hist2004
02-27-2004, 08:53 AM
Ambush of Sergiyev Posad Omon
Introduction
Military actions where there are unexplained circumstances, suspicions of neglect or concealment of the truth relating to loss of life demand investigation. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of two such incidents in March 2000 in Chechnya, which have attracted much adverse publicity because of the large number of casualties sustained by federal forces. One concerns the deaths of 84 desantniki from Pskov who perished at Ulus-Kert on the night of 29 February 2000, the other 22 servicemen of the Sergiyev Posad OMON (Special Militia Detachment) two days later. The month of March 2000 was probably the nadir of the second federal counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, for:
“Three times … Chechen boyeviki have been successful in destroying whole subunits of Russian federal forces. On the night of 1 March a company of Pskov desantniki perished, 2 March a detachment of OMON from near Moscow were crushed, 29 March militiamen from Perm were shot up in an ambush. Funeral marches resounded in the Sergiyev suburb, Pskov and Perm, but Russian generals continued to maintain that the main forces of Chechen boyeviki had been routed and armed resistance would be finished in the very near future.” A significant proportion of deaths and injuries amongst ordinary Russian servicemen happens as a direct result of neglect, avoidance of responsibility or even criminal activity within the federal forces’ command. So, the information handling of these events, and the processes of investigation, in both public and the more secret military legal spheres, and of remembrance can reveal a great deal about the uniformed forces’ relationship with Russian society at large. The court action over the attack on the Sergiyev Posad OMON detachment may well be another indication of the desire to bring these services within the norms of civilised accountability by continuing the momentum of investigation generated in the case of Colonel Budanov over the death of Kheda Kungayeva at Tangi-Chu at the end of March 2000,2 but in the case of the Pskov airborne forces (desantniki), the fallen are honoured as heroes while those responsible escape investigation.
This paper first of all analyses the action involving Sergiyev Posad OMON on 2
March 2000, before moving on to the annihilation of the Pskov airborne company
on the night of 29 February-1 March 2000. While this is in reverse order to their
ocurrence, the OMON incident serves as an introduction to the events at Ulus-Kert,
which obliterated it in terms of media coverage. The saga of Ulus-Kert in particular
has implications not only for the Russian Ministry of Defence but also for other
armies under pressure, starved of financial resources and committed to fighting in mountainous terrain. Conclusions are therefore drawn from both episodes in terms of tactics and the military’s handling of the public outcry.
Ambush Of Sergiyev Posad Omon
“If during the first military campaign only the centre of the city was destroyed, then
today the whole city has been transformed into ruins, only on the outskirts, in areas
of private building, one comes across houses which are possible to restore. As a
whole the city almost resembles a desert. The only thing that enlivens the gloomy
landscape are the well fortified OMON blokposty, which outwardly recall minifortresses...Everyone living here is required to have a pass from the town’s military commandant. Document checking takes place at every blokpost, which are established every 300 metres.” The incident took place barely a week after Gronzyy had been captured by federal forces. The territory of the Chechen Republic was divided between OMON subunits and the newly formed militia units under the command of the former mayor of Groznyy, Bislan Gantamirov. Towards the end of February 2000 a disagreement developed between the chief of the Staropromyslovskiy (Gantamirov’s) militia (ROVD) and the head of the ROVD who had arrived from Sverdlovsk. There were claims that the Sverdlovtsy had fired at a Chechen blokpost. Gantamirov took offence. In the course of unravelling the dispute the head of the Staropromyslovskiy ROVD remarked that reinforcements would be coming to him from Urus-Martan in the shape of an AGS-17 (automatic grenade launcher). The Sverdlovsk chief believed this would undermine the balance of forces. The Groznyy commandant gave instructions that a fire subgroup under Major D’yachenko should oversee the changeover between two OMON subunits, namely the incomers from Sergiyev-Posad and those from Podol’sk completing their tour. D’yachenko was allotted two BTR-70s.
On 1 March 2000 the commander of the Podol’sk OMON Nikolay Tikhonov went in a ‘Ural’ truck to Mozdok, where a special echelon was due to arrive from Moscow, including the composite detachment of Sergiyev Posad OMON who were due to relieve Tikhonov’s detachment. The Sergiyev Posad OMON under the command of Colonel Dmitriy Markelov duly arrived at around 0630 hrs at Mozdok for a three month tour of duty and were met by 11 army trucks which then proceeded to take them to the Podol’sk OMON’s base situated in a northern suburb of Groznyy, Podgornoye, close to Pervomayskaya and known by the locals as Sobachevka. Posted high up on the leading ‘Ural’ was the transparent placard “OMON. Sergiyev Posad”.
The planning of the changeover was complicated by the fact that 1 March had been designated as a day when local inhabitants could have access to Groznyy. The commanders believed that boyeviki might take advantage of this by mixing with ordinary people going about their shopping and penetrating the city. Major D’yachenko also had instructions to prevent the AGS-17 being positioned at the Chechen blokpost.
Early in the morning on 2 March 2000 Groznyy and its suburbs were covered in thick fog.
At around 0800 hrs a blue Volvo-460 and a white Niva drive into Podgornoye. Armed men
get out of the vehicles and in the thick fog conceal themselves in the industrial zone. The
vehicles depart. An hour goes by, at approximately 0900 hrs local market traders in the
centre of the settlement hurry to close their stalls and leave, rumours abound that very soon
there will be a serious gun battle on the central street.
At about this time information about the boyeviki arrives at Blokpost No 53 [manned by
local home guard, close to the Podol’sk OMON’s base]. The home guard believed boyeviki
would make an attempt to get into Groznyy via Podgornoye. There was also additional
information that a detachment of genuine home guard could possibly arrive in two Uaz
vehicles or even in armoured vehicles, in which case they would have to ‘get a move on’, to
give permission for heavy equipment to enter the settlement. Also, the impending arrival of
the Sergiyev Posad OMON was well known. A few days ago one of the streets leading into
Groznyy had been partioned off with an old “Icarus” bus, so that any approach into the
Chechen capital from the north west was only possible through blokpost No 53. The local
militiamen went towards the BTRs as reinforcement. Amongst all those present the rumour
about bandits travelling in UAZ vehicles gathered momentum.
At 0920 hrs two BTRs from the Sverdlovsk militia arrived in the village from Groznyy.
D’yachenko met the chief of staff of the Podol’sk OMON and reported that he had the task of
stopping and disarming the Gantamirov column.
The Ambush initiated at 0950 hrs
At 0950 hrs the leading Ural with the Sergiyev Posad OMON was driving into the outskirts of
the village. When the truck reached the auto service station, the Volvo unexpectedly
blocked the road. At that moment the sound of a bullet rang out: a sniper’s bullet fired from
near the “Icarus” hit the driver of the leading vehicle in the head. The Ural, which was out
of control, left the road and immediately firing began from grenade launchers and heavy
machine guns. The very first shots achieved the targets: already two Urals had been hit
and were ablaze. Under withering fire the Omontsy jumped out of the vehicle bodies
enveloped in flames and attempted to hide themselves in the ditch by the roadside. In the
first minutes of the battle Dmitriy Markelov was killed – a bullet killed the colonel in the
head, seated in the last but one Uaz in the column [Vehicle No 10].
At the same time the Podol’sk militia deployed on Ht 319 south of Podgornoye moved off to
their base, for they saw firing on the column from every direction: from the elevator, from
the greengrocery, from the village itself, from the oil towers situated behind Podgornoye and
even from the OMON base itself – from behind a row of hangars. Nine Podol’sk OMON start
to fire in response from Ht 319 on the oil towers situated close to a water tower - here the
silhouettes of the attackers were obvious. Unexpectedly fire was opened up on the height
from near the village of Armyanskaya gully.
At 1020 hrs several soldiers from the Sofrinskiy Brigade broke through from the direction of
Groznyy to the battle area; they assisted in the evacuation of the wounded, pulled them to
into cover. The majority were transferred to the former auto service station building.
The battle did not quieten down until 1230 hrs and at this time from the direction of the
Sunzha ridge heavy armoured equipment appeared, and in the sky helicopter gunships
provided fire support. The attackers left in the direction of the oil towers nearer to the
mountains. Behind them through Podgornoye swooped BTRs, but fire was not effective.
The attackers left taking the wounded away with them. At this time on the outskirts of the
settlement a flood of about 30 young women appear with coloured bags in their hands.
From a distance these looked like mothers with very small children. The soldiers, naturally,
stopped firing in this direction, only the tankists continue. Pursuit of the boyeviki is
continued. At 1330 hrs troops coordinate helicopter operations by radio. By 1430 hrs in
Podgornoye firing quietens down. Wounded, 38 of them, are loaded onto vehicles and they
depart. Zachistka is carried out in the village and 20 local inhabitants are held.
Questions & Theories
Andrey Skrobot, the NG correspondent, was able to view a video about the events filmed by one of the servicemen who happened to be in the centre of the village. Even in the fleeting film, it was clear that the people who fired on the column were superbly trained snipers. The very first bullets not only hit the driver of the lead vehicle but also the commander’s vehicle. Bullets unerringly went through the windscreen of the Ural. Naturally, the column was made to halt and became an excellent target for the attackers, despite displaying the Russian flag and OMON insignia. According to Skrobot it cannot be excluded that in the turmoil of the battle somebody from the Podol’sk OMON fired on the column. It is also possible that from the direction of the Sergiyev-Posad OMON return fire was opened up. But how was it possible to continue firing when the range between them was no more than 50 metres? And how did they fail to recognise each other for over an hour?
The Podol’sk commander, Major Igor Tikhonov, was also in the column and he had
a radio. Under the circumstances it is not at all clear at whom and what did the
servicemen stationed on Ht 319 fire, whom did the BTRs pursue and to where the helicopters were directed.
According to Skrobot firing at the column was said to have come directly from the Podol’sk base location, though this is physically impossible, for the ground is intersected by concrete enclosures and hangars on the street along which the column was travelling. Nor would the Sverdlovsk militia be able to fire, for the blokpost was round the corner and it would not have been possible to see what was taking place. The machine guns of the Sverdlovsk militia’s BTRs were silent, as witnesses testified. In Skrobot’s words only one explanation remained “the Sergiyev Posad OMON fell into a carefully organised extremist ambush”. On 16 March an operational investigation group from the Moscow GUVD (Interior Ministry directorate) arrived in Pervomayskaya, comanded by Colonel Nikolay Vagin. At that time there were four versions of who carried out the attack:
· Ruslan Gelayev’s boyeviki.
· Local inhabitants from Podgornoye and Pervomayskaya.
· A group of boyeviki who were illegally in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Groznyy with the collaboration of local militiamen.
· The boyeviki who on 1 May 1995 carried out an attack on a motorised column of a composite detachment of the Moscow district GUVD OMON under the command of Colonel V A Tin’kov.
All four possibilities were corroborated by operational sources, and by the facts in Box 2 below.
Box 2 - Corroboration9
It was established that before the exodus of fighters from Groznyy in January 2000,
Brigadier General Ruslan Gelayev left a group of 150 fighters in the area of Podgornoye and
Pervomayskaya. In the main they were snipers, mine-layers and grenade-launchers tasked
with carrying out ‘acts of provocation’ and terrorist acts against Russian MOD and Internal
troops. This was confirmed by by a fighter from one of Gelayev’s subunits, Issa Nal’giyev,
who stated that this detachment was under the command of a brother of Ruslan Gelayev
(the truthfulness of this testimony was checked with a polygraph).
Women traders in the market said that they knew one of the attackers - he was a former
bureau section chief of Staropromyslovskiy ROVD, Adam Isayev.
The first shot fired on the column was from V Askayev - a brother of a worker in the town
militia in Groznyy.
According to other information, field commander Bakuyev had personally taken part in the
attack. After the battle the local militia took him away and hid him.
On the evening of 2 March 2000 close to the village around 15 new graves appeared. It is
well known that according to Muslim tradition the deceased are buried on the day of their
death.
However, it will be remembered that on 28 February 2000 “… at noon the Russian flag was hoisted over Shatoy”. Ruslan Gelayev had already moved to Komsomol’skoye, and judging by the previous Russo-Chechen conflict was also very much involved in the defence of Shatoy, making it very unlikely that he was involved in the events at Podgornoye.
The OGV North Caucasus press centre they said that around 80 boyeviki had been
arrested on suspicion. But some two years later a somewhat different situation was
being presented: it was said that the Podol’sk OMON, who failed to keep abreast of
the situation, opened fire and are responsible for the deaths of the the Sergiyev-
Posad OMON. Questions arose, such as why the column route had not been agreed
and why no BTRs or helicopters were made available to cover the movement of the
column.
The Criminal Case
A criminal case, Number 59030, was initiated on 4 March 2000 in connection with the deaths of 22 servicemen of the Sergiyev Posad OMON. Several MVD (Internal Troops) servicemen were implicated following a special investigation by the Staropromyslovskiy District Procurator. Amongst the accused were the deputy head of Moscow Oblast’ GUVD Major General Boris Fadeyev, the head of the Podol’sk OMON Major Igor Tikhonov and the director of the OGV (MVD) command group in Chechnya Colonel Mikhail Levchenko. The officers, subsequently relieved of their posts, were accused of “neglect, entailing loss of human lives”. In essence, the procurator’s case rested on the fact that the convoy route had not been agreed by the people responsible with the joint headquarters, and that commanders had not organised the necessary helicopter cover and protection by armoured vehicles. However technically just these charges might be, they revealed several unanswered questions.
Box 3 - Questions13
How should the movement route be properly agreed if there is only one road from Mozdok?
Having just arrived at the location the militia general could hardly make arrangements with
someone else’s armoured vehicles and helicopters. As far as it is known from documents,
the military echelon from Moscow to Mozdok met no one from the local military or the MVD
command but on arriving in Mozdok the officer in charge of the echelon Major General of
Militia Aleksandr Ved’dyayev commanded Fadeyev to accompany the echelon by rail to the
final point - Gudermes. Why then was it decided to transport the OMON by truck?
Tikhonov must have received an order about the start of the movement from the command.
Boris Fadeyev only heard that the OMON had been killed on 2 March at 1800 hrs when he
arrived in Gudermes. He was not able to leave Gudermes: in accordance with the chief’s
order he was occupied with the arrivals. Besides that the situation in Gudermes was tense.
The servicemen under Fadeyev remained in a situation of all round defence until 2300 hrs.
It is unclear whether helicopter or armoured support could have saved the subunit from
falling into an ambush. In the history of both Chechen campaigns there are examples when
the boyeviki made short work of columns consisting only of heavy tanks. There is one
further detail of interest: the incident occurred on the territory of Staropromyslovskiy ROVD
in Groznyy, which had the responsibility to ensure security in its zone of responsibility.
Why were there no representatives from there summoned to Moscow? And finally, what
exactly was the role of the Sverdlovsk Militsia?
Outcome of Trial
Both Fadeyev and Levchenko were found ‘not guilty’, but the trial of Major Tikhonov was postponed due to illness, and he therefore has to stand trial at a later date. However, the Procurator’s office is appealing against the verdict on the grounds that neither Fadeyev nor Levchenko took the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the column. The verdict handed down by the court did not explain whether boyeviki had participated in the firing or not. However, in the opinion of the father of one of the dead OMON servicemen, Nikolay Grachev: “The ‘not guilty’ verdict is only the beginning of the matter. We, the victims are not able to support the accusation. Because what is true: if they blame Tikhonov, Fadeyev and Levchenko, we will certainly never know who was the real perpetrator of the tragedy.” From the research carried out by Grachev, it was most likely that it was the boyeviki who had launched an attack on the column. Grachev’s reasoning is given in Box 4 below.
Box 4 - Nikolay Grachev’s View that Boyeviki carried out an Ambush
“The column of Omontsy arrived at 9.40. The Sverdlovtsy started to let through their “own”,
but all of a sudden a shot was heard, as a signal for the attack, one single shot. No one has
established who fired it. Immediately a maelstrom of fire fell on the position of the
Sverdlovsty and the vehicle column. Fire came from grenade launchers, sub machine guns
and sniper rifles.
The attack was organised in such a way that nobody could ascertain who was firing and
from where. In such circumstances, of course [people] could fire on their own. But
maintaining the obvious, the large casualties were caused by aimed shots from hidden,
previously prepared covered shelters in the populated point of Podgornoye, to the right of
the road, where it was not possible for ‘our’ people to be.” [It will be remembered that there
was a query with regard to the presence of the two BTRs belonging to the Sverdlovsk OMON
parked in position on the northern (left hand) side of the road. There was no evidence of
any shots being fired from the BTRs under charge of Major D’yachenko.]
Conclusion
There are so many different and conflicting factors in the various accounts of the incident that a full explanation may never be revealed. The search for the truth is made more difficult by factors such as the foggy weather and the number of different security organs involved. Undoubtedly, the most likely scenario is that of a Chechen separatist operation. Yet one is left with the question - how effective was the system of command and control?
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
Introduction
Military actions where there are unexplained circumstances, suspicions of neglect or concealment of the truth relating to loss of life demand investigation. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of two such incidents in March 2000 in Chechnya, which have attracted much adverse publicity because of the large number of casualties sustained by federal forces. One concerns the deaths of 84 desantniki from Pskov who perished at Ulus-Kert on the night of 29 February 2000, the other 22 servicemen of the Sergiyev Posad OMON (Special Militia Detachment) two days later. The month of March 2000 was probably the nadir of the second federal counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, for:
“Three times … Chechen boyeviki have been successful in destroying whole subunits of Russian federal forces. On the night of 1 March a company of Pskov desantniki perished, 2 March a detachment of OMON from near Moscow were crushed, 29 March militiamen from Perm were shot up in an ambush. Funeral marches resounded in the Sergiyev suburb, Pskov and Perm, but Russian generals continued to maintain that the main forces of Chechen boyeviki had been routed and armed resistance would be finished in the very near future.” A significant proportion of deaths and injuries amongst ordinary Russian servicemen happens as a direct result of neglect, avoidance of responsibility or even criminal activity within the federal forces’ command. So, the information handling of these events, and the processes of investigation, in both public and the more secret military legal spheres, and of remembrance can reveal a great deal about the uniformed forces’ relationship with Russian society at large. The court action over the attack on the Sergiyev Posad OMON detachment may well be another indication of the desire to bring these services within the norms of civilised accountability by continuing the momentum of investigation generated in the case of Colonel Budanov over the death of Kheda Kungayeva at Tangi-Chu at the end of March 2000,2 but in the case of the Pskov airborne forces (desantniki), the fallen are honoured as heroes while those responsible escape investigation.
This paper first of all analyses the action involving Sergiyev Posad OMON on 2
March 2000, before moving on to the annihilation of the Pskov airborne company
on the night of 29 February-1 March 2000. While this is in reverse order to their
ocurrence, the OMON incident serves as an introduction to the events at Ulus-Kert,
which obliterated it in terms of media coverage. The saga of Ulus-Kert in particular
has implications not only for the Russian Ministry of Defence but also for other
armies under pressure, starved of financial resources and committed to fighting in mountainous terrain. Conclusions are therefore drawn from both episodes in terms of tactics and the military’s handling of the public outcry.
Ambush Of Sergiyev Posad Omon
“If during the first military campaign only the centre of the city was destroyed, then
today the whole city has been transformed into ruins, only on the outskirts, in areas
of private building, one comes across houses which are possible to restore. As a
whole the city almost resembles a desert. The only thing that enlivens the gloomy
landscape are the well fortified OMON blokposty, which outwardly recall minifortresses...Everyone living here is required to have a pass from the town’s military commandant. Document checking takes place at every blokpost, which are established every 300 metres.” The incident took place barely a week after Gronzyy had been captured by federal forces. The territory of the Chechen Republic was divided between OMON subunits and the newly formed militia units under the command of the former mayor of Groznyy, Bislan Gantamirov. Towards the end of February 2000 a disagreement developed between the chief of the Staropromyslovskiy (Gantamirov’s) militia (ROVD) and the head of the ROVD who had arrived from Sverdlovsk. There were claims that the Sverdlovtsy had fired at a Chechen blokpost. Gantamirov took offence. In the course of unravelling the dispute the head of the Staropromyslovskiy ROVD remarked that reinforcements would be coming to him from Urus-Martan in the shape of an AGS-17 (automatic grenade launcher). The Sverdlovsk chief believed this would undermine the balance of forces. The Groznyy commandant gave instructions that a fire subgroup under Major D’yachenko should oversee the changeover between two OMON subunits, namely the incomers from Sergiyev-Posad and those from Podol’sk completing their tour. D’yachenko was allotted two BTR-70s.
On 1 March 2000 the commander of the Podol’sk OMON Nikolay Tikhonov went in a ‘Ural’ truck to Mozdok, where a special echelon was due to arrive from Moscow, including the composite detachment of Sergiyev Posad OMON who were due to relieve Tikhonov’s detachment. The Sergiyev Posad OMON under the command of Colonel Dmitriy Markelov duly arrived at around 0630 hrs at Mozdok for a three month tour of duty and were met by 11 army trucks which then proceeded to take them to the Podol’sk OMON’s base situated in a northern suburb of Groznyy, Podgornoye, close to Pervomayskaya and known by the locals as Sobachevka. Posted high up on the leading ‘Ural’ was the transparent placard “OMON. Sergiyev Posad”.
The planning of the changeover was complicated by the fact that 1 March had been designated as a day when local inhabitants could have access to Groznyy. The commanders believed that boyeviki might take advantage of this by mixing with ordinary people going about their shopping and penetrating the city. Major D’yachenko also had instructions to prevent the AGS-17 being positioned at the Chechen blokpost.
Early in the morning on 2 March 2000 Groznyy and its suburbs were covered in thick fog.
At around 0800 hrs a blue Volvo-460 and a white Niva drive into Podgornoye. Armed men
get out of the vehicles and in the thick fog conceal themselves in the industrial zone. The
vehicles depart. An hour goes by, at approximately 0900 hrs local market traders in the
centre of the settlement hurry to close their stalls and leave, rumours abound that very soon
there will be a serious gun battle on the central street.
At about this time information about the boyeviki arrives at Blokpost No 53 [manned by
local home guard, close to the Podol’sk OMON’s base]. The home guard believed boyeviki
would make an attempt to get into Groznyy via Podgornoye. There was also additional
information that a detachment of genuine home guard could possibly arrive in two Uaz
vehicles or even in armoured vehicles, in which case they would have to ‘get a move on’, to
give permission for heavy equipment to enter the settlement. Also, the impending arrival of
the Sergiyev Posad OMON was well known. A few days ago one of the streets leading into
Groznyy had been partioned off with an old “Icarus” bus, so that any approach into the
Chechen capital from the north west was only possible through blokpost No 53. The local
militiamen went towards the BTRs as reinforcement. Amongst all those present the rumour
about bandits travelling in UAZ vehicles gathered momentum.
At 0920 hrs two BTRs from the Sverdlovsk militia arrived in the village from Groznyy.
D’yachenko met the chief of staff of the Podol’sk OMON and reported that he had the task of
stopping and disarming the Gantamirov column.
The Ambush initiated at 0950 hrs
At 0950 hrs the leading Ural with the Sergiyev Posad OMON was driving into the outskirts of
the village. When the truck reached the auto service station, the Volvo unexpectedly
blocked the road. At that moment the sound of a bullet rang out: a sniper’s bullet fired from
near the “Icarus” hit the driver of the leading vehicle in the head. The Ural, which was out
of control, left the road and immediately firing began from grenade launchers and heavy
machine guns. The very first shots achieved the targets: already two Urals had been hit
and were ablaze. Under withering fire the Omontsy jumped out of the vehicle bodies
enveloped in flames and attempted to hide themselves in the ditch by the roadside. In the
first minutes of the battle Dmitriy Markelov was killed – a bullet killed the colonel in the
head, seated in the last but one Uaz in the column [Vehicle No 10].
At the same time the Podol’sk militia deployed on Ht 319 south of Podgornoye moved off to
their base, for they saw firing on the column from every direction: from the elevator, from
the greengrocery, from the village itself, from the oil towers situated behind Podgornoye and
even from the OMON base itself – from behind a row of hangars. Nine Podol’sk OMON start
to fire in response from Ht 319 on the oil towers situated close to a water tower - here the
silhouettes of the attackers were obvious. Unexpectedly fire was opened up on the height
from near the village of Armyanskaya gully.
At 1020 hrs several soldiers from the Sofrinskiy Brigade broke through from the direction of
Groznyy to the battle area; they assisted in the evacuation of the wounded, pulled them to
into cover. The majority were transferred to the former auto service station building.
The battle did not quieten down until 1230 hrs and at this time from the direction of the
Sunzha ridge heavy armoured equipment appeared, and in the sky helicopter gunships
provided fire support. The attackers left in the direction of the oil towers nearer to the
mountains. Behind them through Podgornoye swooped BTRs, but fire was not effective.
The attackers left taking the wounded away with them. At this time on the outskirts of the
settlement a flood of about 30 young women appear with coloured bags in their hands.
From a distance these looked like mothers with very small children. The soldiers, naturally,
stopped firing in this direction, only the tankists continue. Pursuit of the boyeviki is
continued. At 1330 hrs troops coordinate helicopter operations by radio. By 1430 hrs in
Podgornoye firing quietens down. Wounded, 38 of them, are loaded onto vehicles and they
depart. Zachistka is carried out in the village and 20 local inhabitants are held.
Questions & Theories
Andrey Skrobot, the NG correspondent, was able to view a video about the events filmed by one of the servicemen who happened to be in the centre of the village. Even in the fleeting film, it was clear that the people who fired on the column were superbly trained snipers. The very first bullets not only hit the driver of the lead vehicle but also the commander’s vehicle. Bullets unerringly went through the windscreen of the Ural. Naturally, the column was made to halt and became an excellent target for the attackers, despite displaying the Russian flag and OMON insignia. According to Skrobot it cannot be excluded that in the turmoil of the battle somebody from the Podol’sk OMON fired on the column. It is also possible that from the direction of the Sergiyev-Posad OMON return fire was opened up. But how was it possible to continue firing when the range between them was no more than 50 metres? And how did they fail to recognise each other for over an hour?
The Podol’sk commander, Major Igor Tikhonov, was also in the column and he had
a radio. Under the circumstances it is not at all clear at whom and what did the
servicemen stationed on Ht 319 fire, whom did the BTRs pursue and to where the helicopters were directed.
According to Skrobot firing at the column was said to have come directly from the Podol’sk base location, though this is physically impossible, for the ground is intersected by concrete enclosures and hangars on the street along which the column was travelling. Nor would the Sverdlovsk militia be able to fire, for the blokpost was round the corner and it would not have been possible to see what was taking place. The machine guns of the Sverdlovsk militia’s BTRs were silent, as witnesses testified. In Skrobot’s words only one explanation remained “the Sergiyev Posad OMON fell into a carefully organised extremist ambush”. On 16 March an operational investigation group from the Moscow GUVD (Interior Ministry directorate) arrived in Pervomayskaya, comanded by Colonel Nikolay Vagin. At that time there were four versions of who carried out the attack:
· Ruslan Gelayev’s boyeviki.
· Local inhabitants from Podgornoye and Pervomayskaya.
· A group of boyeviki who were illegally in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Groznyy with the collaboration of local militiamen.
· The boyeviki who on 1 May 1995 carried out an attack on a motorised column of a composite detachment of the Moscow district GUVD OMON under the command of Colonel V A Tin’kov.
All four possibilities were corroborated by operational sources, and by the facts in Box 2 below.
Box 2 - Corroboration9
It was established that before the exodus of fighters from Groznyy in January 2000,
Brigadier General Ruslan Gelayev left a group of 150 fighters in the area of Podgornoye and
Pervomayskaya. In the main they were snipers, mine-layers and grenade-launchers tasked
with carrying out ‘acts of provocation’ and terrorist acts against Russian MOD and Internal
troops. This was confirmed by by a fighter from one of Gelayev’s subunits, Issa Nal’giyev,
who stated that this detachment was under the command of a brother of Ruslan Gelayev
(the truthfulness of this testimony was checked with a polygraph).
Women traders in the market said that they knew one of the attackers - he was a former
bureau section chief of Staropromyslovskiy ROVD, Adam Isayev.
The first shot fired on the column was from V Askayev - a brother of a worker in the town
militia in Groznyy.
According to other information, field commander Bakuyev had personally taken part in the
attack. After the battle the local militia took him away and hid him.
On the evening of 2 March 2000 close to the village around 15 new graves appeared. It is
well known that according to Muslim tradition the deceased are buried on the day of their
death.
However, it will be remembered that on 28 February 2000 “… at noon the Russian flag was hoisted over Shatoy”. Ruslan Gelayev had already moved to Komsomol’skoye, and judging by the previous Russo-Chechen conflict was also very much involved in the defence of Shatoy, making it very unlikely that he was involved in the events at Podgornoye.
The OGV North Caucasus press centre they said that around 80 boyeviki had been
arrested on suspicion. But some two years later a somewhat different situation was
being presented: it was said that the Podol’sk OMON, who failed to keep abreast of
the situation, opened fire and are responsible for the deaths of the the Sergiyev-
Posad OMON. Questions arose, such as why the column route had not been agreed
and why no BTRs or helicopters were made available to cover the movement of the
column.
The Criminal Case
A criminal case, Number 59030, was initiated on 4 March 2000 in connection with the deaths of 22 servicemen of the Sergiyev Posad OMON. Several MVD (Internal Troops) servicemen were implicated following a special investigation by the Staropromyslovskiy District Procurator. Amongst the accused were the deputy head of Moscow Oblast’ GUVD Major General Boris Fadeyev, the head of the Podol’sk OMON Major Igor Tikhonov and the director of the OGV (MVD) command group in Chechnya Colonel Mikhail Levchenko. The officers, subsequently relieved of their posts, were accused of “neglect, entailing loss of human lives”. In essence, the procurator’s case rested on the fact that the convoy route had not been agreed by the people responsible with the joint headquarters, and that commanders had not organised the necessary helicopter cover and protection by armoured vehicles. However technically just these charges might be, they revealed several unanswered questions.
Box 3 - Questions13
How should the movement route be properly agreed if there is only one road from Mozdok?
Having just arrived at the location the militia general could hardly make arrangements with
someone else’s armoured vehicles and helicopters. As far as it is known from documents,
the military echelon from Moscow to Mozdok met no one from the local military or the MVD
command but on arriving in Mozdok the officer in charge of the echelon Major General of
Militia Aleksandr Ved’dyayev commanded Fadeyev to accompany the echelon by rail to the
final point - Gudermes. Why then was it decided to transport the OMON by truck?
Tikhonov must have received an order about the start of the movement from the command.
Boris Fadeyev only heard that the OMON had been killed on 2 March at 1800 hrs when he
arrived in Gudermes. He was not able to leave Gudermes: in accordance with the chief’s
order he was occupied with the arrivals. Besides that the situation in Gudermes was tense.
The servicemen under Fadeyev remained in a situation of all round defence until 2300 hrs.
It is unclear whether helicopter or armoured support could have saved the subunit from
falling into an ambush. In the history of both Chechen campaigns there are examples when
the boyeviki made short work of columns consisting only of heavy tanks. There is one
further detail of interest: the incident occurred on the territory of Staropromyslovskiy ROVD
in Groznyy, which had the responsibility to ensure security in its zone of responsibility.
Why were there no representatives from there summoned to Moscow? And finally, what
exactly was the role of the Sverdlovsk Militsia?
Outcome of Trial
Both Fadeyev and Levchenko were found ‘not guilty’, but the trial of Major Tikhonov was postponed due to illness, and he therefore has to stand trial at a later date. However, the Procurator’s office is appealing against the verdict on the grounds that neither Fadeyev nor Levchenko took the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the column. The verdict handed down by the court did not explain whether boyeviki had participated in the firing or not. However, in the opinion of the father of one of the dead OMON servicemen, Nikolay Grachev: “The ‘not guilty’ verdict is only the beginning of the matter. We, the victims are not able to support the accusation. Because what is true: if they blame Tikhonov, Fadeyev and Levchenko, we will certainly never know who was the real perpetrator of the tragedy.” From the research carried out by Grachev, it was most likely that it was the boyeviki who had launched an attack on the column. Grachev’s reasoning is given in Box 4 below.
Box 4 - Nikolay Grachev’s View that Boyeviki carried out an Ambush
“The column of Omontsy arrived at 9.40. The Sverdlovtsy started to let through their “own”,
but all of a sudden a shot was heard, as a signal for the attack, one single shot. No one has
established who fired it. Immediately a maelstrom of fire fell on the position of the
Sverdlovsty and the vehicle column. Fire came from grenade launchers, sub machine guns
and sniper rifles.
The attack was organised in such a way that nobody could ascertain who was firing and
from where. In such circumstances, of course [people] could fire on their own. But
maintaining the obvious, the large casualties were caused by aimed shots from hidden,
previously prepared covered shelters in the populated point of Podgornoye, to the right of
the road, where it was not possible for ‘our’ people to be.” [It will be remembered that there
was a query with regard to the presence of the two BTRs belonging to the Sverdlovsk OMON
parked in position on the northern (left hand) side of the road. There was no evidence of
any shots being fired from the BTRs under charge of Major D’yachenko.]
Conclusion
There are so many different and conflicting factors in the various accounts of the incident that a full explanation may never be revealed. The search for the truth is made more difficult by factors such as the foggy weather and the number of different security organs involved. Undoubtedly, the most likely scenario is that of a Chechen separatist operation. Yet one is left with the question - how effective was the system of command and control?
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004