Marine Corps SpecOps Unit stands up this month

[KB]

February 20, 2006

Ready for MarSOC
Units already in training as command’s debut nears

By Gidget Fuentes
Marine Corps Times staff writer


The Marine Corps will officially jump into the special operations world when it stands up Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command on Feb. 24 and begins training its first spec ops company for deployment on ships later this year.

Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, who’s been nominated for promotion to major general, said the new 2,600-member command will provide “a sea-based special operations force” to theater combatant commanders.

Hejlik assumed command last fall and is slowly growing his headquarters staff from temporary space at Quantico, Va.

The command, known as MarSOC, will activate at Camp Lejeune, N.C., a location said to be well suited since it’s near other spec ops component commanders under U.S. Special Operations Command, based at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, Fla.

MarSOC will include three main components: direct-action companies under a Marine Special Operations Regiment; a Foreign Military Training Unit; and a Marine Special Operations Support Group. Officials expect MarSOC will reach full operational capability by 2010.

But wheels are already in motion.

The first FMTU teams, which are based at Lejeune, are training and will deploy starting in May, said Hejlik, during a Jan. 26 meeting with reporters.

The first Marine Special Operations Company — there will be nine direct-action MSOCs under the Marine Special Operations Regiment — will organize in May, train with the Lejeune-based 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit and deploy later this year. The first West Coast-based spec ops company is slated to join the 13th MEU in September.

Under current plans — outlined to senior leaders during their quarterly “executive off-site” on Jan. 18 and remaining in flux as working group studies and reviews continue — the nine direct-action companies will fall under two Marine Special Operations Battalions. Those battalions report to the Marine Special Operations Regiment.

Besides the direct-action companies and FMTUs, plans also call for the establishment in July of a Marine Special Operations Support Group, which will provide battalions with a range of specialized skills, from security and K-9 teams to communications, intelligence and logistics.

Current plans would organize those into support, intelligence and logistics companies, although officials continue to study skill sets, training standards and structure.

MarSOC “is filling a complementary gap … that we know is out there because the forces of SOCom have been so heavily engaged,” Hejlik said.

As the initial voice of MarSOC, he finds himself juggling continuous questions about its future and e-mails from leathernecks who want to join the new command.

More details will emerge in coming months as service officials draw on feedback inside and outside the service and weigh ongoing studies.

However, Hejlik’s presentation at the Jan. 18 off-site put a lot of meat on the bone concerning how MarSOC will be structured and the kind of people Hejlik is looking for.

Finding the right people

Each of the nine Marine Special Operations Companies will be led by a major and have 97 to 118 Marines and sailors, including about 40 reconnaissance Marines, who have the 0321 military occupational specialty and would conduct direct-action and special reconnaissance missions.

“The core of the MSOC is the 0321 Marine … the force reconnaissance Marine,” said Hejlik, noting the Corps is studying ways to reconstitute and grow enough reconnaissance Marines.

“They’ve got to come from somewhere, and they’ll come from that three-star [Marine Expeditionary Force] commander,” he added.

The Corps is short of 0321s, however — by as much as 25 percent, according to one set of figures — leaving units, such as force reconnaissance companies, short of filling all their platoons.

Hejlik wouldn’t say whether force reconnaissance would be absorbed in part or in whole by MarSOC. Officials also are looking at division reconnaissance battalions, which provide the “eyes and ears” to ground commanders.

But MarSOC won’t just be about recon.

Under plans still being sorted out, each MSOC will include communicators, logisticians, air-naval gunfire liaison companies, supporting fires, explosive ordnance disposal experts and Marines trained in signals, human intelligence and counterintelligence.

Hejlik’s biggest worry, though, is getting enough Marines to fill billets and growing the types of specialized capabilities to round out the gunslingers in each company.

“The hardest part, I think, is the high-demand, low-density MOS, that young sergeant out there and young corporal who’s SIGINT, who’s HUMINT, who’s CI, who’s EOD,” he said.

“Right now, we’ll use the capability that’s inherent with the MEU, and we’ll continue to try to grow our own,” he added.

MarSOC won’t be a full career, however.

Hejlik expects that Marines would spend three to five years in MarSOC and then return to other billets, perhaps as an instructor, or to recruiting or drill instructor duty, to stay competitive for promotion with their peers.

That may not be a popular approach for some reconnaissance Marines, who say the time put into all their specialized training and expertise would be lost.

Hejlik said the Corps would draw back those personnel if needed. “We’ll flag those Marines,” he said, and “bring them back” for shorter duty. Marines could stay longer, “but frankly, I would discourage that,” he added.

It’s unclear yet what the training pipeline will be for the reconnaissance Marines or other MSOC members, or how each company will be equipped. By joining SOCom, MarSOC will get to tap into a larger pool of special operations money, although its funding picture is also unclear.

SOCom’s budget is more than $6.5 billion, and it’s expected to grow as Congress and the Pentagon look to expand spec ops forces, according to the proposed 2007 budget, which includes a request for construction of a battalion headquarters at Camp Pendleton, Calif.

Last year, SOCom began paying retention bonuses, ranging from “special-duty assignment” bonuses of $375 a month to $8,000 to $150,000 “critical skills” retention bonuses for Army Special Forces, Navy SEALs and special-warfare combatant crewmen, Air Force combat controllers and pararescuemen. It’s uncertain what bonuses would be available to MarSOC leathernecks.

Shipboard operators

Under current plans, the nine Marine spec ops companies will train and deploy with a MEU, now a part of Navy expeditionary strike groups. No land-based units have been proposed or studied, nor any similar spec ops companies within Reserve reconnaissance units.

Deploying with a MEU raises questions about command and control, training and logistics of those companies, which would organize and train before “chopping” to the MEU for pre-deployment work-ups and deployment.

However, because the company will be a component under SOCom, operational control of that company will fall to the theater special operations commander, or TSOC, Hejlik said.

“That’s the intent,” he said. “We’re still working out those issues.”

The MSOC would be grown, to a degree, from an MEU’s existing Maritime Special Purpose Force, or MSPF.

Each MSPF typically includes the MEU’s Force Recon platoon, a division reconnaissance platoon and a security “trailer” platoon from the infantry battalion that’s part of the MEU’s ground combat element, plus communicators, EOD, snipers and intelligence. The men are trained in direct action, demolition, maritime interdiction, close-quarters battle and deep reconnaissance.

Until about six years ago, a Navy SEAL platoon permanently assigned to each amphibious ready group trained and operated with the MSPF.

But Naval Special Warfare Command, in a readjustment of its forces, pulled SEALs from the amphibious force and began to base or send platoons overseas or temporarily to ships, when needed. However, MarSOC’s plan would restore and provide SOCom with a more permanent seagoing force.

Some Marines wonder how the existing MSPF would change, what will happen when an MSOC is pulled off the MEU to conduct a SOCom mission, and what the MEU loses in capability when that occurs.

Hejlik acknowledged that officials still must sort through those issues. “The intent is not to rip the gut out of the MEU,” he said, adding that MSOC will be “not separate, but separable” from the naval force.

If the MSOC is available, a MEU commander “can use them as necessary to increase the [unit’s] capability,” he said.

Those links are important, Hejlik said, noting that SOCom’s commander and the Marine Corps commandant “really saw the need to have a sea-based specials operations force, and that’s what we are.”

Another thing that is unclear is whether MarSOC would have its own dedicated air assets.

“We’re working that,” he said, noting that “if there’s a real-life contingency mission for the MSOC, the intent is they will be supported by the MEU.”

The Foreign Military Training Unit will ultimately include two dozen 12-man teams skilled in foreign internal defense. The teams would deploy to Africa, South America “or wherever it happens to be,” Hejlik said.

The typical FMTU mission “is very flexible,” he said. “It could be anywhere from 10 weeks to three to four months,” depending on the country and mission.

Hejlik said his vision for the FMTUs “as we go along, is they’re going to become more ODA-like.” He was referring to Army Special Forces’ 12-man Operational Detachment “Alpha” teams that also conduct foreign internal defense. “Now, that’s not going to be in the next year, because you have to grow the capability and the skill sets,” he said.

Team members are getting language and cultural training, some provided by the Marine Corps and some by SOCom.

In the meantime, Marine Corps planners are pressing ahead with developing, structuring and manning MarSOC.

Whether it would grow beyond the initial 2,600 isn’t certain, although some officials, citing the global needs for highly trained forces, have said that it is possible.

Hejlik thinks that could happen beyond 2010.

“It’s just a matter of how many and how fast,” he said. “Right now, we’ll just stay at 2,600.”

Gidget Fuentes can be reached at (760) 677-6145 or gfuentes@marinecorpstimes.com.

Marine Special Operations Command
Under current plans, the MarSOC will be broken into three main sections:

Marine Special Operations Regiment

1st Marine Special Operations BattalionFour Marine Special Operations Companies1st Special Missions Training Branch

2nd Marine Special Operations BattalionFive Marine Special Operations Companies2nd Special Missions Training BranchSmall Craft Company

Foreign Military Training Unit

Alpha Company 12 teams

Bravo Company 12 teams

Marine Special Operations Support

Support CompanyANGLICO PlatoonSecurity PlatoonCommunications Platoon

Intelligence CompanyCI/HUMINT PlatoonSIGINT PlatoonAnalysis Platoon

Logistics Company

[Anthony91]

Quote: Hejlik expects that Marines would spend three to five years in MarSOC and then return to other billets, perhaps as an instructor, or to recruiting or drill instructor duty, to stay competitive for promotion with their peers.
_________________________

That's going to be a problem, I hope to be in MarSOC for a career. I mean a Force Recon Marine for my entire military career. But i'm only 13, so I won't worry.

[ironcross6]

gee i wonder where this great idea came from. seems like the marines just stood up the poor mans CAG and 75th. nothing like duplicating functions

i think the army should designate a brigade as its amphibious operations unit. while the army would never do that, it makes about as much sense

[AOCBravo2004]

gee i wonder where this great idea came from. seems like the marines just stood up the poor mans CAG and 75th. nothing like duplicating functions

i think the army should designate a brigade as its amphibious operations unit. while the army would never do that, it makes about as much sense

This whole thing was about giving USSOCOM more bodies to prosecute both GWOT and OIF, so of course missions are going to be duplicated. It's better to duplicate that mission and have more bodies then not and allow the smaller sized force to be burned out more rapidly.

[moughoun]

Quote: Hejlik expects that Marines would spend three to five years in MarSOC and then return to other billets, perhaps as an instructor, or to recruiting or drill instructor duty, to stay competitive for promotion with their peers.
_________________________

That's going to be a problem, I hope to be in MarSOC for a career. I mean a Force Recon Marine for my entire military career. But i'm only 13, so I won't worry.
for a 13 year old, your perceptive, 3 to 5 years, guys would only be really becoming well rounded and capable at that stage, it probably should be a career choice if they want or not and not have a TOD stipulation:|, although they probably will have served some time in a "regular" FR unit before, a question though to anyone who knows, will guy's be allowed to go straight from a regular Marine unit into this new MARSOC one?

[FallenAngel]

gee i wonder where this great idea came from.

It actually came from the Army IIRC. ;) The theres a reason why the USMC hasn't been a part of SOCOM since it's inception. But as stated above, the need for bodies has reached an all-time high so, yeah, welcome to MarSOC.

[Bomb kicker]

Allow me to interject. The East/ West Det's that stood up a while ago weren't just a bunch of Boots, it was a hearty mix of seasoned individuals who comprised them and took them from a conceptual pie chart to proven operational status. While MarSOC will have it's fair share of growing pains, it'll come down to (as it is already) what missions the existing SOC commands will lose because 'someone else can do it better'. Sure, the end result will be nearly identical, mission excecuted and sucess acheived, but the Purple World is a strange creature in itself. Besides, even though "every Marine is a rifleman", as in all services, there are those who just do better than their peers. To me, MarSOC seems like a higher speed lower drag DAP...but with my 2-1/2 mins in this club what would know?

MarSOC as a career...don't hold your breathe. If you're given the opportunity to "bid" for it, you're gonna have to put alot more into it later on than your 13yr old mind can comprehend. Good luck nonetheless, there's nothing wrong with being a good old fashioned Bullet Sponge (God Bless 'em!)

As far as the Army standing up an Amphib brigade...it'll never happen. First, the American people won't let it happen. Second, the Army has, is and will always be too large/heavy for proper Amphib/Ship-to-shore/ Over the Horizon/ etc operations. The MC has been doing this for far to long and has more know-how than the Army could ever expect to integrate into each Soldier much less a Brigade. Stick to the occupational side; and besides the only thing that sinks faster than a rock is a Soldier with a ruck.

Time for a beer...

[JTAR7242]

gee i wonder where this great idea came from. seems like the marines just stood up the poor mans CAG and 75th. nothing like duplicating functionsWell, I'm glad you're gracing us with your endless expertise and knowledge. This thread was lost without you.

Honestly, the way this unit has shaped out, it looks like it will be a real asset to the Corps already impressive warfighting ability.


Eh, if only I hadn't ****ed up my knee.

[SOG]

funny, was just looking for this info trying to figure out what had happened with the unit. last i hear in OIF det 1 did 87 hits and was a success, then came back home and was bunkered. glad to hear they are firmly aboard. go rumsy!


Regardless of the indecision, the MC
SOCOM Det 1, sat for over 16 months
while USMC and SOCOM leadership
slow rolled this decision process. But
that did not stop the men at Det 1, who
ignored the politics and continued to
train, hoping for orders back to the
battlefield. Orders never came again,
and their one, highly successful
deployment, will be all they put in the
history books.
Their first deployment netted them a
highly impressive string of operations.
While NSW gets the credibility, MC
SOCOM Det 1 ran successful capture
operations against 9 high value targets
and over 87 successful raids/patrols. The
MC SOCOM Det 1 personnel laced
together an impressive method of
finding, fixing and finishing the enemy
out in the dirt. They never created a
drain on the JSOTF Hqtrs or support
sections for intel or logistics. Often at
times they carried the ball for the NSW
Staff which is not made up of war
fighters as it is in the Marine Corps. So
the Det’s internal capability was
additive and highly adaptive as per
design. (One would think this would
stop and make high level leadership
study the original concept a little better.)
While the Det was sure the Corps would
redeploy them even in direct or indirect
support of another mission, the orders
never came and the “why” is all but a
mystery. During that time, USSOCOM
and NSW were sure the Det was broken
up and redistributed back into the Corps
structure. But Lt Gen Huly & Parks at
HQMC held the Detachment together
awaiting concrete decisions, with only
minor personnel changes for career
necessary appointments


great interview in jan 2006 with the det 1 command which made me think det 1 was not going away.
http://www.blackfive.net/main/2006/01/are_socom_marin.html

thanks KB, i literally opend the page to search for this very topic and there it was!

[Bomb kicker]

I think they showed their mettle....

Citation: For exceptional meritorious service during combat operations while forward deployed to the IRAQI THEATER of OPERATIONS with Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force- Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) and subsequent post deployment tactical experimentation and support for the design of a permanent USMC component to SOCOM, from 19 April 2004 to 3 March 2006. Throughout this period the Marines and sailors of Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment One (MCSOCOM Det One) provided a sustained and unprecedented demonstration of MAGTF principles and Marine Corps ethos in the successful execution of a full range of special operations missions by a Marine Corps unit under the operational control of a special operations headquarters. Taking full advantage of their advanced skills, unique training, and specialized equipment, the Marines and sailors of MCSOCOM Det One aggressively sought opportunities during this historically significant deployment to find, fix and finish an elusive enemy, inflicting significant damage on the Iraqi insurgent movement and in doing so supported the safe and expeditious transfer of authority to the Interim Iraqi Government and the safety of principal government officials. The Detachment’s accomplishments and efforts proved conclusively that the Marine Corps could operate at the level of other special operations units and contributed directly and materially to the Secretary of Defense’s decision to add a Marine Corps component to the Special Operations Command. By their truly distinctive achievements, aggressive combat mindset, and unrelenting devotion to duty, the Marines and sailors of MCSOCOM Det One reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXCERPTS OF WRITE-UP....

Overview:
For exceptional meritorious service from 19 April to 10 Oct 2004, while operating throughout Iraq as Special Operations Task Unit Raider under the operational control of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP). During this timeframe, the XXXX Marines and sailors of Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment One (MCSOCOM Det One) carried out a wide range of missions, from direct action raids to exploiting the enemy’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum. In addition to conducting aggressive combat operations against enemy forces, MCSOCOM Det One personnel served in key leadership billets and formed the nucleus of the of their higher headquarters’ XXXX man Intelligence Directorate. The refined MAGTF skills of the MCSOCOM personnel brought an added dimension to the Naval Component Commander’s battle-staff that was charged with commanding and controlling multiple special operation task units dispersed throughout the theater. As documented in formal studies by various Department of Defense organizations the tremendous impact that the XXXX man Detachment had on the counter-terror and counter-insurgent efforts in Iraq was significantly out of proportion to its size and far beyond their originally conceived concept of employment.

The Secretary of Defense’s October 2005 announcement that the Marine Corps would stand up a component command under SOCOM is a testament to the Detachment’s accomplishments. When the Detachment was originally conceived, many observers questioned the Marine Corps’ ability to field a unit able operate at the level required of SOCOM forces. The Detachment’s performance resoundingly and positively resolved the question and set the stage for the component command and a permanent USMC force contribution to SOCOM.


Highlights of the Detachment’s accomplishments:
• Coalition support for non-US SOF. Provided planning, command and control, and fires support that allowed the fullest possible integration of coalition SOF, effectively increasing CJSOTF-AP’s direct action capability by one third. The liaison team assisted with planning and executed XXXX direct action missions, detaining XXXX Anti-Coalition Force (ACF) individuals, including four operational level ACF cell leaders.
• Direct action missions against operational level targets. Conducted over XXXX direct action missions in the Greater Baghdad area, resulting in the detention of XXXX ACF members (including XXXX cell leaders) and the elimination of XXXX improvised explosive device/vehicle-borne improvised explosive device cells.
• Personal Security Detachment for the Interim Iraqi Government Vice President. With less than seventy-two hours notice and virtually no formal training, provided the Personal Security Detachment for the Interim Iraqi Government Vice President during the crucial early stages of the assumption of this responsibility by US forces.
• Battlespace shaping in support of SOF and conventional forces in large scale, densely populated urban environments. Formed and deployed sub-detachments to Al Kut and An Najaf to provide sniper, fires, SIGINT, intel products, and communications in support SOF and conventional operations. Formed and deployed sniper teams in support of 1st Cavalry Division operations in eastern Baghdad, and a counter-sniper advisor/training team to MNF-N units.
• Intel support to Det One, CJSOTF, and MNF-I operations. Provided topographic, imagery, and signals intelligence support to the Detachment, CJSOTF-AP, the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG), and other coalition entities.
• NSWTG-AP battlestaff augmentation. Augmented the Naval Special Warfare Group-Arabian Peninsula battlestaff, including the principal staff billets of Intelligence, Operations, Plans, and Special Activities Officers and Joint Operations Center Chief.
• Post deployment tactical experimentation and support for the design of a permanent USMC component to SOCOM. Conducted extensive equipment and organizational research and experimentation and concept development, and provided valuable feedback for incorporation by future Marine SOF units and the broader Marine Corps.


Tactical Contributions:
The primary task for the Detachment throughout the six-month deployment was conducting Direct Action missions against operational level insurgent planners, facilitators, leadership and terrorists. Utilizing its unique intelligence force structure of radio reconnaissance, HUMINT Exploitation Team (HET) and Counter Intelligence (CI) Marines, Det One was able to turn unevaluated information into actionable intelligence. The actionable intelligence was then rapidly acted upon by the Direct Action forces organic to the Detachment. Over XXXX Direct Action missions were carried out by the Detachment, resulting in numerous upper-level insurgent cell leaders being captured or killed with no loss of friendly lives. Usually conducted in the middle of the night, circumstances occasionally required daylight raids into urban areas known to be anti-coalition centers of gravity. These dangerous daylight raids were successful due to their audacity. Mid to high ranking members of the insurgency have become very adept at avoiding standard coalition raids by varying when and where they sleep. Their unpredictability became their protection. In order to circumvent this defense, the Marines and Sailors of MCSOCOM Det One used all the tools at their disposal, including intelligence, innovation, ‘out of the box’ thinking and dogged determination to find, fix and finish the enemy.

In light of the pending Transfer of Authority from Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) and the recent assassinations of several key Iraqi political leaders, JSOTF-AP was tasked with providing personal security detachments (PSDs) for many of the top officials in the soon-to-be installed IIG. Learning of the tasking on Thursday night and with very limited experience with PSDs, the Detachment conducted a hasty mission analysis, organized the required forces, and began a detailed and intensive training program. On Sunday, less than seventy-two hours from notification -- the Detachment’s PSD assumed protective duties for one of the IIG Vice Presidents. In consideration of the Detachment’s unique charter and the intent of both SOCOM and the Marine Corps to provide an honest assessment of the concept, the Task Group commander elected to free the Detachment from the PSD in order to allow them to focus on more traditional SOF tasks. The Detachment was relieved of the PSD by the end of the week following the relocation of one the SEAL Task Units from elsewhere in Iraq.
Throughout the six months that Detachment One was located at Radwania Palace Complex (RPC), enemy indirect fire was almost a daily occurrence. Not content to hunker down and accept the incoming rounds, MCSOCOM Det One initiated a series of local security patrols in an attempt to identify and destroy the insurgents who were firing them. Realizing that an overbearing security operation would have negative effects on the surrounding population’s sentiments toward the Coalition, and that the small size of Detachment One made sweeping a large area impossible, the battle staff began planning a surgical strike option. Utilizing intelligence assets organic to the Detachment, a general azimuth and direction from RPC was identified as the most likely area to contain point of origin (POO’s). Through local contacts in the surrounding villages, counter-intelligence personnel spread the word that a large event, complete with celebrities and high-ranking officials, was to take place at a certain time and place, baiting the insurgents to target that area with IDF. Hours prior to the supposed event, MCSOCOM Det One departed RPC on what appeared to be a standard convoy. Using deceptive routing, the convoy established itself in a laager site just minutes from the area containing the suspected POO’s. Counter-battery radar was standing by to identify POO’s as they became active, and OH-58 scout helicopters were orbiting well clear, awaiting a POO. Once identified by counter-battery radar, the POO would be transmitted to the Detachment raid force. Using organic Forward Air Controllers, the Detachment would send the scout helicopters to locate the insurgents near the POO, and provide terminal guidance to the raid force as they closed the distance. Through rapid, out of the box thinking such as this, Detachment One was able to once again put its small force to maximum effectiveness. XXXX insurgents were captured during these raids, multiple rocket launch sites were identified and several launching mechanisms were captured.

During the latter half of August 2004, several cities south of Baghdad became hotbeds for insurgent activities. One such city was Al Kut. Protected by a Ukrainian brigade that was not authorized to leave its base, Al Kut’s fledgling police force was unable to deal with the insurgent threat, and was soon being overrun in their barracks. The only United States troops in the city were a small US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) and a detachment of ANGLICO Marines. Operating from their safe house, the ODA had been in constant combat operations for 5 days, had taken casualties, and were beginning to tire. They requested reinforcement from the CJSOTF. Within hours, a XXXX man, task organized force from MCSOCOM Det One was landing at a nearby airstrip. This small force consisted of JTAC’s, Radio Reconnaissance Marines, snipers, communicators and direct action forces. Upon link-up with the ODA, the MCSOCOM Marines rapidly built their situational awareness and were soon outside the wire. For the next seven days, the MCSOCOM Marines and ODA operated together, providing security for the Governor of Al Kut, manning forward observation JTAC and sniper posts, and controlling coalition aircraft as they struck insurgents within the city. Realizing the need to put a large armored coalition force into the city, the US Army Striker Brigade was repositioned to secure Al Kut. Upon the arrival of this conventional Army unit, the XXXX man MCSOCOM Detachment participated in the planning, briefing and execution of the Brigade’s plan to re-take the city. The MCSOCOM Marines would provide signals intercept, terminal control of fixed and rotary wing fires, control of indirect fire assets, and precision direct fires in support of the Striker brigade. Before the actual assault, the Marines departed friendly lines and stealthily established an observation post. From this location, the JTAC was able to provide overwatch for the Striker brigade as they transited an area known to contain multiple IEDs. Preparatory fires controlled by the JTAC reduced the IED threat, and no friendly casualties were inflicted. With Al Kut back under coalition control, the MCSOCOM Marines re-embarked and returned to Baghdad. The superior performance of the MCSOCOM Marines on the battle field of Al Kut was personally recognized by the Commander USSOCOM General Brown.

Concurrent with the operations in Al Kut, a similar scenario was unfolding in An Najaf. In late August 2004, the Mahdi Militia operating in An Najaf to control of major portions of the city. As Coalition forces began attacking the city from several different directions, the Mahdi Militia began fleeing towards the Imam Ali Mosque in the old section of the city. CJSOTF-AP was again tasked to provide sniper and JTAC support to the conventional forces involved in the fight. MCSOCOM rapidly organized another sniper/JTAC detachment and deployed them to An Najaf. For several weeks, the small detachment of Marines and Sailors from MCSOCOM provided staff liaisons to the US Army Task Force, controlled air strikes into the city from forward observation posts, conducted counter-sniper operations, ensured deconfliction of fires from friendly units, and controlled indirect fire assets as they engaged targets of opportunity. As the Mahdi Militia continued to mass forces at the Imam Ali Mosque, stringent rules of engagement were put in place to minimize risk of damage to that important religious shrine. From their observation post six hundred meters from the Mosque, the Detachment’s snipers and JTAC’s endeavored to engage enemy targets without damaging the shrine. With no political or tactical margin for error, the professionalism and skills of the Detachment’s Marines and Sailors allowed them to execute precision fires and accurate close air support strikes against fleeting targets in close proximity to friendly troops and the Mosque, without damage to either. With their safe haven being pressured from all sides, the insurgents began negotiating for a truce. Upon the declaration of a cease-fire, the small contingent of Marines and Sailors from Detachment One again returned to Baghdad to resume direct action missions.

....yut.

[Rocky_Mt_Devildog]

oh hell yeah

[KB]

What was the write up for? NUC/MUC?

Nice find. One of my former NCOs helped stand up Det One out at Coronado; he said they were a allstar team of sh*thot Marines.

[Bomb kicker]

Not sure...pick one

[szr]

MUC




Edit: It seems I have to type some additional stuff otherwise it won't let me make acronyms all-caps.