hist2004
05-06-2006, 09:30 AM
Afghan Militia’s serving with Soviet Forces
The quality and loyally of these formations varied greatly, but the mujahideen considered them to be more
effective and dangerous than the regular army when they actually had to engage them in combat. Militia forces
most often were recruited by the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities to provide security in provincial areas
where the regular military presence was weak. Tribal leaders were paid not so much to lead their people in
operations against the mujahideen as to secure an area on behalf of the régime, guarding it defensively against
mujahideen attacks. In doing so, the régime secured the neutrality of a sizable portion of the local population
in a given district, a portion of which was already organized and led in accordance with traditional tribal discipline.
When the leader (khan) was bought off, the whole tribe essentially was bought off.
From the point of view of the tribe, joining the militia meant that their district was unlikely to be subject to régime
operations or bombardments as long as they kept the rebels out or under control. Thus they could live in relative
peace. There was also the financial incentive; members of the militia normally were paid much higher salaries than
the regular soldier or average citizen. The régime also provided the militia with food, weapons, and ammunition.
From Kabul’s’ point of view, the recruitment of tribes into the militia meant that the local rebel groups would be
deprived of recruits into their own ranks.
Tribal militia proved especially useful in protecting power lines and pipelines and in closing off some areas of the
eastern borders regions to infiltration from Pakistan. For example, Hassan Khan, chief of the Karokhel tribe,
controlled a large region east of Kabul in the early 80s. He established outposts, conducted patrols, protected
the power lines in the area, and restricted mujahideen movement through the area. He co-operated with the
resistance to a certain degree by funneling supplies to them, but he provided a valuable security service to the
régime as well. However, in 1984, Hassan came under increasing pressure from the resistance to get off the
fence and choose sides once and for all. In August 1984, Hassan evacuated his 3,000 tribesmen to Pakistan,
taking all his military equipment and supplies with him. Before he left however, the militiamen and rebels jointly
destroyed almost all the electrical pylons leading to Kabul.
The defection of such a large group of tribal militiamen was not a rare occurrence. Another group, 2,000 strong
and under the command of Arab Ghani Teymuri, had been securing traffic in the vicinity of Heart for two years.
In the autumn of 1987, the entire group defected to the rebels, taking a substantial amount of weaponry, including
a BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launcher, two mortars with 5,000 rounds, and two tons of food. The militia
then joined the insurgents in attacks against troop convoys in the same area.
Nomad tribes also signed on as militia with the régime from time to time. Militia members were recruited as well
from city dwellers who lost their means of livelihood owing to the economic disruption of the war. Some tribal
militia groups are known to have trained as air assault ‘commandos’. The militia groups, which took their jobs
seriously were respected, in a military sense, by the mujhideen because they possessed some of the same guerrilla
attributes and skills. However, the quality and reliability of the militia varied widely.
The most effective, reliable, and feared militia group were the ‘Jozjanis’. Raised from the population in northern
Jozjan along the Amu Darya (-Oxus) River, the Jozjani Militia was a unique, mixed force of Soviet and Afghan
Uzbeks. Well-paid for their efforts and numbering between 3-4,000, the Jozjani seemed to have no affinity with
the mujahideen, yet no love for the Marxist régime either. Perhaps they are best described as a tough, well organized,
coherent, hard-fighting mercenary force.
Soon after their formation, the Jozjanis were sent to the southern and western Afghanistan. In Kandahar, where they
replaced Soviet soldiers pulled out under the Geneva withdrawal plan, they acquired a reputation for brutality and
savagery both during combat in defense of Kandahar airport and in their relations with the civilian population. They
were hard to control and liked by no one, yet respected by both sides for their hard fighting abilities. It has been
suggested that one reason they fought so hard was because they knew they would receive no mercy from the
mujahideen if they surrendered.
Hist2004
The quality and loyally of these formations varied greatly, but the mujahideen considered them to be more
effective and dangerous than the regular army when they actually had to engage them in combat. Militia forces
most often were recruited by the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities to provide security in provincial areas
where the regular military presence was weak. Tribal leaders were paid not so much to lead their people in
operations against the mujahideen as to secure an area on behalf of the régime, guarding it defensively against
mujahideen attacks. In doing so, the régime secured the neutrality of a sizable portion of the local population
in a given district, a portion of which was already organized and led in accordance with traditional tribal discipline.
When the leader (khan) was bought off, the whole tribe essentially was bought off.
From the point of view of the tribe, joining the militia meant that their district was unlikely to be subject to régime
operations or bombardments as long as they kept the rebels out or under control. Thus they could live in relative
peace. There was also the financial incentive; members of the militia normally were paid much higher salaries than
the regular soldier or average citizen. The régime also provided the militia with food, weapons, and ammunition.
From Kabul’s’ point of view, the recruitment of tribes into the militia meant that the local rebel groups would be
deprived of recruits into their own ranks.
Tribal militia proved especially useful in protecting power lines and pipelines and in closing off some areas of the
eastern borders regions to infiltration from Pakistan. For example, Hassan Khan, chief of the Karokhel tribe,
controlled a large region east of Kabul in the early 80s. He established outposts, conducted patrols, protected
the power lines in the area, and restricted mujahideen movement through the area. He co-operated with the
resistance to a certain degree by funneling supplies to them, but he provided a valuable security service to the
régime as well. However, in 1984, Hassan came under increasing pressure from the resistance to get off the
fence and choose sides once and for all. In August 1984, Hassan evacuated his 3,000 tribesmen to Pakistan,
taking all his military equipment and supplies with him. Before he left however, the militiamen and rebels jointly
destroyed almost all the electrical pylons leading to Kabul.
The defection of such a large group of tribal militiamen was not a rare occurrence. Another group, 2,000 strong
and under the command of Arab Ghani Teymuri, had been securing traffic in the vicinity of Heart for two years.
In the autumn of 1987, the entire group defected to the rebels, taking a substantial amount of weaponry, including
a BM-21 122-mm multiple rocket launcher, two mortars with 5,000 rounds, and two tons of food. The militia
then joined the insurgents in attacks against troop convoys in the same area.
Nomad tribes also signed on as militia with the régime from time to time. Militia members were recruited as well
from city dwellers who lost their means of livelihood owing to the economic disruption of the war. Some tribal
militia groups are known to have trained as air assault ‘commandos’. The militia groups, which took their jobs
seriously were respected, in a military sense, by the mujhideen because they possessed some of the same guerrilla
attributes and skills. However, the quality and reliability of the militia varied widely.
The most effective, reliable, and feared militia group were the ‘Jozjanis’. Raised from the population in northern
Jozjan along the Amu Darya (-Oxus) River, the Jozjani Militia was a unique, mixed force of Soviet and Afghan
Uzbeks. Well-paid for their efforts and numbering between 3-4,000, the Jozjani seemed to have no affinity with
the mujahideen, yet no love for the Marxist régime either. Perhaps they are best described as a tough, well organized,
coherent, hard-fighting mercenary force.
Soon after their formation, the Jozjanis were sent to the southern and western Afghanistan. In Kandahar, where they
replaced Soviet soldiers pulled out under the Geneva withdrawal plan, they acquired a reputation for brutality and
savagery both during combat in defense of Kandahar airport and in their relations with the civilian population. They
were hard to control and liked by no one, yet respected by both sides for their hard fighting abilities. It has been
suggested that one reason they fought so hard was because they knew they would receive no mercy from the
mujahideen if they surrendered.
Hist2004