ogukuo72
05-17-2006, 10:47 PM
The "example" of Michael Wittmann had been used so many times as an "illustration" of German combat abilities that it seemed that it had been used as a short-hand. But did anyone actually know what happened on 13 Jun 44?
Here are two accounts, with only minor differences in details:
At 0900 Wittmann's Tiger attacked. A few minutes later, in the direction of Caen, he destroyed three tanks; a Sherman Firefly and a Cromwell tank (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cromwell_tank) on the right and another tank on the left, proceeding to Villers without pause and attacking the lightly armored vehicles of The Rifle Brigade. During this engagement, he destroyed nine half-track vehicles, four Carden Loyd Carriers (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Carden_Loyd_Carrier&action=edit), two other carriers, and two 6-pounder (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_6_pdr) anti-tank guns, then destroyed three Stuart light tanks and one half-track vehicle. Entering Villers-Bocage alone, he destroyed three of the four Cromwells in position at the top of the Lemonnier farm.
He followed Clémenceau Street where his tank destroyed two Sherman command tanks of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery before knocking out another scout car and half-track. As Wittmann arrived at the Jeanne d'Arc (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeanne_d%27Arc) square, he ended up opposite the Sherman Firefly (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Firefly) of Sergeant Lockwood of "B" Squadron. The Firefly, whose 17-pounder (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordnance_QF_17_pdr) was the only Allied main tank gun capable of defeating the frontal armour of a Tiger in most circumstances, fired four shells at Wittman. One hit the hull of the Tiger, which returned fire and knocked down a section of wall on the Sherman. Wittmann then made a half-turn, his tank lightly damaged, and returned down Clémenceau Street. The Cromwell tank of Captain Dyas that had not been destroyed, confronted him, firing two 75mm shells, failing to harm the Tiger. Wittmann put the Cromwell out of action with one shot.
As Wittmann proceeded on the road leaving Villers-Bocage, his left track was hit by a 6-pdr shell, forcing him to stop on the street in front of the Huet-Godefroy store. Wittman engaged targets in range. Thinking that the Tiger might be salvaged and repaired later, Wittmann and crew abandoned the tank without destroying it, leaving the area on foot but without weapons. (Wikipedia)
There have been many conflicting accounts published about SS-Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman’s (http://www.strategos.demon.co.uk/D-Day/Wittmann.htm) almost single-handed battle at Villers-Bocage which successfully stopped a British armoured advance by the 22nd Armoured Brigade, part of the 7th Armoured Division. The following is perhaps the most likely sequence of events, which emphasises German tactical superiority, whilst not elevating the role played by Wittman to ludicrous heights
Phase One began when the 22nd Armoured Brigade, with 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) in the lead, were ordered to capture the important road junction of Villers-Bocage and the high ground beyond (Point 213) on the morning of June 13th. Lt-Colonel Arthur, the Viscount Cranleigh, the commanding officer, had requested time to carry out a proper reconnaissance of the area as German armoured cars had been spotted observing the advance south from Tilly-sur-Seulles. Orders were, however, to push on regardless (which, apart from the immediate aim, accorded with the Allies’ overall strategy of keeping the German armour away from the American front). Leaving the regimental HQ tanks at the top of the main street in Villers, ‘A’ Squadron was ordered forward to secure Point 213 about two km north-east up N175. On reaching Point 213, ‘A’ Squadron halted and the commanders, Cranleigh included, decided upon a staff discussion and briefing. Some British troops even began to brew up, thinking the area was safe. Indeed, XXX Corps intelligence had no idea of the real opposition in the area.
In fact, all was not well, for the British had advanced out of Villers to Point 213, past a force of heavy Tiger tanks commanded by veteran tank killer Michael Wittman. He had six Tigers at his disposal, plus assorted other troops and vehicles, positioned some 200 metres to the south of the N175. The British were completely unaware of the Germans’ presence.
Wittman launched his attack catching the British completely off guard. The Tigers of his force engaged ‘A’ Squadron and the motorised ‘A’ infantry company. There was little they could do, and the Cromwells and Fireflies were soon in trouble.
Meanwhile, Wittman set off in a Tiger and cut in behind ‘A’ Squadron and began an assault in the British forces in Villers itself. He engaged infantry forces, light reconnaissance Stuart tanks, unarmed artillery observation tanks and eventually the regimental HQ Cromwells, under the temporary command of Major Carr. Carr attempted to engage Wittman’s tank but the 75mm shells bounced off and Carr’s tank was destroyed. The other Cromwells were also despatched, except for Captain Pat Dyas’s vehicle. He backed off the road and Wittman did not spot him as he drove past though the town. German infantry had also started to filter into the eastern end of the town in support of Witmman’s attack. Wittman continued his advance engaging the scattered remnants of the RHQ group. Dyas pursued him down the street, hoping to shoot the Tiger in the rear.
Retreating British elements informed ‘B’ Squadron of the situation and Wittman soon found himself in a duel with a Firefly commanded by Sergeant Lockwood at the western end of the town. Witmman then began to withdraw, engaging the luckless Dyas en route. Dyas also obtained a hit on the Tiger, but to no avail and Dyas’s Cromwell was soon knocked out. As Wittman moved back through the town his Tiger was immobilised by a 6-pdr anti-tank gun at very close range and Wittman and his crew escaped on foot.
Nevertheless, the situation was grim for the British. The RHQ had been neutralised and ‘A’ Squadron was under heavy attack on Point 213. Soon after the German attack had commenced, shortly after 0900, ‘A’ Squadron was left with nine tanks, two of which were Fireflies, and Cranleigh’s scout car. News had now filtered through to Cranleigh’s command group of the German attack on the east end Villers Bocage, which had effectively cut the regiment in two. It was reported that 1/7th Queens Battalion was going to attempt to fight through the town to relieve them. The Germans too around Point 213 were in a state of some confusion. They now only had four properly operating Tigers, and although infantry units were filtering through to aid them, Wittman was conspicuous by his absence. He was in fact reporting to his HQ to assess the situation.
At the western end of Villers, 1/7th Queens and ‘B’ Squadron prepared to act. Major Aird, now temporary CinC of the 4th CLY Sharpshooters, decided to infiltrate the town with infantry and then bring up ‘B’ Squadron. This is was hoped would provide the opportunity to rescue ‘A’ Squadron. However, ‘A’ Squadron’s situation deteriorated as the morning went on, and after mid-day further German tank activity was noted by Cranleigh and his troops. In fact, the Germans were concentrating some considerable force, particularly an ad hoc battle group from elements of Panzer Lehr. At 1235 Cranleigh requested smoke to cover a run for the town, but this failed and soon afterwards, Point 213 was recaptured by the Germans and Cranleigh and the survivors were taken prisoner.
By the early afternoon, tanks from ‘B’ Sqaudron (No.4 Troop, led by Sergeant Bill Cotton) had driven through the southern part of the town and having failed to cross the railway embankment, had positioned themselves in the main town square by the Mairie. 1/7th Queens were also positioned throughout Villers.
German forces began attempting to enter Villers, initially Panzer IVs of Panzer Lehr, but they lacked infantry support and the assault had stalled. However, Haupsturmfuhrer Ralf Mobius (1st Kompanie, 101 Heavy Tank Battalion and Wittman’s superior) led a force of Tigers into the town with limited infantry support. A group of four Tigers pressed down the main street but were ambushed by No.4 troop and a six pounder anti-tank gun from 1/7th Queens. Elsewhere, a force of three Tigers attempted to infiltrate the town from the east but were disabled by PIATs and 6-pdr a-t guns at very close range.
However, as the afternoon wore on more and more pressure was brought to bear by the Germans as they fed troops into Villers and 1/7th Queens were driven back Between 1700 and 2030 hours, the British withdrew from Villers-Bocage and set up a defensive ‘Brigade Box’ to the north-west of the town, but the position was deteriorating for the British in the sector and Operation Perch came to an end. Villers-Bocage was to suffer heavily as the own was pummelled by the RAF 2TAF (2nd Tactical Air Force). (strategy.demon.co.uk)
What precisely was supposed to be proven by Michael Wittmann's rampage through Villers-Bocage?
British Mistakes
Many historians seemed to have behaved as nothing more than bean counters, adding up the figures of losses on both sides and declaring the winner, without actually looking at other factors that would actually teach us some lessons about tactics and strategy.
In considering Michael Wittmann's "achievements" it must be remembered that the British made a number of errors to begin with.
First, they were moving across the enemy's front where he had heavy forces, without due regard to security and without a clear idea of the presence of the enemy. This was a highly dangerous position to be in.
Second, no proper recce was done, although to the A Squadron commander’s credit, he had made such a request but was denied.
Third, 22nd Armoured Brigade made a mistake by dividing its forces, dispersing its tank squadrons, AT troops and infantry companies. Whether for the attack or for the defence, this was unwise.
Fourth, A Squadron seemed completely oblivious to security, and stopping for a briefing and discussion in the middle of the battlefield was careless to say the least.
These could only be attributed to either complacency or inexperience on the part of the British - probably both.
Mitigating Factors
But there were mitigating factors.
First, while 22nd Armoured Brigade itself was a veteran unit, having fought in North Africa and Italy, but not all regiments within the Brigade itself was veteran. Some were very green indeed.
Second, the Allies had only been onshore for a week after D-Day. This not only meant that green units did not yet had the opportunity to learn the hard lessons of battle, there was also a certain degree of disorganisation.
Third, the urgency to expand the beachhead was perfectly understandable, and perhaps there was a certain need to throw cautions to the wind to seize as much terrain as possible.
Remember, historians have often criticised the British for not being bold and dashing enough to seize Caen on the go on 6 Jun 44. It seemed hardly fair to then turn around and criticise the British for behaving in the prescribed manner on 13 Jun.
Michael Wittmann’s Joy-Ride and the British’s Quick Reflex
Let's return to Michael Wittmann now. Blowing up so many tanks and stuff in and around Villers-Bocage was certainly quite impressive. But we've already seen that this could be attributed to the British lack of preparedness and carelessness. It hardly took skill to cut up a man caught without his sword and with his pants down.
Once British defences were properly set up, the Tiger tanks got nowhere. As we saw, larger forces of Tiger tanks achieved nothing for much of the afternoon of 13 Jun 44. Four Tigers managed to force their way into the village, but was stopped by British tanks and 6-pdr AT guns. Another group of three Tigers tried to infiltrate into the village, but was stopped by PIATs and 6-pdrs.
This hardly demonstrated the combat superiority of either the German soldiers or the Tiger tanks. Indeed, if the British defences had been as well organised in the morning, Michael Wittmann’s career might have ended right then and there instead of two months later at the hands of a British or Canadian tank.
What the episode did demonstrate was how quickly British forces learnt from their mistakes, and how swiftly they recovered from a disastrous morning and set up a skillful defence that stopped other – stronger – teams of Tigers. But this point was naturally ignored most of the time as they got in the way of a good story.
What was often ignored, too, was the fact that Michael Wittmann's rampage was brought to a rather inglorious halt by a little peepsqueak of a AT gun, and he and his crew had to bail out to escape on foot. Being knocked out by a 6-pdr was hardly something to boast about and was thus also conveniently left out of most accounts.
What was also often ignored was the fact that the German infantry with Michael Wittmann achieved little. They managed to infiltrate into the village but was soon thrown out by the British infantry. They could not exploit the carnage he was causing. This could be attributed to the fact that Michael Wittmann was off joy-riding instead of supporting the infantry in their attack. This was hardly behaviour expected of a skilled professional.
At that point in time, the Germans had the best opportunity to quickly seize the village. The battle could have ended right there and then with the village in German hands. Instead, as we've seen, this did not happen. Michael Wittmann's failure to support his infantry colleague meant that the British was allowed time to organise their defences.
The British remained very much in possession of the village after Michael Wittmann's "achievements". This forced the Germans to continue attacking it. Having now set up a proper defence, the British inflicted more losses on the Germans, including their supposedly "tough" Tiger tanks. After having inflicted a bloody nose on the Germans, the British then withdrew in an orderly fashion to more defensible terrain. All in all, the British did rather well after an embarrassing morning.
Conclusion
Michael Wittmann's legend was writ so large on everybody's mind that few seemed inclined to stop and think through what had happened on 13 Jun 44. Few saw that the British had reacted with great speed to a very dangerous situation and quickly formed a tough defence that inflicted casualties and losses on the Germans.
Even fewer seemed to have recognised that Michael Wittmann's joy-ride was actually an act of irresponsibility which resulted in higher German casualties and losses.
If this episode is a typical illustration of German combat abilities, it is clear that the Germans - even while more experienced and using better weapons - were uncoordinated in combat, that their expertens were prima donnas who disregarded their duty to support their fellow soldiers, and that the Germans took more casualties than necessary as a result.
If the morning had demonstrated British inexperience, the rest of the day demonstrated the incompetence of the Germans, the irresponsibility of Michael Wittmann's behaviour, and the underlying reason why the Germans' supposed tactical and combat superiority frequently failed to lead to battle victories.
Here are two accounts, with only minor differences in details:
At 0900 Wittmann's Tiger attacked. A few minutes later, in the direction of Caen, he destroyed three tanks; a Sherman Firefly and a Cromwell tank (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cromwell_tank) on the right and another tank on the left, proceeding to Villers without pause and attacking the lightly armored vehicles of The Rifle Brigade. During this engagement, he destroyed nine half-track vehicles, four Carden Loyd Carriers (http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Carden_Loyd_Carrier&action=edit), two other carriers, and two 6-pounder (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/QF_6_pdr) anti-tank guns, then destroyed three Stuart light tanks and one half-track vehicle. Entering Villers-Bocage alone, he destroyed three of the four Cromwells in position at the top of the Lemonnier farm.
He followed Clémenceau Street where his tank destroyed two Sherman command tanks of the 5th Royal Horse Artillery before knocking out another scout car and half-track. As Wittmann arrived at the Jeanne d'Arc (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeanne_d%27Arc) square, he ended up opposite the Sherman Firefly (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sherman_Firefly) of Sergeant Lockwood of "B" Squadron. The Firefly, whose 17-pounder (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ordnance_QF_17_pdr) was the only Allied main tank gun capable of defeating the frontal armour of a Tiger in most circumstances, fired four shells at Wittman. One hit the hull of the Tiger, which returned fire and knocked down a section of wall on the Sherman. Wittmann then made a half-turn, his tank lightly damaged, and returned down Clémenceau Street. The Cromwell tank of Captain Dyas that had not been destroyed, confronted him, firing two 75mm shells, failing to harm the Tiger. Wittmann put the Cromwell out of action with one shot.
As Wittmann proceeded on the road leaving Villers-Bocage, his left track was hit by a 6-pdr shell, forcing him to stop on the street in front of the Huet-Godefroy store. Wittman engaged targets in range. Thinking that the Tiger might be salvaged and repaired later, Wittmann and crew abandoned the tank without destroying it, leaving the area on foot but without weapons. (Wikipedia)
There have been many conflicting accounts published about SS-Obersturmfuehrer Michael Wittman’s (http://www.strategos.demon.co.uk/D-Day/Wittmann.htm) almost single-handed battle at Villers-Bocage which successfully stopped a British armoured advance by the 22nd Armoured Brigade, part of the 7th Armoured Division. The following is perhaps the most likely sequence of events, which emphasises German tactical superiority, whilst not elevating the role played by Wittman to ludicrous heights
Phase One began when the 22nd Armoured Brigade, with 4th County of London Yeomanry (Sharpshooters) in the lead, were ordered to capture the important road junction of Villers-Bocage and the high ground beyond (Point 213) on the morning of June 13th. Lt-Colonel Arthur, the Viscount Cranleigh, the commanding officer, had requested time to carry out a proper reconnaissance of the area as German armoured cars had been spotted observing the advance south from Tilly-sur-Seulles. Orders were, however, to push on regardless (which, apart from the immediate aim, accorded with the Allies’ overall strategy of keeping the German armour away from the American front). Leaving the regimental HQ tanks at the top of the main street in Villers, ‘A’ Squadron was ordered forward to secure Point 213 about two km north-east up N175. On reaching Point 213, ‘A’ Squadron halted and the commanders, Cranleigh included, decided upon a staff discussion and briefing. Some British troops even began to brew up, thinking the area was safe. Indeed, XXX Corps intelligence had no idea of the real opposition in the area.
In fact, all was not well, for the British had advanced out of Villers to Point 213, past a force of heavy Tiger tanks commanded by veteran tank killer Michael Wittman. He had six Tigers at his disposal, plus assorted other troops and vehicles, positioned some 200 metres to the south of the N175. The British were completely unaware of the Germans’ presence.
Wittman launched his attack catching the British completely off guard. The Tigers of his force engaged ‘A’ Squadron and the motorised ‘A’ infantry company. There was little they could do, and the Cromwells and Fireflies were soon in trouble.
Meanwhile, Wittman set off in a Tiger and cut in behind ‘A’ Squadron and began an assault in the British forces in Villers itself. He engaged infantry forces, light reconnaissance Stuart tanks, unarmed artillery observation tanks and eventually the regimental HQ Cromwells, under the temporary command of Major Carr. Carr attempted to engage Wittman’s tank but the 75mm shells bounced off and Carr’s tank was destroyed. The other Cromwells were also despatched, except for Captain Pat Dyas’s vehicle. He backed off the road and Wittman did not spot him as he drove past though the town. German infantry had also started to filter into the eastern end of the town in support of Witmman’s attack. Wittman continued his advance engaging the scattered remnants of the RHQ group. Dyas pursued him down the street, hoping to shoot the Tiger in the rear.
Retreating British elements informed ‘B’ Squadron of the situation and Wittman soon found himself in a duel with a Firefly commanded by Sergeant Lockwood at the western end of the town. Witmman then began to withdraw, engaging the luckless Dyas en route. Dyas also obtained a hit on the Tiger, but to no avail and Dyas’s Cromwell was soon knocked out. As Wittman moved back through the town his Tiger was immobilised by a 6-pdr anti-tank gun at very close range and Wittman and his crew escaped on foot.
Nevertheless, the situation was grim for the British. The RHQ had been neutralised and ‘A’ Squadron was under heavy attack on Point 213. Soon after the German attack had commenced, shortly after 0900, ‘A’ Squadron was left with nine tanks, two of which were Fireflies, and Cranleigh’s scout car. News had now filtered through to Cranleigh’s command group of the German attack on the east end Villers Bocage, which had effectively cut the regiment in two. It was reported that 1/7th Queens Battalion was going to attempt to fight through the town to relieve them. The Germans too around Point 213 were in a state of some confusion. They now only had four properly operating Tigers, and although infantry units were filtering through to aid them, Wittman was conspicuous by his absence. He was in fact reporting to his HQ to assess the situation.
At the western end of Villers, 1/7th Queens and ‘B’ Squadron prepared to act. Major Aird, now temporary CinC of the 4th CLY Sharpshooters, decided to infiltrate the town with infantry and then bring up ‘B’ Squadron. This is was hoped would provide the opportunity to rescue ‘A’ Squadron. However, ‘A’ Squadron’s situation deteriorated as the morning went on, and after mid-day further German tank activity was noted by Cranleigh and his troops. In fact, the Germans were concentrating some considerable force, particularly an ad hoc battle group from elements of Panzer Lehr. At 1235 Cranleigh requested smoke to cover a run for the town, but this failed and soon afterwards, Point 213 was recaptured by the Germans and Cranleigh and the survivors were taken prisoner.
By the early afternoon, tanks from ‘B’ Sqaudron (No.4 Troop, led by Sergeant Bill Cotton) had driven through the southern part of the town and having failed to cross the railway embankment, had positioned themselves in the main town square by the Mairie. 1/7th Queens were also positioned throughout Villers.
German forces began attempting to enter Villers, initially Panzer IVs of Panzer Lehr, but they lacked infantry support and the assault had stalled. However, Haupsturmfuhrer Ralf Mobius (1st Kompanie, 101 Heavy Tank Battalion and Wittman’s superior) led a force of Tigers into the town with limited infantry support. A group of four Tigers pressed down the main street but were ambushed by No.4 troop and a six pounder anti-tank gun from 1/7th Queens. Elsewhere, a force of three Tigers attempted to infiltrate the town from the east but were disabled by PIATs and 6-pdr a-t guns at very close range.
However, as the afternoon wore on more and more pressure was brought to bear by the Germans as they fed troops into Villers and 1/7th Queens were driven back Between 1700 and 2030 hours, the British withdrew from Villers-Bocage and set up a defensive ‘Brigade Box’ to the north-west of the town, but the position was deteriorating for the British in the sector and Operation Perch came to an end. Villers-Bocage was to suffer heavily as the own was pummelled by the RAF 2TAF (2nd Tactical Air Force). (strategy.demon.co.uk)
What precisely was supposed to be proven by Michael Wittmann's rampage through Villers-Bocage?
British Mistakes
Many historians seemed to have behaved as nothing more than bean counters, adding up the figures of losses on both sides and declaring the winner, without actually looking at other factors that would actually teach us some lessons about tactics and strategy.
In considering Michael Wittmann's "achievements" it must be remembered that the British made a number of errors to begin with.
First, they were moving across the enemy's front where he had heavy forces, without due regard to security and without a clear idea of the presence of the enemy. This was a highly dangerous position to be in.
Second, no proper recce was done, although to the A Squadron commander’s credit, he had made such a request but was denied.
Third, 22nd Armoured Brigade made a mistake by dividing its forces, dispersing its tank squadrons, AT troops and infantry companies. Whether for the attack or for the defence, this was unwise.
Fourth, A Squadron seemed completely oblivious to security, and stopping for a briefing and discussion in the middle of the battlefield was careless to say the least.
These could only be attributed to either complacency or inexperience on the part of the British - probably both.
Mitigating Factors
But there were mitigating factors.
First, while 22nd Armoured Brigade itself was a veteran unit, having fought in North Africa and Italy, but not all regiments within the Brigade itself was veteran. Some were very green indeed.
Second, the Allies had only been onshore for a week after D-Day. This not only meant that green units did not yet had the opportunity to learn the hard lessons of battle, there was also a certain degree of disorganisation.
Third, the urgency to expand the beachhead was perfectly understandable, and perhaps there was a certain need to throw cautions to the wind to seize as much terrain as possible.
Remember, historians have often criticised the British for not being bold and dashing enough to seize Caen on the go on 6 Jun 44. It seemed hardly fair to then turn around and criticise the British for behaving in the prescribed manner on 13 Jun.
Michael Wittmann’s Joy-Ride and the British’s Quick Reflex
Let's return to Michael Wittmann now. Blowing up so many tanks and stuff in and around Villers-Bocage was certainly quite impressive. But we've already seen that this could be attributed to the British lack of preparedness and carelessness. It hardly took skill to cut up a man caught without his sword and with his pants down.
Once British defences were properly set up, the Tiger tanks got nowhere. As we saw, larger forces of Tiger tanks achieved nothing for much of the afternoon of 13 Jun 44. Four Tigers managed to force their way into the village, but was stopped by British tanks and 6-pdr AT guns. Another group of three Tigers tried to infiltrate into the village, but was stopped by PIATs and 6-pdrs.
This hardly demonstrated the combat superiority of either the German soldiers or the Tiger tanks. Indeed, if the British defences had been as well organised in the morning, Michael Wittmann’s career might have ended right then and there instead of two months later at the hands of a British or Canadian tank.
What the episode did demonstrate was how quickly British forces learnt from their mistakes, and how swiftly they recovered from a disastrous morning and set up a skillful defence that stopped other – stronger – teams of Tigers. But this point was naturally ignored most of the time as they got in the way of a good story.
What was often ignored, too, was the fact that Michael Wittmann's rampage was brought to a rather inglorious halt by a little peepsqueak of a AT gun, and he and his crew had to bail out to escape on foot. Being knocked out by a 6-pdr was hardly something to boast about and was thus also conveniently left out of most accounts.
What was also often ignored was the fact that the German infantry with Michael Wittmann achieved little. They managed to infiltrate into the village but was soon thrown out by the British infantry. They could not exploit the carnage he was causing. This could be attributed to the fact that Michael Wittmann was off joy-riding instead of supporting the infantry in their attack. This was hardly behaviour expected of a skilled professional.
At that point in time, the Germans had the best opportunity to quickly seize the village. The battle could have ended right there and then with the village in German hands. Instead, as we've seen, this did not happen. Michael Wittmann's failure to support his infantry colleague meant that the British was allowed time to organise their defences.
The British remained very much in possession of the village after Michael Wittmann's "achievements". This forced the Germans to continue attacking it. Having now set up a proper defence, the British inflicted more losses on the Germans, including their supposedly "tough" Tiger tanks. After having inflicted a bloody nose on the Germans, the British then withdrew in an orderly fashion to more defensible terrain. All in all, the British did rather well after an embarrassing morning.
Conclusion
Michael Wittmann's legend was writ so large on everybody's mind that few seemed inclined to stop and think through what had happened on 13 Jun 44. Few saw that the British had reacted with great speed to a very dangerous situation and quickly formed a tough defence that inflicted casualties and losses on the Germans.
Even fewer seemed to have recognised that Michael Wittmann's joy-ride was actually an act of irresponsibility which resulted in higher German casualties and losses.
If this episode is a typical illustration of German combat abilities, it is clear that the Germans - even while more experienced and using better weapons - were uncoordinated in combat, that their expertens were prima donnas who disregarded their duty to support their fellow soldiers, and that the Germans took more casualties than necessary as a result.
If the morning had demonstrated British inexperience, the rest of the day demonstrated the incompetence of the Germans, the irresponsibility of Michael Wittmann's behaviour, and the underlying reason why the Germans' supposed tactical and combat superiority frequently failed to lead to battle victories.