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PELASGOS
02-16-2006, 05:30 PM
I used my ban to do something useful so I translated an article published in 1993.
I apologize for the poor translation but you will get the picture. During the weekend i will post some interesting pics about the topic.



The battle for Nicosia airport.


The battle for Nicosia airport is still pretty much unknown in Greek military history. Most historical accounts of the events in Cyprus report that when Greek metropolitan and Greek Cypriot forces delivered the civil airport to UN forces the Turks attacked to seize it and engaged by UN forces. What is not known publicly is that before the UN takes control of the airport fierce battles between Greeks and Turks took place in the airport. Greeks the last moment saved the airport and handed it over in a military manner to UN. Our narrator is a Greek conscript sergeant of the Greek special raiding forces or LOKS as they are known who participated in the battle. A full special ops squadron was transferred by Noratlas cargo planes in Cyprus. Each of the 15 Noratlas was loaded with 30 raiders and 1500 kilos of ammo. Full history of the flight called operation Nike (Victory) will be posted soon. One Noratlas was shot down by friendly fire (Greek Cypriot AA guns) killing 27 raiders and crew. Flying from Crete in sea level to avoid Turkish radars without the escort of fighter jets was a suicide mission. The Noratlas’ Nike 6’ avoided the last minute collision to a US aircraft carrier. When finally the planes landed the raiders were regrouped and participated in classic special ops behind Turkish lines but also as elite infantry due to the heat of events and absence of other forces. One such battle is the battle for the airport.


Island of Crete

In our camp in Chania our A squadron was on alert since the government ordered general mobilization. The plan is known-send forces to Cyprus. At first the news is that B squadron from Macedonia will go to Cyprus. The time is passing and finally we got the order to go. We are to fly by Noratlas military cargo aircrafts. We repack our gear to be mission specific and have minimum loads due to aircraft regulations. One of the fifteen Noratlas will be loaded with the squadron’s heavy weapons. Our lieutenant throws his food cans and loads his Bergen with more than 300 bullets for his 45 pistol and FN FAL rifle. ‘Commandos’ he shouts the Cypriots will provide food on site. As a result we follow his lead and the whole place is stuffed with cans. Our bergen consists only ammo, a spare BDU and water canteens.

The announcement that we go to Cyprus sends us to heaven. We are singing all the time traditional Cretan songs. The morale is high. A fellow hospitalized commando when he hears that the squadron has a go, leaves the hospital and is coming to join and pick his gear.

21:00 hours - 20 July 1974. We are transported in military trucks going for Souda military airport. We pass through Cretan villages. Villagers are out in the streets shouting’ honor your weapons’. Older men, veterans of the Battle of Crete wearing their traditional vrakes (wide trousers) petting their moustaches smile with satisfaction. Many have sons serving in the squadron. Their children are going to continue their tradition. Our force is 360 men plus 60 combat divers from a unit covering the Aegean. Half of the combat divers are officers – instructors.


On the ground - Cyprus.

01:00 July 22. We try to recuperate from the loss of our friends during the landing. There is no time for thinking, we must take some sleep. It’s an unsound sleep and full of nightmares.


Morning - July 23. Archbishop School of Nicosia. Our company, 41 LOK gets orders to be at stand by. After a wild 42 LOK and finally all three companies are ready .We check our bergens and web gear. Weapons, radios, boobytrap devices, explosives and ammo plus food and water cans are at reach. We drink a coffee smoking a much appreciated cigarette. Finally we get the go. Our mission: protect Nicosia airport. Intel indicts that the Turks will advance forces to seize it. The airport is of strategic importance and is guarded by a company of Greek Cypriot raiders, a company of the Greek Contigent in Cyprus (ELDYK) and the airport’s police guard armed with 106 recoilless rifles.The airport is 2 km behind the confrontation zone. We board some old city buses driven by Cypriot MPs. We lie down so the buses look empty. We split to four parties and we go to the airport by different roads so no one can predict that this is a joint force with a joint objective.We move parallel to the frontline and we arrive at the airport. About 500 meters at 3 o’clock we see military trucks unloading infantry troops. Ours or Turks? Can’t say from this distance but they also don’t seem to recognize us. It doesn’t matter, we are inside. I am a radio operator carrying an Israeli made GRC 25 but also a medic to cover the losses of the landing.




Battle positions.

Commandos soon begun to assume battle positions. Our lieutenant, a sergeant, seven LMGs, one MG plus three 90 mm recoilless rifles, one sniper and me quickly go to the roof of the airport’s main hall. We walk bending and post our weapons. In the roof we find already posted a LMG and a MG with Cypriot raiders.
My company’s firing line is vertical to the Turkish axis of attack. Our lieutenant instructs the 2 MGs to let the Turks come close enough to a wide area so the 8 LMGs will reap them out. In this way a death zone is created since the area is clear with no vegetation or something to cover.
Inside the well-hole the sniper observes through his sniper scope and begins to report valuable info. Our lieutenant sees with his binoculars. I take the signal from the radio: LOKS ready to fight. The tar on the roof begins to melt. Raiders swim in their sweat.Temperature more than 40 C. The Turks notice our positions and the fighting begins. 43 LOK fires first and sequentially all airport defenders join. A raider and a Cypriot MP are wounded slightly. We have also some old M-8 APC’s courtesy of airports police. My company has a UN camp directly at 12 o clock so we will hit the attacking Turks from aside. We have no fear of a direct attack due to the presence of the UN camp. Our only concerns are the Turkish air force and mortars. The Turks probably thought that the airport was defended only by Cypriots and so did the UN. They can not know that three companies slipped from the city in buses under their noses. I must say that the Cypriot raiders did miracles and won all the battles they fought.
But we are with the finger on the trigger. Turks are preparing full attack with infantry and tanks. The lieutenant, a compatriot from Evia says to me:’ Patriotaki’ they are ****ed. They don’t know we’re here. They are sanding troops to every direction. It will be a slaughter’.

Continuous attacks

Indeed Turks spread and attack. About 150 of them in every direction begun to advance. Both 42 and 43 LOKs fire at them at 12 o’clock we hit them from their side. It’s hell. No Turk from this first wave survives as I see it. Some only at the back begun to retreat and take cover inside a small park near to the UN camp with the hope we won’t shoot at this direction. I look around and see the lieutenant. One hand holds the binoculars, the other rests on his rather large fighting knife he carries. He smiles under his moustache with satisfaction-probably for the outcome. What happens sir I ask, are they leaving? No sergeant they are just regrouping. Haven’t you heared the infamous Ottoman jurusia? If they got their lesson and calculated our fire they will come back probably with a battalion strong and more so it would be more difficult. Before I realize his thought a shell explodes a thousand meters behind me. The lieutenant immediately finds azimuth with his compass and he orders me to write it. Soon a second shell explodes in the same line but 200 meters closer to us, so he orders me to report that we are taking fire by 4.2 mortars with direction the opposite of the azimuth. The Turks having the UN camp in the front can’t shoot our side directly so they are firing mortars progressively every 200 meters until they hit the building. One Turkish shell destroys a civil aircraft 500 meters from the building.Then quiet. ‘It looks they have no other shells’ a sergeant says smiling. Sergeant they are coming again FIRE!! FIRE!! the lieutenant screams. More attacks at the hot zone. I see body parts flying all over -the remaining pool back. The M-8s are going to a counter attack firing at them. The Turks who are sheltered near the UN camp try to create us a headache. We fire a barrage of M79 white phosphorus grenades and the bushes take fire. They are burning alive. There is an abandoned house up in a hill and they try to use it as an observation post. The sniper shouts: ‘People inside the house 1800-2000m’. They are out of range for the recoilless rifles. Something needs to be done. The sniper fires two shots. A 90 mm recoilless rifle crew takes position. The lieutenant instructs the shooter to hold the 90mm steady raising it 45 degrees above the usual fire position. Target beyond maximum range.
Fire!!- The whole place shakes. ‘ALL DOWN’ the lieutenant’s voice is piercing. Suddenly a MG burst strikes the roof. Luckily no one is hurt. The sniper reports that the 90mm hit 200 meters from the house. The Turks are leaving it, they thought it was a mortar. Why don’t they use their tanks?
The day passes with more wave attacks with the same results. During pauses commandos fieldstrip the LMG's and clean the gas regulators because they jam from continuous fire. Turkish yurusia are coming again again. But our calculated fire is lethal.You see 3 of our officers are members of the official shooting team of the Greek raiding forces and they have trained us superbly. My lieutenant’s motto is: ‘When you believe the bullet you fire, your fear takes a walk’.




Disengagement

Its afternoon and UN forces arrive at the airport. Orders from Greek Cypriot command are CEASE FIRE. At least a battalion of Canadian soldiers armed and escorted by APC’S are coming to stop the battle and take control of the airport. Their commander, a lieutenant colonel ignores our commander and doesn’t talk to him as is the proper military protocol. He bypasses him giving him an ironic glance saying: What do Greek raiders do here? Furious from this remark a raider raises his FN fal and fires at him in point blank range. Miraculously the FAL jams and other raiders disarm him quickly. If the UN commander was killed like that we would be in tons of trouble. During negotiations our sniper reports suspicious activity. Our lieutenant observes with caution and sees that during the negotiations Turks are trying to advance this time with tanks. He orders me to radio back the Greek Cypriot command and they realize that they play games against us. The UN commander demands us to leave first and when the airport is empty UN troops are to enter. His sympathy to Turks is obvious. If we leave he will let the advancing Turks to take the airport. We won the battle, the place is full of Turkish corpses and yet the Turks must prevail as winners. Not to mention the fact that we have no cover if we leave. It’s a method commonly used as we found out later by the British forces that openly collaborated with the Turks despite serving under UN. But if the UN officially takes control as we demand can’t deliver it to the Turks.

Luckily our sniper spots the Turks and warns us.’ Commandos listen up’ the voice of our lieutenant is dominant:’ Load and prepare’. A UN officer will come with a radio man. They must believe that if the Turks won’t retreat we will break the cease fire. Indeed a UN lieutenant with a radio operator equipped with a US made GRC radio are coming to the roof. The two lieutenants talk some time when our guy shouts ungry making gestures. The UN guy begs: please sir just a minute: Our officer is out of control or he is playing it real nice?’ Commandos ARM’. Other UN officers the same time are talking to Turks. Finally our officer shows his five fingers and says’ five minutes’.’ Ok Sir Ok Sir’ replies the UN guy and begins to talk to the radio. Finally an agreement is reached and Turks return to their original positions. Our replacement is taking place normally by UN. Man to man, platoon to platoon, company to company as all world armies do. We go last of the roof with the lieutenant who cheques constantly the area. We pass the corridor and I see the airport’s vault. Sir we must deliver the vault to the Cypriot command. ‘Listen patriotaki’ he says and write it down inside your brain: We came to fight Turks; we won’t pollute our hands with money. ‘Stay away’. I can’t forget his words. When we are about to leave I try to communicate with the others but it’s impossible; People talk in every frequency. But my Israeli made GRC has extra frequencies unreachable by the US made radios. Finally all radio operators turn to a pre-arranged frequency and we manage to coordinate our forces.


We arrive in Nicosia and rest to an abandoned camp. The same night BBC reports that Greek Cypriots assisted by Greek metropolitan forces defended the airport inflicting heavy casualties to the Turks. Probably is a report by British journalist Philips who was present at the airport but was drawn away by our commander for his personal safety. Later I heard he was killed during a mission. Petty, he was a noble man. Our casualties are a master sergeant dead and a raider wounded. The master sergeant Photopoulos Athanasios was killed when he left his barricaded position and started walking towards the attacking waves firing his rifle from the hip full auto . Raider Andrulakis had his right arm amputated after receiving a round in the shoulder. The shot was fired by the Canadians from the UN controlled area and our people fired back.

Turkish casualties are a question. Cypriots intercepted a signal to the Turkish commander at the airport. He was asked why he had so many casualties with no success. I remember that after two weeks Turks attacked again despite the cease fire but intercepted by UN troops

Today almost 20 years later, often I recollect the events. My mind remembers my dead and wounded friends. They wrote history with their heroism. We did our duty. The rest is a job for historians.

...................................................................................................

Some useful info:


Greek officers on site claim that after the failure of the first wave Canadians informed the Turks about the exact strength of the defendants and they threw an entire regiment about 2000 soldiers at the airport the majority of which was wiped out. The good thing is that the official Turkish KIA’s for the entire operation in Cyprus is 1285!!! Nicosia airport was never used again since 1974.

Laworkerbee
02-16-2006, 08:11 PM
Good read thanks!

Kontra1
02-16-2006, 09:51 PM
Yeah..interesting read.

I'm sure it would only be fair to tell the story from the beginning and I'm sure you'd have no opposition to that...after all, there is always a beginning to each war and it has always two sides to it ;)

For those who are interested to know how it all started, please look here;

http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/MACEY/macey.html

http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/index.html

Laworkerbee
02-16-2006, 09:53 PM
Yeah..interesting read.

I'm sure it would only be fair to tell the story from the beginning and I'm sure you'd have no opposition to that...after all, there is always a beginning to each war and it has aways two sides ;)


http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/MACEY/macey.html

nice anymore Kontra?, I'm interested in hearing from both sides perspectives

Kontra1
02-16-2006, 10:02 PM
nice anymore Kontra?, I'm interested in hearing from both sides perspectives

I have lots of more Turkish sources both in English and Turkish, but I prefer using the third party observations regarding the situation..and the links I provided covers just about everything and more.

Coop
02-17-2006, 06:57 AM
Definitely a higly interesting, and rare, "from the battlefield" report about this campaign.

Greek officers on site claim that after the failure of the first wave Canadians informed the Turks about the exact strength of the defendants...<snip>No surprise, then one really has to see the situation from the vantage point of Western powers (Canada included) of the time: they considered Greeks for leftists, subverged by the Soviets, while Turks were obvious staunch allies. No surprise the Canadian "peacekeepers" were not the least supportive for Greeks - and especially not for regular Greek Army troops on Cyprus.

...and they threw an entire regiment about 2000 soldiers at the airport the majority of which was wiped out. The good thing is that the official Turkish KIA’s for the entire operation in Cyprus is 1285!!!
The question here is what do you mean with "wipped out"? Killed to the last man? That happened only very, very seldom (less than ten times) in the entire history of warfare.

For my part, I see no reason to have doubts about these figures - for several reasons including such facts like:

- The Turks have opened their archives to the public, so also the complete archive of their air force; the Greeks did not;

- The Turks (not without a reason) feel they came victorious from their campaign on Cyprus, in 1974, so they have no reason to hide their real losses;

- Exaggerating enemy losses is extremely common on the part of any combatant, regardless which war, which nationality. Exaggerating the effects of own firepower is also common: seeing somebody being blown apart and pieces of his body flying around really "does it" to human beings, you know...

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 11:41 AM
Definitely a higly interesting, and rare, "from the battlefield" report about this campaign.

No surprise, then one really has to see the situation from the vantage point of Western powers (Canada included) of the time: they considered Greeks for leftists, subverged by the Soviets, while Turks were obvious staunch allies. No surprise the Canadian "peacekeepers" were not the least supportive for Greeks - and especially not for regular Greek Army troops on Cyprus.


The question here is what do you mean with "wipped out"? Killed to the last man? That happened only very, very seldom (less than ten times) in the entire history of warfare.

For my part, I see no reason to have doubts about these figures - for several reasons including such facts like:

- The Turks have opened their archives to the public, so also the complete archive of their air force; the Greeks did not;

- The Turks (not without a reason) feel they came victorious from their campaign on Cyprus, in 1974, so they have no reason to hide their real losses;

- Exaggerating enemy losses is extremely common on the part of any combatant, regardless which war, which nationality. Exaggerating the effects of own firepower is also common: seeing somebody being blown apart and pieces of his body flying around really "does it" to human beings, you know...


We had a military govt in 1974 backed by US so there is not a chance they considered us commies. It was just their agenda to support the partition of Cyprus.

I don't think of course they were killed til the last man. But the numbers are close about 2000 soldiers involved. It was theit way of attack that produces these figures. It's not exaggeration. This happened again in Cyprus:

Raids magazine (English one) August 1992 page 20:

George's battalion was sent to Famangusta road where it held back three Turkish regiments for three days and inflicted heavy losses. The young Greek lieutenant now a Colonel says: They threw in wave after wave of men and seemed totally unconcerned by the losses. My impression was that they wanted us to expand all our ammo. I don't know if their tactics altered since but when faced by such a large masses of men, our best weapon is superior tactical sense'.

Kontra1
02-17-2006, 11:45 AM
It was just their agenda to support the partition of Cyprus.


This is a myth only you pll believe(kind of excuse for the loss of the war I guess)

If it was true...why the hell was sanctions imposed on us by US for four years..I'm sure no one knows that on your side. ;)

Coop
02-17-2006, 01:09 PM
We had a military govt in 1974 backed by US so there is not a chance they considered us commies.If you prefer to believe this, that's fine with me.

It was just their agenda to support the partition of Cyprus.Aha. Well, that's interesting, because - regardless which way they actually believe, the USA are obviously always blamed by somebody in the Balkans. So, for example, the Croats say that Washington wanted to keep Yugoslavia intact and left the Serbs to rule, the Serbs say the USA wanted Croatia to separate so that Washington has it easier to control different states; some Greeks (like you) say the USA wanted sepration of Cyprus, others (see the account above) obviously indicate the West was on the Turkish side, and Turks say that it was actually so that Washington had no time to react, blah, blah, blah blah...

Could you, please, all agree with yourself, what is the actual purpose of the US politics in the area?

Couldn't it be that (at least at the times of the Cold War), it was always the same: stop the spread of communism (or what the USA see as such)?

If nothing else, try at least to keep Yalta agreements in your mind, that should make it easier for you.

I don't think of course they were killed til the last man. But the numbers are close about 2000 soldiers involved.Oh yes: 2000 troops involved in that particular engagement, that could be right. I have no problem with this. But, "KIA", sorry, no way.

In fact, the single heaviest loss in that operation the Turks suffered was when their air force bombed four own destroyers, sinking one (and killing some 80 sailors).

Raids magazine (English one) August 1992 page 20:

George's battalion was sent to Famangusta road where it held back three Turkish regiments for three days and inflicted heavy losses. The young Greek lieutenant now a Colonel says: They threw in wave after wave of men and seemed totally unconcerned by the losses. My impression was that they wanted us to expand all our ammo. I don't know if their tactics altered since but when faced by such a large masses of men, our best weapon is superior tactical sense'.This is a "standard" type of Greek accounts about engagements with Turks. Kind of like standard type of Israeli accounts about their wars with Arabs: the other side is always consisting of hysterical masses, prone to human wave tactics and screaming "kill me, kille me" all the time, gladly buying any bullet that comes their way.... of course, the own side consists only of stoic and heroic knights, cool warriors that can shoot behind the corner....

Please, give me a break.

I talked with dozens of Greek participants from the fighting on Cyprus in 1974, really dozens. Vast majority of them have immense problems to admit a simple fact that Cyprus is separated because a) their own provocations (i.e. massacres on Turkish population), and b) they were d-e-f-e-a-t-e-d in 1974.

Why were they defeated? Because the Turks deployed superior firepower, because they have had excellent coordination between air and land forces, and because they caught the CNG and the Greek regular forces deployed on the island off ballance.

The Greek command, namely, expected the landings to occur in the Famagusta area, while the Turks landed on the northern coast and also landed their paras along Greek communications. So, when the Greeks began moving their mechanized units from Famagusta towards the Turkish beachhead (as well as form Nicosia to Kyreneia), this was first ambushed and then the paras called in air support (admittedly, quite some Turkish paras were neutralized as well). Now, the fact was that the THK was so omnipresent in this conflict, that were there was a single Turkish soldier with a radio, there was also a gaggle of F-100s or something else hanging in the air too - resulting in the THK wreacking havoc upon Greek units exposed on the march. In fact, the few Greek officers that survived I talked with say that the the road-march of the German Panzer-Lehr Division in Normandy, in response to Allied landings in June 1944, was a picnic in comparission to what they experienced on the road from Famagusta.

Napalm dropped by THK fighter-bombers decimated also most of the Greek Army commando units deployed on Cyprus (except the unit deployed on Nicosia IAP).

Aside from this, the Cypriot Greeks fought between each other at least as much as they fought Turks; the junta in Athens couldn't make up its mind if it should fight or not (just take a look at contradictory orders issued to the air force) etc. Finally, there was a complete break-down in the CNG's chain of command: the CO CNG was in Athens, waiting to get his orders - that never came, plus the Turks developed ECM to jam CNG's radio communications.

That was what made it possible for Turkish paras, commandos and Marines to fight for three days without any armour in support, just for example...

flanker7
02-17-2006, 01:24 PM
Napalm dropped by THK fighter-bombers decimated also most of the Greek Army commando units deployed on Cyprus (except the unit deployed on Nicosia IAP).


Only KIA of the Greek A'MK were the men killed when the Noratlas was shot down.
My unit had 25 KIAs and almost 40 MIA

Coop
02-17-2006, 02:33 PM
Only KIA of the Greek A'MK were the men killed when the Noratlas was shot down.
My unit had 25 KIAs and almost 40 MIA
Ah, yes! I do sometimes mix the A'Monada Katadromon (A-Radier Battalion) ELDYK with 31, 32, 33 and 34 MK DKD (MK= Moires Katadromon, commando units of the CNG's "Raiders Command").

The later four suffered worst as they got hit by repeated THK attacks, and then the CNG used them for frontal attacks on Turkish positions.

No wonder, these units have had even most of their commanders shot away in the process...

flanker7
02-17-2006, 02:40 PM
Ah, yes! I do sometimes mix the A'Monada Katadromon (A-Radier Battalion) ELDYK with 31, 32, 33 and 34 MK DKD (MK= Moires Katadromon, commando units of the CNG's "Raiders Command").

The later four suffered worst as they got hit by repeated THK attacks, and then the CNG used them for frontal attacks on Turkish positions.

No wonder, these units have had even most of their commanders shot away in the process...

Man you have no idea what you are talking about. Only commander killed was that of 33MK on Agios Ilarionas. 33MK was also the worst hit unit as it was supported after taking Agios Ilarionas and under repeaed attacks and shelings it was forced to withdraw. 32 and 34 had minimal if any participation. By far most succesfull was 31MK(Koja Kayia ridge against Turkish paratroopers and most amaizingly Piroi village, one platoon plus 1 T-34 and a BTR-152)

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 03:10 PM
If you prefer to believe this, that's fine with me.

Aha. Well, that's interesting, because - regardless which way they actually believe, the USA are obviously always blamed by somebody in the Balkans. So, for example, the Croats say that Washington wanted to keep Yugoslavia intact and left the Serbs to rule, the Serbs say the USA wanted Croatia to separate so that Washington has it easier to control different states; some Greeks (like you) say the USA wanted sepration of Cyprus, others (see the account above) obviously indicate the West was on the Turkish side, and Turks say that it was actually so that Washington had no time to react, blah, blah, blah blah...

Could you, please, all agree with yourself, what is the actual purpose of the US politics in the area?

Couldn't it be that (at least at the times of the Cold War), it was always the same: stop the spread of communism (or what the USA see as such)?

If nothing else, try at least to keep Yalta agreements in your mind, that should make it easier for you.

Oh yes: 2000 troops involved in that particular engagement, that could be right. I have no problem with this. But, "KIA", sorry, no way.

In fact, the single heaviest loss in that operation the Turks suffered was when their air force bombed four own destroyers, sinking one (and killing some 80 sailors).

This is a "standard" type of Greek accounts about engagements with Turks. Kind of like standard type of Israeli accounts about their wars with Arabs: the other side is always consisting of hysterical masses, prone to human wave tactics and screaming "kill me, kille me" all the time, gladly buying any bullet that comes their way.... of course, the own side consists only of stoic and heroic knights, cool warriors that can shoot behind the corner....

Please, give me a break.

I talked with dozens of Greek participants from the fighting on Cyprus in 1974, really dozens. Vast majority of them have immense problems to admit a simple fact that Cyprus is separated because a) their own provocations (i.e. massacres on Turkish population), and b) they were d-e-f-e-a-t-e-d in 1974.

Why were they defeated? Because the Turks deployed superior firepower, because they have had excellent coordination between air and land forces, and because they caught the CNG and the Greek regular forces deployed on the island off ballance.

The Greek command, namely, expected the landings to occur in the Famagusta area, while the Turks landed on the northern coast and also landed their paras along Greek communications. So, when the Greeks began moving their mechanized units from Famagusta towards the Turkish beachhead (as well as form Nicosia to Kyreneia), this was first ambushed and then the paras called in air support (admittedly, quite some Turkish paras were neutralized as well). Now, the fact was that the THK was so omnipresent in this conflict, that were there was a single Turkish soldier with a radio, there was also a gaggle of F-100s or something else hanging in the air too - resulting in the THK wreacking havoc upon Greek units exposed on the march. In fact, the few Greek officers that survived I talked with say that the the road-march of the German Panzer-Lehr Division in Normandy, in response to Allied landings in June 1944, was a picnic in comparission to what they experienced on the road from Famagusta.

Napalm dropped by THK fighter-bombers decimated also most of the Greek Army commando units deployed on Cyprus (except the unit deployed on Nicosia IAP).

Aside from this, the Cypriot Greeks fought between each other at least as much as they fought Turks; the junta in Athens couldn't make up its mind if it should fight or not (just take a look at contradictory orders issued to the air force) etc. Finally, there was a complete break-down in the CNG's chain of command: the CO CNG was in Athens, waiting to get his orders - that never came, plus the Turks developed ECM to jam CNG's radio communications.

That was what made it possible for Turkish paras, commandos and Marines to fight for three days without any armour in support, just for example...


The point of this thread is of military tactics not politics. The Cyprus issue isn't of Greek Turkish interest only by mostly a Middle East politics issue plus British interests.

Fact is that there was a betrayal in Cyprus and Greece didn't send full forces as Turkey did. They didn't let our subs hit the Turkish armada either despite the fact they were present. Why you find peculiar that Greeks or Israelis talk about masses and masses? That's how both Turks and Arabs fight. The same happened to Bosnia. The good part is that Turks in some cases had with them Mullahs who fanaticised troops before attacks.

You should read the memoirs of the Turkish general Demirel head of the op in Cyprus. It's very interesting.

Kontra1
02-17-2006, 03:18 PM
The good part is that Turks in some cases had with them Mullahs who fanaticised troops before attacks.


Hahaha...you're assuming this would be same as your Orthodox traditions...No kiddo, Turkish army is very well known about it's secular views...no one will buy this attemp. Mullahs are NOT in our tradition(reality check)...we don't even have field Imams within our army. In the war situation anyone who can say few religious words is accepted for the job.

Nice try kid ;)

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 03:29 PM
Hahaha...you're assuming this would be same as your Orthodox traditions...No kiddo, Turkish army is very well known about it's secular views...no one will buy this attemp. Mullahs are NOT in our tradition(reality check)...we don't even have field Imams within our army. In the war situation anyone who can say few religious words is accepted for the job.

Nice try kid ;)

I mean muslim imams - maby mullahs is not the right word. You had them in Cyprus or not to fanatize the troops?

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 03:47 PM
Man you have no idea what you are talking about. Only commander killed was that of 33MK on Agios Ilarionas. 33MK was also the worst hit unit as it was supported after taking Agios Ilarionas and under repeaed attacks and shelings it was forced to withdraw. 32 and 34 had minimal if any participation. By far most succesfull was 31MK(Koja Kayia ridge against Turkish paratroopers and most amaizingly Piroi village, one platoon plus 1 T-34 and a BTR-152)

Flanker you know what happened when commandos surprised the sleeping Turks in Agios Ilarionas. p-)

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 03:51 PM
Canadian veterans link about the attack of Turks to seize the airport after UN took over:


To one degree or another, bravery and heroism were integral parts of the
efforts of all the Canadians in Cyprus over the years. The invasion of
1974 saw fierce fighting with thousands of Turkish soldiers landing in
Cyprus in just the first 24 hours. Many episodes of Canadian courage and
valour emerged from this period which saw one of the first uses of direct
force by Canadians to protect themselves in a peacekeeping mission.
During the invasion, one of the main Turkish objectives was the airport in
Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. The UN commander was able to negotiate a
local cease-fire and withdrawal of Greek and Turkish forces from the
airport area, which the Canadian UN troops then occupied. However, the
Turks still threatened to attack the airport. The defending Canadians had
only a few anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns, but the strategic
Canadians moved around the airport, under cover of night, to create the
illusion that the airport was heavily defended. The ruse worked and the
Canadians held the location.

DANJANOU
02-17-2006, 04:14 PM
PELASGOS you forgot to add the link. Here it is:

http://www.commando.org/cyprus.php

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 04:19 PM
PELASGOS you forgot to add the link. Here it is:

http://www.commando.org/cyprus.php


it's not that link but thanks:

http://www.vac-acc.gc.ca/remembers/sub.cfm?source=history/canadianforces/cyprus


That Un Canadian commander is a lucky SOB. :)

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 04:21 PM
A good link with the first phase of the operation Nike with the aged Noratlas planes:

http://koti.welho.com/msolanak/kyprosengl.html

Kontra1
02-17-2006, 04:47 PM
I mean muslim imams - maby mullahs is not the right word. You had them in Cyprus or not to fanatize the troops?


No man...we don't have embedded field imams in our military.Anyone who knows more about these kind of things will do the job in the battle field, and there are always some individulas among the regular soldiers who knows about religion more than others.They'll take care of it.

These medevil like stories you've been told are usually created for you so you can convince yourselves for, that other sides determination to fight is some thing else than what it actually is.... believing in what they fight for.

Coop
02-17-2006, 06:03 PM
Man you have no idea what you are talking about. Only commander killed was that of 33MK on Agios Ilarionas.Yeah, really: I don't know what am I talking about...why don't you then say that the rank and the name of the officer in question was Maj. George Katsanis, that he was last seen fighting at Mt. St. Ilarionas, and initially declared MIA before this was changed to KIA, even if his body was never found?

Feel free to come down from your ivory tower: you have my promise that nobody is going to hurt you...

33MK was also the worst hit unit as it was supported after taking Agios Ilarionas and under repeaed attacks and shelings it was forced to withdraw. 32 and 34 had minimal if any participation.Aha. And, why don't you say why?

The point of this thread is of military tactics not politics.Really? So, why do you then began discussing the topic of the Greek junta being "supported" by the USA?

The Cyprus issue isn't of Greek Turkish interest only by mostly a Middle East politics issue plus British interests.Would you mind translating this?

Fact is that there was a betrayal in Cyprus and Greece didn't send full forces as Turkey did. They didn't let our subs hit the Turkish armada either despite the fact they were present. Why you find peculiar that Greeks or Israelis talk about masses and masses? That's how both Turks and Arabs fight.Just a few posts above I explained to you that this is utter nonsence and a way the Greek and Israeli propaganda explain the Turks and Arabs, respectivelly, fight - but certainly stands in no connection with truth. Now you come back to explain the same again...

The same happened to Bosnia. The good part is that Turks in some cases had with them Mullahs who fanaticised troops before attacks.This really shows the level of your knowledge about this topic....

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 06:21 PM
No man...we don't have embedded field imams in our military.Anyone who knows more about these kind of things will do the job in the battle field, and there are always some individulas among the regular soldiers who knows about religion more than others.They'll take care of it.

These medevil like stories you've been told are usually created for you so you can convince yourselves for, that other sides determination to fight is some thing else than what it actually is.... believing in what they fight for.


I have no need to convince myself about anything . With or without imams the lead is hotp-)

PELASGOS
02-17-2006, 06:36 PM
Yeah, really: I don't know what am I talking about...why don't you then say that the rank and the name of the officer in question was Maj. George Katsanis, that he was last seen fighting at Mt. St. Ilarionas, and initially declared MIA before this was changed to KIA, even if his body was never found?

Feel free to come down from your ivory tower: you have my promise that nobody is going to hurt you...

Aha. And, why don't you say why?

Really? So, why do you then began discussing the topic of the Greek junta being "supported" by the USA?

Would you mind translating this?

Just a few posts above I explained to you that this is utter nonsence and a way the Greek and Israeli propaganda explain the Turks and Arabs, respectivelly, fight - but certainly stands in no connection with truth. Now you come back to explain the same again...

This really shows the level of your knowledge about this topic....


OK tell us how Turks and Arabs fight since you are such a guru in combat. Also tell us about Mujaheddin tactics in Bosnia to enlight us.

Coop
02-18-2006, 01:44 AM
OK tell us how Turks and Arabs fight since you are such a guru in combat. Also tell us about Mujaheddin tactics in Bosnia to enlight us.Well, for details you can search some of my earlier posts about Arab military history (a year or so ago). Sufficient to say that the answer to your question is: definitely not the way you attempt to suggest.

Otherwise, they wouldn't have been victorious against Greeks, back in 1974.

flanker7
02-18-2006, 03:02 AM
@Coop. I don't understand what are you saying?
Are you trying to prove that you know something?

As for not saying why 33MK was worse hit. I do. Didn't you read. I say they didn't support them and they came under repeaded Turkish attacks which force them to withdraw. If you mean why the 32 and 34 had minimal participation, well, they were, and still are reserve units. They dit participate in the attacks on Pantadaktulos but later withdrawn for reorganization(and no, not from the massive losses inflicted uppon them as you imply)

Coop
02-18-2006, 03:59 AM
@Coop. I don't understand what are you saying?
Are you trying to prove that you know something?I do not "try to prove" anything: contrary to you, I know what I know and (at least as important) also know what I don't know.

But, if you're asking for a message from me, in clear text: don't behave as if everything you say is a dogma, you know everything and nobody else does.

As for not saying why 33MK was worse hit. I do. Didn't you read. I say they didn't support them and they came under repeaded Turkish attacks which force them to withdraw.I can't say that it's not so that from time to time I have my problems with understanding specific things. But, I do remember a specific procedure according to which one side states something, and then the other does the same. Given that the human beings do not have any telephatic capabilities, this is the only way either side can know what the other thinks or knows or whatever else.

I think to remember that some people called this "communication" or something like that....?

So, here few things you say I have no clue about, for others to understand what are we actually talking here about (use of a good maps of Cyprus is strongly recommended: search for the area between Lefkosia and Kyrenia; he later is a small town almost directly north of Lefkosia).

After the coup that removed Bishop Makarios from power, parts of CNG launched attacks on Turkish enclaves on Cyprus. The largest of these was north of Lefkosia. As of 20 July 1974, when the Turkish invasion came, the 33 and 31MK were deployed on the western side of area between Tempos and Agyria (north of Lefkosia), along the road connecting Tempos and Kioneli. 32 and 34MK were deployed on the eastern side of this area, along the road connecting Mantres and Tempos. South of 32 and 34MK were 399TP and 361TP. Due south-west of this area, and almost directly north of Lefkosia were ELDYK and 23EMA.

Except for the later two untis (which were mainly busy fighting Turkish paras), all the other units were attacking Turkish enclaves in the area. When the Turkish military came they had to also prevent the advance of Turkish marines towards Lefkosia. So also 32 and 34MKs, which were in the first line of the eastern side of this battlefield and for which you say had minimal participation....

The fact is, however, that - just like the 33MK on the western wing - the 32MK flank on the eastern wing was exposed to attacks by Turks, and subjected to heavy THK air attacks, suffering losses in the process.

Now, you can say that I have no clue about this, and don't know what am I talking about, but my (ex-CNG) sources were very clear in description of rolling THK air strikes and problems - as well as losses - these were causing. Admittedly, they would not mention exact figures. So, I can say I don't know how many losses the 32 and 34MK suffered, then my sources would not describe them in other details but "heavy, including most of commanding officers".

My experience teaches me that it is extremely problematic to talk reasonably and without emotions about all of this with any Greek. It took much patience to get even this much of info - and it is not the least surprising that you weren't able to do any better by now. Correspondingly, I would not be surprised if this "reorganisation" you're talking about came after these two units (32 and 34MK) suffered "heavy" losses - as mentioned by other Cypriot sources.

But, there is this thing called "communication" (spelling?); as a devout optimist, I sincerely hope you know a little bit more about it than I do. Thus, master & commander "Flanker": how about you teaching me what "really" happened there this time?

flanker7
02-18-2006, 07:53 AM
Hm, I'll try to be laconic and less ironic than you. Here we go, 32MK and 34MK fought the first 3 days of the invation. After all, actuall days of combat were very few and major turkish advances were made during sease-fire periods and offcourse during Attila II. 34MK was used along 33MK fighting east to west against the turkish enclave north of Nicosia. Also 32MK but further north. All objectives were accomplished the first night. I can only provide numbers for 32MK at this time which were 7KIAs. Later, 32MK remained in defensive positions along with 2 infantry battalions until 22nd of July when under attack from tank-infantry group when they withraw eastwards.
23rd of July until 14 of Augast there was a sease fire agreement which offcourse Turkey regularly broke either by advancing or by fire. After using this sease fire to reenforce their forces to the level of 2 Divisions and with complete air supremacy Attilla 2 was an "easy" advanse towards the objectives since CNG could not pose any serius resistance

Coop
02-18-2006, 09:19 AM
Very good. Now we're on the same wavenlenght.

And this enables me to ask few questions, then there are some things that I don't know nor understand yet.

First what I'm not getting, considering what one gets to hear from Greek sources (including you), is: as soon as it coupped against Macarios, the CNG turned and attacked Turkish enclaves in northern Cyprus - this is where also all four of its commando/"raider" battalions were deployed. Can you explain why?

There was no purpose in doing this except one wanted to provoke a Turkish intervention and then scatter own forces away from possible sites of Turkish landings. Obviously, by pure accident, some of these forces then came in the way of the Turkish advance, but in general, this was certainly not by purpose then otherwise there would be more but two CNG recoilles guns waiting for Turks on the beech in Kyrenia.

So, why were attacks against Turkish enclaves launched as first?

Then, if the only major Turkish advances were undertaken during periods of cease-fire (yes, I've heard this dozens of times before), then how comes they took one third of the island?

All the Greeks I talked about this insist that the amphibious landing near Kyrenia was "blocked for two weeks". Obviously, this was not the case, but OK, let's say it was - then this is what most Greeks insist upon. You're not that far from this version, then you imply that no Greek unit was defeated, but that all held their positions until ordered to leave.

Therefore, we have quite a confusing situation here, which makes no logic: the main body of Turkish forces couldn't move, i.e. almost half the force the Turks deployed couldn't participate in the fighting at all. The other half - consisting of paras and commandos - was scattered in the hills north of Lefkosia, and - according to all the Greeks I talked about this so far - "neutralized". I guess you would say the same?

Consequently, I don't understand how comes that during these periods of cease-fire (and not to talk about during the first four nights) the CNG could not re-deploy its forces? It was not threatened by rolling air strikes (which also destroyed both of its mechanized battalions), plus the UN troops were not everywhere (as can be seen from what the Turks were doing).

So, the CNG could re-deploy and stop advances of the Turkish contingent, especially as one half of the later was scattered in the hills north of Lefkosia, and another part blocked near Kyrenia. Why was this not done?

Finally, where does this with "Operation Atilla" come from? Every Greek explains this, even those who know it's an urban legend. The Turks never named any operation that way (why should they? Atilla has nothing to do with Turks). "Cyprus peace-keeping operation" or something sarcastic of that kind, yes, but "Atilla", sorry, no way...

flanker7
02-18-2006, 12:01 PM
Before I begin, the "including you" part of your post doesn't aply here cause I don'tremember ever writing these things and most of them find me dissagreeing.


1st Question. No turkish position were attacked prior of 20th of July(big mistake if you ask me since they gave invading Turkish Army a foothold)
The forces of CNG were to busy trying to establish their "goverment" and prevent any counter action against the coup. Especially the commando units and tanl units that were the primary forces involved in the coup, due to their higher dissiplen more or less. For example, the morning of July 20th found one company of 31MK guarding the CyBC and the rest the presindendal palace.
So, no action against turkish positions prior to 20th.

2nd Question. Before 14th of August the Turkish occupied part of Cyprus was sort of an enlarge enclave I mention before spreading from north of Nicosia to Kyrenia and from Karavas on the west to Koutsoventis on the east. There they reenforced their forces(from the 23 of July onwards) to the strength of 2 divisions-28th and 39th- plus the commando and paratroops of the initial air assaults. The forces were overwelming and the already weak CNG possed no serius opposition. So they advanced towards Ammochostos to the east and Morphou to the west fairly easily.

3rd Question. No, the landing was not blocked for 2 weeks. Only opposition was on the first night in a counter attack by 1 company were a Turk colonel was killed near the beach by 3.5" AT round. But there was no further push to extinguish the forces on or near the beach, no other forces were near.

4th Question. As to why there was no deployment of CNG units to defeat early, in the beginings, the invation. Well, thats the whole issue of the Treason in Cyprus. Despite the repords from the island that a Turkish invation was imminent, the Jounta in Greece insisted that it was a bloagf and that they had reassuarments from Kissinger that no such thing was going to happen. Even after the bombings begun, the jounda and their puppets here, insisted that it was an excersise. Some actions was taken towards the evening of the 20th (by the junda I mean) but later recalled. For excample, sending of two Type 209 subs to attack the fleet of Kyrenia, they were called back 8 hours before contack. F-4Es were ready and armed in Crete and pilots ready, were called back. Only action that went through was the A MK on the early hours of 22nd.

Hope I adressed all issues that you put

PELASGOS
02-18-2006, 03:01 PM
Well, for details you can search some of my earlier posts about Arab military history (a year or so ago). Sufficient to say that the answer to your question is: definitely not the way you attempt to suggest.

Otherwise, they wouldn't have been victorious against Greeks, back in 1974.

They won becouse they had minimal adversaries .Sure this was the right timing politically for them to invade getting advandage of the events in Cyprus. Maby if someday we learn the true number of their casualties we can conclude safer results. And don't tell me that a military establishment like the Turkish one would inform openly its citizens about the exact number of casualties even if victorious like in Cyprus.

Vorian
02-18-2006, 03:16 PM
o surprise, then one really has to see the situation from the vantage point of Western powers (Canada included) of the time: they considered Greeks for leftists, subverged by the Soviets, while Turks were obvious staunch allies. No surprise the Canadian "peacekeepers" were not the least supportive for Greeks - and especially not for regular Greek Army troops on Cyprus.

Leftish? Yeah many Greeks are, but at that time Greece was under the control of a right-wing military regime which hunted down communists.

Kontra1
02-18-2006, 03:54 PM
And don't tell me that a military establishment like the Turkish one would inform openly its citizens about the exact number of casualties even if victorious like in Cyprus.

Don't you worry about that...the more our loss is...the more grouch we keep for the enemy...for the next time ;)

So...they wouldn't spare on the numbers.

You should worry about your military's playing with the numbers..for the sake of saving some dignity whatever they had left.

flanker7
02-18-2006, 04:09 PM
I'm stearing at the reply page for some time now and I can't realy come up with something to write to you Kontra. I can't choose whether to laugh or to feel sorry. Anyway, I like the fact that I can see what ordinary, every day Turks think like.

PELASGOS
02-18-2006, 04:11 PM
Don't you worry about that...the more our loss is...the more grouch we keep for the enemy...for the next time ;)

So...they wouldn't spare on the numbers.

You should worry about your military's playing with the numbers..for the sake of saving some dignity whatever they had left.


I will tell this to our current General Chief of Staff. He was one of the raiders in Cyprus who had a number of confirmed kills. Maby the problem is that peace isn't our forte.

Kontra1
02-18-2006, 07:56 PM
I'm stearing at the reply page for some time now and I can't realy come up with something to write to you Kontra. I can't choose whether to laugh or to feel sorry. Anyway, I like the fact that I can see what ordinary, every day Turks think like.

...and why is that?? Your greek friend told us you all believe this kind of stories about us... lol

You should feel sorry for yourself. That's the impression you've been giving me with your posts.

flanker7
02-19-2006, 02:39 AM
********************************************

Edited

PELASGOS
02-19-2006, 07:28 AM
...and why is that?? Your greek friend told us you all believe this kind of stories about us... lol

You should feel sorry for yourself. That's the impression you've been giving me with your posts.




Brain flu is really spreading in Turkey:)

liberation
02-20-2006, 03:41 AM
Who on earth's name the West should support if the Greeks and the Turks ever go back to war again is beyond me.

Turks and Greeks are clearly too immature to solve their problems without fighting so maybe they should be sealed off in a corner in SE Europe and be left to kill each other.

flanker7
02-20-2006, 05:39 AM
Judging by your post you must be ultra-mature

PELASGOS
02-23-2006, 05:35 AM
Judging by your post you must be ultra-mature


He doesn't have a clue about our region and international interests.

Clearday-TRForce
11-08-2006, 08:47 AM
Cyprus: Turkish Point of View




July 20, 1974


- On July 20th at 0449 hours a RF-84F reconnaissance aircraft was launched from the Incirlik Air Base as the first action.

- The assault on the island itself was planned for 0600 on the 20th, with an airborne assault at Gönyeli (10 km NW of Nicosia) by 19 C-47s and at Kirni by six C-130s and eleven C-160Ds. All went well, but three aircraft were hit by anti-aircraft fire. A C-130 and a C-160 only sustained light damage, whereas C-47 no.6035 caught fire and only barely made an emergency landing near Silifke on the Turkish mainland

- Meanwhile commando soldiers and Navy Seals secured the coastal road and initiated the seaborne landing at Karaoğlanoğlu 6 miles west of Kyrenia (Girne). A large force of 72 transport helicopters of various types of UH-1s from all Turkish forces had been put under command of the 2nd Army’s helicopter Regiment. This force assembled at a temporary operating area near Tasuçu, at the southern most point at the mainland Turkey. From here a combined assault into the areas taken by the airborne troops started at 0707 hours. Ten helicopters were damaged by ground fire as they approached in the perfect V- formation. Later in the day tactics were changed into sudden low level approaches and only two more helicopters received hits.

- After intensive attacks from the air a second wave of airborne drops was affected by one C-47, 12 C-160s and six C-130s at 1255 and a third wave consisting of six C-160s and three C-130s just before sunset. These last two waves did not take any anti-aircraft fire. Air operations terminated at 2115 hours on the first day after 6000 troops had been put ashore and a bridgehead secured.

- The first day of operations included 117 ground attacks, 64 airborne assaults, 18 reconnaissance missions and eight air defence sorties. Air Force losses were one F-100D (55-3756) of 171.Filo, one F-100C (54-2042) of 132.Filo, one RF-84F of 184.Filo and the one C-47 (6035) making a crash landing. The only Air Force aircrew fatality was 1.Lt. Ilker Karter of the 184. Filo, the pilot of the RF-84F. Twelve Army helicopters received light damage and a Do.28D on a clandestine mission crashed with all its occupants being killed.


July 21, 1974

Renewed operations were launched at 0550 hours to attack reported Cyprus troops massing for attack. Included in the attack were Super Sabres from 131, 132, 171 and 172.Filos. 184. Filo provided reconnaissance support. A large convoy of 40 vehicles was spotted on the road winding from Paphos to Nicosia and it was vigorously attacked and destroyed at 0755. The effect of this event was that many Cyprus troops gave up their arms as soon as an aircraft was heard approaching. The battles that day resulted in the Turkish army taking Kyrenia (Girne) but at the high cost of 21 fatalities

Meanwhile on the evening of the 20th, reports had been circulating of a Greek ship convoy having been spotted west of the Paphos harbour, on its way from Rhodes. This serious event caused a special alert for the radar units, and S-2Es from the 301. Filo from Antalya were sent to investigate. The radar reports indicated Greek naval manoeuvrering and later reports spoke of 4 destroyers and 7 transport ships. On the 21st, early in the morning, a RF-84F of 184. Filo piloted by the Filo commander, Lt. Col. Yetkiner, made a thorough investigation. His report was frank: "I have seen nothing!" At the same time, however the Radar station at Anamur and a radar sweep by the S-2Es reported several targets. The question was, is it the US 6th fleet or something else? As the morning became day attacks were planned on the "convoy" and the Turkish Navy confirmed that it had no ships in that sector. At 1300 the Air Force gave the target clear for attack, ordering the 111. Filo with F-100Ds and 141. Filo with F-104Gs to get ready to attack at 1335. Later the 181.Filo was also alerted. At 1400 the departures got under way with 111. Filo launching 16 F-100Ds at Eskisehir between 1410 and 1416 and 181. Filo launching 12 F-100Ds from Antalya between 1430 and 1503. Each of the 28 aircraft carried two 750 pound bombs

Sixteen F-104Gs of 141.Filo each carrying a 750 pound bomb departed from Ankara/Mürted in the time from 1443 to 1451. In addition two more Filos, 112. Filo with F-100Cs and 191. Filo with F-104Gs were put on ready alert. Before more could be done, however a message was received at 1530 that the aircraft had attacked and sunk a Turkish ship. Later F-104Gs of 191. Filo made a thorough reconnaissance of the area north and west of Cyprus only reporting 4 small vessels. At 2010 air operations for the day were called off with a total of 203 attack and 19 reconnaissance missions, 28 air defence and 23 transport sorties flown (not including army helicopter operations). The day however had seen the loss of four F-100s (a D 55-2825 of 111.Filo and a C.54-2083 of 112.Filo being two of them) and an F-104G (64-17783 of 191.Filo), fortunately without casualties.



July 22, 1974

At 0506 in the early morning of the 22nd it was confirmed that the Turkish destroyer "Koçatepe" had been sunk. Three hours later four C-130s dropped medical provisions to the rescue forces in the waters north of Cyprus.

Meanwhile at 1115 hours in the land battle, 15 C-47s dropped 300 paratroopers in an attack on the area south of Gönyeli, 5 km north of Nicosia. At 1435 17 F-104Gs of 141.Filo attacked the Nicosia airport with 750 pound bombs. This caused the fighting there to stop. At 1535 the Turkish General Command announced an armistice from 1700 onwards. The day had seen 122 attack and 12 reconnaissance missions, 23 air defence and 19 transport sorties completed. An F-5A belonging to the Greek Air Force was seen crashing after an attempt to engage an F-102A (55-3401) flown by Capt. Onur from 142.Filo in an air battle. (some Turkish sources claim that the F-5 was shot down by a Falcon missile) The day’s losses were one pilot ejecting from an F-100D (54-2238 of 172.F) and two aircraft destroyed in landing accidents, an F-102A (55-3413) and an F-100C. All three pilots survived.



July 23, 1974

Having declared an armistice on the 22nd, only 3 reconnaissance missions and 46 air defence sorties were flown on the 23rd. This in response to the incident with the F-5 the day before and because of heavy radar traffic was tracked at the Turkish Air Defence installations. This, however could have been an indication of electronic counter measures. During these operations an F-102A (54-1403) from 142.Filo crashed during take-off, killing the pilot, 1.Lt. Çinar.


Turkish Air Force AOB 1. July 1974


Air Force HQ: Ankara

Air Transport Command (Etimesgut/Ankara)
12. Air Transport Base (Etimesgut/Ankara)
- 223. Transport Filo: C-47A (based in Etimesgut/Ankara)
- 224. Transport Filo: C-47A (based in Etimesgut/Ankara)
- 221. Transport Filo: C-160A (based in Erkilet)
- 222. Transport Filo: C-130E, C-47A (based in Erkilet)

1. Tactical Air Force (Eskisehir)
- 114. Tactical Recce Filo: RF-84F

1. Jet Air Base (Eskisehir)
- 111. Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D
- 112. Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D

4. Jet Air Base (Mürted/Ankara)
- 141. All-Weather Fighter Filo: F-104G
- 142. All-Weather Filo: F-102A
- 182. All-Weather Filo: F-102A

6. Jet Air Base (Bandirma)
- 161. Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-5A
- 162. Fighter-bomber Filo: F-5A
- 301. Maritime Filo: S-2E

Air Training Command (Izmir)
2nd Jet Training Air Base (Çiğli)
- 121. Training Filo: T-33A
- 122. Training Filo: T-37C
- 123. Training Filo: T-41D

3. Jet Air Base (Konya)
- 131. Tactical Training Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D
- 132. Tactical Training Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D

3. Tactical Air Force (Diyarbakir)
- 184. Tactical Recce Filo: RF-84F

5. Jet Air Base (Merzifon)
- 151. Fighter-Bomber/All-Weather Filo: F-5A
- 152. Fighter-Bomber/All-Weather Filo: F-5A

7. Jet Air Base (Erhac)
- 171. Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D
- 172. Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D

8. Jet Air Base (Diyarbakir)
- 181. Fighter-Bomber Filo: F-100C/D

F-100Ds of 172.Filo at Malatya being readied for their attack missions.
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture09.jpg

THK F-100-pilots being briefed for the operation...
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture06.jpg


The beach at Karaoğlanoğlu, some six miles west of Kyrenia/Girne, where the Turkish landings took place
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture10.jpg

S-2E trackers of the Turkish Navy deployed to Antalya for sea reconnaissance
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture14.jpg

F-104G "64-17783" of the 191.Filo seen at Mürted on 20.July 1974, a day before it crashed
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture17.jpg

The seven C-130Es available to the THK in 1974 provided excellent service during the short campaign
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture18.jpg

...and T-34 tanks displayed at Karaoğlanoğlu
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/picture22.jpg



Most important development in THK’s capability when compared to the times of earlier tensions around Cyprus, was the fact that by 1974 it could lift up to 5.000 armed troops at once. The helicopter fleet of the Turkish Army could lift additional 1.000 men, together with their equipment and supplies. Finally, the Turkish Navy obtained capability to handle 5.000 troops with heavy equipment and supplies. The THK had also massively improved its capability to provide close-air-support to ground forces. It was obvious that the Turkish chiefs of staff were learning from earlier contingencies.

Order of battle for Turkish Army and Navy units involved in the coming operation was as follows:

6. Kolordu Komutanligi (6th Army, C-in-C Lt.Gen. Ersin)
* 2nd Ordu Hava Alayi (2nd Army Aviation Regiment, with a total of about 70 AB.204s, AB.205s, and UH-1s)

* Hava Indirme Tugayi (Airborne Brigade, Brig.Gen. Everen), including
- 1 Parasut Taburu (1st Parachute Battalion)
- 2. Parasut Taburu (2nd Parachute Battalion)
- 3. Parasut Taburu (3rd Parachute Battalion)
- 4. Parasut Taburu (4th Parachute Battalion)

*Komando Tugayi (Commando Brigade, Brig.Gen. Demirbag)
- Brigade HQ Company
- 1. Komando Taburu (1st Commando Battalion)
- 2. Komando Taburu (2nd Commando Battalion)
- 3. Komando Taburu (3rd Commando Battalion)
- 230 Piyade Alayi/1. Taburu (230th Infantry Regiment/1st Battalion Air-mobile)
- Jendarma Komando Taburu (Special Police Comando Battalion)

* Cakmak Özel Görev Kuvveti – Cikarma Tugayi (Special Strike Force Landing Brigade, Brig.Gen. Tuncer)
- 6. Deniz Piyade Alayi (6th Amphibious Infantry Regiment, Lt.Cdr. Ikiz), with three marine battalions
- 50. Piyade Alayi (50th Infantry Regiment, Col. Karaoglanoglu, from the 39th Infantry Division)
- 39. Bölügü (39th Divisional Tank Battalion/Reinforced Company, from 39th Infantry Division)

* 39. Piyade Tümeni (39th Infantry Division, Maj.Gen. Demirel)
- 14. Piyade Alayi (14th Infantry Regiment)
- 39. Tank Taburu (39th Divisional Tank Battalion)
- 39. Kesif Bölügü (39th Divisional Reconnaissance Company)
- 39. Tocu Alayi (39th Divisional Artillery Regiment)
- 39. Istihk. Taburu (39th Divisional Engineer Battalion)

* 28. Piyade Tümeni (28th Infantry Division, Maj.Gen. Polat)
- 230. Piyade Alayi (230th Mechanized Infantry Regiment, minus one battalion)
- 61. Piyade Alayi (61st Infantry Regiment)
- 28. Tank Taburu (28th Divisional Tank Battalion, minus one company)
- 28. Kesif Bölügü (28th Divisional Reconnaissance Company)
- 28. Topcu Alayi (28th Divisional Artillery Regiment, with one battalion 105mm How, and one Battalion 75mm How)
- 28. Istihk. Taburu (28th Divisional Engineer Battalion)
- 28 Tanksavar Bölügü (28th Divisional Anti-Tank Company, with 15 jeep-mounted Cobra ATGMs)

Aside from regular Turkish military units, the Turks also organized the “Kibris Türk Alayi” (Cyprus Turkish Forces Regiment), which was actually a battalion of 650 troops, organized as follows:

* Gönyeli Grubu (Gönyeli Group), based in the town of Kioneli, some four kilometres NW of Nicosia, with:
- 2. Piyade Bolugu (2nd Infantry Company)
- 3. Piyade Bolugu (3rd Infantry Company)
- Agir Silah Bolugu (Heavy Weapons Company)

* Ortakoy Grubu (Ortakoy Group), based in the town of Ortakiol, some two kilometres NW of Nicosia, with:
- 1. Piyade Bolugu (1st Infantry Company)
- 4. Piyade Bolugu (4th Infantry Company)
- Alay Kh. Srv. Bolugu (Regimental HQ Company)

Another armed Turkish organization was “TMT” – standing for “Turk Mukavement Teskilati”, or “Turkish Resistance Organisation. The TMT was organized in ten districts (or “Sancaklar”), each of which had one armed unit, varying in size from company to battalion. Every battalion was led by an officer from mainland Turkey, while smaller units were led by local Turks. Total TMT strength was some 9.000 men, with 9.000 in reserve. TMT had four battalions in Lefkose, three in Bogaz and three in Serdarli, as well as (probably) one each in Mogosa, Larnaka, Limassol, Baf, Lefke, Erenkoy, and Yesilirmak.

The Turkish Navy deployed one amphibious group, with over 30 landing craft, and a Task Force consisting of destroyers:
- Adatepe, D-353 (former USS Forrest Royal, DD-872, transferred to Turkey on 27 March 1970)
- Cakmak
- Kocatepe, D-354 (former USS ? DD-861)
- Tinaztepe, D-355 (former USS Keppler, of the Gearing FRAM-2 class)


In general, the Turkish landing operations went on without major problems. Well supported from the air, the paras operated in well-integrated battle groups, supported by jeep-mounted recoilless guns, then some artillery and even armour – and always in close cooperation with the THK. The coordination was not perfect: a company of paras landed in the middle of the CNG’s advance from Nicosia to Kyrenia, and was swiftly neutralized. The paras also failed to build a coherent bridgehead or secure Turkish-Cypriot enclaves in the north and became capable of launching offensive operations. Nevertheless, overall, Turkish losses during the landing were minimal: the CNG was not only taken by surprise by Turkish selection of landing sites on the northern coast, and caught with its best units concentrated in the Famagust area – where they were exposed to merciless air strikes by Turkish fighter-bombers – but also very much suffered from infighting between different fractions following the coup in Nicosia.

Two and a half hours after the landing of paras, the third Turkish battle group, the SSOLF, arrived over the sea. Under command of Gen. Suleyman Tuncer, and led by special forces, the amphibious force hit the beach at two points on the northern coast of Cyprus – “Pladini” and “Karaoglanoglu” – some ten kilometres apart. Both beaches were only some 200m deep, and blocked by Besparmak cliffs. Facing no major resistance, the naval landing operation was completed within only three hours: the sole point of CNG resistance were two jeeps mounting recoilless rifles calibre 106mm, spotted and destroyed barely one hour after the landing began. By the noon the Turks considered their bridgehead secure and began moving towards south, encountering only sporadic resistance from few scattered CNG artillery and armoured units. These were tackled with help of fierce THK air strikes. Around the noon, when the Greek-Cypriot mechanized units moved along the road to Girne and Pontemili, they were fiercely pounded by Turkish fighter-bombers, which marked the beginning of the fiercest fighting. Experiencing the same fate like German armoured divisions rushed to counter Allied landings in Normandy, 30 years before: without air cover, the Greeks lost a better part of their Armoured Battalion, as well a most of their Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion to rolling Turkish air strikes.

By the afternoon, the road from Girne to Lefkosia was secured, but not without several Turkish losses. During the strikes against different targets in Cyprus on that day, the THK lost three fighters – all to anti-aircraft fire put up by the CNG: an F-100D of the 171. Filo, an F-100C of the 132. Filo (both pilots ejected), and an RF-84F of the 184 Filo


Nicosia under THK air strikes; during the fierce fighting on the ground the Turkish paras were heavily depending on the air support from the THK
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/cy09.jpg

Turkish paras seen later during the fighting on Cyprus; note another UH-1 in the rear. The helicopters of the Turkish Army contributed considerably to the final Turkish success of the invasion
http://www.acig.org/artman/uploads/cy14.jpg


Conc: By the time, the fate of Cyprus – but also that of the junta in Athens - was sealed. When the Turks began landing their reinforcements – including main bodies of the 28th and 39th Infantry Divisions, supported by some 150 M47 Patton tanks – on 23rd July, Brig.Gen. Dimitrios Ioannides’ regime in Athens collapsed. Sampson simultaneously resigned in Nicosia, and was replaced by Clerides. The Greek junta could simply not decide whether or not to become involved on Cyprus: Brig.Gen. Ioannides trusted Kissinger that the USA would prevent a Turkish invasion, and thus failed to alert the armed forces in time. Gen. Bonanos, Chief of the General Staff, could not make up his mind should the Greek forces fight or not; Army Commander Gen. Galatsanos explained that it would take days for Greek forces to get to the border to Turkey, and then it would be too late; Admiral Arapakis, C-in-C Greek Navy would not release any of the two advanced, German-built Type 209 submarines to intercept the Turkish naval forces; while the C-in-C EPA, Papanicolau, ordered the fighter-bombers to be deployed to Crete and Rhodes, but would not order them into combat.

With this the threat of the war between two NATO allies was over, but the Turkish Army was now on Cyprus and tensions were still increasing over the Aegean Sea as well. In fact, while the Cypriot, Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, as well as foreign ministers of the guarantor powers met in Geneva, on 25 July, to discuss the military situation on the island, and Prime Minister Ecevit publicly welcomed the change of government in Greece, Turkish forces continued taking territory and improving their positions. Broken and demoralized, isolated from supply bases in Greece, the CNG retreated: by the end of July, the Turks had most of northern Cyprus in their hands.

The second conference about Cyprus began on 10 August, again in Geneva, and saw participation of Clerides and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Denktas. The later proposed a federation, with Turks controlling 34% of island. When this proposal, and several other Turkish proposals were rejected, while Clerides asked for between 36 and 48 hours to consult with the government in Nicosia, on 14 August the Turks launched a new offensive. Thus began the second phase of the Turkish intervention, about which quite little is known, except that it was supported by new F-100-strikes, and that within two days it resulted in Turks controlling no less but 37% of Cyprus.

Having brought their forces in favourable positions, the Turks then declared the “Atilla Line”, which ran from Morphou Bay in northwest to Famagusta (Gazimagusa) in the east, and then ordered a ceasefire. Cyprus remains partitioned until today and a large Turkish Army contingent is stationed on the island ever since.


source:

- OPERATION "NIKI" (Nike), 1974; A suicide mission to Cyprus Detailled description of the sole EPA operation over Cyprus, in 1974.
- ACIG.org forum, foremost Mr. Tom N. (details about specific air-to-air engagements), Mr. M.I.T. and Mr. S. Stevens (orders of battle)



regards,
CDTRF

eugenlitwin
11-08-2006, 12:56 PM
Michael J. Totten visited Varosha, the Ghost City of Cyprus (http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=18088_The_Ghost_City_of_Cyprus), in 2005. The city was deserted during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and is now fenced off and patrolled by the Turkish occupiers. The Turks carved up the island. Greek Cypriot citizens in Varosha expected to return to their homes within days. Instead, the Turks seized the empty city and wrapped it in fencing and wire.In March 2006, Italian Luigi Geninazzi made a report from the same area (http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/010542.php). 180,000 persons live in the northern part of the island, 100,000 of whom are colonists originally from mainland Turkey.
According to Geninazzi, the Islamization of the north of Cyprus has been concretized in the destruction of all that was Christian. Yannis Eliades, director of the Byzantine Museum of Nicosia, calculates that 25,000 icons have disappeared from the churches in the zone occupied by the Turks. Stupendous Byzantine and Romanesque churches, imposing monasteries, mosaics and frescoes have been sacked, violated, and destroyed. Many have been turned into restaurants, bars, and nightclubs.
Geninazzi confronted Huseyn Ozel, a government spokesman for the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with this. Most of the mosques in Greek Cypriot territory have been restored. So why are churches still today being turned into mosques? The Turkish Cypriot functionary spreads his arms wide: “It is an Ottoman custom...”

http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1409

Clearday-TRForce
11-09-2006, 02:28 AM
Michael J. Totten visited Varosha, the Ghost City of Cyprus (http://littlegreenfootballs.com/weblog/?entry=18088_The_Ghost_City_of_Cyprus), in 2005. The city was deserted during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and is now fenced off and patrolled by the Turkish occupiers. The Turks carved up the island. Greek Cypriot citizens in Varosha expected to return to their homes within days. Instead, the Turks seized the empty city and wrapped it in fencing and wire.In March 2006, Italian Luigi Geninazzi made a report from the same area (http://www.jihadwatch.org/dhimmiwatch/archives/010542.php). 180,000 persons live in the northern part of the island, 100,000 of whom are colonists originally from mainland Turkey.
According to Geninazzi, the Islamization of the north of Cyprus has been concretized in the destruction of all that was Christian. Yannis Eliades, director of the Byzantine Museum of Nicosia, calculates that 25,000 icons have disappeared from the churches in the zone occupied by the Turks. Stupendous Byzantine and Romanesque churches, imposing monasteries, mosaics and frescoes have been sacked, violated, and destroyed. Many have been turned into restaurants, bars, and nightclubs.
Geninazzi confronted Huseyn Ozel, a government spokesman for the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, with this. Most of the mosques in Greek Cypriot territory have been restored. So why are churches still today being turned into mosques? The Turkish Cypriot functionary spreads his arms wide: “It is an Ottoman custom...”

http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/1409



It is again politics not militarity tactics or not related to military things. I want to say something to our mods about eugenlitwin. This guy uses MP.net to ignore all Turkish thesis and things. He continuesly tries to show Turks "bad guys" "islamic people" and bla bla things. He has needed to be warn about his manner and attidute to a nation.



regards,
CDTRF

PELEIDES
11-09-2006, 06:08 PM
Can we get off the Greek-Turkish "I'm better than you" crap? Why not mention how when the massive earthquake hit Turkiye about 8 years ago the Greek military landed on Turkish soil to HELP their Turkish neighbours in a time of need. Remember how the Turks responded when Athens was hit with an earthquake a month later? They came to HELP the Greeks.

My father was born in Athens and moved to Canada after serving in WWII. When I was about 6 years old I had heard something on the TV about Greece and Turkey. I went to ask my dad .

I asked him if I should hate the Turks. He responded, "Why would you hate the Turks or anybody?" "Because we're Greek". "First of all you are Canadian and Canadians don't hate anyone. As for your Greek heritage, we have much to be proud of. Hating an entire people is not one of them."
Being Greek does not mean you hate Turks, otherwise the culture and civilization we created is a lie.

I told him about the stories I had heard about how the Turks killed his grand-father and grand-mother. He told me that in war things happen. He told me that both sides did things that they would not be proud of. He told me that the only person who can apologise is the soldier who killed them, and the only ones to accept that apology is his grand parents.

He went on to tell me that if you break the chain of hate you save the current generation. Look at the former Yugoslavia. People were killing them selves because a thousand years ago on this spot one group killed another and now one group today wants revenge.

My father went on to tell me that when I grew up, if I ever met a Turk "offer your hand in friendship. If he accepts it you've both broken a chain of hate. If he rejects you at least you've broken your chain."

I went to Turkey and Greece in 2003. I found the Turks very friendly towards me. In Greece I met a Turk who was staying over at a Greeks house. He said the Greeks knew he was Turkish but asked him to stay for a weekend party they were having. He said that he had the time of his life and has been asked to come back the following year. More chains broken.

Dad also said, in the future, Canada may be in a conflict with some other country. Before you hate everyone from that country rather than its government, think of the babies in that country. Could you really hate a baby? Every nation has in it's history something that they are proud of, and something they are ashamed of. As for me I was born in Canada with a Greek father and a Canadian mother. My father has passed away but I won't forget what he taught me. I teach the same to my children, it sets them free. I am a citizen of the world.

Clearday-TRForce
11-10-2006, 02:30 AM
Can we get off the Greek-Turkish "I'm better than you" crap? Why not mention how when the massive earthquake hit Turkiye about 8 years ago the Greek military landed on Turkish soil to HELP their Turkish neighbours in a time of need. Remember how the Turks responded when Athens was hit with an earthquake a month later? They came to HELP the Greeks.

My father was born in Athens and moved to Canada after serving in WWII. When I was about 6 years old I had heard something on the TV about Greece and Turkey. I went to ask my dad .

I asked him if I should hate the Turks. He responded, "Why would you hate the Turks or anybody?" "Because we're Greek". "First of all you are Canadian and Canadians don't hate anyone. As for your Greek heritage, we have much to be proud of. Hating an entire people is not one of them."
Being Greek does not mean you hate Turks, otherwise the culture and civilization we created is a lie.

I told him about the stories I had heard about how the Turks killed his grand-father and grand-mother. He told me that in war things happen. He told me that both sides did things that they would not be proud of. He told me that the only person who can apologise is the soldier who killed them, and the only ones to accept that apology is his grand parents.

He went on to tell me that if you break the chain of hate you save the current generation. Look at the former Yugoslavia. People were killing them selves because a thousand years ago on this spot one group killed another and now one group today wants revenge.

My father went on to tell me that when I grew up, if I ever met a Turk "offer your hand in friendship. If he accepts it you've both broken a chain of hate. If he rejects you at least you've broken your chain."

I went to Turkey and Greece in 2003. I found the Turks very friendly towards me.





I very much appreciated with your post as a Turkish friend of you. Thanks for your civilian balanced thoughts. The hatred race is among extremists and ultra nationalists, and also keyboard warriors. The Greek and Turkish people looks same,smell same...Everybody try to say differences, but we have many commons...



regards,
CDTRF