US postwar Iraq strategy a mess, Blair was told

[Crassus]

John Sawers, Mr Blair's envoy in Baghdad in the aftermath of the invasion, sent a series of confidential memos to Downing Street in May and June 2003 cataloguing US failures. With unusual frankness, he described the US postwar administration, led by the retired general Jay Garner, as "an unbelievable mess" and said "Garner and his top team of 60-year-old retired generals" were "well-meaning but out of their depth".
...

...
The mistakes include:
· A lack of interest by the US commander, General Tommy Franks, in the post-invasion phase.
· The presence in the capital of the US Third Infantry Division, which took a heavyhanded approach to security.
· Squandering the initial sympathy of Iraqis.
· Bechtel, the main US civilian contractor, moving too slowly to reconnect basic services, such as electricity and water.
· Failure to deal with health hazards, such as 40% of Baghdad's sewage pouring into the Tigris and rubbish piling up in the streets.
· Sacking of many of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party, even though many of them held relatively junior posts.


Rest:http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1730427,00.html

[Pille1234]

· Bechtel, the main US civilian contractor, moving too slowly to reconnect basic services, such as electricity and water.

related:



AP Enterprise: Electricity hits bottom as U.S. engineers wind down their effort in Iraq

CHARLES J. HANLEY and SAMEER N. YACOUB, Associated Press Writers
March 14, 2006 9:44 AM
BAGHDAD, Iraq (AP) - Electricity output has dipped to its lowest point in three years in Iraq, where the desert sun is rising toward another broiling summer and U.S. engineers are winding down their rebuilding of the crippled power grid.

The Iraqis, in fact, may have to turn to neighboring Iran to help bail them out of their energy crisis - if not this summer, then in years to come.

The overstressed network is producing less than half the electricity needed to meet Iraq's exploding demand. American experts are working hard to shore up the system's weaknesses as 100-degree-plus temperatures approach beginning as early as May, driving up usage of air conditioning, electric fans and refrigeration.

If the summer is unusually hot, however, ''all bets are off,'' said Lt. Col. Otto Busher, an engineer with the U.S. Army's 4th Infantry Division.

''We're living miserably,'' said housewife Su'ad Hassan, a mother of four and one of millions in Baghdad who have endured three years of mostly powerless days under U.S. occupation. Her family usually goes without hot water and machine washing, she said, and ''often my children have to do their homework in the dim light of oil lamps.''

Despite such hardships, Army Corps of Engineers officers regard their Restore Iraq Electricity project as one of the great feats in corps history, along with the building of the Panama Canal a century ago.

Their efforts and related programs, at a three-year cost of more than $4 billion and tens of thousands of man-hours, built or rehabilitated electric-generating capacity totaling just over 2,000 megawatts - equaling the output of America's Hoover Dam.

''It's not a disappointment, not in my opinion. We've added megawatts to the grid,'' said Kathye Johnson, reconstruction chief for the joint U.S. military-civilian project office in Baghdad.

For one thing, deprived areas outside the Iraqi capital are doing better, with a nationwide average of 10 to 11 hours of electricity daily, compared with three to five hours in Baghdad. That represents a reshuffling of priorities from prewar days, when the Baathist government diverted flows from northern and southern power plants to this central metropolis.

Although the U.S. effort helped boost Iraq's potential generating capacity to more than 7,000 megawatts, available capacity has never topped 5,400, held down by plant breakdowns and shutdowns for maintenance, fuel shortages and transmission disruptions caused by insurgent attacks, inefficient production, sabotage by extortionists, and other factors.

In the first week of February, a busy maintenance period, output dropped to 3,750 megawatts, reports the joint U.S. agency, the Gulf Region Division-Project Contracting Office. That's a new low since the period immediately after the 2003 U.S. invasion.

Now the U.S. reconstruction money is running out, the last generating project is undergoing startup testing in southern Iraq, and the Americans view 2006 as a year of transition to full Iraqi responsibility, aided by a U.S. budget for ''sustainability,'' including training and advisory services.

Even that long-term support may fall short, however. The reconstruction agency allotted $460 million for this purpose, but in a report to Congress on Jan. 30 the special inspector-general for Iraq reconstruction estimated $720 million would be needed.

The decline of Iraq's electrical system can be traced back at least to the 1991 Gulf War, when U.S. warplanes targeted the grid. The government rebuilt the system to produce 4,400 megawatts, still short of demand. But damage from the 2003 invasion - and particularly from looting that followed - knocked production down to 3,200 megawatts and wrecked transmission lines.

The Army engineers who rolled into Iraq in 2003 found power plants barely operating, lacking spare parts and suffering from years of neglect brought on by U.N. trade sanctions. They brought in contractors to upgrade installations, but the looting and sabotage went on. Insurgents attacked fuel pipelines. Other Iraqis toppled transmission towers to keep power in their own cities and away from Baghdad.

To battle the insurgency, U.S. authorities shifted more than $1 billion from power projects to security spending. Having planned to add or rehabilitate 3,400 megawatts' worth of power production, they settled instead for 2,000. The lack of security also slowed work: Fewer than half the 350 local power-distribution projects planned by the Americans had begun as of early this year, the inspector-general reported Jan. 30.

''It's problems, rather than mistakes,'' said Mohamoud al-Saadi, an Iraqi Electricity Ministry official, citing the sabotage and insurgency.

But some believe the Americans also made a critical mistake by installing gas-turbine generators rather than building or overhauling more of the oil-fueled, steam-run plants.

Iraq doesn't have pipelines to deliver natural gas from its oil fields, so plant operators resort to low-grade oil to run the gas-combustion engines, reducing power output by up to 50 percent and potentially damaging the machinery.

''Turbines don't run well on that, and that forces us into a maintenance cycle,'' said Tom Waters, deputy director for electricity in the U.S. reconstruction office.

Meanwhile, demand kept rising as Iraqis bought imported air conditioners, washer-driers, DVD players and other power-hungry appliances. To help fill the gap, households or neighborhood groups are buying diesel-run generators, stringing dangerous makeshift wiring around their homes.

Demand, almost 9,000 megawatts last summer, is expected to rise sharply this year, and the Army engineers responsible for Baghdad are worried.

''We're about 4,000 megawatts in the hole nationwide to meet our needs,'' Maj. Al Moff, 4th Infantry Division electricity specialist, noted at a recent internal briefing for division officers.

He said the system risked losing 300 megawatts more in hydroelectric power because the Tigris River was running extremely low. But a recent agreement by Turkey to release more upriver water appears to have lifted that threat.

One solution could be power from Iran: one Iraqi proposal is for a transmission line to import much more than the 100 megawatts of Iranian power Iraq now buys.

The U.S. Embassy won't talk about it, in view of Washington's animosity toward Tehran over its nuclear ambitions. But the reconstruction office's Waters said one of the U.S.-financed Iraqi substations under construction could handle more Iranian power.

''Completing an Iran transmission line could give them up to 1,500 megawatts,'' said Army engineer Moff.

The Iranian Embassy says Tehran has earmarked $1 billion in loans for Iraqi infrastructure, mostly for electrical power, the Iranian news agency reports.

Even if a major Iran linkup is built, however, other projects may stay in the blueprint stage unless more aid is forthcoming from Washington or other donors.

''We have a lot of unfinished projects because of a lack of government funding,'' said the Electricity Ministry's al-Saadi.

Reconstruction chief Johnson agrees with Iraq's five-year cost estimate. ''It's probably in the range of $16 to $20 billion to complete the infrastructure to provide 24/7 sustainable power to all the citizens of Iraq,'' she said.

In the long term, Johnson said, it's essential for Iraq to open its power industry to private investment. That would mean making it profitable by following the advice of the World Bank and others to raise rates; Iraqis now pay 50 cents to a dollar a month.

Can people afford more?

Hassan's family already cannot afford fuel for its small generator. ''Most of the time we can't use it,'' the Baghdad housewife said.

Whether she and others can afford higher rates, a classic ''chicken and egg'' problem confronts energy-short Iraq, said Moff.

''Before you can raise rates,'' he pointed out, ''you have to have power.''


...

[mattnwnc03]

i think a little more fricken thought shouldve happened before even having any thought of invading iraq.a damn shame, many a human life has been lost because of this great big ooooppps

[Roaming East]

Shiatloads of these reports always come out 2 years after the fact, thats what irks me. Where were these people before we invaded? I dont recall one damn pundit or useless talking head discussing how regardless if the US goes to war, there seems to be no viable strategy for our actions afterwards.
hindsight is 20/20...

[ElHombre]

Shiatloads of these reports always come out 2 years after the fact, thats what irks me. Where were these people before we invaded? I dont recall one damn pundit or useless talking head discussing how regardless if the US goes to war, there seems to be no viable strategy for our actions afterwards.
hindsight is 20/20...

exactly what planet have you been living on? i can think of gen. shinseki'd warnings to congress before the war off the top of my head. '300,000 troops needed' ring a bell? rumsfeld and wolfowitz publicly contradicting him?

[Roaming East]

point taken. I recall the over whelming complaints on the size of the Force needed coming AFTER we had already invaded however. I could very well be wrong on this though. Does nobody any good if you keep your mouth shut when the preparations begin and once we're committed you begin trumpeting the 'I told you so's'
A lot like that clown Wesley Clark did after retiring.

[remo williams]

. Where were these people before we invaded? I dont recall one damn pundit or useless talking head discussing how regardless if the US goes to war, there seems to be no viable strategy for our actions afterwards.

there were people who asked the how and what's regarding the post invasion,but were ususally and consistently ignored and cast as dissenters,non patriotic,not a team player(read Yes Man) etc.as far as publicly discussing it,it'd most likely would have cost them their jobs as well as led to likely prosecution as any disclosure regarding any aspect of the war plans would have violated their security clearance.for ex.And as i recall ther were alot of "retirements" and "resignations" which started before and carried through to the present.this is what happens when the chief wants only those who will go along with whatever.say that you posting your opinion on somethng would cost you your spot in the academy you're in...would you air it anyway?or wait until you're clear of ground zero or higher up on the foodchain so you wouldn't suffer harsher consequences?this is the problem with Ceo's and business persons making life and death decisions for a country.the decisions are not well informed,but simply command decisions to be fulfilled right wrong or otherwise.and any doubt about how well said course of action is planned is cast out.

[khukuri]

Shiatloads of these reports always come out 2 years after the fact, thats what irks me. Where were these people before we invaded? I dont recall one damn pundit or useless talking head discussing how regardless if the US goes to war, there seems to be no viable strategy for our actions afterwards.
hindsight is 20/20...

Filling in what other already said. alot of the people who critize alsohad no part in decision making and probably havent discovered the plan or lack of it afterwards based on the effects end results.
Other than that its also a "culture" thing. look at the thread with SAS guy that loathed the operation publicly. Many had nothing against just the fact that he went public. Same thing but more upin the chain of command. going out public is really failing youre friends in the boards

[mudbunny]

"· The presence in the capital of the US Third Infantry Division, which took a heavyhanded approach to security."

All on the list make sense except this one, which is not surprising that it comes from the British. They would rather ask an Iraqi "kind Sir, would you please put down the RPG, okay, let's have some tea and discuss your indiscretions".

"point taken. I recall the over whelming complaints on the size of the Force needed coming AFTER we had already invaded however. I could very well be wrong on this though. Does nobody any good if you keep your mouth shut when the preparations begin and once we're committed you begin trumpeting the 'I told you so's'
A lot like that clown Wesley Clark did after retiring."

I find it funny that you write in a manner that suggests that Bush and Rummy were totally open to dissenting opinions. Try again, if their views did not follow the "company line" they were kicked out of the party. Period.

[Turhapuro]

"· The presence in the capital of the US Third Infantry Division, which took a heavyhanded approach to security."

All on the list make sense except this one, which is not surprising that it comes from the British. They would rather ask an Iraqi "kind Sir, would you please put down the RPG, okay, let's have some tea and discuss your indiscretions".
I think that they complain about indiscriminary fire. There is thin line between protecting you ass and shooting too much. The problem is that when you use large margin of safety (shoot everything that moves), people under occupation will get angry and blow themselves up with your troops. So you actually get more your troops killed by loose rules of engagement.

I grant you that some of british complaints are out of line, but I think that taking some casualties in the first place saves from more casualties in the long run.

[a_very_ex_STAB]

Shiatloads of these reports always come out 2 years after the fact, thats what irks me. Where were these people before we invaded? I dont recall one damn pundit or useless talking head discussing how regardless if the US goes to war, there seems to be no viable strategy for our actions afterwards.
hindsight is 20/20...

'These people' as you call them were saying don't invade!!!! There may not have been much discussion where you were but there was plenty here in the UK about wtf do we do after the invasion is over.

[XShipRider]

Shiatloads of these reports always come out 2 years after the fact, thats what irks me. Where were these people before we invaded? I dont recall one damn pundit or useless talking head discussing how regardless if the US goes to war, there seems to be no viable strategy for our actions afterwards.
hindsight is 20/20...
Sounds a lot like WWII. Hint: The Marshall Plan

http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/57.htm

Look at the timelines... 1953 before Europe was put back together after WWII.

Rome wasn't built in a day. You have to remember, the US doesn't have as much
experience at warmaking as the European countries. We've just been around 200+
years, a pittance compared to most EU nations. You folks have been fighting
colonial wars and each other for far longer than the US has been in existence.

Give us some time to catch up.:cantbeli:There's a learning curve.

[stonecutter]

Another (minor) example:

Before the invasion, historians, archaeologists, and museums the world over warned that the priceless collection of artifacts at the Bagdad museum would be in danger of getting looted after the Americans entered the city, and that U.S. forces should spare a few men to protect it to prevent this from happening.

Guess what happened? The U.S., which went to Iraq to help the oppressed Iraqi people, was too busy guarding the Oil Ministry, and the museum was trashed.

[XShipRider]

Another (minor) example:

Before the invasion, historians, archaeologists, and museums the world over warned that the priceless collection of artifacts at the Bagdad museum would be in danger of getting looted after the Americans entered the city, and that U.S. forces should spare a few men to protect it to prevent this from happening.

Guess what happened? The U.S., which went to Iraq to help the oppressed Iraqi people, was too busy guarding the Oil Ministry, and the museum was trashed.
I believe they've recovered many or most of these artifacts.
http://www.dcmilitary.com/army/pentagram/8_37/national_news/25320-1.html
http://frankwarner.typepad.com/free_frank_warner/2003/11/iraq_musuem_now.html

I guess protection of the long-dead was considered by some as more
important than protecting the living. Though your response is rife with
bias in that you mentioned the Oil Ministry as being of paramount
importance on a par with human life.

They did try to protect the oil fields. These being the life-blood of Iraq.
What other commodity do they have? Sand? They'd be hard pressed to
rebuild their country after a war by selling sand.

I wonder how many of these artifacts are sitting in the private collections
of these "historians, archaeologists, and museums the world over...," never
to see the light of day again? Collections closed to the public and their
own government inspectors.