BoyElroy
02-09-2006, 12:59 AM
February 2006 Jane's Intelligence Review
Iran's conventional forces remain key to deterring potential threats
With attention focused on Iran's potential to develop a nuclear arsenal, the Islamic Republic's conventional armed forces are a key bulwark against external military threats. In the first article in a two-part analysis, Michael Knights evaluates Iran's ability to defend itself against US or Israeli air strikes.
Regardless of whether the confrontational style of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues or is contained by reactionary forces within the Iranian establishment, Iran is likely to remain in a state of armed tension with the US for the foreseeable future. Although Iran is expected to develop an embryonic nuclear weapons capability in the next decade, the Islamic Republic will continue to rely on its conventional forces to deter most external threats.
Until Tehran acquires a nuclear arsenal, its only option will be to prepare its land, air and sea defences for attack. However, Tehran will find that nuclear weapons are of little use in most conflicts and are almost impossible to forge into a strategic deterrent. Non-nuclear military forces are most useful and flexible deterrent in most conflict scenarios.
http://img157.imageshack.us/img157/5720/iranarmyandarmyaviationbases7v.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
A map showing the location of Iran's Army and Army Aviation units
Iran's threat assessment
The most realistic military threat to Iran in the near term is the limited use of force by the US. Were the present diplomatic crisis to escalate, then it would be likely to do so shortly before Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr receives fuel. According to the Russian government, this will occur in 2006, but delays are almost inevitable and fuel delivery could be pushed back to 2007.
Whatever the timeframe, the activation of Bushehr is a key moment that could well force the US and Israel to consider whether diplomatic efforts have been sufficiently effective in delaying Iran's nuclear development. If the US were to take military action, it could take the form of a naval blockade (specifically targeted against nuclear materials or possibly to impose broader sanctions) or air strikes. Air strikes could be undertaken in order to do the least damage necessary to cause delay - using highly selective nodal targeting - or the maximum, undertaking attacks on a far broader set of targets, including the integrated air defence system (TADS), using surface-to-surface missiles (SSM).
Because Iran would be likely to regard even a limited strike as the start of general hostilities, the US might logically decide to strike as many targets as possible. On the other hand, a limited strike could considerably reduce military and political exposure from the operation. Such a strategy would reduce risks to friendly forces as well as Iranian military and civilian personnel and obviate most of the need for host-nation basing in the region. The key target in any operation, regardless of its scope, would be Iran's nuclear industry. Attacks on Iran's air defences would not seek to cause long-term degradation, although any large-scale operation would require a broader range of air defence targets to be struck.
Beyond this, the two types of operation diverge. A substantial operation might include wider strikes against known or suspected non-nuclear elements of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme, such as suspected chemical or biological weapons centres. The US could also attack delivery systems - including strategic missiles and long-range aircraft -as a means of setting back Iran's ability to deploy WMD.
The minimum force packages required for an Israeli or US strike would vary widely. An Israeli strike on even a single nuclear facility would stretch Israel's nascent long-range strike capability and require innovative basing and airborne refuelling solutions. The most direct routes are overland and would require Israeli strike aircraft to penetrate 1,500 km through Iraq, 1,900 km through Saudi Arabia and 2,600 km through Turkey. These operations could be undertaken by F-15I fighter jets with limited post-launch refuelling support or even by F-16I jets using new buddy-refuelling capabilities. Air-launched standoff options such as Popeye missiles or submarine-launched Harpoon or Popeye Turbo missiles might not be able to penetrate hardened nuclear targets, instead being limited to littoral targets. These restrictions strongly suggest that the Bushehr nuclear reactor site is the only facility that offers the right blend of feasibility and payoff for an Israeli strike.
http://img236.imageshack.us/img236/500/iraniannavybases4ex.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
A map showing Iran's naval facilities
The US could choose to engage a larger but still focused set of nuclear targets - for example, Bushehr and key gasification and enrichment facilities - or it could widen the operation to include a range of military and regime targets. Washington would be unlikely to receive support from regional allies and possibly even the UK, which would need to authorise use of the regional airbase at Diego Garcia. As a result, the principal assets used would be long-range land attack cruise missiles, with a small but pivotal direct attack role for the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.
Using ship and submarine-launched Tomahawks or B-52-launched conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM) against the most distant targets would require the US to shoot from a Tomahawk 'basket' or a CALCM 'box' within the Gulf or just east of the Straits of Hormuz, creating major force protection issues in the event of Iranian retaliation.
CALCM might not be a tenable option when faced with these threats, placing greater emphasis on naval cruise missiles. Even a limited strike would require relatively deep penetration of Iranian airspace by B-2 stealth bombers. If a broader range of nuclear or WMD delivery targets were struck, or if B-2 strikes were deemed to require full suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and electronic warfare packages, the force needed would grow rapidly to incorporate the air assets of one or more US naval carrier battle groups. A range of US special forces assets could be used to support the strikes.
Iranian defence doctrine
Iran's conventional warfighting strategy is to deter aggression by making the cost of an attack as high as possible. Iran's defence doctrine will shape how the Islamic Republic seeks to achieve this objective with military means.
Contemporary Persian military culture bears little relation to the traditional Soviet-influenced outlook of major Arab military powers such as Iraq, Syria and Libya. Although many Western-trained officers were purged from the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Services (IRIAS), the remaining senior military leadership struggled to ensure that Western, rather than Soviet-inspired, military doctrine and equipment remained in service in Iran. Consequently, Tehran has observed the evolving strengths and weaknesses of Western military forces in regional contingencies.
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic came into direct conflict with US forces during Operation 'Nimble Archer' on 18 April 1988 (an element of Operation `Praying Mantis'). In this series of US naval air strikes, Iran deviated from the asymmetrical naval tactics it had previously used and attempted to use major surface combatants to fight the US. Iran's defeat highlighted the country's need to maintain ambiguity about operations such as its mining of the Straits of Hormuz, to keep US naval forces as far away from Iranian coastal areas as possible and engage using guerrilla tactics.
At the doctrinal level, Operation 'Desert Storm' appears to have strengthened the Iranian military's basic proclivity towards Western doctrine and technology. At the operational and strategic levels, Desert Storm hinted at the capabilities, particularly in the sphere of WMD development, that might be required to deter a US invasion of Iran. Iran also appears to have noted Iraq's error in denying the coalition access to local airbases and uninterrupted logistical buildup, increasing Iran's awareness of the need to develop anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities.
According to Saff, Iran's open-source armed forces journal, Iran has also incorporated the lessons of US operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 into its military planning, including further means of countering US air superiority and conducting manoeuvre warfare and psychological operations.
Command weaknesses
Unless Iran's military modernisation can move beyond mechanical and electronic spheres, its military will remain a second-rate force. Iran's success in indigenous development or external procurement of command, control, communications, cornputerisation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies will decide the extent to which Iran weakens or strengthens in terms of the global and regional military balance.
Although Iran is likely to have developed strategies to challenge enemy C4ISR advances, both in terms of complicating enemy decision-making and reducing their ability to conduct surveillance and locate Iranian military forces, Iran's own ability to maintain command, control and communications (C3) while under attack by a modern military adversary currently appears limited. Although Tehran is laying buried and undersea fibre-optic landlines, investing in satellite communications, importing and indigenously developing encrypted communications and installing limited computerisation within its command centres, if these systems come under attack, the Islamic Republic may quickly
lose its ability to maintain high-volume tactical communications between regional commands.
Iran will also have to develop a more effective and survivable network of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, as its immobile ground-based surveillance radar network and slowly expanding airborne early-warning fleet are susceptible to enemy attacks. In terms of maintaining an effective situational awareness within its own airspace and territorial waters, Iran's extensive array of passive sensors -observation positions, listening posts and acoustic naval sensors - would likely complement surviving elements of the radar system to provide the basic intelligence required to give early warning to defences at key economic and military hubs. For more demanding tasks beyond Iran's borders, such as 'over the horizon' location and tracking of US aircraft carriers, Iran will have to develop considerably more advanced wide-area surveillance capabilities, possibly including satellite reconnaissance capabilities and survivable long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Maintaining air defences
Since the Shah's era, Iranian planners have recognised that defending Iran's airspace is challenging because of the expansive size of the country and its mountainous character, which necessitates hundreds of ground-based radar stations and surface-to-air missile (SAM) units to create an integrated radar picture and fill in the large gaps (or radar 'shadows') created by the terrain. The solution adopted by imperial Iran -culminating in the 1977 Seek Sentry arms deal - sought instead to procure seven E-3A AWACS aircraft and 79 F-14A Tomcat fighters (each of the latter type carrying a powerful long-range AWG-9 radar system) to build a large airborne early-warning (AEW) network. Although the AWACS aircraft never reached Iran, the F-14A aircraft were delivered before the revolution, giving Iran a fleet of 'mini-AWACS' aircraft that remains in service to this day.
http://img236.imageshack.us/img236/9776/iranianairforcebases6kx.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
A map showing Iran's air force bases.
Fusing elements of the Shah's grandiose plans with over 25 years of improvisation, cannibalisation and, most recently, modernisation, Iran's air defences have evolved uniquely. Interceptor aircraft and SAMs play an equal role in the system, which derives most of its radar coverage from airborne rather than ground-based sensors. Iran has only added one ground-based surveillance radar station since 1979, and that was on the Afghan border. Instead, Iran's air defence forces continue to rely on the F-14A Tomcat force, which keeps 30 aircraft on active duty at any time through a carefully maintained system of phased rotation of the fleet of 45 to 50 operational aircraft.
Extensive maintenance efforts are likely to keep these aircraft, and their vital AWG-9 radar systems, active until 2015, by which time Iran could be experienced in operating a new fleet of locally license-produced Antonov An-140 AEW aircraft. These small AWACS aircraft are likely to enter service in sufficient numbers to permit full 24-hour radar coverage along Iran's Gulf coast during crisis periods.
Despite this coverage, Iran is unlikely to seek to develop a fully integrated nationwide air defence system like the Iraqi model of the 1980s. Instead, Iran uses a point defence strategy, with its strongest defences located around strategic points such as Tehran, Esfahan, Kharq Island, Bandar Abbas and Bushehr. Highly integrated local networks of interceptor aircraft and ground-based SAMs will provide layered protection for these areas.
They will employ a mobile defence involving the regular relocation of SAMs and a network of low-flying fighters screened by mountain ranges and teamed with F-14A controllers operating at higher altitudes and further inland. The system would aim to ambush penetrating attackers and their supporting AWACS or tankers with salvos of long-range SAM, beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) fired by F-14As and shorter-ranged air-to-air missiles (AAM) delivered by other fighters.
In seeking to continue to present a meaningful air-to-air threat, Iran is well aware that Western air forces have decisively destroyed regional air forces in every major regional conflict since the 1980s.
Iran continues to think of itself as an exception to most rules, including the developing trend towards purely ground-based air defences for non-Western armed forces, and has trained accordingly. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) continues to use adapted US training syllabi and requires trainees to complete at least 400 flying hours before moving on to advanced aircraft. Pilots must complete a further 300-500 hours on combat aircraft before qualifying as combat pilots. Iranian pilots are trained to overcome the weapons when faced with more advanced opponents, making the Iranian air force stand out as a different breed of non-Western regional air force.
Iranian pilots have learned to make use of advanced radar tactics, terrain masking, manoeuvre and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) in order to surprise opponents, minimise their warning time and limit enemy shooting opportunities. To improve the survivability of Iran's aircraft on the ground, the IRIAF maintains a large number of hardened aircraft shelters, a range of dispersal options and distributed sets of support packages at a number of potential operating bases.
Alongside its aerial interceptors, Iran will also deploy increasingly sophisticated ground-based air defences. For the foreseeable future, Iran will continue to field sufficient air defence artillery and shoulder-launched SAMs to keep attackers at medium to high altitudes, thereby denying them the ability to exploit Iran's serious vulnerability to low-level, below the radar intrusion.
http://img236.imageshack.us/img236/3171/iranianairdefences1oq.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
At key targets, Iran is developing missile engagement zones built around sophisticated Russian SAMs. Iran has deployed a single battery of the highl] capable S-300PMU (NATO codename SA-1( `Grumble') missiles to the Bushehr nuclear reactor site. Iran will also incorporate the Tor M-1 point defence systems to provide low-level coverage. The S-300V (NATO codename SA-12a 'Gladiator' or SA-12b `Giant') wide-area defence systems are also being incorporated into the air defence system to protect key centres out to a radius of 200 km. Finally, Iran maintains roaming SAM defences currently composed of mobile versions of reverse-engineered and substantially upgraded
Western SAMs.
Littoral and regional defences
Iran's Gulf island bases and oil rigs are the most vulnerable parts of Iranian territory, and Tehran spends considerable effort in rehearsing the reinforcement of its offshore holdings. In addition to providing observation outposts and mooring points for missile boats, these islands make it impossible for commercial shipping to move outside Iranian missile or artillery range, as they sit astride the eastern and western shipping lanes. Abu Musa, the most significant and farthest flung of Iran's presumed territories is the most vulnerable. The island's fortifications appeared relatively limited when revealed by commercial satellite imagery in 1999, but like other Iranian-controlled islands such as Sirri, the island is likely stocked with 60 to 90 days' supplies and cocooned with shelters and weapons caches. Iran reinforced Abu Musa in October 1994 and February 1995, reportedly bringing additional SAMs, chemical artillery shells (probably non-lethal CS gas) and 4,500 troops.
Iran's limited amphibious and airmobile units could also reinforce its offshore assets, although only at great cost and with limited success. While Iran has four brigades of Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval infantry, it lacks sufficient amphibious craft to lift more than 25 to 30 tanks and 800 to 1,200 troops in a single wave. Even if Iran's merchant marines were used to support an amphibious operation, only a single brigade of troops could be transported.
Iran has also learned, both directly (through operations against the US in 1988) and indirectly (through Iraq's experiences in the 1990s), that in the case of hostile US intervention in the Gulf, the US must be kept as far away from the Iranian coast as possible. Iran's A2AD strategies could target local airbases available to the US or US aircraft carriers or surface warfare vessels sailing in or near the Gulf. Anti-access and area denial are related strategies. While area denial operations typically concentrate on physically destroying or degrading infrastructure that supports the US military's access to the Gulf, the threat of such attacks could also represent anti-access threats, reducing the political willingness of host states to provide the US with access. Advances in cruise, and ballistic missile technology will give Iran the ability to launch heavy-area denial attacks on most of the unfortified military facilities in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states. As a result, the US may not be able to count on the access points and reception facilities needed to marry troops up with pre-positioned equipment or bed down land-based expeditionary units. This would undermine some key enablers of a power projection-based deterrent posture in the Gulf.
Due to weaknesses in wide-area naval surveillance, Iran is far less capable of locating and attacking dispersed and moving A2AD targets such as carrier battle groups or other naval surface warfare groups. Even if targeting information can be gathered, it loses value quickly. For example, if a weapon were launched from a range of 430 km, the carrier would have moved 5,000 metres before the weapon impacts, necessitating the use of smart weapons that can search the 78.5 km2 area. Even if hits can be achieved, a US carrier can take multiple hits from all but the largest specialised anti-shipping missiles (AShM) or nuclear-armed missiles.
In terms of forcing the US to deploy its naval forces away from the Iranian coast, Iran's most potent capability remains the Indian Ocean operations of its three Russian-built 877EKM Kilo submarines. However, doubts remain about the survivability of such platforms and about Tehran's ability to maintain communications with them or carry out over-the-horizon targeting of enemy naval forces. The very existence of the Kilos may force US naval forces to advance at a slower rate and operate at longer ranges from Iran. There are indications that Iran may be considering aggressive tactics such as attacking escorting warships with weapons such as wake-homing torpedoes.
According to the Iranian armed forces journal Saff, Iranian naval doctrine of 1999 states that "the Navy must consider the Sea of Oman as its specific operational field for deployment of submarines in both offensive and defensive postures". To support these operations, Iranian doctrine called for the development of port facilities and "special logistics craft to support the sea-bound naval units".
The port of Chah Bahar is being developed to serve this role, and Iran's Kilos are likely to have finished transferring their operations there from Bandar Abbas well before the middle of the next decade. This will reduce US ability to track and isolate the craft in the Straits of Hormuz. Iran is extending the 45-day endurance of its submarines by increasing the length of cruises (currently around 10 days per month), improving their reliability in the warm regional waters and getting technical assistance from Russia and India. Iran is also developing the capability to carry out covert replenishment at sea, using indigenously produced logistics and replenishment vessels.
Implications for US policy
Although there are tremendous disincentives attached to a military strike on Iran, the stagnation of diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue of its nuclear programmes means that a US or Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear programmes cannot be discounted.
Any strike would be undertaken at the very limits of the US and Israeli military-technical envelopes due to restrictions on regional hosting and overflight rights. Targeting intelligence would be the key limiting factor on the execution of the operation for the US, which would struggle to keep the campaign manageably small and focused on Iran's nuclear targets. A minimal strike would result in equally minimal delay to Iran's nuclear programmes.
The IRIAS appears to have succeeded in its basic aim of achieving deterrence by denial - that is, it has made Iran a sufficiently tough target for potential adversaries. This level of conventional defensive capability provides Iran with a range of highly flexible deterrent options. In terms of US policy, Iran's conventional defences make all but the most discriminating and ephemeral of US air strike options difficult and potentially costly to the Pentagon.
Iran's air defence system is not configured to defend against a surprise surgical attack involving US stealth aircraft attacking a small number of targets. The Bushehr reactor site is effectively defenceless against standoff cruise missile or stealth aircraft attacks. However, it would be considerably harder for the US and impossible for Israel to undertake a larger and more enduring and effective series of strikes of the sort that would be required to truly set back Iran's nuclear capacity.
In addition to Iran's ability to harden, disperse and hide targets, the country's air defence system is likely to reconfigure itself in unpredictable and decentralised ways. This increases the need for an ever-broadening planning requirement that could see the scale and complexity of an air strike option increase considerably. The same characteristics are applicable to Iran's littoral and broader regional defences, which would complicate considerably the US Navy's ability to enter and loiter in the Gulf or use its air point of disembarkation (APOD) hubs for combat and logistical power projection. Even before taking into account the added deterrent effect of Iran's powerful retaliatory capabilities, which will be discussed in depth in the second part of this series, the conventional defensive capabilities developed by Iran have created a significant disincentive for an overstretched and exhausted US military and the distant Israel Defence Force to undertake operations against the Islamic Republic.
Iran's conventional forces remain key to deterring potential threats
With attention focused on Iran's potential to develop a nuclear arsenal, the Islamic Republic's conventional armed forces are a key bulwark against external military threats. In the first article in a two-part analysis, Michael Knights evaluates Iran's ability to defend itself against US or Israeli air strikes.
Regardless of whether the confrontational style of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues or is contained by reactionary forces within the Iranian establishment, Iran is likely to remain in a state of armed tension with the US for the foreseeable future. Although Iran is expected to develop an embryonic nuclear weapons capability in the next decade, the Islamic Republic will continue to rely on its conventional forces to deter most external threats.
Until Tehran acquires a nuclear arsenal, its only option will be to prepare its land, air and sea defences for attack. However, Tehran will find that nuclear weapons are of little use in most conflicts and are almost impossible to forge into a strategic deterrent. Non-nuclear military forces are most useful and flexible deterrent in most conflict scenarios.
http://img157.imageshack.us/img157/5720/iranarmyandarmyaviationbases7v.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
A map showing the location of Iran's Army and Army Aviation units
Iran's threat assessment
The most realistic military threat to Iran in the near term is the limited use of force by the US. Were the present diplomatic crisis to escalate, then it would be likely to do so shortly before Iran's first nuclear reactor at Bushehr receives fuel. According to the Russian government, this will occur in 2006, but delays are almost inevitable and fuel delivery could be pushed back to 2007.
Whatever the timeframe, the activation of Bushehr is a key moment that could well force the US and Israel to consider whether diplomatic efforts have been sufficiently effective in delaying Iran's nuclear development. If the US were to take military action, it could take the form of a naval blockade (specifically targeted against nuclear materials or possibly to impose broader sanctions) or air strikes. Air strikes could be undertaken in order to do the least damage necessary to cause delay - using highly selective nodal targeting - or the maximum, undertaking attacks on a far broader set of targets, including the integrated air defence system (TADS), using surface-to-surface missiles (SSM).
Because Iran would be likely to regard even a limited strike as the start of general hostilities, the US might logically decide to strike as many targets as possible. On the other hand, a limited strike could considerably reduce military and political exposure from the operation. Such a strategy would reduce risks to friendly forces as well as Iranian military and civilian personnel and obviate most of the need for host-nation basing in the region. The key target in any operation, regardless of its scope, would be Iran's nuclear industry. Attacks on Iran's air defences would not seek to cause long-term degradation, although any large-scale operation would require a broader range of air defence targets to be struck.
Beyond this, the two types of operation diverge. A substantial operation might include wider strikes against known or suspected non-nuclear elements of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme, such as suspected chemical or biological weapons centres. The US could also attack delivery systems - including strategic missiles and long-range aircraft -as a means of setting back Iran's ability to deploy WMD.
The minimum force packages required for an Israeli or US strike would vary widely. An Israeli strike on even a single nuclear facility would stretch Israel's nascent long-range strike capability and require innovative basing and airborne refuelling solutions. The most direct routes are overland and would require Israeli strike aircraft to penetrate 1,500 km through Iraq, 1,900 km through Saudi Arabia and 2,600 km through Turkey. These operations could be undertaken by F-15I fighter jets with limited post-launch refuelling support or even by F-16I jets using new buddy-refuelling capabilities. Air-launched standoff options such as Popeye missiles or submarine-launched Harpoon or Popeye Turbo missiles might not be able to penetrate hardened nuclear targets, instead being limited to littoral targets. These restrictions strongly suggest that the Bushehr nuclear reactor site is the only facility that offers the right blend of feasibility and payoff for an Israeli strike.
http://img236.imageshack.us/img236/500/iraniannavybases4ex.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
A map showing Iran's naval facilities
The US could choose to engage a larger but still focused set of nuclear targets - for example, Bushehr and key gasification and enrichment facilities - or it could widen the operation to include a range of military and regime targets. Washington would be unlikely to receive support from regional allies and possibly even the UK, which would need to authorise use of the regional airbase at Diego Garcia. As a result, the principal assets used would be long-range land attack cruise missiles, with a small but pivotal direct attack role for the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber.
Using ship and submarine-launched Tomahawks or B-52-launched conventional air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM) against the most distant targets would require the US to shoot from a Tomahawk 'basket' or a CALCM 'box' within the Gulf or just east of the Straits of Hormuz, creating major force protection issues in the event of Iranian retaliation.
CALCM might not be a tenable option when faced with these threats, placing greater emphasis on naval cruise missiles. Even a limited strike would require relatively deep penetration of Iranian airspace by B-2 stealth bombers. If a broader range of nuclear or WMD delivery targets were struck, or if B-2 strikes were deemed to require full suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) and electronic warfare packages, the force needed would grow rapidly to incorporate the air assets of one or more US naval carrier battle groups. A range of US special forces assets could be used to support the strikes.
Iranian defence doctrine
Iran's conventional warfighting strategy is to deter aggression by making the cost of an attack as high as possible. Iran's defence doctrine will shape how the Islamic Republic seeks to achieve this objective with military means.
Contemporary Persian military culture bears little relation to the traditional Soviet-influenced outlook of major Arab military powers such as Iraq, Syria and Libya. Although many Western-trained officers were purged from the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Services (IRIAS), the remaining senior military leadership struggled to ensure that Western, rather than Soviet-inspired, military doctrine and equipment remained in service in Iran. Consequently, Tehran has observed the evolving strengths and weaknesses of Western military forces in regional contingencies.
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic came into direct conflict with US forces during Operation 'Nimble Archer' on 18 April 1988 (an element of Operation `Praying Mantis'). In this series of US naval air strikes, Iran deviated from the asymmetrical naval tactics it had previously used and attempted to use major surface combatants to fight the US. Iran's defeat highlighted the country's need to maintain ambiguity about operations such as its mining of the Straits of Hormuz, to keep US naval forces as far away from Iranian coastal areas as possible and engage using guerrilla tactics.
At the doctrinal level, Operation 'Desert Storm' appears to have strengthened the Iranian military's basic proclivity towards Western doctrine and technology. At the operational and strategic levels, Desert Storm hinted at the capabilities, particularly in the sphere of WMD development, that might be required to deter a US invasion of Iran. Iran also appears to have noted Iraq's error in denying the coalition access to local airbases and uninterrupted logistical buildup, increasing Iran's awareness of the need to develop anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities.
According to Saff, Iran's open-source armed forces journal, Iran has also incorporated the lessons of US operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq since 2003 into its military planning, including further means of countering US air superiority and conducting manoeuvre warfare and psychological operations.
Command weaknesses
Unless Iran's military modernisation can move beyond mechanical and electronic spheres, its military will remain a second-rate force. Iran's success in indigenous development or external procurement of command, control, communications, cornputerisation, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) technologies will decide the extent to which Iran weakens or strengthens in terms of the global and regional military balance.
Although Iran is likely to have developed strategies to challenge enemy C4ISR advances, both in terms of complicating enemy decision-making and reducing their ability to conduct surveillance and locate Iranian military forces, Iran's own ability to maintain command, control and communications (C3) while under attack by a modern military adversary currently appears limited. Although Tehran is laying buried and undersea fibre-optic landlines, investing in satellite communications, importing and indigenously developing encrypted communications and installing limited computerisation within its command centres, if these systems come under attack, the Islamic Republic may quickly
lose its ability to maintain high-volume tactical communications between regional commands.
Iran will also have to develop a more effective and survivable network of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, as its immobile ground-based surveillance radar network and slowly expanding airborne early-warning fleet are susceptible to enemy attacks. In terms of maintaining an effective situational awareness within its own airspace and territorial waters, Iran's extensive array of passive sensors -observation positions, listening posts and acoustic naval sensors - would likely complement surviving elements of the radar system to provide the basic intelligence required to give early warning to defences at key economic and military hubs. For more demanding tasks beyond Iran's borders, such as 'over the horizon' location and tracking of US aircraft carriers, Iran will have to develop considerably more advanced wide-area surveillance capabilities, possibly including satellite reconnaissance capabilities and survivable long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Maintaining air defences
Since the Shah's era, Iranian planners have recognised that defending Iran's airspace is challenging because of the expansive size of the country and its mountainous character, which necessitates hundreds of ground-based radar stations and surface-to-air missile (SAM) units to create an integrated radar picture and fill in the large gaps (or radar 'shadows') created by the terrain. The solution adopted by imperial Iran -culminating in the 1977 Seek Sentry arms deal - sought instead to procure seven E-3A AWACS aircraft and 79 F-14A Tomcat fighters (each of the latter type carrying a powerful long-range AWG-9 radar system) to build a large airborne early-warning (AEW) network. Although the AWACS aircraft never reached Iran, the F-14A aircraft were delivered before the revolution, giving Iran a fleet of 'mini-AWACS' aircraft that remains in service to this day.
http://img236.imageshack.us/img236/9776/iranianairforcebases6kx.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
A map showing Iran's air force bases.
Fusing elements of the Shah's grandiose plans with over 25 years of improvisation, cannibalisation and, most recently, modernisation, Iran's air defences have evolved uniquely. Interceptor aircraft and SAMs play an equal role in the system, which derives most of its radar coverage from airborne rather than ground-based sensors. Iran has only added one ground-based surveillance radar station since 1979, and that was on the Afghan border. Instead, Iran's air defence forces continue to rely on the F-14A Tomcat force, which keeps 30 aircraft on active duty at any time through a carefully maintained system of phased rotation of the fleet of 45 to 50 operational aircraft.
Extensive maintenance efforts are likely to keep these aircraft, and their vital AWG-9 radar systems, active until 2015, by which time Iran could be experienced in operating a new fleet of locally license-produced Antonov An-140 AEW aircraft. These small AWACS aircraft are likely to enter service in sufficient numbers to permit full 24-hour radar coverage along Iran's Gulf coast during crisis periods.
Despite this coverage, Iran is unlikely to seek to develop a fully integrated nationwide air defence system like the Iraqi model of the 1980s. Instead, Iran uses a point defence strategy, with its strongest defences located around strategic points such as Tehran, Esfahan, Kharq Island, Bandar Abbas and Bushehr. Highly integrated local networks of interceptor aircraft and ground-based SAMs will provide layered protection for these areas.
They will employ a mobile defence involving the regular relocation of SAMs and a network of low-flying fighters screened by mountain ranges and teamed with F-14A controllers operating at higher altitudes and further inland. The system would aim to ambush penetrating attackers and their supporting AWACS or tankers with salvos of long-range SAM, beyond visual range air-to-air missiles (BVRAAM) fired by F-14As and shorter-ranged air-to-air missiles (AAM) delivered by other fighters.
In seeking to continue to present a meaningful air-to-air threat, Iran is well aware that Western air forces have decisively destroyed regional air forces in every major regional conflict since the 1980s.
Iran continues to think of itself as an exception to most rules, including the developing trend towards purely ground-based air defences for non-Western armed forces, and has trained accordingly. The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) continues to use adapted US training syllabi and requires trainees to complete at least 400 flying hours before moving on to advanced aircraft. Pilots must complete a further 300-500 hours on combat aircraft before qualifying as combat pilots. Iranian pilots are trained to overcome the weapons when faced with more advanced opponents, making the Iranian air force stand out as a different breed of non-Western regional air force.
Iranian pilots have learned to make use of advanced radar tactics, terrain masking, manoeuvre and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) in order to surprise opponents, minimise their warning time and limit enemy shooting opportunities. To improve the survivability of Iran's aircraft on the ground, the IRIAF maintains a large number of hardened aircraft shelters, a range of dispersal options and distributed sets of support packages at a number of potential operating bases.
Alongside its aerial interceptors, Iran will also deploy increasingly sophisticated ground-based air defences. For the foreseeable future, Iran will continue to field sufficient air defence artillery and shoulder-launched SAMs to keep attackers at medium to high altitudes, thereby denying them the ability to exploit Iran's serious vulnerability to low-level, below the radar intrusion.
http://img236.imageshack.us/img236/3171/iranianairdefences1oq.jpg (http://imageshack.us)
At key targets, Iran is developing missile engagement zones built around sophisticated Russian SAMs. Iran has deployed a single battery of the highl] capable S-300PMU (NATO codename SA-1( `Grumble') missiles to the Bushehr nuclear reactor site. Iran will also incorporate the Tor M-1 point defence systems to provide low-level coverage. The S-300V (NATO codename SA-12a 'Gladiator' or SA-12b `Giant') wide-area defence systems are also being incorporated into the air defence system to protect key centres out to a radius of 200 km. Finally, Iran maintains roaming SAM defences currently composed of mobile versions of reverse-engineered and substantially upgraded
Western SAMs.
Littoral and regional defences
Iran's Gulf island bases and oil rigs are the most vulnerable parts of Iranian territory, and Tehran spends considerable effort in rehearsing the reinforcement of its offshore holdings. In addition to providing observation outposts and mooring points for missile boats, these islands make it impossible for commercial shipping to move outside Iranian missile or artillery range, as they sit astride the eastern and western shipping lanes. Abu Musa, the most significant and farthest flung of Iran's presumed territories is the most vulnerable. The island's fortifications appeared relatively limited when revealed by commercial satellite imagery in 1999, but like other Iranian-controlled islands such as Sirri, the island is likely stocked with 60 to 90 days' supplies and cocooned with shelters and weapons caches. Iran reinforced Abu Musa in October 1994 and February 1995, reportedly bringing additional SAMs, chemical artillery shells (probably non-lethal CS gas) and 4,500 troops.
Iran's limited amphibious and airmobile units could also reinforce its offshore assets, although only at great cost and with limited success. While Iran has four brigades of Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) naval infantry, it lacks sufficient amphibious craft to lift more than 25 to 30 tanks and 800 to 1,200 troops in a single wave. Even if Iran's merchant marines were used to support an amphibious operation, only a single brigade of troops could be transported.
Iran has also learned, both directly (through operations against the US in 1988) and indirectly (through Iraq's experiences in the 1990s), that in the case of hostile US intervention in the Gulf, the US must be kept as far away from the Iranian coast as possible. Iran's A2AD strategies could target local airbases available to the US or US aircraft carriers or surface warfare vessels sailing in or near the Gulf. Anti-access and area denial are related strategies. While area denial operations typically concentrate on physically destroying or degrading infrastructure that supports the US military's access to the Gulf, the threat of such attacks could also represent anti-access threats, reducing the political willingness of host states to provide the US with access. Advances in cruise, and ballistic missile technology will give Iran the ability to launch heavy-area denial attacks on most of the unfortified military facilities in the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states. As a result, the US may not be able to count on the access points and reception facilities needed to marry troops up with pre-positioned equipment or bed down land-based expeditionary units. This would undermine some key enablers of a power projection-based deterrent posture in the Gulf.
Due to weaknesses in wide-area naval surveillance, Iran is far less capable of locating and attacking dispersed and moving A2AD targets such as carrier battle groups or other naval surface warfare groups. Even if targeting information can be gathered, it loses value quickly. For example, if a weapon were launched from a range of 430 km, the carrier would have moved 5,000 metres before the weapon impacts, necessitating the use of smart weapons that can search the 78.5 km2 area. Even if hits can be achieved, a US carrier can take multiple hits from all but the largest specialised anti-shipping missiles (AShM) or nuclear-armed missiles.
In terms of forcing the US to deploy its naval forces away from the Iranian coast, Iran's most potent capability remains the Indian Ocean operations of its three Russian-built 877EKM Kilo submarines. However, doubts remain about the survivability of such platforms and about Tehran's ability to maintain communications with them or carry out over-the-horizon targeting of enemy naval forces. The very existence of the Kilos may force US naval forces to advance at a slower rate and operate at longer ranges from Iran. There are indications that Iran may be considering aggressive tactics such as attacking escorting warships with weapons such as wake-homing torpedoes.
According to the Iranian armed forces journal Saff, Iranian naval doctrine of 1999 states that "the Navy must consider the Sea of Oman as its specific operational field for deployment of submarines in both offensive and defensive postures". To support these operations, Iranian doctrine called for the development of port facilities and "special logistics craft to support the sea-bound naval units".
The port of Chah Bahar is being developed to serve this role, and Iran's Kilos are likely to have finished transferring their operations there from Bandar Abbas well before the middle of the next decade. This will reduce US ability to track and isolate the craft in the Straits of Hormuz. Iran is extending the 45-day endurance of its submarines by increasing the length of cruises (currently around 10 days per month), improving their reliability in the warm regional waters and getting technical assistance from Russia and India. Iran is also developing the capability to carry out covert replenishment at sea, using indigenously produced logistics and replenishment vessels.
Implications for US policy
Although there are tremendous disincentives attached to a military strike on Iran, the stagnation of diplomatic efforts to resolve the issue of its nuclear programmes means that a US or Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear programmes cannot be discounted.
Any strike would be undertaken at the very limits of the US and Israeli military-technical envelopes due to restrictions on regional hosting and overflight rights. Targeting intelligence would be the key limiting factor on the execution of the operation for the US, which would struggle to keep the campaign manageably small and focused on Iran's nuclear targets. A minimal strike would result in equally minimal delay to Iran's nuclear programmes.
The IRIAS appears to have succeeded in its basic aim of achieving deterrence by denial - that is, it has made Iran a sufficiently tough target for potential adversaries. This level of conventional defensive capability provides Iran with a range of highly flexible deterrent options. In terms of US policy, Iran's conventional defences make all but the most discriminating and ephemeral of US air strike options difficult and potentially costly to the Pentagon.
Iran's air defence system is not configured to defend against a surprise surgical attack involving US stealth aircraft attacking a small number of targets. The Bushehr reactor site is effectively defenceless against standoff cruise missile or stealth aircraft attacks. However, it would be considerably harder for the US and impossible for Israel to undertake a larger and more enduring and effective series of strikes of the sort that would be required to truly set back Iran's nuclear capacity.
In addition to Iran's ability to harden, disperse and hide targets, the country's air defence system is likely to reconfigure itself in unpredictable and decentralised ways. This increases the need for an ever-broadening planning requirement that could see the scale and complexity of an air strike option increase considerably. The same characteristics are applicable to Iran's littoral and broader regional defences, which would complicate considerably the US Navy's ability to enter and loiter in the Gulf or use its air point of disembarkation (APOD) hubs for combat and logistical power projection. Even before taking into account the added deterrent effect of Iran's powerful retaliatory capabilities, which will be discussed in depth in the second part of this series, the conventional defensive capabilities developed by Iran have created a significant disincentive for an overstretched and exhausted US military and the distant Israel Defence Force to undertake operations against the Islamic Republic.