Manuscript: SS-Gen. Max Simon "Experience gained in combat"

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Max Simon, Genlt der Waffen SS
Commanding General, SS Totenkopf Div
Later CiC XIII SS corps









Experience gained in combat

With Russian infantry



Note: A very interesting study dealing with tactical and organizational problems, and containing guiding principles for future development of the subject.





Signed: Kesselring 30 Mar 49







Translator: W. Meyer
Editor: G. Vanderstadt




Historical division European Command








Forward



This manuscript describes briefly at the home environment, the indoctrination, the capabilities and the tactics employed by small units of the Russian infantry during World War 2. In addition the writer has recorded certain conclusions in regard to future organization training, the value of which can only be determined by study of the problems involved in future warfare, a thorough knowledge of the weapons available and the characteristics of the opposing forces.
Inasmuch as most military campaigns eventually reach a point where, for varying reasons, the impetus of the attack must halt and reform the description of the infiltration tactics employed will be an item worthy of study and evaluation.


LOUIS M. NAWROCKEY
Major, cavalry
Chief, Operational History
(German) branch
Table of contents

Page
I.The “Unknown” Russian soldier 1-5
II.The education of the Russian infantrymen 5-13
III.Toward it is the Russian infantry in a defensive action 13-16
IV.Russian infantry in offensive action 16-22
V.Soviet tanks 22-23
VI.What conclusions can be drawn for modern
infantry from this experience? 24
A.Officers, NCOs and enlisted men 24-26
B.Suggestions for the organization of the infantry 26-27
C.Most important rules concerning tactics
employed in combat 27-28
VI.Concluding remarks 28


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I- The "Unknown” Russia" Soldier
In 1941 I commanded a motorized infantry regiment (panzer grenadier regiment), in the German advance on Leningrad from the Koenigsberg area in East Prussia through Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. My regiment was part of the panzer corps led by Genfldm (then General) von Manstein. Under the same corps and as commander of the same regiment, I took part in the autumn operations which drove the Soviet forces attacking south of Lake Ilmen on the flank and the rear of the northern German army group beyond Lovat and Pola and advanced our lines to the Waldau Mountains. In 1942 I and my regiment were under the command of Sixteenth Army, which was enveloped in the Demjansk fortress. Prior to this we- had been under the command of 6 Division. During the first half of 1943, I commanded a panzer division in the Kharkov area in the Ukraine.
Thus, my experience was gained in two years if continuous combat, during which my unit was always employed at focal points. I became acquainted with the characteristics of the Russian soldier of World War II in offensive and defensive action, in the heat of the summer and in the bitter cold of the winter, in the rugged country of northern Russia with its impenetrable forests and swamps and In the vast fertile plains of Ukraine.
When the Russian campaign opened in June 1941 we German soldiers in general knew little about our Russian opponent. The veterans of World War I described the Russian infantryman as a tenacious fighter in defensive action, but thought little of his performance in attack.







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The Russian campaign against Finland had not revealed much to us; it seemed that the Russian Any had not shown its full strength in this and struggle against a far inferior opponent. It must also be remembered that at least the lower echelons of the German military had given hardly any thought to the possibility of an imminent war against Russia. It was not until our arrival in East Prussia on 8 Jun 41, less than a week after leaving Southern France, that we realized why we had been shipped to the East so suddenly and so urgently. During the few days before the campaign started on 22 Jun 41, it was impossible to devote much time and effort to a thorough study of the characteristics and the fighting qualities of our new opponent or the peculiarities of his country, although such a study would have been extremely helpful; too many tasks resulting from the sudden commitment had to be given priority. Excellent descriptions of the Russian country were available, but the qualities of the modern Russian soldier were absolutely unknown.
There was a widespread belief in the German Army and among the German people that the Russian soldier was dissatisfied with the Soviet form of government and was eagerly waiting for us to free him from Bolshevist pressure. We were even strengthened in this belief in the beginning, when the Russian troops withdrew rapidly and we became acquainted with the "Soviet Paradise” through personal experience.
However, we were soon disillusioned. I remember the battle for Duenaburg (Dvinsk), which was the first engagement with the Russians that required any considerable effort on our part and which proved costly to us; it reminded us of the fierce fighting against the British Guards regiments




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for the La Bas-e Canal in Flanders in 1940.
The so-called Stalin Line was held even more tenaciously, and the deeper we penetrated into Russia and the closer we got to Leningrad, the more we were amazed by the Russian infantry's power to resist, its snipers, and its efficient defense tactics. The large battles of encirclement and the enormous numbers of PWs taken in the center of the Eastern Front do not alter my opinion; there, the Russian commanders surrendered after they had been completely cut off from their lines of communications or because the situation in their respective front sectors left them no other choice.
Very soon, we realized that we had underestimated our opponent; we had to adjust our tactics to those of the Russians and had to learn a great deal. But the flower of our shock troops had "been irretrievably lost "by then, and today I feel justified in saying that a complete misjudgment and underrating of the Russian power of resistance was one of the reasons for the failure of Germany's campaign against Russia. How did this happen?
Was the failure due to the peculiarities of the Russian terrain, which proved so difficult for us, with its wide spaces, its deep, impenetrable forest, the lack of roads and its many watercourses? On close inspection, it must be admitted that although the German advance was slow when compared with the 1940 blitzkrieg in France, it was nevertheless comparatively rapid through Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, so that the failure cannot have
been caused by the terrain or the space. Actually the failure was due
solely to the resistance offered by the Russian Army, and this stubborn resistance was not put up by the Russian air force or by the Russian artillery,




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which two arms at the time were no match for their German counterparts,
but exclusively by the Russian infantry which, supported by the Soviet .
armored formations, fought fanatically for every inch of Russian soil.
The stiff resistance cannot be accounted for by the mere fact that the Russian infantry was numerically superior to the German. Numbers alone were not decisive; this was proved many a time, when small croups of German infantrymen not only held their own against far superior enemy units, but even defeated them.
At this time (summer and fall 1941), the concept of nationalism had not yet penetrated the thick skulls of the Russian combat troops: Stalin did not proclaim the nationalistic doctrine until late fall.
Was the Russian infantry better trained than the German? Was it better equipment? It was neither better trained nor better equipped; it is true that from the beginning, the Russians had a great number of mortars of different calibers, while the German infantry had only a few mortars of light caliber; but on the other hand the Russians were still equipped with the old-type machine guns of World War I.
These questions occupied my mind as early as Aug 41 when I lay wounded in a hospital, and for the first time since the start of the campaign had time to assess the events of the first months of the war against Russia. After my return to the front in late August 41, I took every possible opportunity to endeavor to find the answer
I talked to a great number of PWs and interrogated especially officers and the more intelligent NCOs and enlisted men. The results of these conversations and interrogations, together with my personal experience in






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combat, my impressions gained in daily contact with the Russian civilian population, instructions issued by the appropriate offices, personal impressions gained by superiors, comrades, and subordinates will be discussed in the following pages and comparisons drawn with German conditions.

II. The Education of the Russian Infantryman
It is generally known among Western Europeans that the masses of the
Russian people live under primitive conditions, that they are extremely frugal and that they are not affected by weather conditions. It is also known that their standard of living is low and their schooling inadequate. In spite of this it is almost impossible for Western Europeans to imagine what the living conditions of the Russian people really are like.
We saw only a few towns in the area west and south of Lake Ilmen. The country is sparsely populated and its inhabitants live in small isolated villages. For centuries the people of these areas have hardly changed their way of living. They still live in primitive wooden houses, they all sleep in one room, (the grandparents, the parents, the children and other members of the household on the huge stove), in close company with pigs, chickens and other large and small domestic animals and vermin. Roads as they are known in Western Europe exist neither in the villages nor outside. The roads indicated on maps are neither hard-surface roads nor definitely established routes; they are tracks which are used as the season permitting and as occasion demands. In spring and autumn, these "roads" are completely covered with mud and thus impassable for any vehicles which therefore travel alongside the road, thereby making it broader and broader. In summer, the road consists solely of dust and it is only






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in winter that traveling across the wide white countryside in a horse-
drawn sleigh affords at least some pleasure.
The Russian peasant does not need roads. The things he needs for his livelihood, such as shelter and most of his clothing, have been passed on to him "by his ancestors, while his farm provides him with food. Nowadays, whatever he produces afore his own necessities must be turned over to the Commissar, and it is usually more than he had to turn over to the landowner prior to 1917.

The peasant has hardly any other necessities. Electric light, motion picture theaters, radios, etc. still are unknown to him. On his "roads”, he has no use for modern shoes or modern clothing, so that he does not miss such items. His world is his family, and it is bounded by the edge of his village. If the crop is not a failure and the Commissar leaves him the few commodities which he and his family need to live in the manner they have always lived, he is satisfied with his lot.
Even 25 years of Bolshevist rule, have changed nothing in these villages.

I saw the "Kolchose" system in operation only in the Ukraine, an area which has a different appearance in every respect; in my opinion its culture and civilization are far superior to the culture and civilization found in northern Russia, In the Ukraine, for Instance, nearly all churches were preserved, while almost all of those which I saw In the Lake Ilmen area had been destroyed, though icons were still to be found in every farm house.
It is necessary to view things through the eyes of a 20-year-old







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Russian who, after growing up in such a village, enters a town for the first time in his life to become a soldier. For the first time, he sees paved streets and even cobblestone pavements appear modern to him; he sees great numbers of stone buildings with two to three stories, electric lights, railroads and perhaps street cars, busses and a great number of automobiles. In the barracks, the size of which must appear enormous to him, he receives a handsome uniform, underwear, a bed, and even a razor, with which he has to shave daily. With this his education in the Soviet system has already begun. During the first few days of his army life, the company "politruk" (the political commissar of his company), starts processing the young recruit. The politruk explains to him that all the fine things which he is now seeing for the first time were created by the Bolshevist government for the workman and the farmer, who had been oppressed by the regime of the Czars. He shows him how magnanimously the Soviet State has been working under Lenin and Stalin for the welfare of the people and thus arouses the interest and the admiration of the simple-minded recruit in the prescribed manner. Before long the well-trained “politruk” will select from his flock those recruits whose intelligence is above average.
This selected group is now given particular attention in special educational courses in which visual aids play an important part. It is sufficient to show the primitive man how comfortably he, the "politruk” himself, is billeted, how well he is clad and how excellent his food is (officers and commissars draw special food, tobacco and liquor ration even at the front). The recruit listen to radio broadcasts, they are





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taken to motion pictures and stage shows, etc., and thus these young peasants become imbued with enthusiasm for the system which has brought all these fine things about and it is easy for the "politruk" to convert them into faithful adherents of communism. Since, as has been mentioned before, only those recruits are selected for special instruction who show above-average intelligence, further instruction is given in reading, writing and arithmetic. In accordance with their natural gifts, inclinations and qualifications, the recruits are trained either as NCO, officer or commissar replacements, or they receive training at a later stage for some civilian occupation. In any case, the system achieves one objective; The young peasant, who knew little or nothing about politics prior to his induction into the army, becomes a convinced communist, an ardent adherent of Stalin, and is ready to die for the preservation of the Soviet Paradise
Such is the nucleus of the Red Army, built up in decades of systematic effort devoted to selection, education and methodical coordination. The most efficient of these experts have become today’s victorious generals; many in the younger generation have a chance to replace them some day. Those who cannot qualify for the highest posts are still numerous enough to inspire the masses and to lead them to death if this is required in the interests of the State or the Party. Their intelligence is sufficient and they have learned enough to think and act for the masses, to train them and to instruct them in the use of the weapons. These former peasants can compete in every respect with those of their comrades who grew up in cities or came from the ranks of the industrial workers.
In view of the fact that conditions in the cities and industrial







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districts are different, one could perhaps call my experiences one-sided. However, it is not the purpose of this study to give a description of the Soviet people or soldier in general, but to discuss the characteristics of the Russian infantryman, and the majority of the infantrymen come from rural areas. Naturally personnel for the more or less technical arms such as armored forces, signal troops, air force, navy, etc., are taken from the industrial districts.
It is my opinion that the foregoing is the secret underlying the combat efficiency of the Russian infantry and the cause for its unexpected tenacity. The fact that the bulk of the replacements were recruited among the primitive population of the rural areas, who lack technical skill, simply forced the Russian recruiting officers to assign the replacements from rural areas to the infantry and those coming from the cities and Industrial areas to the other arms. Thus a virtue was made of necessity: nobody can deny that the peasant is more suitable than the townsman for service in the infantry. In contrast to townspeople, the man bred under country conditions is familiar with nature and with the soil. More so than in the past, the modern infantryman has to fight not only on the ground but also in the ground; modern weapons force him, more than in the past, to adjust himself to the terrain and to take advantage of every cover which it offers. A good infantryman has to be thoroughly familiar with the terrain.

The Russian peasant, who is close to nature, has many of the prerequisites of a modern infantryman. The fact that he cannot think independently (a deficiency not found among Western European peasants) is





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partly made up for by the above-described selection and training of officers and NCOs. Finally the inexhaustible manpower reservoir at the disposal of Russian leadership is an important factor. However, in the last, our side always benefited from the Russian's lack of Initiative, particularly because the German soldier usually displays a great deal of initiative.
In contrast to the Russians, German military leadership seems to have underrated the importance of the infantry when the German Army was rebuilt; whether this was due to necessity or other reasons is unknown to me. The 100,000-man Army (Reichswehr) had an excellent infantry which could have furnished extremely efficient cadre personnel for the new infantry units. Unfortunately however, a very high percentage of the available personnel had to be utilized for the organization of the Luftwaffe and the panzer forces etc. and, naturally, the best men, those who would have been extremely valuable to the infantry, ware assigned to the new arms. The recruits assigned to the infantry prior to the war, and even mere so during the war, also consisted mainly of those replacements who were left over after assignments to the other arms had been made. As early as 1938 the commanders of numerous infantry regiments were no longer able to fill their NCO positions because not enough men enlisted in the infantry and because not ell of those who did enlist were fit. In 1943, I had in my newly organized panzer grenadier division a total of 40 officer candidates for six infantry battalions, but 53 officer candidates for the single panzer battalion! These figures speak for themselves. The infantry failed to attract young volunteers; Luftwaffe and

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panzer forces proved more attractive. It would therefore have been appropriate if the recruiting offices had equalized matters "by assigns-
ing the best replacements from the rural areas to the infantry Just as, prior to 1914, assignments had been made to the cavalry and to the horse-drawn arms. Unfortunately, this was not done and events took their course: so far as the infantry was concerned, it was absolutely impossible to replace adequately the heavy casualties of the Eastern campaign; the cadres of efficient NCOs, of whom there had been too few from the outset, were decimated a few months after the start o f the campaign; there was a lack of officers in all companies and battalions; the arriving replacements were young, inexperienced and hardly of average quality. The neglect and underrating of the infantry had dire consequences; never again was it possible to bring the infantry up to strength which the overall situation required. Finally, the limited number of German infantrymen was no longer match for the masses of the Russian infantry. In spite of all technical developments, the infantryman still has to bear the brunt of ground combat; it is he alone who defends and protects the homeland. The best men from the cities are good enough as infantrymen, but the young peasant, who is thoroughly familiar with nature, makes the best individual fighter, a quality which is of extreme importance in modern infantry.
Military training was conducted in the same systematic and purposeful manner in which experts on Russian infantry were selected and trained in decades of painstaking work.* The innate faculties of the Russian






* Translations: Ebenso planmaessig und zielbewusst wie die Auslese und Bildung der Kenner der Russischen Infanterie in jahrzehntelanger Arbeit erfolgte, wurde auch die militaerische Ausbildung betrieben.



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soldiers were skillfully utilized and even their shortcomings were cunningly put to use. The frugality of the Russian soldier, his ability to endure hardship and the harshest weather conditions, his familiarity with nature and his craftiness constituted a good basis on which infantry combat drill could be developed. The primitive way of thinking and the mental sluggishness of the Russian peasant did not permit employment of complicated weapons. Therefore the Russians had to be satisfied with simple weapons, with the infantry weapons of World War I, such as the rifle, the machine gun and the mine thrower. Thanks to the excellent eyesight of the peasants, it was possible to train a number of the riflemen as snipers, who handled their guns in a masterly manner and shot down the enemy skillfully from any position just as
(UNREADABLE)
The old-type machine gun of World War 1 well-known to its crews, who were proud of their weapon, which they handled just as efficiently as the snipers their rifles. A large supply of ammunition was always available. The mine thrower of World War 1
was developed to become the mortar of World War II, which was easy to produce, easy to service and yet extremely effective. Its effectiveness, which was realized by the Russians very soon after the start of the Eastern campaign, finally led to the production and employment Stalinorgel (Stalin Organ)*. The first pieces were captured by our troops (Aug 41) were so primitive that we were at first unable to ascertain what kind of weapon they were; only later on we did find out what a dangerous weapon the Stalin. organ was.






* Stalinorgel (Stalin Organ) a multiple mortar battery which fired 48 rounds in rapid succession.



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Snipers and mortars inflicted heavy losses on our troops during
attack, while in the beginning of the campaign the Russian artillery inflicted less damage. The Russian artillery was numerically superior to our own, but there was no cooperation with the infantry. Only isolated Russian planes were encountered in the beginning.

From the outset however, the Russian tanks were backbone of the infantry, the mechanized "politruks" . During the advance, the infantrymen clung to than and in defensive action they sought cover behind them just as chicks run to the mother hen.

III. The Russian Infantry in Defensive Action
The Russian infantrymen displayed outstanding skill in adapting themselves to the peculiarities of the terrain and in utilizing it to the full and they knew how to dig in within a surprisingly short time. Their system of positions was a simple as it was practical. They used trenches comparatively seldom; two or three riflemen used to occupy a deep and narrow foxhole. The machine gun crews also occupied such foxholes; they were always well distributed and employed in such a manner as to leave no deadspaces. The best places were occupied by the snipers, of which each company had forty to fifty; frequently they were encountered perched on trees and in houses, always well camouflaged and therefore hard to spot. If possible the mortars were emplaced in natural hollows; otherwise suitable holes were dug and reinforced; all calibers ware available from the start of the campaign,
In addition to the mortars, the Russians employed flame throwers, which were often set off by remote control so that the attacking troops suddenly



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ran into a sea of flames. Tanks were assembled in well covered positions, ready for counterthrusts, or they were dug in, distributed all over the position. The main targets of these tanks, which were supported by a great number of antitank guns, were the attacking panzers.
Thus a system of defense positions in depth was established which was protected by wire entanglements and the large-scale employment of mines. This method of defense was employed in any terrain, in Villages, in level country, on hills and in forests.

Particularly impressive was the excellent combat discipline displayed by the Russian companies. Usually they allowed our patrols to penetrate their lines without harassing them, and even permitted them to withdraw without any interference if they felt sure that they had not learned anything. Generally however, none of our men returned. As a rule, our reconnaissance planes saw little or nothing of the enemy, who remained motionless in well camouflaged positions. I remember German officers once driving in a motor vehicle through a seemingly deserted village. The officers were neither stopped nor fired upon, and they saw nobody. They swore later that neither a soldier nor a civilian had been in it. However, when we tried to occupy the village only a few hours later we found out that it was fortified, and when we finally conquered it after fierce fighting, we found that it had been defended by an infantry regiment reinforced with weapons of every type. But even Russian infantryman could not have set up a system of positions as described above within a few hours, although the Russian soldier is extremely efficient in digging trenches; actually, all positions had been well camouflaged and everybody had kept



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so quiet that the officers had failed to notice anything when passing through.

Since we frequently had no knowledge as to the location and strength of the enemy position, our artillery preparation seldom had the desired effect. The Russians allowed our advancing infantrymen to come as close to their lines as possible in order then to force them to the ground through sniper, machine gun, and mortar fire; our attacking panzers sustained heavy losses due to the fire of the enemy antitank guns and tanks, while their advance was considerably slowed down by mines and tank traps. At this stage the enemy artillery fire, which during the initial stages hardly worried us, began to become annoying,
We very soon learned how to spot the enemy positions and to draw his fire through feint attacks. An attack against the enemy' s flank or rear nearly always led to success within a surprisingly short time. Clever utilization of the terrain and an adequate number of advanced artillery observers to ensure proper support by our own artillery were prerequisites for this. Whenever an attack war launched from an unexpected direction the Russian system failed, which demonstrated the weakness of their one-sided training,

However, the Russian infantryman always fights to the last, each man in his foxhole. Tank crews whose tanks were burning continued firing with every available gun as long as there was life in them. Our success was never secure until we could be sure that no living enemy was left in the position. Even wounded men who had lost consciousness picket(sic) up their weapons again as soon as they recovered their senses.



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After a penetration had been achieved, it was necessary to prepare for defense at once, because the enemy always had reserves available for an immediate counter thrust. However, such counterthrusts were only dangerous when we were caught by surprise. The Russian command is not flexible enough to conduct immediate and swift counterthrusts. On the whole, however, the Soviets are masters at defense, and we learned a great deal from them.
IV. Russian Infantry In Offensive Action
In the beginning of the Eastern campaign the Russian attacks were not to impressive, and showed little initiative on the part of the Russian Command. They were carried out methodically but cooperation with the heavy arms was inadequate and the lack of a flexible command was noticeable.
Whenever such attacks struck our still intact good infantry regiments, which stubbornly contested every inch of ground in well prepared positions, and while our artillery was served by efficient forward observers, the Red Army gained practically no offensive successes.
It was only after our infantry had been bled white in months of bitter fighting did the Soviet Army, employing numerically vastly superior forces in massed onslaughts, was able to gain victory over our forces, who, lacking even the most essential of winter clothing in the icy Russian winter and unable to dig themselves into the frozen ground, had to face ceaseless attacks by day and by night without support by our panzers, which had been rendered immobile and incapable of combat action owing to the masses of snow and to damage caused by frost.


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A major Russian attack was usually preceded by artillery preparation lasting several hours and comparable to the concentrated artillery fire of World War I in France. Only well-entrenched troops could endure such
a concentration of fire. The Russians generally used shells with percussion fuses; on frozen ground the spray effect of these shells was particularly dangerous. The artillery fire became especially effective if was directed by enemy agents behind our front.
As soon as the artillery fire had been lifted, the infantry attack began; it was supported by tanks and snipers and, to an ever-increasing extent by close support combat planes. If our own infantry was still in fighting condition i.e., if it had survived the artillery fire concentration, it was still possible to repel the first attack wave, particularly if heavy infantry weapons were employed against the enemy flanks. In any case, it was important to separate the Russian infantry from the accompanying tanks, to which the Red infantrymen clung like bunches of grapes. Veteran German infantrymen paid little attention to the enemy tanks; they left it, to the antitank weapons and tank destroyer units to combat them and by their efficient fire (if possible flanking fire), they forced the Russian infantry to dig in. Usually the Russians tanks halted at this juncture and by their fire covered their own infantry, which dug in with lightning speed; occasionally however, the Russian tank advanced on the German positions in order to flatten them out.
In the first case, the Russian tanks and constituted excellent targets for German tank destroyer units; in the second case, they were doomed if German panzers or antitank artillery fire were hand. In many instances,


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the attack was stopped in this way.
The less our artillery had suffered as a result of the enemy artillery preparation, the greater was our chance to repel the enemy attack, particularly if our infantry still had forward observers.
If the Russians succeeded in penetrating our position, it was of the utmost importance to launch an immediate counterthrust. A small force of determined infantrymen , accompanied by panzers and supported by heavy arms, was usually sufficient to annihilate the forces who had effected the penetration before they had time to enlarge it, a task which the Russians were usually slow to undertake.
If the Soviets failed in their first attack, a second, third, fourth, fifth and sometimes even further attacks were certain to follow at short notice, but during all my years of experience the repeat attacks did not depart a single time from the pattern of the first attack. The Russian officers’ lack of flexibility, which has been mentioned previously, was aggravated by the fact that they were always held personally responsible for failures, so that they were anxious to report the accomplishment of the assigned mission under which any circumstances.
In this connection, I must point out that the Russians were not able to assigned enough trained radio operators to the combat units and probably will remain unable to do so for some time to come. As a result, the radio operators at the front line used only simple codes and we nearly always were able to intercept and decoder radio messages without any difficulty. Thus we obtained information quick information on the front situation, and frequently also on Russian intentions;


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Sometimes I received such reports from our monitoring stations earlier than the situation of our own combat troops and was able to make my decisions accordingly. This is one of the weak spots in the Russian army, the importance of which must not be underestimated!
If the Soviet command fines that the intended offensive operations cannot be carried out in the above described manner, it employs the method of infiltration, i.e. it tries to get troops on notice behind the enemy line, a method which is in line with the general Bolshevist policy, which favors the use of underground channels. Political agents really at the same time military spies; like partisans and parachutists, they're equipped with radio sets. Once the Russian sector commander has discovered the week and thinly manned parts of the enemy front, these “infiltration parties”, which are led by trained agents, find their way behind the front. No water and no swamp is too deep for these infiltration parties and no forest too dense; for them to word “impossible” is nonexistent. It is widely known that during the last years of the war Soviets in German officer uniforms appear at the command posts in the east and passed on fictitious orders, thus creating considerable confusion.
The only defense against “infiltration” is continuous and strict vigilance by all officers, and NCOs and enlisted men, at and behind the front. The front troops must be on guard against the enemy reconnaissance and shock troops, as often the sole mission of such troops is to prepare or to camouflage and infiltration.


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The Russian command used to organize reconnaissance parties of considerable strength, varying from 30 to 50 men, which was necessary because of the characteristics of the Russian soldier. Although each reconnaissance party is led by efficient officers and accompanied by a sufficient number of public works, it is never less easily spotted and repulsed if the men at the front are watchful. In combating a reconnaissance party, care must be taken to prevent individual from separating from it in order to gradually penetrate one's own lines. These men hide in front of, within or behind the lines for several days and are reinforced gradually by men coming in a similar manner. Then suddenly they emerged at a given time in accordance with their orders and do considerable damage.

How dangerous infiltration can become is demonstrated by a my own experience:

In Feb 42, the German sixteenth Army was completely surrounded in the so-called Demjansk pocket, so that for several months its six divisions had to receive all supplies by air while two Russian attack Army's with a total of 30 to 40 divisions among them the “Guards’ Corps” which were employed here for the first time tried to smash the pocket; however, the German divisions held their ground. The vast swampy forest extends along the eastern bank of the Pola between the town of Demjansk and lake Ilmen; this area is impassable except during the severest part of winter, when the swamps are frozen. The swampy jungle was behind our front line. Toward the end of Feb 42, we observed planes cruising above the forest and giving flash signals. First, we thought of Russian

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Partisans, although we had not yet encountered any partisans in this area ( even subsequently we did not encounter partisans.)
The unit adjacent to mine sent out a reconnaissance party that failed to return. On the following night I sent out a stronger party. This party returned intact but it had seen nobody, although a great number of recently extinguished campfires were found. During one of the following nights the leader of this reconnaissance party finally succeeded in spotting the hitherto invisible enemy and in drawing him from hiding. A village at the edge of the forest, which was occupied only by elements of a supply train unit, was attacked by enemy forces coming from the direction of the forest for three days and it was only after the employment of heavy weapons that the enemy was driven back into the woods. Fortunately, several PWs were taken and through the interrogation of these PWs, the situation was clarified. We discovered that for three weeks Russian parachutists on snowshoes had been infiltrating slowly at various points of the German front and had assembled in the vast forced . Our men had frequently seen snowshoe tracks in the morning, but had paid no attention to them, assuming that they had been left by our own troops. The red parachutists belonged to the Russian I and II Parachute Brigade; their strength was 5000 men and in addition to hand arms and machine guns they were equipped with mortars. Their commander was a lieutenant colonel. As the former adjutant of Marshal Trchaschewsky, who had been sentenced to death, he had been held in prison for several years, but now, as a parachute specialist, he had been given the following assignment: first to take the Demjansk airdrome, the heart of the German pocket, and


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thereupon to smash the pocket in collaboration with forces attacking from the outside the parachutists remained quiet in the woods by lay-time, and received orders, food supplies and additional ants by night-time from the planes we had observed. The airdrome actually was attacked a few daps later. It had not been possible to attack the Russian brigade in the forest itself because we lacked the necessary strength for such an action, but the defense of the vital airdrome had been well prepared and the Russian attack was repulsed. Later on, the Russians inside the pocket, supported by forces attacking from the outside tried
to break through toward the South, but we succeeded in annihilating them and captured the put the above-mentioned commander.
Although this incident ended favorably for our side, it demonstrates how dangerous the situation can become if seemingly insignificant indications of Russian infiltration are not given due attention. In this case, it was the snowshoe tracks. In other cases it might be refugees, deserters, or something else. Vigilance is of vital importance!
V. Soviet Tanks
Whereas the Russians employed many types of tanks at the beginning of the Eastern campaign, they later gave preference to the T 34, which definitely proved to be the best of them. In the Ukraine they also employed American tanks, but these were of an obsolete type and too complicated for the Russians, so that they were soon discarded. As far as I know, no major changes occurred during the last years of the war. I shall refrain from giving a description of the tanks because they are well


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known; furthermore new types of tanks will be employed in a future war.
However, the crews will not be different from these we fought. The Russian townsman, who is highly interested in technical matters, is just as well suited for the modern tank arm as the Russian peasant is for the infantry. An added factor is that the Russian worker usually is a convinced communist who, having enjoyed the blessings of "his" revolution for decades, will fight fanatically as a class-conscious proletarian. Just as the Red infantryman is ready to die in his foxhole, the Soviet tank soldier will die in his tank, firing at the enemy to the last, even if he is alone in or behind the enemy lines. It was amazing to see the primitive technical means with which the Russian crews kept their tanks ready for action and how they overcame all difficulties.
Thus for instance, in Jan 43 Russian tanks drove from the eastern bank of Lake Ilmen up to the mouth of the Pola and from there up the frozen river to appoint beyond our own lines. In order to make it possible for the infantry to follow, wooden sleighs were attached to the tanks on which the infantrymen crouched. During the muddy seasons (spring and fall), the Russians, within an extremely short time, built a great number of corduroy roads leading to the front in order to support their infantry with tanks even in swamps. For the purpose of crossing rivers, they constructed submerged bridges.
Cooperation between tanks and infantry was always very good; this was a result of rigid combat drill. The tanks efficiently aided the "politruks" in their task of keeping the troops together or driving them forward.


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VI. What Conclusions Can be drawn for Modern Infantry from this
experience?
A. Officer NCOs and Enlisted Men:
1. The Building Up of Suitable Infantry Emplacements Must Not be Neglected
Even in modern ground combat the infantry will remain the principal arm. Any armed forces whose command fails to realize this fact and neglects the infantry will be at a disadvantage from the outset . With her vast manpower reservoir, Russia is numerically superior to the Western Powers. The Western Powers will therefore have to substitute quality for quantity; and the process of selection must begin at the recruiting stage. Young peasants belong in the infantry because they are "close to nature”. .
2. Officer and NCOs must be Carefully Selected and Trained
In order to train good the individual fighters , an efficient officer and NCO corps is necessary. The policy of assigning the best officers and NCOs to other arms or even allowing them to seek a transfer must not be tolerated.
It is not the tank officer or the artillery officer, but the infantry officer, who leads at the front. He must be able to utilize all arms for the support of his troops and properly direct their commitment in offensive and in defensive action. Inasmuch as the Infantry officer is more exposed to enemy fire any other officer, the infantry officer corps is bound to have the highest casualties; ample reserves must there-
*) I refer, in this connection to my study “Modern Infantry Training” in much all experience has been evaluated .


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fore he available. An infantry company must never he left with only one officer, while other arms might have an officer to each platoon.
No officer should be promoted to field grade unless he has received a thorough infantry training and has Ashley led an infantry company for a long period of time.
This is an ideal which can hardly he realize, but I am deliberately sinking the probe into what might he termed & festering sore, in order to sound a warning.
The infantry in NCO is left to his own devices in combat; he must he tough, he must lead his men in an exemplary manner, and he must be able to take the place of an officer.
2. The greatest Possible No. of Riflemen must he Trained as
snipers!
As many riflemen as possible must be trained as snipers; every rifleman must be able to handle a machine gun as well as his rifle. He must learn the fundamentals at the target range; combat practice firing should only begin when he has shown at the target range that he is familiar with his weapon. In the field, the rifleman must be a good marksman who can fire from all positions; he must also know how to adapt himself to the peculiarities of the ground, to dig in with lightning speed and to make use of terrain features.
The principle must be to obtain a good line of vision and cover!
Riflemen whose marksmanship performances during training are below average should be trained as mortar gunners.


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B. Suggestions for the Organization of the Infantry:
1. The rifle squad constitutes the smallest unit. It consists of the squad leader, six riflemen and one machine gunner, foams of two or three men (Schuetzenrotte) should occupy foxholes, which are narrow and deep enough to protect the riflemen against tanks while still enabling them to fire effectively. Larger teams are not only more difficult to command, but also offer better targets for the enemy.
2. Three rifle squads form a rifle platoon. The platoon leader must have his disposal a platoon headquarters detail consisting of two or three messenger and a trench radio.
3. The rifle company comprises three rifle platoons, one mortar platoon with three to six mortars, one antitank squad (Panzerfausts), one sniper squad, and the company headquarters detail.
The mortar platoon and the sniper squad will be employed by the company commander for the formation of focal points; it is always a mistake to distribute these units among the platoons. The antitank squad will contain the most courageous and skilled men of the company/ and the company commander should not send it into action before recognizing at what point his company is threatened by enemy tanks.
4. The Infantry Battalion consists of three rifle companies, one mortar company with from six to twelve medium or heavy mortars, one or two antitank platoons and one or two antiaircraft platoons.
5. The Infantry Regiment consists of three Infantry battalions and,
in addition,


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one heavy infantry howitzer company (four howitzers),
one tank or assault gun company,
one antiaircraft company,
one Engineer Company,
one headquarters company (reconnaissance platoon, signal platoon,
headquarters staff personnel).
6. Each division’s wartime T/O must provide for the organization of one replacement training battalion for each of its infantry regiments in order to make possible the immediate replacement of casualties suffered by the companies in action.
Such organizational measures have proved their value not only in the East, but also in the Italian theater of war and in the West.
C. Host Important Rules Concerning Tactics Employed in Combat
I. In offensive action:
1. Sufficient time must be devoted to thorough reconnaissance of the enemy position (aerial photographs, patrols, feint attacks),
2. The rule must be to direct attacks against the enemy's flank or rear.
3. Clever choice and exploitation of the terrain; any time lost here will be repaid by the preservation of lives.
4. Cooperation between infantry, tanks, and heavy arms, especially artillery, must be carefully taught and secured by the employment of a great number of forward observers.
5. Once a penetration has been effected preparations for defense must commence immediately.


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II. In Defensive Action:
1. Establishment of a defense in depth, preparation of a defense fire plan,
2. Infantry must be instructed to watch the enemy constantly in order to avoid surprises.
3. During an enemy attacks the enemy infantry must be separated from its supporting tanks.
4. Preparations must be made to employ heavy weapons against the enemy flanks*
5. Reserve combat troops must be held in readiness for counter thrusts; it is wiser to weaken the front line than to disregard this rule; reserves are tramp cards!
VII. Concluding Remarks
Little is known about postwar developments in the Soviet Army, However, it is safe to assume that with its characteristic tenacity of purpose , the Soviet command has eliminated the weaknesses and shortcomings uncovered during the past war, and is doing everything possible to make the Russian infantry the best in the world.
Whether or not the Soviet Command will be hampered in these efforts by the effect contact with western civilization has had on the primitive Russian soldier is just as uncertain as the value of the influence German PWs have had on Russian thinking and feeling.
The following factors will always influence the development of the Russian Army:


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a. The physical strength of the Russian but people, which is a result of their living close to nature.
b. The absolute subordination of the individual to an outside directing will, enforced by Draconian measures.
c. The vast manpower reservoir at Russia's disposal.
d. The steady advance of technology in the Soviet Union .
It is the task of the Western Power to train combat soldiers who are not only the equals to with their Russian counterparts, but to be their superiors.
Weil. February 1949
(signed) Max Simon

[Johnny_H02]

I cant waite to read this thanks for the post :D

[CRAZY MERC]

What is a source?

[USGRANT64]

US National Archives Foreign Military Studies collection MS3-058

[Cpt. Spaulding]

nice read!!!