The Limits of Foresight in the Pre-WW II RMA

[Jedburgh]

We Can See Clearly Now: The Limits of Foresight in the Pre-World War II Revolution in Military Affairs (http://kms.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=DBB0DC99-26D1-E0A6-17F3-123F090A9496&lng=en)

This paper reviews the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that preceded the Second World War. The author explains that while the German army displayed the characteristics of an RMA "early adopter", the British and American armed forces delayed adopting the RMA. The French even refused to do so. Drawing conclusions for present-day defense strategists, he argues that while nothing can resolve "RMA uncertainty", the best way to manage it is to develop capacities for rapid adaptation.

[rjbhutton]

I didn't read the whole thing.. in fact I stopped after the first paragraph... maybe some other time.. it was interesting though.

Surely it depends on whether you are driving the RMA and the one exploring the new options (like the "lightweight, agile, in-and-out" force), which is what the US seems to be doing (having the most R&D money). The issue seems to be more one for those countries with less capability to be the instigator of such RMAs...

I guess I'm assuming that the paper was written by a US military person (monograph from one of the war colleges), and am therefore wondering why s/he is wondering about reacting to RMAs when the US is leading them...

or am I wrong and very US-centric (I am a Brit living in the US)?