kicking with legs. Vorob’yev, his legs taken off with mortar bomb splinters, one bullet in his stomach, another in his chest, struggled until the last drop of blood.

“When 1st Company on the morning of 2 March broke through to the summit, the body of the hero was still warm. This brave officer had killed in battle Idris, a friend of Khattab and a commander of the vile detachment of cutthroats. To the last round Dmitriy Kozhemyakin covered the retreat of his subordinates senior sergeant Suponinskiy and private Porshnev. Not one of the Guards had let down his military compatriots. There on Ht 776.0 a diverse collection of people - Christians, Muslims, different nationalities - Russians, Tatars, Ukrainians and Jews fought side by side … There in minature almost the whole of the former Soviet Union was represented.” By dawn (0500) on 1 March the elite ‘white angels’ battalion of Basayev and Khattab had arrived on the summit. At 0611 hrs the battalion commander M Yevtyukhin by radio called down fire on his position for the last time. Communication then ceased.

“A group of officer volunteers [eventually] got to the height by night [2 March]. Having searched the battlefield they did not find anyone alive: soldiers and officers were mutilated (Khattab had ordered that no one was to be taken alive) and several had been decapitated.”

There was profound horror at the scale of devastation: mature beech trees of many years standing had been shattered by shells and mortar bombs, like grass cut by a mowing machine.

Aftermath

Outcome of the Battle

Only six desantniki survived the battle. 84 men lost their lives. General Troshev

believed they gained a victory: the boyeviki band of some 1,500 men was stopped,

destroyed and dispersed around the area, for Khattab was not able to break

through en masse to his immediate objective of Sel’mentauzen and to his more

distant objective of Vedeno. Some small groups did break through several days

later, such as a group of 70 which surrendered by Sel’mentauzen. They were a

frostbitten, demoralised band who saw no point in continuing resistance. It was

claimed at the time that the desantniki had not only destroyed their plans but they

had also broken the will of the enemy to continue fighting. However, whilst these

claims some days later turned out to be more myth than fact, in the short term,

“Boyeviki razbity na melkiye gruppy” by Aleksandr Gol’ts. “At first glance all the trumps are

now in the hands of federal forces. The boyeviki, if the announcements of the Command are

to trusted, are reliably blocked in the Argun gorge. The detachment of Gelayev is crushed in

the village of Komsomol’skoye. But the formations of Khattab and Basayev, although the

leaders themselves have managed to escape, are scattered, and now are dealing with them

the operation to drive the boyeviki under the command of Ruslan Gelayev out of Komsomol’skoye during March 2000 was directly affected by the need to preserve the lives of federal servicemen following the disaster at Ulus-Kert. Due to these restraints the operation took a comparatively long time to complete: the siege took almost 14 days, for the engineer fortifications were highly sophisticated, but it also resulted in the escape of Ruslan Gelayev to cause renewed problems for Russian and Georgian authorities right up to the present time.

Delayed Announcement of Disaster - Implications
It was so unthinkable that a disaster should befall a subunit belonging to the elite air desant forces that it took until 7 March for the casualty figures to be made public. The news slowly trickled out with “the falsehood of the generals on TV that 20 men had been killed. Then the figure of 31, but in fact 84 men were killed.”

Many recriminations, accusations and explanations were to follow, for example:

“The boyeviki as a rule select a narrow sector for a counter offensive, and having concentrated their main forces on it strive to break out from the cordon. This for example explains that during the time of the breakthrough close to Ulus-Kert in the battles 3-4 March many desantniki were killed. In fact their breakthrough took place on an airborne company frontage of around 700-900 metres and 31 servicemen had died. Boyeviki casualties on the breakthrough were 100 men.” The authorities may have needed a further 10 days to confirm the losses sustained in the bloody battle at Ulus-Kert. Marshal Igor’ Sergeyev, the Russian Minister of Defence at the time, confirmed the results of the battle on 10 March 2000 by stating that 85 servicemen of the Pskov Division had lost their lives. Even then the figures were not correct, for at the same time as the Defence Minister’s announcement, the Deputy Commander of Airborne Forces, General Nikolay Stas’kov, announced that 84 men had died.

Not only that, but in the initial announcement on 7 March it was stated that the battles close to Ulus-Kert took place on 3-4 March, when in fact the company had been wiped out by 1 March. Whilst the military staff and press machine would in the area of the villages of Ulus-Kert and Sel’mentauzen. Only all these conversations about a reliable cordon [block-system] summon great doubts”.

“The battles in
Komsomol’skoye in fierceness were comparable only with the battles for Groznyy (the battle

of the desantniki at Ulus-Kert was a special occasion). The village seemed very well fortified

in the engineer sense. Here were not a few fortified structures which conformed to the rules

of military science. Cellars had been transformed into strong points and withstood direct

fire from tank shells. The majority of cellars were connected by underground corridors,

blocked by steel doors. In essence every house had been transformed into a fortress…”



appear to function extremely well with regard to pre-planned deception, in the case of an untoward event involving a mixture of factors which could have a potentially negative impact on the public’s perceptions, such as the scale of casualties in this instance or the missile strike in Groznyy market on 22 October 1999,55 public relations organs appear confused; the system appears incapable of providing a rational response. There seems to be a constant inability to face an unpleasant truth, or more accurately to announce it straightaway, thus minimising speculation and building trust and confidence.

Perhaps the worst outcome of this disaster for the Russian Airborne Forces is the

fact that “many officers of the Regiment continue to believe that the ‘corridor’ for the

passage of Khattab’s band had been bought and only the desantniki did not know

about the ‘deal’”. This of course adds grist to the allegations that the military wish

to continue the war for as long as possible to strengthen their position in terms of

prestige, allotment of funds and hardware, and underlining that the army is of vital

importance to Russia. There have been other instances where allegedly money has

changed hands between members of the two opposing forces, involving corruption

and treachery, namely Pervomayskoye in January 1996 when the Chechens were

able to break out of the cordon, Lieutenant General Shamanov’s Operation “Wolf

Hunt” during the Chechen breakout from Groznyy in January 2000 when the
Chechens suffered heavy casualties and an episode at Duba-Yurt when tanks from Colonel Budanov’s 160 Tank Regiment saved Russian servicemens’ lives on 31 December 1999.

“Officers of the Army and Internal Troops speak frankly about the existence of prices to be

paid for guarantees to the rebels for release from a siege or for a population centre not to be

subjected to a ‘combing’ operation for gunmen. The sums cited range between US$20,000

and US$40,000. The OMON blames the Army for being open to corruption and the Army

blames the OMON for the same. “It transpires that agreements for escaping from a siege are

concluded between Dudayev’s commanders and federal officers at the rank of battalion or

regimental commander. It is hard to believe this, but gunmen are known, as a rule, to get

out with no difficulty from “triple” circles of blockade. This, however, is the subject for legal

investigations.”

“Russian servicemen who fought in Chechnya in 1999 charge Major General Aleksey

Verbitskiy with betraying a group of razvedchiki. They claim that the General received

money from Khattab for sending them into ambushes.” Tanks from Colonel Yury Budanov’s

160 Tank Regiment saved some of the razvedchiki [20 out of a total of 100]. “After the tragedy, Major General Verbitskiy and Colonel Budanov became the worst of enemies.”

Lieutenant Colonel Mitroshkin who was associated with this episode at Duba-Yurt “tried to

exchange counterfeit dollars after returning to the Ryazan region. He is too unimportant to

Khattab to be paid with real money.” Major General Verbitskiy was later to arrest Budanov

after the episode at Tangi-Chu. There may be a coincidence that this was published during

the Budanov trial.

‘arrangement’ would tend to cover the trails of those who planned or become involved in such acts.

According to press reports,the pain of those affected by the deaths of the men in 6 Company has been sharpened by the fact that the fatalities have not aroused sufficient interest to justify a criminal investigation. The deaths of 118 officers and men who perished in the Kursk are the subject of a criminal enquiry which still continues today. In the case of 6 Company, the military command has developed the notion that “the company carried out its military duty and perished heroically”. At the same time the desantniki of 76 Division suggest that in the correct command of a subunit such casualties would not have been necessary.



The anniversary of the dead was marked with great ceremony. There is no doubt that the

desantniki, taking part in the unequal battle with numerically superior enemy forces by the

entrance to the Argun Gorge, deserved all the honours awarded to them by the official

authority. And nevertheless, the chiefs in big shoulder boards sat at the table, again and

again the thought arose “Was everthing done to save the boys? This question was directed

at Colonel General Georgiy Shpak, the commander airborne troops. At the Orlets cemetery

by Pskov, he replied, “We analysed the battle and came to the conclusion: everything.” The

father of the Hero of Russia Aleksey Vorob’yev, Colonel (Retd) Vladimir Nikolayevich Vorob’yev was convinced that it was not so. A cadre officer, he asked fellow servicemen about Aleksey and other desantniki who had been in this ill fated gorge, and on the basis of all the meetings he came to a bitter conclusion that it was possible that what befell 6 Company was avoidable.

General Troshev has often asked himself the same agonising question. Would it have been possible to avoid such losses, did we do everything to save the desantniki? In truth it is your remit, General, in the first place to care about the preservation of life. It’s not hard to realise, but for sure we did not do everything then.

Establishing the chronological facts of that battle, I think about the actual possibilities of landing the desant by helicopter. And again I turn down such a variant, as a future adventure. Did we know the number of terrorists and where they were located? No. What does it mean to drop a desant into an ancient beech forest? And helicopters could be easily destroyed. Could the risk have been taken? Yes, not to know that you killed, saving one company, another company together with aircraft and their crews.

Yet the incident does reveal several fairly elementary errors by the Russian forces and commanders.

· Summary of Errors

· Distance and subsequent loss of communications in mountainous terrain.

· Why, in issuing the order to capture Ht Istykort, was no reconnaissance carried out



beforehand? 2,500 boyeviki could not appear from nowhere

· Too much equipment, non-essentials taken but essentials omitted.

· Lack of appreciation of time and distance calculations on route adopted.

· 3rd platoon unable to disperse and take cover when caught by boyeviki.

· No artillery defensive fireplan. Why, when the company had become encircled was there



no artillery support?

· The Commander of OGV (East) General Makarov knew that 90 desantniki for almost 24



hours were engaged in a bloody battle with numerically superior enemy forces

· No Forward Air Controller - unable to contact helicopters for offensive fire support. Why



was there a lack of action on the part of front and army aviation? Why did not front aviation drop mines on the approaches to the height? The weather on these days for a change was sunny.

· Inability to encode messages.

· Why was the tank fire support removed by Colonel Melent’yev?

· Poor map-reading skills.



Some of the comments and remarks noted above were sent in a letter to Defence Minister Igor’ Sergeyev, but no reply was received.66 It is also unclear whether the letter actually ever reached the minister. The widow of Senior Lieutenant Vorob’yev, Lyudmila Vorob’yeva, is experiencing problems over the rate of the widow’s pension she should be receiving.

Relatives of the fallen servicemen now meet annually in Pskov: “On 1st March 2001 at 1200 hrs the largest bell of Troitskiy Cathedral thundered reminding every one that a year ago in the Argun Gorge 84 men of the 6th Company, 104th Regiment of the Airborne Forces were killed. Of these 30 were from Pskov or residents of the oblast,” or to put it in another way, “in 6th Company of 104th Regiment every third serviceman was from Pskov and its oblast.”

On this point Vladimir Vorob’yev makes
some telling points about the current state of training and the deficiencies of the federal

airborne elite, and the loss of skill gained in Afghanistan. “First of all before going into the

mountains it is necessary to have full knowledge of the enemy. In Afghanistan we fought

differently, we occupied a position, consolidated ourselves on it and only then moved further

on. And here they moved on in a heap for 15 km … in the mountains that does not happen.Its necessary to be like a pawn on the chess board. Regimental commander Melent’yev of his own free will asked for the withdrawal of the company, but the Commander of OGV (East) General Makarov did not give the decision to withdraw.”

On the eve of the second anniversary of Ulus-Kert, a company group from Pskov visited the St Petersburg Serafimovskoye cemetry where sailors from the Kursk and a desantnik, Hero of Russia Guards Lieutenant Dmitriy Kozhemyakin are buried. On 1 March 2002 a remembrance ceremony was held in Cherekha, the permanent base location of 104 Regiment.

Day of Remembrance at Cherekha on 1 March 200270
1130 Relatives, families and guests assemble by the Memorial Stone (RCP Cherekha)

1130-1140 Parade of regimental personnel by the Memorial Stone, Guard of Honour

1200 Meeting devoted to the memory of the hero-desantniki

1215-1235 Laying of flowers at the Memorial Stone

1235-1250 Consecration of the memorial site

1300-1325 Mass in the Chapel. Georgiy Victory Hymn

1315-1325 Move to 6 Company location, meeting of relatives with the divisional commander, representatives of Pskov city and oblast’ administration, presentation to the heroes’ relatives of the 21 volume oblast’ Book of Remembrance On 5 March 2002 the Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov on a working tour of troop formations in the northwest of Russia visited 76 Guards Airborne-Desant Division at Pskov. He was accompanied by the airborne forces commander Colonel General Georgiy Shpak and the Commander of Leningrad Military District Colonel General Valentin Bobryshev. Sergey Ivanov met the divisional commander and visited the military township of 104 Parachute Desant Regiment. Whilst with the regiment the minister attended battle training and laid a wreath at the memorial. He also took part in a medal presentation ceremony, congratulating the men on their excellent service and noting that:

“76th Division was one of the very best divisions in the country … The Ministry of Defence will take all the measures possible and do everything in the plan of new weapons and the social status of servicemen, which was very low … Soldiers and officers will be able to observe the measures taken by the Ministry of Defence from 1 July in their pockets.”

Conclusion
If anyone has any doubts about the disastrous effect of long-term financial neglect on an elite fighting element of a military machine, then that person should read the saga of 6 Company, 104 (Chereshka) Parachute-Desant Regiment, 76 (Pskov) Airborne Division in the operation at Ulus-Kert. Many of these failings were due to lack of training and cooperation. They embraced individual training, from minor tactics to operations at formation level and the lessons learned from past campaigns. The continual and incessant use even of supposedly high grade elite troops degrades their combat capability without proper rest periods and time spent on an ordered training cycle. Sergey Ivanov, the Russian Defence Minister touched on this point when visiting the Division on 5 March 2002:

“A deep, serious inspection and examination has been completed in the division recently … At night I read the results, actions and documents. As a whole the condition is good. Two regiments of this division emerge absolutely excellently on the background of the remainder. The difficulty for the division lies in the fact that a regiment of the division is situated in Chechnya on rotation.”

Their relatives, perhaps even desantniki themselves, are concerned at the constant

deployment of servicemen from Pskov to the toughest assignments: “The Pskovichi

did not organise the war in Chechnya, but in this Caucasian war, why exactly are

Pskovichi often sent in the spearhead of the fiercest battles?”
Clearly, in analysing these events, little crtiticism if any can be directed at the bravery and courage of the Russians who once again demonstrated one of the enduring characteristics of the Russian soldier in defence - not to yield: “At the end of the last century 6th Company of Pskov desantniki performed a similar feat. True, in that and in other instances the feat in one became the consequence of neglect in others.”

Suffice to say that the allegations of incompetence “alas, are drifting apart somewhat from the official version.” Even two years later, no answers have been given to the questions of relatives. When the Memorial Stone, with its parachute canopy designed and sculpted by Anatoliy Tsarik, is dedicated on 2 August 2002, these questions will again be raised.

It later emerged that the main reason for his visit to Pskov and Headquarters

76th Division was to evaluate the experiment on forming a contract army - 76 division had

been selected for the start of the experiment.

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

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