nognig
02-11-2006, 08:45 AM
For anyone interested in reading about the defeat of an insurgency, Peru's fight against the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) is worth a look.
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shining_Path)
There are a lot of similarities between the insurgency in Peru and the current one in Iraq. The Shining Path targeted civilians, infrastructure with bombs and asassinations. There are big differences between Peru and Iraq's insurgencies, the big one being the intensity of the violence.
For an really interesting read, check out these five links. They are the "Sendero Files" that the FAS (Federation of American Scientists) published during the height of the insurgency.
July 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf1.htm)
August 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf2.htm)
September 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf3.htm)
October 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf4.htm)
November 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf5.htm)
The above articles are worth reading because one can get a sense of how quickly an insurgency can fall. The insurgency raged on for 12 years (1980-1992), but died between July 1992 and Nov 1992.
A quote from the July 1992 article.
"Security is now the number one problem for everyone," says Isabel Coral, a grass roots organizer with experience in Lima shantytowns and Ayacucho. "The state of war makes the [economic and political] crisis even worse, and people understand that." Interior Minister Army General Juan Briones hinted that the latest car bombs might come from a new terrorist organization, perhaps, an arm of an opposition party like the center-left APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) or the mainstream left parties, striking back at Fujimori.
A quote from the August 1992 article.
For many, the random attacks have broken their will to resist: the public outcry for harsher repression, like capital punishment, dominates the media, while those who can afford ready their bags for moving abroad. The impact of the bombing wave has hit hard at Peru's wobbling economy. Many business people are giving up all hope of making a profit in the recessive market. The bombs have frightened off the few foreign investors not already wary after the presiden- tial coup. In these circumstances, any remaining concerns for compliance with human rights in counter-insurgency may end up being another casualty of the bombing spree.
A quote from the Nov 1992 article, after the capture of
On September 12, an elite unit of the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE) raided a residence in the middle-class neighborhood of Surco, suspecting that the residence operating as a dance studio was really a SL safehouse. On the second floor, policemen found a bearded, casually dressed man with a distinct air of a university professor. It was Abimael Guzmán, 57, Sendero's supreme leader and the most wanted man in Peru for more than a decade.
NN
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shining_Path)
There are a lot of similarities between the insurgency in Peru and the current one in Iraq. The Shining Path targeted civilians, infrastructure with bombs and asassinations. There are big differences between Peru and Iraq's insurgencies, the big one being the intensity of the violence.
For an really interesting read, check out these five links. They are the "Sendero Files" that the FAS (Federation of American Scientists) published during the height of the insurgency.
July 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf1.htm)
August 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf2.htm)
September 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf3.htm)
October 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf4.htm)
November 1992 (http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/sf5.htm)
The above articles are worth reading because one can get a sense of how quickly an insurgency can fall. The insurgency raged on for 12 years (1980-1992), but died between July 1992 and Nov 1992.
A quote from the July 1992 article.
"Security is now the number one problem for everyone," says Isabel Coral, a grass roots organizer with experience in Lima shantytowns and Ayacucho. "The state of war makes the [economic and political] crisis even worse, and people understand that." Interior Minister Army General Juan Briones hinted that the latest car bombs might come from a new terrorist organization, perhaps, an arm of an opposition party like the center-left APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) or the mainstream left parties, striking back at Fujimori.
A quote from the August 1992 article.
For many, the random attacks have broken their will to resist: the public outcry for harsher repression, like capital punishment, dominates the media, while those who can afford ready their bags for moving abroad. The impact of the bombing wave has hit hard at Peru's wobbling economy. Many business people are giving up all hope of making a profit in the recessive market. The bombs have frightened off the few foreign investors not already wary after the presiden- tial coup. In these circumstances, any remaining concerns for compliance with human rights in counter-insurgency may end up being another casualty of the bombing spree.
A quote from the Nov 1992 article, after the capture of
On September 12, an elite unit of the National Directorate Against Terrorism (DINCOTE) raided a residence in the middle-class neighborhood of Surco, suspecting that the residence operating as a dance studio was really a SL safehouse. On the second floor, policemen found a bearded, casually dressed man with a distinct air of a university professor. It was Abimael Guzmán, 57, Sendero's supreme leader and the most wanted man in Peru for more than a decade.
NN