hist2004
03-15-2006, 07:02 PM
A year prior to the introduction of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Soviet aviation was already carrying out various missions in the border regions and throughout the country. Fixed wing and helicopter flights primarily carried out reconnaissance and data-gathering missions. Soviet Army aviation helicopters, carrying the markings of the Afghan air force, flew using minimum radio communications. During this time, the Soviets formed a composite team of ethnic Tadjik and Uzbek air force officers at the airfield of one of the aviation regiments. They were air force pilots, on-board aviation technicians, ground aviation specialists, aviation engineer services specialists, and civil aviation personnel. They were given an accelerated course on aviation theory, followed by flight school at one of the helicopter academies. They further perfected their flight techniques in Soviet Central Asia. After all this, they began to conduct independent missions in Afghanistan. Hardly any of them suspected that their preparation was the preparation for a long and difficult war in the skies over Afghanistan. During the war, hundreds and thousands of aviators would be killed and maimed and their aircraft would be struck and shot down.
From its first combat, aviation proved to be of special significance. Helicopters were given a variety of fire support, air assault, and special missions. The Soviets used a variety of gunship, armed-transport, and transport helicopters for these missions in the skies above Afghanistan.
The Mi-24 was the Soviet production rotary-wing helicopter gunship. This helicopter was assigned to provide close aviation support to ground forces and to destroy ground targets (primarily moving) from the forward enemy fighting positions to the depths of their position. Mi-24 helicopters were also used to lay land mines, conduct reconnaissance, and carry out a variety of special missions. The Mi-8mt armed transport helicopter was used for the conduct of air assault landings, transporting personnel and cargo, destroying ground targets, and carrying out special missions.
The Mi-6 transport helicopter was used for the conduct of air assault landings, transporting personnel, or transporting up to 12 metric tons of cargo in the cargo bay and suspended beneath it. The Mi-6 may also be refitted as a fuel bowser. The helicopter is armed with a heavy machine gun and 250 rounds. A small quantity of the Mi-9 VZPU helicopter airborne command posts were used in Afghanistan to control combat.
Helicopters were equipped with a variety of weapons systems and munitions to meet mission requirements. The standard armaments included rocket pods full of unguided rockets, machine guns, and grenade launchers. For special missions, helicopters were armed with antitank guided missiles and aerial bombs of various types.
Flying helicopters in Afghanistan was very difficult. The majority of the airfields and heliports were located from 1,000 to 1,800 meters above sea level and were very dusty. External wind temperature in the summer reached 45° to 52° Celsius [113° to 126° Fahrenheit] in the southern region and 40° to 45° Celsius [104° to 113° Fahrenheit] in the northern region. In the central and western parts of Afghanistan, strong winds arose, especially in the second half of the day. These winds obscured visibility and created dust storms. Combat missions took helicopters into the high mountains. All these conditions reduced the engine power and the lifting capacity of the aircraft, lowered the flight ceiling, and worsened the take off and landing characteristics and the technical reliability of the helicopter. The territory of Afghanistan was divided into four regions that were controlled by subunits of army aviation and partly by the ground forces. The northern region included the cities of Kunduz, Khanabad, Faizabad, Puli-Kumri, Tashkurgan, and Mazar-i-Sharif. The eastern region included the cities of Khost, Asadabad, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kabul, and Bagram. The southern region included the city of Munarai to the southern border zone of Pakistan, Kandahar, and Lashkargah. The western region included the cities of Farah, Shindand, and Herat. Each of these regions had its own geographic and climatic conditions with its own peculiarities that affected the helicopters. In particular, there are the mountain regions, characterized by slopes, canyons, and mountain ranges where the average mountain height is between 3,000 to 4,000 meters. Furthermore, there are zones containing great deserts. The terrain and climate had a decided effect when selecting the optimum helicopter flight path, the proper safety altitude for overflying a danger zone, the target attack approach route, the amount of hover time available to aim and fire, and the exit route to take after the attack. Further, the operational capabilities and ease of flying the helicopter were influenced by the constant rising and descending air currents over mountain passes and canyons.
Helicopter flight personnel in Afghanistan wore a simple, suitable flight uniform consisting of flight coveralls and a steel protective helmet. During flights supporting the ground forces, they also wore flak jackets. Further, every member of the flight crew was armed with TO&E weaponry—a pistol and short-barreled Kalashnikov assault rifle. The crew was also equipped with parachutes, radios, life-saving gear, and smoke and light signaling devices for emergencies. The opportunity to use helicopters depended partially on where the helicopters were based. Regiments and subunits in Afghanistan were usually based at civilian airfields or at specially prepared heliports at the garrisons of combined arms units and subunits. Helicopter bases had a parking area for the helicopters, a command post, a rocket and ammunition preparation site, buildings for engineering-technical subunits, an ammunition storage area, a POL storage area, and a building for equipment for airfield-technical support. Communications and radio-technical support were located at each airfield and heliport. Aviation garrisons were usually located adjacent to the airfield or heliport. An aviation garrison consisted of the headquarters, barracks, or prefab sleeping quarters, a mess hall, a movie theater, steam baths with small swimming pools, and other service buildings.
Special engineering-construction subunits built and equipped heliports and aviation garrisons. They were assisted by the personnel of the army aviation units and subunits.
Combined arms subunits protected and defended airfields, heliports, and aviation garrisons by manning defensive perimeters designed to exclude enemy mortar and small-arms fire. The aviation units and subunits provided their own internal guard on the parked helicopters and aviation garrison buildings. The combat employment of helicopters in Afghanistan depended on the nature and tactics of enemy actions. The Mujahideen fought in small groups and frequently at night. In all circumstances, their clothing was indistinguishable from that of the general populace. It was very difficult to find and destroy such an enemy from the air.
Enemy air defense systems also hindered the employment of aviation. Mujahideen senior commanders paid special attention to combating aircraft and helicopters since these mobile, lethal systems could find, block, and destroy the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen presented their highest awards and rewards to those groups that succeeded in knocking down aircraft and helicopters, as well as those who captured pilots.
The primary Mujahideen air defense weapons were the DShK heavy machine gun, the mountain air defense machine gun mount, small arms fire, and RPG-7 grenade launchers. In the mid-1980s, the Mujahideen began to use large amounts of “Strella-2” and “Stinger” shoulder-fired air defense missiles.42 Air defense fire was usually combined with salvo fire from small arms. Further, the Mujahideen routinely fired normal automatic weapons at aerial targets using improvised mounts that provided the angle of elevation and arc of fire. Mujahideen air defense weapons were as a rule deployed, dispersed, and echeloned in lines. Air defense fire opened up simultaneously on a given signal, when an aircraft or helicopter was on a bombing run or when they were pulling out from a bombing run. The dispersed air defense systems allowed the enemy to fire in various directions. Further, the Mujahideen kept their air defense systems in their firing positions only when necessary. At other times, they were kept in special fortified hidden positions. This made it very difficult to find the Mujahideen air defense weapons and destroy them.
In later years, the enemy used the air defense “nomadic ambush” widely to combat Soviet aviation. These ambushes were established close to airfields at the ends of the take-off and landing strips and also on the likely flight routes of aircraft and helicopters. In order not to give away their positions, the Mujahideen did not fire tracer ammunition while they were firing at aerial targets. They would fire on the aircraft and helicopters during their approach and as they flew away and, as a rule, concentrate the fires from several air defense ambushes on both the lead aircraft and its wing aircraft. When possible, fires would come from the front, rear, side, and even above.
Army aviation flew at different heights during different periods of the war in order to counter enemy air defense. Thus, at the start of combat, right up until 1981, they flew at the minimum allowable height. With the increase in the number of enemy weapons, it was no longer safe to fly at this altitude as the quantity of combat-damaged helicopters rapidly grew. As a consequence, army aviation had to fly at a working altitude of 500 to 700 meters. This somewhat reduced the number of bullets and rounds striking the helicopters. However, the incidence of damage remained high. Thus, in June 1982, while a Mi-24 helicopter was carrying out a mission in the area near the city of Kandahar, a bullet penetrated the armor beneath the fuselage and entered the cargo compartment, wounding the on-board technician in the leg and hitting the main reduction gear. With the appearance of the “Strella-2” shoulder-fired air defense missile in the Mujahideen arsenal, army aviation had to fly at the higher altitude of 1,500 meters above the ground. Further, to protect the helicopter during this period, 3 army aviation widely employed the exhaust deflecting skirt installed on the engine nozzle to disperse the hot stream of exhaust gases.
Also, they installed flare dispensers that fired flares at intervals behind the aircraft when over those areas where enemy air defenses might be located. These flares would draw infrared homing missile guidance systems away from the aircraft. The Mujahideen acquisition of the American-manufactured “Stinger” shoulder-fired air-defense missile gave them the ability to hit an aircraft out to a distance of 4,800 meters and up to 2,000 meters in elevation. The Soviet command had to severely limit the employment of helicopters, especially during daylight. However, it was impossible to abandon the use of rotary-wing aircraft completely.
Helicopter pilots had to become even more skilled to survive. Combat pilot training was conducted in several phases. It began in the mountain desert terrain of Soviet Central Asia and continued after the crew’s arrival in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the crew received general training, designed to integrate the crews into the formation, and direct training for combat. Usually the training was conducted in subunits and units.
Upon receipt of a combat mission, an aviation commander would ensure that he understood his mission and his senior commander’s concept of the operation. He reviewed the terrain and the mission of the unit he was supporting and the missions of subunits of that unit. He reviewed coordination procedures with other aviation subunits and ground units and determined the time available to prepare for the coming combat. During training and preparation for combat, one of the basic tasks of the unit and subunit army aviation staffs was to provide an accurate picture of the combat situation and the condition of subordinate subunits. Particular attention was paid to the enemy situation—the composition of his groupings, his intentions, and his air defense layout. Further, a thorough study of the terrain was key in determining how to conduct the upcoming combat. To support this terrain study, army aviation would conduct reconnaissance flights over the region and take aerial photographs used to create photo mosaics to supplement large-scale maps. As a result of the evaluation of the terrain, planners determined the accessibility of the region, landing zones for armed helicopter transports, potential use of the terrain to support action against the enemy, possible firing positions for enemy air defense systems, and the routes that Mujahideen forces could use for maneuver and withdrawal. As a result of the evaluation, specific missions were assigned to every aviation combat subunit and armed-transport helicopter subunit.
The plan included artillery and frontal aviation suppression of enemy air defenses in the high mountain regions and enemy air defense zones. Specific targets, flight routes to them, and helicopter gun ship armaments were specified in verbal combat orders. Mission training for flying personnel began with an analysis of the previous combat mission, review of other relevant examples, and a discussion of past errors and their causes. A very important step in mission training was active coordination between the army aviation subunits and the subunits and units of the ground force. In the course of the operation, coordination was stressed to ensure uninterrupted contact between the commander of the ground force and supporting aviation. A group of command and control officers and FACs controlled aviation during the conduct of operations.43 The effectiveness of aviation strikes and the success of combat at the objective depended, to a great deal, on the preparations, coordination, and precise actions of this group. FACs, attached to ground battalions, received their missions from the battalion commander and directed army aviation strikes against specified enemy targets. All questions of coordinating army aviation and artillery were handled on the spot with the FOs who were also attached to the battalion headquarters.
Having verified the location of targets, determined the location of enemy air defense systems, and checked the terrain relief, the FACs determined the sequence of target strikes by the aviation group and determined the best flight attack and exit routes to guarantee the safety of their aviation group. When enemy positions were detected and identified, the FAC marked them for the helicopter crews. The FAC would use signal rockets and tracer bullets to show the direction to the target. After the helicopters carried out their first attack, the FACs would make the necessary corrections for the next attack. During the course of the aviation support of the ground forces, it was often necessary to redirect the helicopter strikes to other, more important targets. This required well-trained pilots and FACs with a detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground. In Afghanistan, army aviation missions were classified as fire, air assault, and special. The most important fire missions were in direct support of ground combat. The primary method of fire support was for helicopter gun ship subunits and groups to launch successive strikes on planned targets and targets of opportunity while accompanying the ground units that were engaged in combat. These strikes were conducted in accordance with a predetermined schedule or on call when the FAC alerted aircraft on strip alert or circling in the air. Often, tactical aviation support to combat in the mountains was severely limited. Maneuverability of helicopters is drastically reduced at heights of 2,500 meters and more, and the accuracy and effectiveness of helicopter armaments falls off. Helicopters would have to attack targets while covered by other helicopter groups conducting air defense suppression missions. The attacking helicopters would try to exit over an area not covered by enemy air defenses. These attack helicopters would not hover, but would attack at maximum speed to minimize their exposure time over target.
Helicopter flights were made at 1,500 meters above the ground. These altitudes were reduced only when conducting a gun run to launch rockets and fire the on-board cannon and machine guns. In this case, the “form a circle” helicopter tactic was highly recommended. Attack helicopters would form a circle high above the target or to the side. In turn, attack helicopters would dive down, attack the target, and then use a horizontal combat turn or a steep climb to exit and rejoin the circle. The attack helicopters would then repeat their attack on the target in turn. This tactic was used only by those pilots who had mastered helicopter gunnery and the control of their aviation technical equipment. During these gun runs, the most effective armaments were ATOM, coupled with a salvo of free-flight rockets.
During the course of the war in Afghanistan, the army aviation units and subunits continually searched for new tactics, techniques, and procedures; ways to improve aviation equipment; and ways to improve the armaments and ordnance. Particular attention was devoted to testing and adapting weapons employing new physical principles or providing increased lethality and effectiveness. Night-combat capability was improved with various new sights and night-vision binoculars that aided target illumination at night. Experiments were conducted to improve the probability of kill by mounting homing warheads on helicopter rockets. Helicopters provided essential support to ground forces conducting cordon and search actions in inhabited areas located within green zones. Green zones were difficult terrain to advance through, since they have a well-developed system of irrigation canals and are densely covered with vegetation.
Further, the enemy often converted the adobe buildings and their enclosure walls (duval) located within the green zones into strong points. Helicopter gunships provided cover to the combined Soviet/DRA forces that cooperated in such actions. When the ground commander required aviation support in the green zone, attack helicopters flew into the combat zone at an elevation of 1,500 to 2,000 meters. Normal aviation support was provided by a pair or section of circling helicopters that responded to a ground-based FAC who directed and corrected the helicopter strikes. This proved effective since all the helicopter crews observed the strikes of the leading helicopter, and then, in the event that the leading helicopter drew return fire, the following gunships could accurately destroy the enemy firing position. The helicopter conducted its gun run and exit at an angle of attack of 20° to 30°. It began its exit at a height of 1,200 to 1,000 meters and a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 meters past the target.
Helicopters frequently engaged targets located close to the forward edge of friendly forces. The minimum safe distances for using aerial ordnance near friendly forces are the following: free-flight rocket, 1,000 meters; helicopter cannon, 500 meters; and helicopter machine gun, 300 meters. These safety constraints also required that flight personnel were skilled in aerial gunnery using all the various armaments. Further, the FAC had to know the current ground situation precisely and comprehensively and be able to quickly react to changes in the ground commander’s plan. When the enemy put up a stubborn resistance that attack helicopters could not overcome, the FACs called in close-air support aircraft or fighter bombers to bomb and strafe the enemy, smash his adobe structures, and destroy his strong points.
Should the aviation support requirement extend over a long time, relief helicopter crews were substituted when the aircraft were refueled and rearmed. The same helicopters usually provided close air support to the ground force throughout the action.
When the fire support to ground forces mission ended, the helicopters would exit the combat zone. If, for some reason, an individual motorized rifle subunit was not able to exit the region before sunset, it would establish a perimeter defense and helicopter gunships would remain overhead. In some cases, armed helicopter transports would evacuate the subunit at night. In October 1986, helicopters evacuated part of a motorized rifle company from a green zone near Kandahar city. The troopers were surrounded and being shelled by enemy mortars. Helicopter gunships destroyed four of six Mujahideen firing points. This kind of combat action was not rare. It demanded a high level of professional skill and moral-psychological conditioning [courage] on the part of the flying personnel. One of the more important missions performed by army aviation in Afghanistan was conducting air assault landings and supporting the air assault force. It was equally difficult conducting the assault landing and evacuating the force at mission’s end.
When the helicopter subunit commander received the air assault mission, he would make an estimate of the situation and select the more suitable LZs. Flight personnel would then thoroughly study these LZs on a photomosaic of aerial photographs. In the process of preparing for the mission, aviation planners paid particular attention to calculating the maximum flying weight of the helicopter, the weight of the air assault cargo, the altitude of the LZ above sea level, the size of the LZ, and the locations of sites for refueling the helicopters. They selected a flight profile and flight route to the LZ based on the terrain while circumventing those areas saturated with enemy air defense systems. Frontal aviation and combat helicopters conducted fire preparation to destroy and suppress targets, enemy personnel, and enemy air defenses along the flight route and in the region of the LZ. The air assault landing took place immediately after the fire preparation.
During the landing, helicopter gunships isolated the region while the assault group landed, provided safety to the lift birds, and engaged newly discovered and recovering enemy air defense sites. If the location of enemy air defense sites was not fully known, helicopter flights would conduct a feint to draw fire and thus pinpoint their firing systems. As the air assault groups flew to the area, the helicopters of these groups might fly at different altitudes in order to forestall enemy fire from the mountain slopes and canyons. Su-25 close air support aircraft often reinforced covering groups of helicopter gunships. The SU-25s overflew the area of the assault landing and exerted strong psychological pressure on the Mujahideen by destroying their known air defense systems with powerful bombing and strafing attacks. The number of LZs depended on the size of the operation, the availability of forces, and the missions to be accomplished. Frequently the LZs were barely adequate, being too small, very dusty, and very high above sea level. Therefore the helicopters might set down on one or two wheels or hover to unload air assault forces.
This risked brushing the tail rotor against the steep mountain slope. The exact location of the LZ could not exceed the planned location by more than 500 to 1,000 meters. The most difficult part of flying the helicopter at that point was determining the descent to landing, since a repeat approach was often impossible. If the landing was in the mountains located over 2,500 meters in altitude, the helicopters of a landing group lightened their weight by removing some armaments and armor, limiting the number of air assault troops that they carried, and limiting their fuel load. There was a shortage of
(Continued)
From its first combat, aviation proved to be of special significance. Helicopters were given a variety of fire support, air assault, and special missions. The Soviets used a variety of gunship, armed-transport, and transport helicopters for these missions in the skies above Afghanistan.
The Mi-24 was the Soviet production rotary-wing helicopter gunship. This helicopter was assigned to provide close aviation support to ground forces and to destroy ground targets (primarily moving) from the forward enemy fighting positions to the depths of their position. Mi-24 helicopters were also used to lay land mines, conduct reconnaissance, and carry out a variety of special missions. The Mi-8mt armed transport helicopter was used for the conduct of air assault landings, transporting personnel and cargo, destroying ground targets, and carrying out special missions.
The Mi-6 transport helicopter was used for the conduct of air assault landings, transporting personnel, or transporting up to 12 metric tons of cargo in the cargo bay and suspended beneath it. The Mi-6 may also be refitted as a fuel bowser. The helicopter is armed with a heavy machine gun and 250 rounds. A small quantity of the Mi-9 VZPU helicopter airborne command posts were used in Afghanistan to control combat.
Helicopters were equipped with a variety of weapons systems and munitions to meet mission requirements. The standard armaments included rocket pods full of unguided rockets, machine guns, and grenade launchers. For special missions, helicopters were armed with antitank guided missiles and aerial bombs of various types.
Flying helicopters in Afghanistan was very difficult. The majority of the airfields and heliports were located from 1,000 to 1,800 meters above sea level and were very dusty. External wind temperature in the summer reached 45° to 52° Celsius [113° to 126° Fahrenheit] in the southern region and 40° to 45° Celsius [104° to 113° Fahrenheit] in the northern region. In the central and western parts of Afghanistan, strong winds arose, especially in the second half of the day. These winds obscured visibility and created dust storms. Combat missions took helicopters into the high mountains. All these conditions reduced the engine power and the lifting capacity of the aircraft, lowered the flight ceiling, and worsened the take off and landing characteristics and the technical reliability of the helicopter. The territory of Afghanistan was divided into four regions that were controlled by subunits of army aviation and partly by the ground forces. The northern region included the cities of Kunduz, Khanabad, Faizabad, Puli-Kumri, Tashkurgan, and Mazar-i-Sharif. The eastern region included the cities of Khost, Asadabad, Jalalabad, Gardez, Ghazni, Kabul, and Bagram. The southern region included the city of Munarai to the southern border zone of Pakistan, Kandahar, and Lashkargah. The western region included the cities of Farah, Shindand, and Herat. Each of these regions had its own geographic and climatic conditions with its own peculiarities that affected the helicopters. In particular, there are the mountain regions, characterized by slopes, canyons, and mountain ranges where the average mountain height is between 3,000 to 4,000 meters. Furthermore, there are zones containing great deserts. The terrain and climate had a decided effect when selecting the optimum helicopter flight path, the proper safety altitude for overflying a danger zone, the target attack approach route, the amount of hover time available to aim and fire, and the exit route to take after the attack. Further, the operational capabilities and ease of flying the helicopter were influenced by the constant rising and descending air currents over mountain passes and canyons.
Helicopter flight personnel in Afghanistan wore a simple, suitable flight uniform consisting of flight coveralls and a steel protective helmet. During flights supporting the ground forces, they also wore flak jackets. Further, every member of the flight crew was armed with TO&E weaponry—a pistol and short-barreled Kalashnikov assault rifle. The crew was also equipped with parachutes, radios, life-saving gear, and smoke and light signaling devices for emergencies. The opportunity to use helicopters depended partially on where the helicopters were based. Regiments and subunits in Afghanistan were usually based at civilian airfields or at specially prepared heliports at the garrisons of combined arms units and subunits. Helicopter bases had a parking area for the helicopters, a command post, a rocket and ammunition preparation site, buildings for engineering-technical subunits, an ammunition storage area, a POL storage area, and a building for equipment for airfield-technical support. Communications and radio-technical support were located at each airfield and heliport. Aviation garrisons were usually located adjacent to the airfield or heliport. An aviation garrison consisted of the headquarters, barracks, or prefab sleeping quarters, a mess hall, a movie theater, steam baths with small swimming pools, and other service buildings.
Special engineering-construction subunits built and equipped heliports and aviation garrisons. They were assisted by the personnel of the army aviation units and subunits.
Combined arms subunits protected and defended airfields, heliports, and aviation garrisons by manning defensive perimeters designed to exclude enemy mortar and small-arms fire. The aviation units and subunits provided their own internal guard on the parked helicopters and aviation garrison buildings. The combat employment of helicopters in Afghanistan depended on the nature and tactics of enemy actions. The Mujahideen fought in small groups and frequently at night. In all circumstances, their clothing was indistinguishable from that of the general populace. It was very difficult to find and destroy such an enemy from the air.
Enemy air defense systems also hindered the employment of aviation. Mujahideen senior commanders paid special attention to combating aircraft and helicopters since these mobile, lethal systems could find, block, and destroy the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen presented their highest awards and rewards to those groups that succeeded in knocking down aircraft and helicopters, as well as those who captured pilots.
The primary Mujahideen air defense weapons were the DShK heavy machine gun, the mountain air defense machine gun mount, small arms fire, and RPG-7 grenade launchers. In the mid-1980s, the Mujahideen began to use large amounts of “Strella-2” and “Stinger” shoulder-fired air defense missiles.42 Air defense fire was usually combined with salvo fire from small arms. Further, the Mujahideen routinely fired normal automatic weapons at aerial targets using improvised mounts that provided the angle of elevation and arc of fire. Mujahideen air defense weapons were as a rule deployed, dispersed, and echeloned in lines. Air defense fire opened up simultaneously on a given signal, when an aircraft or helicopter was on a bombing run or when they were pulling out from a bombing run. The dispersed air defense systems allowed the enemy to fire in various directions. Further, the Mujahideen kept their air defense systems in their firing positions only when necessary. At other times, they were kept in special fortified hidden positions. This made it very difficult to find the Mujahideen air defense weapons and destroy them.
In later years, the enemy used the air defense “nomadic ambush” widely to combat Soviet aviation. These ambushes were established close to airfields at the ends of the take-off and landing strips and also on the likely flight routes of aircraft and helicopters. In order not to give away their positions, the Mujahideen did not fire tracer ammunition while they were firing at aerial targets. They would fire on the aircraft and helicopters during their approach and as they flew away and, as a rule, concentrate the fires from several air defense ambushes on both the lead aircraft and its wing aircraft. When possible, fires would come from the front, rear, side, and even above.
Army aviation flew at different heights during different periods of the war in order to counter enemy air defense. Thus, at the start of combat, right up until 1981, they flew at the minimum allowable height. With the increase in the number of enemy weapons, it was no longer safe to fly at this altitude as the quantity of combat-damaged helicopters rapidly grew. As a consequence, army aviation had to fly at a working altitude of 500 to 700 meters. This somewhat reduced the number of bullets and rounds striking the helicopters. However, the incidence of damage remained high. Thus, in June 1982, while a Mi-24 helicopter was carrying out a mission in the area near the city of Kandahar, a bullet penetrated the armor beneath the fuselage and entered the cargo compartment, wounding the on-board technician in the leg and hitting the main reduction gear. With the appearance of the “Strella-2” shoulder-fired air defense missile in the Mujahideen arsenal, army aviation had to fly at the higher altitude of 1,500 meters above the ground. Further, to protect the helicopter during this period, 3 army aviation widely employed the exhaust deflecting skirt installed on the engine nozzle to disperse the hot stream of exhaust gases.
Also, they installed flare dispensers that fired flares at intervals behind the aircraft when over those areas where enemy air defenses might be located. These flares would draw infrared homing missile guidance systems away from the aircraft. The Mujahideen acquisition of the American-manufactured “Stinger” shoulder-fired air-defense missile gave them the ability to hit an aircraft out to a distance of 4,800 meters and up to 2,000 meters in elevation. The Soviet command had to severely limit the employment of helicopters, especially during daylight. However, it was impossible to abandon the use of rotary-wing aircraft completely.
Helicopter pilots had to become even more skilled to survive. Combat pilot training was conducted in several phases. It began in the mountain desert terrain of Soviet Central Asia and continued after the crew’s arrival in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the crew received general training, designed to integrate the crews into the formation, and direct training for combat. Usually the training was conducted in subunits and units.
Upon receipt of a combat mission, an aviation commander would ensure that he understood his mission and his senior commander’s concept of the operation. He reviewed the terrain and the mission of the unit he was supporting and the missions of subunits of that unit. He reviewed coordination procedures with other aviation subunits and ground units and determined the time available to prepare for the coming combat. During training and preparation for combat, one of the basic tasks of the unit and subunit army aviation staffs was to provide an accurate picture of the combat situation and the condition of subordinate subunits. Particular attention was paid to the enemy situation—the composition of his groupings, his intentions, and his air defense layout. Further, a thorough study of the terrain was key in determining how to conduct the upcoming combat. To support this terrain study, army aviation would conduct reconnaissance flights over the region and take aerial photographs used to create photo mosaics to supplement large-scale maps. As a result of the evaluation of the terrain, planners determined the accessibility of the region, landing zones for armed helicopter transports, potential use of the terrain to support action against the enemy, possible firing positions for enemy air defense systems, and the routes that Mujahideen forces could use for maneuver and withdrawal. As a result of the evaluation, specific missions were assigned to every aviation combat subunit and armed-transport helicopter subunit.
The plan included artillery and frontal aviation suppression of enemy air defenses in the high mountain regions and enemy air defense zones. Specific targets, flight routes to them, and helicopter gun ship armaments were specified in verbal combat orders. Mission training for flying personnel began with an analysis of the previous combat mission, review of other relevant examples, and a discussion of past errors and their causes. A very important step in mission training was active coordination between the army aviation subunits and the subunits and units of the ground force. In the course of the operation, coordination was stressed to ensure uninterrupted contact between the commander of the ground force and supporting aviation. A group of command and control officers and FACs controlled aviation during the conduct of operations.43 The effectiveness of aviation strikes and the success of combat at the objective depended, to a great deal, on the preparations, coordination, and precise actions of this group. FACs, attached to ground battalions, received their missions from the battalion commander and directed army aviation strikes against specified enemy targets. All questions of coordinating army aviation and artillery were handled on the spot with the FOs who were also attached to the battalion headquarters.
Having verified the location of targets, determined the location of enemy air defense systems, and checked the terrain relief, the FACs determined the sequence of target strikes by the aviation group and determined the best flight attack and exit routes to guarantee the safety of their aviation group. When enemy positions were detected and identified, the FAC marked them for the helicopter crews. The FAC would use signal rockets and tracer bullets to show the direction to the target. After the helicopters carried out their first attack, the FACs would make the necessary corrections for the next attack. During the course of the aviation support of the ground forces, it was often necessary to redirect the helicopter strikes to other, more important targets. This required well-trained pilots and FACs with a detailed knowledge of the situation on the ground. In Afghanistan, army aviation missions were classified as fire, air assault, and special. The most important fire missions were in direct support of ground combat. The primary method of fire support was for helicopter gun ship subunits and groups to launch successive strikes on planned targets and targets of opportunity while accompanying the ground units that were engaged in combat. These strikes were conducted in accordance with a predetermined schedule or on call when the FAC alerted aircraft on strip alert or circling in the air. Often, tactical aviation support to combat in the mountains was severely limited. Maneuverability of helicopters is drastically reduced at heights of 2,500 meters and more, and the accuracy and effectiveness of helicopter armaments falls off. Helicopters would have to attack targets while covered by other helicopter groups conducting air defense suppression missions. The attacking helicopters would try to exit over an area not covered by enemy air defenses. These attack helicopters would not hover, but would attack at maximum speed to minimize their exposure time over target.
Helicopter flights were made at 1,500 meters above the ground. These altitudes were reduced only when conducting a gun run to launch rockets and fire the on-board cannon and machine guns. In this case, the “form a circle” helicopter tactic was highly recommended. Attack helicopters would form a circle high above the target or to the side. In turn, attack helicopters would dive down, attack the target, and then use a horizontal combat turn or a steep climb to exit and rejoin the circle. The attack helicopters would then repeat their attack on the target in turn. This tactic was used only by those pilots who had mastered helicopter gunnery and the control of their aviation technical equipment. During these gun runs, the most effective armaments were ATOM, coupled with a salvo of free-flight rockets.
During the course of the war in Afghanistan, the army aviation units and subunits continually searched for new tactics, techniques, and procedures; ways to improve aviation equipment; and ways to improve the armaments and ordnance. Particular attention was devoted to testing and adapting weapons employing new physical principles or providing increased lethality and effectiveness. Night-combat capability was improved with various new sights and night-vision binoculars that aided target illumination at night. Experiments were conducted to improve the probability of kill by mounting homing warheads on helicopter rockets. Helicopters provided essential support to ground forces conducting cordon and search actions in inhabited areas located within green zones. Green zones were difficult terrain to advance through, since they have a well-developed system of irrigation canals and are densely covered with vegetation.
Further, the enemy often converted the adobe buildings and their enclosure walls (duval) located within the green zones into strong points. Helicopter gunships provided cover to the combined Soviet/DRA forces that cooperated in such actions. When the ground commander required aviation support in the green zone, attack helicopters flew into the combat zone at an elevation of 1,500 to 2,000 meters. Normal aviation support was provided by a pair or section of circling helicopters that responded to a ground-based FAC who directed and corrected the helicopter strikes. This proved effective since all the helicopter crews observed the strikes of the leading helicopter, and then, in the event that the leading helicopter drew return fire, the following gunships could accurately destroy the enemy firing position. The helicopter conducted its gun run and exit at an angle of attack of 20° to 30°. It began its exit at a height of 1,200 to 1,000 meters and a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 meters past the target.
Helicopters frequently engaged targets located close to the forward edge of friendly forces. The minimum safe distances for using aerial ordnance near friendly forces are the following: free-flight rocket, 1,000 meters; helicopter cannon, 500 meters; and helicopter machine gun, 300 meters. These safety constraints also required that flight personnel were skilled in aerial gunnery using all the various armaments. Further, the FAC had to know the current ground situation precisely and comprehensively and be able to quickly react to changes in the ground commander’s plan. When the enemy put up a stubborn resistance that attack helicopters could not overcome, the FACs called in close-air support aircraft or fighter bombers to bomb and strafe the enemy, smash his adobe structures, and destroy his strong points.
Should the aviation support requirement extend over a long time, relief helicopter crews were substituted when the aircraft were refueled and rearmed. The same helicopters usually provided close air support to the ground force throughout the action.
When the fire support to ground forces mission ended, the helicopters would exit the combat zone. If, for some reason, an individual motorized rifle subunit was not able to exit the region before sunset, it would establish a perimeter defense and helicopter gunships would remain overhead. In some cases, armed helicopter transports would evacuate the subunit at night. In October 1986, helicopters evacuated part of a motorized rifle company from a green zone near Kandahar city. The troopers were surrounded and being shelled by enemy mortars. Helicopter gunships destroyed four of six Mujahideen firing points. This kind of combat action was not rare. It demanded a high level of professional skill and moral-psychological conditioning [courage] on the part of the flying personnel. One of the more important missions performed by army aviation in Afghanistan was conducting air assault landings and supporting the air assault force. It was equally difficult conducting the assault landing and evacuating the force at mission’s end.
When the helicopter subunit commander received the air assault mission, he would make an estimate of the situation and select the more suitable LZs. Flight personnel would then thoroughly study these LZs on a photomosaic of aerial photographs. In the process of preparing for the mission, aviation planners paid particular attention to calculating the maximum flying weight of the helicopter, the weight of the air assault cargo, the altitude of the LZ above sea level, the size of the LZ, and the locations of sites for refueling the helicopters. They selected a flight profile and flight route to the LZ based on the terrain while circumventing those areas saturated with enemy air defense systems. Frontal aviation and combat helicopters conducted fire preparation to destroy and suppress targets, enemy personnel, and enemy air defenses along the flight route and in the region of the LZ. The air assault landing took place immediately after the fire preparation.
During the landing, helicopter gunships isolated the region while the assault group landed, provided safety to the lift birds, and engaged newly discovered and recovering enemy air defense sites. If the location of enemy air defense sites was not fully known, helicopter flights would conduct a feint to draw fire and thus pinpoint their firing systems. As the air assault groups flew to the area, the helicopters of these groups might fly at different altitudes in order to forestall enemy fire from the mountain slopes and canyons. Su-25 close air support aircraft often reinforced covering groups of helicopter gunships. The SU-25s overflew the area of the assault landing and exerted strong psychological pressure on the Mujahideen by destroying their known air defense systems with powerful bombing and strafing attacks. The number of LZs depended on the size of the operation, the availability of forces, and the missions to be accomplished. Frequently the LZs were barely adequate, being too small, very dusty, and very high above sea level. Therefore the helicopters might set down on one or two wheels or hover to unload air assault forces.
This risked brushing the tail rotor against the steep mountain slope. The exact location of the LZ could not exceed the planned location by more than 500 to 1,000 meters. The most difficult part of flying the helicopter at that point was determining the descent to landing, since a repeat approach was often impossible. If the landing was in the mountains located over 2,500 meters in altitude, the helicopters of a landing group lightened their weight by removing some armaments and armor, limiting the number of air assault troops that they carried, and limiting their fuel load. There was a shortage of
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