Chillianwallah ( Story of one of the British Army's most forgotten battles )

[Johnny_H]

'My company,' he writes 'was near the centre where the Colours were as a target to aim at. One discharge of grape seems to have swept away my right section-for a moment I am alone, still unhurt. On, on we go . . . . the goal is almost won . . . . the ground becomes clearer, the flashes from the guns more vivid, we can now dimly see through the smoke the Sikhs labouring at their guns . . . . bayonets come down to the charge and with wild, choking hurrahs, scarcely a shot having been fired, though our men were loaded, the battery is won.'
Campbell was emphatic in his praises. 'It is impossible,' he wrote, 'for any troops to have surpassed... the gallantry displayed in this attack. This single regiment actually broke the enemy's line and took the large number of guns in their front.' Napier was no less warm: 'their conduct,' he declared, 'has never been surpassed by British soldiers on a field of battle.'

http://www.rrw.org.uk/museums/brecon/fact_sheets/4.htm

[britopinion]

Never mind Chilianwallah being one of Britains most forgotten battles, which your right it is, the 1st and 2nd Anglo-Sikh wars are Britains most forgotten wars it would seem.

Considering the effort we put in to the wars, the fact that they finally secured all of India as part of British Empire and the ferocity of all of the battles of both wars you'd think they would be much more 'famous' and well known.

The Sikh army (the Khalsa) was without doubt the most formidable adversary any British army had faced in India, perhaps anywhere. They were well motivated, well trained to European standards and well led at battalion and regiment level and i believe at higher levels, although Indian historians will disagree with that.

Certainly the Khalsa's infantry was on par with the East India Company's infantry and perhaps even British army infantry. Their artillery was i think superior to anything the British had at their disposal when they first went to war in 1845, and although that overall superiority had been eroded by the time of the 2nd Anglo-Sikh war and the battle at Chilianwallah it was still formidable.

Under General Sir Hugh Gough's sometimes limited command abilities the British/EIC army had some very close calls during the wars, at Ferozeshah in the 1st Anglo-sikh war both sides fought each other to a standstill and the British came closer to a disasterous defeat than any other time in India.

However when General Gough showed the flair that he was sometimes capable of the British/EIC army soundly defeated what was an extremely capable enemy.

Under Gough's subordinate General Sir Harry Smith the British met and defeated a Sikh army at Aliwal on 28th of January 1846 during the 1st Ango-Sikh war in what was later to be referred to as 'the battle without a mistake'.

[britopinion]

The thing that does annoy me when studying this conflict is the insistence from Indian historians (and as a result Indians in general) that the success of the British army was almost completely due to the betrayal of the Sikh army leaders, who they claim intentionally led their army to defeat in every battle they fought with the British.

Apart from the fact there's no evidence whatsoever to back up these claims the fact that almost every battle fought in the 1st and 2nd Anglo-Sikh wars was a hard one and costly (in terms of British/EIC live lost) victory undermines these claims completely.

To my mind if the British had such a large advantage as the Sikh leadership on their side then the war would have gone far smoother than it did. The Sikh army's performance during the war was impressive, if they had achieved this level of performance with a leadership that was actively trying to undermine it then the assumption must be that with a leadership dedicated to their victory they would have won the war easily.

This would be an easy victory against a combined British and East India Company army that during this period had a very high combat reputation.

The Khalsa was good, but it wasn't that good.

[Johnny_H]

Thanks for the info

Nice to see others with the same taste for Imperial History that I do hehe.
its not so common in this PC driven world we live in now.

[Hellfish6]

I'm suprised - I've read of this battle but only a few months ago discovered Napier's punative expedition to Abyssinia in 1868. Victorian wars have been a hobby of mine for a few years now, so I was shocked when I found one I'd never heard of before. Is it really better known that Chillianwallah (which, by the way, is enormously fun to say)? Chillianwallah. :)

[wiking]

Never heard of these, but there's lots of English\British wars that have gone more or less forgotten or ignored by the general uneducated public.

The campaign to retake Sudan in the very late 19C has allways interested me, ever since i read about it in Winston Churchills memoiars.

And of course Sir Arthur Wellesley's (Later The Duke of Wellington) campaign in India in the late 18C. First as a Lt. Colonel during the fight against the tippo sultan and the siege of Seringapatam, and later as a General during the battle of Assaye and the siege and defeat of Gawilghur. (Yes, i've read to much Bernard Cornwell, i know p-) )

[Hellfish6]

A good, if kinda silly way to get into the Victorian era is to read the Flashman novels by George McDonald Fraser. That's what hooked me.

[Salonen]

Maybe someone should suggest Osprey to publish a title on the Sikh wars, instead of another one about Zulu 1879. :roll:

Then people might get an idea about this "forgotten" campaign.

[britopinion]

Maybe someone should suggest Osprey to publish a title on the Sikh wars, instead of another one about Zulu 1879. :roll:

Then people might get an idea about this "forgotten" campaign.

That would be good.

Osprey have done a couple of books in their Men At Arms series that give a bit of information on the Anglo-Sikh wars...

Men At Arms 219 Queen Victoria's Enemies (3): India.
This gives a brief description of the wars and has a few good colour
plates of Sikh soldiers.

Men At Arms 421 The Sikh Army 1799-1849.
This gives a great description of the Sikh army in the 50 years up
until the wars but dosn't go in to much detail about the wars at
all, although there are some good colour plates.

[Johnny_H]

I want to read this, it looks like it has potential.

A Norfolk Soldier in the First Sikh War -A Private Soldier Tells the Story of His Part in the Battles
by J. W. Baldwin (http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/search-handle-url/index=books-ca&field-author=Baldwin%2C%20J.%20W./702-9848712-6702469) (Author)
http://img214.imageshack.us/img214/5965/184677031902lzzzzzzz4kj.th.jpg (http://img214.imageshack.us/my.php?image=184677031902lzzzzzzz4kj.jpg)

Synopsis
From Amazon.co.uk
A PRIVATE SOLDIER TELLS THE STORY OF HIS PART IN THE BATTLES FOR THE CONQUEST OF INDIA - The First Sikh War is facinating to many readers interested in Victorian Warfare. More than any adversary the Sikh's Khalsa army, modelled on European lines was the most formidable the British Empire faced in India. The end of the Sikh Wars meant the sub-continent was at last 'coloured red', but first our writer, Swaffham man Private Baldwin had to endure the terrible battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshah & Sobroan. This authentic voice from the ranks is complemented by the campaign history of Gough & Innes.



http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/1846770319/qid%3D1141545281/702-9848712-6702469

[Para]

When Britain first fought the Gurkha's in Nepal, the battle went on all day and neither side had one, but it was the first time the Gurkha's had not defeated their enemy, so they adopted Britain instead of fighting it.

[bigjeff]

When Britain first fought the Gurkha's in Nepal, the battle went on all day and neither side had one, but it was the first time the Gurkha's had not defeated their enemy, so they adopted Britain instead of fighting it.

Yeh both sides were impressed by the others - Gurkha's brutal close-quarter fighting & British's stragegy and command.

[transoxiana]

please check on my blog if you like:--


http://low-intensity-conflict-review.blogspot.com/

[PsihoKekec]

British Battles (http://www.britishbattles.com/index.htm) has excelent section on both Sikh Wars.

[transoxiana]

British Dispositions and Plan of Battle
The British possessed superiority in artillery42 in terms of calibre of guns. Most of the 60 pieces of Sher Singh were of small calibre, while Gough had 12 heavy guns and howitzers (8 eighteen pounders and 4 eight inch howitzers) ,17 nine pounders, 25 six pounders , and a number of horse artillery guns,66 in all.The British artillery was organised into two heavy batteries of four 18 pounders and ,two 8 inch howitzer each,three field batteries,and six horse artillery batteries,66 guns in all.The overall artillery commander was Brigadier Tennant and under him Brigadier Brooke commanded the Horse artillery brigade while Brigadier Huthwaite commanded the Foot Artillery. Once Gough ordered general deployment for battle at about two-o clock the artillery was deployed as following. The heavy gun batteries i.e two batteries of four 18 Pounders each and two batteries of two 8 inch howitzers each, under Majors Shakespeare and Ludlow with Major Horsford as the overall Heavy artillery commander, thus a total of 20 heavy guns, were all deployed in the centre of the British line. Three Troops of Horse Artillery (Colonel Brind) of six 6 Pounder guns each and two field batteries (Lieutenants Walker and Robertson) of 9 pounders under Major Mowatt were attached to the left attacking division i.e Campbells. The left attacking division i.e Major General Sir Gilberts was supported by three troops of Horse Artillery (Colonel Grant) and one Field Battery of 9 Pounders under Major Dawes.
The British army was as earlier stated, divided into two infantry divisions i.e Brigadier General Colin Campbell commanding the 3rd Division or simply the left division (and Major General Sir Walter Gilbert commanding the 2nd Infantry Division or left division. Both the infantry divisions were supported by one cavalry brigade each on the outer flanks i.e 1st Cavalry Brigade (HM 3rd Light Dragoons, 5th and 8th Bengal Native Light Cavalry) of Brigadier White on the left flank and 2nd Cavalry Brigade (HM 9 Lancers, HM 14 LD, 1st and 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry) of Brigadier Pope on the right flank. Campbell’s division consisted of Brigadier Pennycuick’s Brigade (HM 24 Foot, 25 and 45 Bengal Native Infantry) and Brigadier Hoggan’s Brigade (HM 61 Foot, 36th and 46th Bengal Native Infantry). Major General Gilbert’s division consisted of Brigadier Mountain’s Brigade (HM 29 Foot, 30th and 56th Bengal Native Infantry) and Brigadier Godby’s Brigade (East India Company’s 2nd Bengal European Infantry Regiment, 31st and 70th Bengal Native Infantry). Brigadier Penny’s Brigade originally under Brigadier General Campbell was the army reserve with two infantry battalions i.e 15th and 69th Bengal Native Infantry. The 20th Bengal Native Infantry alongwith 3rd and 9th Bengal Native Irregular Cavalry alongwith three field guns was designated as baggage guard, with Brigadier Hearsay as baggage guard commander43.
We have earlier discussed that Gough ordered his army to form up for battle at 2 o’clock. By 3 o’clock Gough’s army was formed up to attack. Four infantry brigades each comprising two native and one British infantry battalion commenced their advance towards the Sikh position east of the thick jungle around three o’ clock. The jungle consisted of trees interspersed with thick undergrowth and extremely thorny trees and bushes sometimes referred to as “Musket” in the Punjabi Shikari (Hunting) terminology. The closest European equivalent to this term is brushwood.
Malleson states that Gough was a “thorough believer in the bayonet and looking upon guns as instruments which it was perhaps necessary to use but which interfered with real fighting, he, wild with excitement ordered his infantry to advance and charge the enemy’s batteries”. The reader may note that the Sikh position was at least 1760 yards from the British army and there was dense forest in between!44
Brigadier Pennycuicks Attack
We will now proceed brigadewise and briefly discuss the battle. Firstly we will deal with Brigadier General Campbell’s Division. Campbell was a Royal British Army officer born in 1792. He had seen action under Wellington in the Peninsular War and in 1849 had some 42 years of service behind him. Son of a Glasgow carpenter Campbell was helped getting into the class-conscious British army through the help of a rich relative. Campbell became, as was the norm at that time a colonel after some 30 years service. He was described by many contemporaries as “extremely brave” and “thorough” but “utterly devoid of dash” and “too cautious” and “ too selfish for any place”45 as is mostly the case with men with humble origins who progress upwards slowly mastering all the red tapism and bureaucratic obstacles in armies! Campbell like Gough was a firm believer in the power of the bayonet! Campbell’s prime responsibility was to command and co-ordinate the function of both his brigades. However keeping in view the adverse terrain he decided to accompany his left brigade i.e Hoggan’s brigade in the attack while ordering Pennycuick the right brigade commander to lead the attack on his own. . Gough and Innes well summed up Campbell’s decision as following, “ He abrogated the duties of a divisional commander to discharge with splendid success those of a brigadier”!46 However before the attack commenced Campbell rode to Pennycuicks brigade and after briefing Pennycuick about the attack rode on to HM 24th Foot, the British unit of Pennycuicks brigade and gave them the following orders, “ There must be no firing, the work has to be done with the bayonet” 47. HM 24th Foot 1000 bayonets strong had newly arrived in India.48 The unit was thus highly enthusiastic but highly inexperienced in the British Indian way of warfare! By some oversight or due to an out of proportion sense of excitement, once HM 24th Foot commenced its advance, it did so without loading its muskets!49 through some confusion the artillery designated to provide fire support to Pennycuick trotted to the left50. Pennycuick advanced rapidly towards the Sikh position, HM 24th Foot doing so more rapidly, full of enthusiasm to bayonet the accursed natives, that thin red line tipped with steel, as the British infantry at that time was known! The Sikh artillery whose overall commander was Illahi Baksh a Punjabi Muslim functioned admirably and as soon as 24 Foot came within round shot range of 800 yards, it was effectively engaged by Sikh artillery, and men starting falling. At 100 yards the Sikh infantry engaged the unit with musket fire, but the unit advanced stoically without firing back, their muskets unloaded, determined to do the work with the bayonet as ordered by Campbell. 24th Foot was the first to emerge in open ground west of the jungle outstripping both the native units of Pennycuick’s brigade i.e the 25 and 45 NI on the right and left flanks respectively. To add further bad luck to 24th Foot’s fate right across its axis of advance was a large water pond between the Sikh position and the British unit. 24th Foot thus had to break formation to cross the pond bypassing it from left and right while some braver souls attempted to wade through it. At this moment the Sikh artillery played havoc with 24th Foot causing inflicting great slaughter. 24th Foot did reach the Sikh guns but the punishment inflicted was too severe. As close quarter fighting started 24th Foot soon lost many officers including its commanding officer. The unit had not loaded its muskets and had advanced too fast thus reaching the Sikh position unsupported by both native units. Beveridge states that the unit advanced at a double time pace because of a misunderstanding on part of two officers leading the brigade , however this view is not substantiated by either Fortescue or Gough and Innes .The native units advancing more carefully, while preserving their energy for the final assault under the more experienced British officers of the East India Company’s private army did finally attack the Sikh position, a few minutes after 24th Foot’s attack, suffering many casualties in the process but by this time HM 24th Foot was close to the breaking point The Sikhs counterattacked and the 24th Foot broke up and withdrew in disorder back into the jungle towards Chillianwalla. The native units also withdrew. Pennycuick, his son Lieutenant Pennycuick and his brigade major all died in the bloody engagement. In all Penycuicks brigade lost some 376 men killed (244 from HM 24 Foot and, 112 from 25 NI, and 20 from 45 NI) and about 417 wounded (266 from HM 24 Foot, 92 from 25 NI and 59 from 45 NI). The brigade fought well but failed because of sheer tactical ineptitude of HM 24 Foot in advancing too rapidly and because of its blind obedience to Campbell’s instructions regarding use of bayonets apart from lack of artillery support. Pennycuick’s brigade’s remnants arrived in driblets back to their start line east of the jungle.51
Brigadier Hoggan’s attack
Campbell’s left brigade whom Campbell accompanied fared better. It was well supported by artillery and HM 61 Foot was a better-led and trained unit. The native units on the flanks of HM 61 Foot knew their job and their pace of advance in any case depended on the European unit in the middle .The reader may note that the British always cleverly placed the European unit in the middle so that the thankless and dirty job of looking after the flanks where most of the Enfilading fire came was assigned to the native units! Soon after commencing advance Hoggan’s brigade lost touch with Pennycuick’s brigade because of the jungle. Once it crossed the jungle it arrived right in front of a gap in the Sikh line 53 in between the Sikh left flank of their (Sikhs) right division and the right flank of the Sikh centre. Fortescue denies this and states that once Hoggan’s brigade appeared out of the jungle there were Sikh troops in front of it.54 However Fortescue does admit that Hoggan’s brigade was able to advance thanks to massive concentration of some 29 British artillery pieces i.e Mowatt’s battery on Hoggans right and Colonel Brind’s three horse-artillery batteries (troops) on the left55. These British guns as per Fortescue were able to silence an excellently sited Sikh heavy battery which otherwise was ideally placed to enfilade the advance of the entire brigade . In any case whether there was a gap in front of Hoggan’s brigade as Malleson asserts or not as Fortescue would like us to believe Hoggan’s brigade successfully advanced onwards and after doing its job in the front wheeled northwards towards Pennycuick’s supposed position , while the cavalry brigade along with Colonel Brind’s horse artillery troops ably performed the task of flank protection and defeated a Sikh attempt to attack Hoggan’s brigade’s flank from the south by well directed artillery fire and a sharp cavalry charge. However in the process one squadron of HM 3rd Lancers lost contact with the brigade while pursuing the Sikh cavalry.This squadron was in turn counterattacked by Sikh cavalry and in the process lost 23 men killed . This squadron only re joined its parent unit at the end of the days fighting and thus was a major reason why Brigadier White was unable to utilise his brigade more effectively to attack the Sikhs from the left .Hoggan’s brigade now advanced northwards wheeling right and took in the flank the Sikh troops which had defeated Pennycuicks brigade . The Sikhs were outflanked and fought well but Hoggan’s brigade evicted them from their position and continued its advance northwards rolling up the Sikhs flank from the south. Hoggan’s brigade continued its advance till it finally met Major General Gilbert’s left brigade. The reader may note that Hoggan’s brigade was sucessful in joining up with Mountain’s brigade i.e Sir Walter Gilberts left brigade because Mountain’s brigade attacked the Sikhs facing Hoggan’s brigade from their unguarded north rear.52
Major General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert’s attack
Major General Walter Gilbert commanding the right division consisting of Brigadier White and Mountain’s Brigades was a far more experienced man than Campbell or Gough.He had seen action in the First Sikh War and was not only an extremely brave leader of men but also a relatively more sensible man as compared to Gough and Colin Campbell. Walter functioned as an effective divisional commander and coordinated the advance of both his brigade’s well. Brigadier Mountain’s Brigade on the left encountered stiff Sikh resistance . The 56th NI its right flanking unit ran into an excellently sited Sikh position and was counterattacked by an overwhelming number of Sikhs. The unit fought well but was repulsed after losing in the process 8 officers and 322 men killed and wounded56. The other two units i.e HM 29th Foot and the 30 NI were however more successful and captured the Sikh positions opposite Lulianee spiking a large number of Sikh artillery guns and rendering them ineffective. As a result of success of HM 29 Foot and 30 NI 56 NI was rallied and joined the brigade . It may be noted that Mountain’s brigade attacked the Sikhs facing Hoggan’s brigade advancing from the south and thus enabled Hoggan’s brigade to defeat those Sikhs57. Gilbert’s right brigade i.e Brigade Godby’s brigade performed relatively better than Mountain’s brigade . The brigade ably supported by artillery sucessfully cleared all Sikh positions in its front and drove the Sikhs close to the river Jhelum opposite the village of Tupai. Godby then halted his brigade in order to reorganise before the final attack driving into the Sikh’s once he was suddenly attacked by the Sikhs in force from his rear. How this happened will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
Conduct of Pope’s Cavalry Brigade leading to diasaster on the right flank
We have earlier stated that Brigadier Pope’s cavalry brigade was tasked to protect the right flank of the army of Punjab. Pope’s cavalry brigade consisted of HM 14th Light Dragoons , HM 9th Lancers, 1st Bengal Native Light Cavalry (1 LC) , and 6th LC . The European cavalry regiment average strength was approximately 400 Sabres and Native Cavalry Regiment strength was approximately 300 sabres.58 Brigadier Pope was from 6th LC and had more than forty years service. He was a brave and dashing officer in his earlier years but was not really physically or mentally fit to command a cavalry brigade in action.59 The 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry the readers may note was one of the most illustrious units of the native cavalry. One of its most illustrious feats was a daring charge at the battle of Sitabldi in the Third Maratha War where it dispersed a Maratha force of about 18,000 men including 3,000 Arab mercenaries.60 This battle was unique in the sense that there were no British units present and the battle was an all Indian show barring the British officers of the native units.
Pope notwithstanding his dash as a young officer , was an invalid in 1849 , and one who could hardly sit on horseback 61. As soon as the British advance commenced Pope with the cavalry brigade on the right flank also advanced. Immediately a body of Sikh cavalry emerging from the high ground around Rasul , made a threatening demonstration towards Popes right rear flank. Pope detached a wing (half regiment) each of HM 9th Lancers and 1st and 6th LC under the overall command of Colonel Lane to observe them and to act as a flank protection screen. Lane deployed his force a little northwards and thus lost visual contact with the remaining British army ,because of the intervening strips of jungle . Pope continued his advance westwards with the remaining brigade, some nine cavalry squadrons, i.e HM 14th Light Dragoons (HM 14 LD) and wing each of 1st and 6th LC and HM 9th Lancers. Soon another body of Sikh cavalry appeared in front of Pope’s axis of advance . The Bengal Horse artillery the best branch of the British immediately deployed into action to engage these Sikhs. However Pope , without thinking of anything decided to charge the Sikhs , also masking the British artillery’s fire in line formation . The result was a weak charge without any depth or artillery support , delivered in words of Gough and Innes without speed or momentum.62 The Sikh horsemen led by Jawahir Singh Nalwa63 the bold and dashing son of Sardar Hari Singh Nalwa now realising that poor execution and bad terrain had brought Pope’s apology of a cavalry charge to an absolute halt64 now counter charged. Jawahir Singh with his band of horsemen emerged, once again, through the wild Doab jungle, and charged Popes force, in the process of which some Sikh horsemen physically attacked Brigadier Pope, cutting him across the head with his Tulwar, and wounding him 65. At this critical stage of the battle Pope’s brigade which had already halted and was waiting for orders, now became leaderless. An event then occurred which the British historians right from 1849 onwards find hard to explain or account for. HM 14th Light Dragoon turned about and bolted! The native cavalry also panicked and followed HM 14th Light Dragoon rearwards, galloping through at top speed through their own horse artillery batteries backwards! Fortescue states that HM 14th Light Dragoon bolted because Pope gave them a word of command of “Threes Right” which they heard as something like “Threes about” 66 and that’s why the unit bolted! There is no doubt that had a native cavalry unit done so Fortescue’s verdict may have been much more harsh! Jawahir Singh Nalwa pursued Pope’s cavalry brigade with great elan, cutting down many British Horse artillerymen including Major Christie, one of the battery commanders , destroying six guns and carrying four guns intact apart from two ammunition wagons and fifty three horses as war trophies!67 Pope’s cavalry brigade from this moment onwards ceased to be a fighting formation! It was rallied with great difficulty by Gough’s staff and the regimental Chaplain of HM 14 LD, with his pistol! It was said that Gough recommended the Chaplain to be promoted to the rank of Brevet Bishop ,on the battlefield!68
The flight of Pope’s brigade resulted in a serious operational imbalance in the British position . Their right rear flank was now vulnerable to counter attack . Sher Singh Attariwalla immediately ordered a counter attack and Sikh infantry and cavalry west of Rasul immediately advanced down from the heights through the open gap encircling Gilbert’s division from the rear! It was Pope’s good luck that he died soon afterwards from wounds suffered in the battle.

[VAMAN]

This is for sure that the battle of Chillianwala was a stalemate.

[transoxiana]

yes thats OK ....but British battles introduces a new fiction ...when the sikhs charged they blamed bengal light cavalry whereas all british accounts state that the rot began from HM 14 Light Dragoons.....

[Eoin666]

fascinating reading so far fellas

[VAMAN]

This article is worth reading.

Chillianwala
The forgotten British reverse in India
by Maj (Retd) AGHA HUMAYUN AMIN from WASHINGTON DC .

The list of military disasters which the British suffered in India is long, but most of these were rationalised by British military historians by highlighting situational factors which made British defeat certain and inevitable and was in many cases due to circumstances involving overwhelming numerical inferiority, excessive battle exhaustion, adverse weather and terrain etc. The Battle of Chillianwala fought on 13 January 1849 is, however, one odd exception and stands out as a battle in which the British failed to defeat their opponents despite having the advantages of weight of numbers, ideal weather and terrain, superior logistics etc. In Afghanistan the British disaster was explainable since the British force which was destroyed while retreating from Kabul to Jalalabad was a vastly over numbered exhausted and logistically very weak force of some 700 Europeans and 4,500 Native troops which was destroyed by a vastly superior Afghan force in adverse mountain terrain and very cold weather. At Bhurtpore the British failure to capture the mud fortress was ascribed by a British military historian to lack of adequate artillery.1 At Chillianwala a British Army which had a high European troop component large number Sepoy (regiments), sufficient artillery, two heavy cavalry brigades to ensure that no one could surprise the British army, excellent logistics, little campaign exhaustion having fought no major battle since assumption of hostilities, winter weather negating the possibility of heatstroke and cholera the worst killers of white soldiers in India,failed to defeat the Sikhs. Chillianwala thus stands out as a battle which changed Indian perceptions about British military effectiveness and had a direct link with the “Great Sepoy Rebellion” or “The Indian War of Independence” of 1857.


A succession of British military victories since 1757 barring few exceptions like Battle of Pollilore (September 10 1780), Siege of Bhurtpore (1804-1805), Monsoon’s Retreat (1804), Kabul Brigade’s Retreat (January 1842) which were dismissed as exceptions (to the general rule of “European Superiority) by virtue of exceptional numerical or other odds; it was assumed that no Native army of India, Nepal or Afghanistan could stand a determined bayonet charge by the Red Coats. A feeling of superiority was produced accompanied by the natural attitude of over confidence and rashness, and most British commanders felt that simply a direct march to the sound of guns and a simple frontal assault using “Cold Steel” was enough to disperse any native army however tough or well trained. The uses of manoeuvre or taking into account the “Independent Will of the Enemy” and the fact that a British army could ever be surprised was dismissed as impossible. Thus once the British suffered a rude reverse accompanied by heavy casualties despite having all the advantages; public opinion in Britain was shocked. The British Commander in Chief General Gough was replaced by Charles Napier. Subsequently when the Sikhs were defeated at Battle of Gujerat (21 February 1849) British military historians rationalised their defeat at Chillianwala by laying the blame on “Bad Terrain” “Lack of Artillery” “Cowardice of the Native Troops” etc. Chillianwala was forgotten and Gough again became a hero. The damage done at Chillianwala to the prestige of British arms was enormous and played a major role in changing Indian attitudes about the British, leading directly to the “Great Sepoy Rebellion” in which the British almost lost their Indian Empire and the English East India Company whose private Bengal Army had fought Chillianwala lost India to the British Crown!


ANALYSIS
British Casualties

The casualties that the British suffered were relatively much larger in proportion as compared to any battle that they fought later or earlier at least as far as unit averages were concerned. There are many aspects of this issue. Firstly native casualties Vis a Vis British unit casualties proved that the natives fought as well as the British despite no national motivation to do so. Secondly most British casualties especially those of HM 24th Foot occurred not because of greater valour but simple tactical ineptitude. Thirdly the casualties suffered were much higher at least in proportion to casualties suffered by the Indian Army in any subsequent war including the two world wars or even the 1965 and 1971 wars as far as the two Indo Pak armies are concerned. The total British casualties were 2,357 , sub divided as 602 killed (including 22 British officers) , 1,651 wounded and 104 missing (which in reality were killed) . The vast bulk of cavalry casualties was borne by Brigadier White’s brigade.

http://www.info-sikh.com/PageChilli.html (http://www.info-sikh.com/PageChilli.html)

[transoxiana]

Thanks for quoting my article written for Defence Journal in July 2000.

The article was originally written for Journal of Military History USA in January 2000 but they did not publish it for flimsy reasons.....ulterior bias being anglo saxon brotherhood !

best regards

Agha

[oldsoak]

Amazing. Did the Brits win anything at all ? They seem to be have lost quite a few times according to the first line "The list of military disasters which the British suffered in India is long " . One presumes their list of victories must have been longer or is that another myth waiting to be disproved ?

[transoxiana]

you can do that task ...pour some solomons wisom on british victories.......the article referred to a particular battle...the english east india company won the first decisive battle plassey by bribery.....Buxar in 1764 was a decisive victory of the company......in most battles the company used some 80 % native units and 20 % were their private european units and some units taken on payment from the brit government

[VAMAN]

Thanks for quoting my article written for Defence Journal in July 2000.

The article was originally written for Journal of Military History USA in January 2000 but they did not publish it for flimsy reasons.....ulterior bias being anglo saxon brotherhood !

best regards

Agha
You wrote this article? It is an impressive read well done. I think it should have been published long ago. What is holding it back? British try to take credit for everything. In western countries the British version of things is available so people don't get the whole picture of historical facts.

[transoxiana]

vaman sahib

thanks for your remarks.....the article was not published by Journal of Military History of USA.....they are a biased publication ......in another case when i pointed out major analytical failures in two articles published by a singapore professor and prof kaukshik roy they refused to publish my letter and when they did in roys case they ommitted the real points that i had made....actually their referees who judge the articles knew balls about indian history.

regards

Agha