Krasnaya Zvezda
03-12-2004, 07:08 PM
Is Chechen separatism nearing its end?
with the recent death of Chechnya’s exiled former president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (who was killed in a car explosion in Doha, Qatar), and that of Chechen rebel commander Ruslan Gelayev (I'd rather refer to him as "terrorist"...but ok let's be politically correct for once) after his botched and hopeless raid at the Dagestani border, it seems that Chechen resistance is finally losing momentum.
After losing some of its most prominent leaders, Chechen rebels can no longer rely on the power structure that arose at the end of the second Chechen war, and will probably split into smaller, disorganized cells with no central command. Even when Gelayev made a last attempt to cross the Dagestani border with his pityful band of mercenaries, it was clear that this was a last-ditch maneuvre to escape the inevitable encirclement laid by Russian troops around the desperate group of rebels.
Besides, his criminal band consisted mainly of "foreign" mercenaries who were quick to abandon the fight and who were more inclined to brutally dispose of the wounded instead of giving any assistance to the ethnic Chechens. This may also be an indication that local Chechens are probably growing weary of the rebels and are not willing to join forces with them anymore, so that Chechen rebel commanders must increasingly resort to recruiting "foreign" mercenaries whose loyalty to the Chechen cause may be highly questionable.
For what pertains to the availability of equipment, weapons, explosives and other offensive assets, the rebels have lost most of their major caches and hideouts within Chechnya, although they might still dispose of some weapon stocks in hidden camps and bases at the Ingush, Dagestani, and Georgian borders. It is true that Gelayev's gang was rather well armed with plenty of ammunition, light automatic weapons and even scoped sniper rifles, but they did not possess any significant firepower to be a match for Russian Spetsnaz and helicopter fire. This was companded by the inherent difficulties of marching their way through the snow-covered valleys, mountains and ravines bordering Dagestan, where they could quite easily get spotted by low-flying helicopters. With respect to this, infra-red and thermal sensors could be used by Russian forces quite effectively to pinpoint the group of fleeing rebels against the snowy mountain background.
Chechen rebels have now probably lost the initiative and are not in a position to stage major ambushes to Russian convoys as they did in the past, with the exception of sporadic, smaller-scale attacks with the use of ladmines and remote-controlled bombs. Across-the-border raids are also becoming a very risky proposition for the rebels, since Russian border troops are constanly keeping an eye on possible attack and escape routes along the Chechen border, although the area around the Pankisi gorge will still remain a thorn in Russia's back as long as Georgia tolerates the presence of rebels on its territory, and as long as it fails to eradicate them once and for all (concerning this last point, although the Bush administration has declared war on terrorism, in fact it is pradoxically doing its "best" to oust Russia from the region, and turn Georgia against her....in the meanwhile little or nothing is being undertaken by the Georgians and their newly found US-allies to combat the Chechens in the Pankisi gorge...after all it is not too far-fetched to draw parallels between this peculiar situation and the US-support given to the Mujahedeens fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan).
"Foreign" economic help to Chechen rebels might also be faltering since all possible sources of financing for terrorist organizations around the globe are slowly being extinguished thanks to increased international checks and investigations. This in turn means that Chechen resistance will hardly be able to obtain heavier and more advanced weaponry that could be used to counter the superior firepower of Russian forces (such as helicopter gunships). Wealthy Yemenite, Saudi, or Jordanian Sheikhs and Emirs wishing to support Chechen separatism had better look for other ways of investing their money yielding safer return on investment...
As far as the loss of leadership is concerned, it appears that the self-proclaimed Chechen president Aslan Mashkhadov is still at large, but it won't be long before he gets caught or liquidated by Russian troops. Still, this does not mean that hostilities will end, since lesser known leaders will probably replace the old ones, but they will hardly enjoy the charismatic appeal of people belonging to the "old guard'" such as Dudayev or Basayev. Although still very dangerous and difficult, the current situation in Chechnya is not comparable to what it used to be during the 1st and 2nd Chechen wars, and the local population is probably more keen on getting back to "normal" life rather than embracing Wahabism, and running around wildly shouting "Allahu Akhbar". Ordinary Chechens might well not share the same ideals as "foreign" Arab extremists whose only goal is to blow thelmselves up in Moscow's metro stations, who may not be as welcome as they were more than a couple of years ago.
Nevertheless, it is too early to cry for victory.
Nearly every time the Russian government claimed Chechen resistance had been finally crushed, they were proved wrong by a string of guerilla counterattacks, terrorist bombings, hostage-takings, and the like. This time, it is of the utmost importance for Russia to liquidate the remaining pockets of resistance, to keep a high level of suveillance and intelligence-gathering, and to reestablish the rule of law in a lawless and war-torn country, in cooperation with local authorities.
Regards,
Krasnaya Zvezda
with the recent death of Chechnya’s exiled former president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev (who was killed in a car explosion in Doha, Qatar), and that of Chechen rebel commander Ruslan Gelayev (I'd rather refer to him as "terrorist"...but ok let's be politically correct for once) after his botched and hopeless raid at the Dagestani border, it seems that Chechen resistance is finally losing momentum.
After losing some of its most prominent leaders, Chechen rebels can no longer rely on the power structure that arose at the end of the second Chechen war, and will probably split into smaller, disorganized cells with no central command. Even when Gelayev made a last attempt to cross the Dagestani border with his pityful band of mercenaries, it was clear that this was a last-ditch maneuvre to escape the inevitable encirclement laid by Russian troops around the desperate group of rebels.
Besides, his criminal band consisted mainly of "foreign" mercenaries who were quick to abandon the fight and who were more inclined to brutally dispose of the wounded instead of giving any assistance to the ethnic Chechens. This may also be an indication that local Chechens are probably growing weary of the rebels and are not willing to join forces with them anymore, so that Chechen rebel commanders must increasingly resort to recruiting "foreign" mercenaries whose loyalty to the Chechen cause may be highly questionable.
For what pertains to the availability of equipment, weapons, explosives and other offensive assets, the rebels have lost most of their major caches and hideouts within Chechnya, although they might still dispose of some weapon stocks in hidden camps and bases at the Ingush, Dagestani, and Georgian borders. It is true that Gelayev's gang was rather well armed with plenty of ammunition, light automatic weapons and even scoped sniper rifles, but they did not possess any significant firepower to be a match for Russian Spetsnaz and helicopter fire. This was companded by the inherent difficulties of marching their way through the snow-covered valleys, mountains and ravines bordering Dagestan, where they could quite easily get spotted by low-flying helicopters. With respect to this, infra-red and thermal sensors could be used by Russian forces quite effectively to pinpoint the group of fleeing rebels against the snowy mountain background.
Chechen rebels have now probably lost the initiative and are not in a position to stage major ambushes to Russian convoys as they did in the past, with the exception of sporadic, smaller-scale attacks with the use of ladmines and remote-controlled bombs. Across-the-border raids are also becoming a very risky proposition for the rebels, since Russian border troops are constanly keeping an eye on possible attack and escape routes along the Chechen border, although the area around the Pankisi gorge will still remain a thorn in Russia's back as long as Georgia tolerates the presence of rebels on its territory, and as long as it fails to eradicate them once and for all (concerning this last point, although the Bush administration has declared war on terrorism, in fact it is pradoxically doing its "best" to oust Russia from the region, and turn Georgia against her....in the meanwhile little or nothing is being undertaken by the Georgians and their newly found US-allies to combat the Chechens in the Pankisi gorge...after all it is not too far-fetched to draw parallels between this peculiar situation and the US-support given to the Mujahedeens fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan).
"Foreign" economic help to Chechen rebels might also be faltering since all possible sources of financing for terrorist organizations around the globe are slowly being extinguished thanks to increased international checks and investigations. This in turn means that Chechen resistance will hardly be able to obtain heavier and more advanced weaponry that could be used to counter the superior firepower of Russian forces (such as helicopter gunships). Wealthy Yemenite, Saudi, or Jordanian Sheikhs and Emirs wishing to support Chechen separatism had better look for other ways of investing their money yielding safer return on investment...
As far as the loss of leadership is concerned, it appears that the self-proclaimed Chechen president Aslan Mashkhadov is still at large, but it won't be long before he gets caught or liquidated by Russian troops. Still, this does not mean that hostilities will end, since lesser known leaders will probably replace the old ones, but they will hardly enjoy the charismatic appeal of people belonging to the "old guard'" such as Dudayev or Basayev. Although still very dangerous and difficult, the current situation in Chechnya is not comparable to what it used to be during the 1st and 2nd Chechen wars, and the local population is probably more keen on getting back to "normal" life rather than embracing Wahabism, and running around wildly shouting "Allahu Akhbar". Ordinary Chechens might well not share the same ideals as "foreign" Arab extremists whose only goal is to blow thelmselves up in Moscow's metro stations, who may not be as welcome as they were more than a couple of years ago.
Nevertheless, it is too early to cry for victory.
Nearly every time the Russian government claimed Chechen resistance had been finally crushed, they were proved wrong by a string of guerilla counterattacks, terrorist bombings, hostage-takings, and the like. This time, it is of the utmost importance for Russia to liquidate the remaining pockets of resistance, to keep a high level of suveillance and intelligence-gathering, and to reestablish the rule of law in a lawless and war-torn country, in cooperation with local authorities.
Regards,
Krasnaya Zvezda