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hist2004
03-17-2004, 04:41 PM
I came across this article...interesting analysis...let me know what you guys think.

The Korean conflict is over, but Cold War warriors refuse to accept this reality because they need a “threat.” In 1994, the Military-Industrialist worked the media and politicians into a war hysteria which almost caused President Clinton to order air strikes in North Korea. In his book “Hazardous Duty,” retired Colonel David Hackworth describes his trip to Korea in which he uncovered this phony threat. Fortunately, former President Jimmy Carter heard the war drums and flew to North Korea as a private citizen and ended the phantom crisis.

When Pentagon officials talk about the need to maintain a “two-war” capability, they often refer to Korea. This is absurd since South Korea can crush North Korea without American help. North Korea’s million-man army may look impressive on paper, but remember that Iraq had a million-man army, which also had modern equipment, combat experience, and plenty of fuel.

In contrast, North Korean soldiers suffer from malnutrition and rarely train due to a scarcity of fuel and ammo. Most North Korean soldiers could not attack because they are needed to defend the entire DMZ and coastal approaches (they remember the 1950 landing at Inchon) while entire divisions must remain throughout North Korea to fend off heliborne offensives, food riots, and probable coups.

On the other hand, the entire 700,000 man South Korean active duty army can be devoted to the defense of Seoul. The modern South Korean army is backed by over 5,000,000 well-trained reservists who can be called to duty in hours. South Korea has twice the population of the North, thirty times its economic power, and spends three times more on its military each year. South Korean military equipment is first class whereas most of the North Korean military equipment is over 30 years old and much is inoperable due to a lack of maintenance. If war broke out, South Korea has a massive industrial capacity and $94 billion in foreign currency reserves to sustain a war, while North Korea has no industry and no money. As a result, South Korea is roughly five times more powerful than North Korea.

If North Korea insanely attacked, the South Koreans would fight on mountainous and urban terrain which heavily favors defense, and complete air superiority would shoot up anything the North Koreans put on the road. Assuming the North Koreans could start up a thousand of their old tanks and armored vehicles, they cannot advance through the mountainous DMZ. The South Koreans have fortified, mined, and physically blocked all avenues through these mountains, and it would take North Korean infantry and engineers weeks to clear road paths while under fire.

The North Korean military could gain a few thousand meters with human wave assaults into minefields and concrete fortifications. However, these attacks would bog down from heavy casualties, and a lack of food and ammo resupply. Fighting would be bloody as thousands of South Korean and American troops and civilians suffer from North Korean artillery and commando attacks. Nevertheless, the North Korean army would be unable to breakthrough or move supplies forward. Even if North Korea magically broke through, all military analysts scoff at the idea that the North Koreans could bridge large rivers or move tons of supplies forward while under attack from American airpower.

It is important to remember that the last Korean war involved Chinese forces supported by North Koreans with the latest Soviet equipment and supplies. China and Russia no longer aid North Korea and trade openly with South Korea. Thousands of Chinese soldiers guard the Yalu River to prevent crossings by starving North Koreans. North Korean soldiers no longer train for war, but spend most hours harvesting crops, while their old aircraft and ancient tanks sit idle from a lack of fuel and parts. In 1999, Lt. Gen. Patrick Hughes, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told Congress that discipline in the North Korean army had collapsed, and that refugees report soldiers stealing food at gun point. Nighttime satellite pictures reveal few lights in the North because of a lack of electricity.

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States. North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA. North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution.

The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive. A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

However, South Korean leaders would be distressed about economic losses and the cost of occupying the North. They would have little incentive to overrun North Korea quickly if 450,000 free spending American GIs with billions of dollars in American military aid were on the way. Rather than quickly overrunning the North, South Korean leaders may demobilize some units to restart its economy. Hopefully, Americans will realize that something is wrong when infantrymen from Kansas are deployed to invade North Korea while infantrymen from Seoul are sent home. Perhaps they will recall the logic of President Lyndon Johnson who said in 1964 that he was “not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing themselves.” If South Koreans are unwilling to defend their nation from poverty stricken cousins from the North, why should Americans defend them? The USA imports no vital resources from Korea; the consumer items imported from South Korea are readily available elsewhere.

Chinese participation is extremely unlikely since China is busy with its free enterprise transformation while ensuring domestic tranquility. In fact, stopping thousands of starving North Korean refugees from crossing their border has become a major problem, although the Chinese refuse to spend any of their billions of dollars in US trade surpluses to purchase food for their old ally. Korea has no natural resources which interest China, and Chinese support would cause a major war with powerful South Korea, the United States, and probably Japan and Taiwan. On the other hand, a prosperous Korea provides a buffer against China’s traditional enemy - Japan.

The US Army must adapt to the end of the Cold War in Asia and stop wasting millions of dollars on new military construction projects in Korea. Second, the North Koreans have stated that the 37,000 American troops must go before peace talks can progress. (Imagine how South Korea would feel if 37,000 Russian troops were based in North Korea.) Many South Koreans know that American troops are no longer needed and anti-American base protests are common.

The United States must support peace efforts by announcing that 17,000 soldiers will withdraw from South Korea within two years. The US Army could move the headquarters for the 2nd Infantry Division and one combat brigade to Washington State to join two combat brigades at Fort Lewis to form a solid combat-ready division near Pacific ports. This would allow the US Army to close several camps in Korea, which would eliminate several thousand military and civilian base support billets, and save millions of dollars each year from base operations and overseas shipments. Pulling 17,000 soldiers from Korea will also increase morale and readiness since most Korea positions are filled with one-year unaccompanied tours.

This would leave one combat brigade in Korea, which could become part of the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. This brigade and two US Air Force wings could remain as a symbolic presence of 20,000 American troops until a peace agreement is formalized. The billions of dollars saved could be used to improve Army readiness and the thousands of support personnel freed could fill gaps in other units. Army Generals may dispute savings by pointing to the $333 million a year in “burden sharing” by the South Korean government. However, not one penny of this money is paid to the US military, but goes to Koreans for land rent and some base services.

If the US military pulled 17,000 soldiers out of Korea, there is no reason why this contribution must shrink. South Korea spends less of it’s GDP on its military each year than the United States. The US Army has complained about maintaining Patriot missile batteries and Apache attack helicopters in South Korea; a burden it imposed on itself in 1994. Meanwhile, South Korea has refused to purchase these advanced weapons with the billions of dollars in annual trade surpluses with the United States. If South Korea is truly concerned about the North Korean threat, it has the resources to expand its military and buy the latest military equipment from the United States.

The Center for Defense Information estimates that US military business injects almost $5 billion a year into the South Korean economy. Shifting some of this activity to Fort Lewis would spur economic activity in Washington State. Closing unneeded overseas bases is far cheaper than domestic bases and the economic impact is actually positive as spending shifts to American communities. However, this will be opposed in Washington DC as lobbyists representing Korea and certain corporations politic to keep “their” bases open, and by Army Generals seeking to retain an outdated mission.

The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely. North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of success without major backing from China or Russia. The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea. The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a combined team to the Olympics. Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to the starving North Koreans. The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.

It may take many years for the two Koreas to unite, meanwhile the USA can contribute to peace and save billions of dollars by starting a withdrawal of forces. The US Army can increase its ability to deploy expeditionary forces in Asia by cutting infrastructure in Korea and forming a solid division at Fort Lewis. The USA already has a huge logistical infrastructure in Japan, Hawaii and Guam, it doesn't need bases in Korea. American forces should continue to train with South Korea, but the $5 billion a year military base subsidy to South Korea must end. Unfortunately, lying about the Korean situation has become a cornerstone of the Pentagon's effort to boost military spending beyond Cold War levels.

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

Seoulstriker
03-17-2004, 04:50 PM
Hist2004,

thank you for the fantastic article. surprisingly, it has changed my perspective on the entire situation. i had always imagined the north korean million man army to be a formidable threat as it was the only thing maintained by the government.

still, kim-jung mentally-ill might be crazy enough to launch nukes at SK for the sake of it. but i guess the raw military power isn't needed.

do you have a counter-point article? :)

Maverick77
03-17-2004, 04:56 PM
remember that Iraq had a million-man army, which also had modern equipment, combat experience, and plenty of fuel

Iraqis had 400 000 men 50 000 which would acctually stick around to fire a shot in a conventional war.

If you call 40 year old equipment modern then ok.

Yes the Iraqis had combat experience, theyd experienced loss.

The iraqis were still totally uncordinated and unable to put up any type of useful resistance.

Operation Ivy
03-17-2004, 05:18 PM
Very Interesting Read, i do agree though that the US should pull out of SK

Falco
03-17-2004, 05:24 PM
Good article ! It was interesting.

I love Rachael Leigh Cook
03-17-2004, 06:28 PM
hist2004, I have read some of your other contributions elsewhere on this forum, and believe you to be a military scholar of some merit, quite apart from most of the other drivel posted here. Therefore, I think you should know better than to post a complete article without acknowledging the author or source, which in this case I believe to be a Jan 2001 editorial by Carlton Meyer posted on his website www.g2mil.com. I say believe because I am only 90% sure and the article has since been taken off-line. These little details are rather important if you are seeking any kind of serious discussion and analysis don't you think?

As for the article itself, Mr. Meyer is certainly very knowledgeble and experienced in his field, but he most certainly has an agenda to push(and thus my nitpick about the source), which is detailed on his website. I must say that most of his editorials are very insightful and a joy to read.

2Sheds_Jackson
03-17-2004, 06:29 PM
I agree that the US should work towards letting the South defend itself. The problem of course is that they didn't do a great job of it before.

The article is a bit misleading - it says basically that we don't need to militarily prepare for attack because it's not needed - and even if they did attack, not much would happen because, well, we've prepared for it.

Seoul is within range of artillery fired from the North. They don't need to start a single tank to destroy the heart of the South. And with nukes, it would only take a couple of shots. It doesn't need ICBMs - it can just put nukes in an artillery shell & go to town. Depending upon the demented trolls in power in the North to act rationally would be a disaster. They've proved time and again that they're not playing by any rule book. One only has to look at the Korean war, treatment of prisoners, the Pueblo Incident & accompanying torture, ficticious cities built just for show, DMZ hacking murders of US servicemen (Paul Bunyan incident), abduction of people from S. Korea & Japan. They're absolutely nuts.

I think more likely than an attack would be a nuclear North holding the South hostage. Or a nuclear North selling nukes to support its economy. It's a threat that cannot be ignored. But with Asia's economy rolling along, shouldn't the South & other regional powers be picking up the ball & running with it?

can you find the underdeveloped economy in this picture? Note that Seoul's suburbs extend right up to the DMZ.
http://members.tripod.com/~RickinBham/Korea_Earthlights.jpg

hist2004
03-17-2004, 06:38 PM
The author didn't give as much to the following as I would have:

North Korea is one of the world leaders in fielding Special Operations Forces (SOF). It is estimated that this force totals or exceeds 121,500 soldiers. They are organized into 22 light infantry type brigades and 7 independent light infantry battalions. They are charged with five basic missions: conducting reconnaissance, performing combat operations in conjunction with conventional operations, establishing a second front in South Korea’s rear areas, countering ROK/US special operations forces in north Korea’s rear area, and maintaining internal security.
STRATEGIC LEVEL OPERATIONS
Strategic level missions include the seizure and/or destruction of ROK/US strategic/theater command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3I), and NBC warfare assets. More specifically, the assassination or abduction of ROK/US political leaders, senior military commanders, and acts of terrorism. They may also conduct raids against US Air Force airfields in Japan and against military installations in Hawaii. Missions of a strategic level are controlled by the President of north Korea, Kim Chong-Il, the Central People’s Committee, and other national level agencies.
OPERATIONAL
Operational level missions consist of the seizure and destruction of major military targets (airfields, naval bases, port facilities, POL storage facilities, missile sites, etc.) within the rear area. They may also be used to interdict the arrival of ROK and U.S. reinforcements and supplies for forces deployed south of the DMZ. Operational missions support the advancement of regular north Korean ground forces and are controlled by VII Special Purpose Corps (also known as the Light Infantry Training and Guidance Bureau) and the Forward Corps reconnaissance section.
TACTICAL
These missions are controlled by the Forward Corps intelligence office. Missions include assaults against, and control of, major fortified defensive positions, envelopment operations, or flanking attacks in support of regular ground force units. Light Infantry units may also augment corps and division reconnaissance elements by conducting diversionary and unconventional warfare operations.
As we prepare for and are committed to battle, the Dragon Force will face numerous Special Operations Force (SOF) teams conducting operational and tactical level missions.
LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADES
The north Korean military began fielding light infantry brigades in 1969 when the VII Special Purpose Corps (SPC) was established. By the time fielding was completed, there were 22 light infantry brigades (14 assigned to the VII SPC and 8 assigned to the forward corps). As with most of the north Korean army, most of the brigades operate close to the DMZ. Therefore, they are often attached to the Forward Corps in which they are located. Each brigade is comprised of approximately 5,200 soldiers. Members of light infantry brigades are known to be politically reliable and have served four to seven years in combat branches. Light Infantry forces are typically assigned the following missions:
o Infiltrate 35 - 70 Km from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
o Infiltrate and seize or destroy nuclear, C3I, chemical or missile assets.
o Infiltrate and disrupt or destroy sensitive facilities (especially airfields and POL)
o Infiltrate enemy defensive positions in order to conduct enveloping, or flanking attacks in support of regular ground forces.
o Infiltrate and seize, or interdict, control of major lines of communications, preventing the arrival of reinforcements or supplies to ROK and U.S. units.
o Infiltrate enemy defenses to seize and control of important terrain features and civilian facilities (i.e. dams, power plants, etc.).
o Act as reconnaissance assets to support corps and divisions.
o Act as a rear guard and delaying force, during withdrawal operations, to harass the enemy by destroying bridges, tunnels, power grids, etc..
TACTICS
During combat operations SOF are typically attired in civilian clothing. You can also expect to see them dressed in ROK or American military uniforms. SOF personnel are trained to operate in the smallest size unit possible. It is likely that we will encounter teams operating with as few as three to five personnel. Guerrilla bands will be established to harass us and to provide intelligence back to their higher headquarters. Infiltration will normally occur at night or during hours of limited visibility, with the assistance of military personnel familiar with the DMZ. Small units will cross the DMZ on foot or tunnels suspected to lay under the DMZ, by small assault landing craft, midget submarine, and specially designed high-speed boats resembling civilian fishing craft.
EQUIPMENT
The equipment carried by SOF personnel varies depending on their mission. Since they are force to sustain themselves after being infiltrating, what they can carry is limited. Typical equipment consists of knives, silenced pistols, AK-47 or M-16 rifles, hand grenades / demolition equipment (often carried around their own bodies to prevent capture), rocket launchers (RPG-7 or AT-3) and 60mm mortars. It is likely that these soldiers carry the best equipment available to the north Korean military. If you encounter a SOF team, pay careful attention to the type of equipment - it will help the intelligence section determine what type of unit we are fighting.
AIRBORNE / AIRMOBILE BRIGADES
The airborne/airmobile infantry brigades provide north Korea with the capability to project combat forces deep into the South Korean rear area. North Korean airborne/airmobile units have missions similar to their American counterparts:
o Seize and control bridges, amphibious and river crossing sites.
o Seize and destroy government command and control facilities.
o Seize and destroy critical logistic facilities and mass destruction weapons.
o Seize and control tactical targets such as airfields.
o Conduct raids and guerrilla activities in enemy rear areas.
o Conduct operations in support of South Korean insurgent groups.
o Conduct operations preventing the movement of enemy reserves and supplies.
o Conduct link-up operations with conventional and unconventional units.
o Conduct operations to rescue encircled units, provide for their resupply and assist in engineering activities.
TACTICS
Airborne
Airborne infiltrations will be conducted by low-flying aircraft (namely the AN-2 Colt and the MD-500 helicopter). The AN-2 Colt is a propeller-driven biplane which is made from cloth and wood, making it virtually invisible to radar. The AN-2 can transport ten fully loaded passengers for 300 Km and the MD-500 can move four for 600 Km. The South Korean military also uses the MD-500, it is likely that north Korean aircraft will have South Korean markings in an attempt to make infiltration easier.
North Korean airborne operations are normally organized into assault, follow-on, and rear area echelons. The main force of the assault will be preceded by a reconnaissance element and a small airborne force (possibly with artillery and anti-armor assets) to secure the LZ/DZ for the main force. The main force carries out the expansion of the LZ/DZ to exploit resources. The follow-on echelon lands four to six hours later with the support units. Personnel normally carry a three to four day supply of ammunition and rations since aerial resupply is unlikely. Movement to the LZ/DZ is normally conducted using two or three routes with fighter aircraft in support. Dummy drops are conducted as part of a deception plan. Air drops are almost always conducted during hours of limited visibility.
Airmobile
These operations are conducted using a variety of helicopters. Usually airmobile operations draw personnel from a corps’ light infantry brigade. Missions are conducted as deep as 50 km from the FLOT, but 15 to 20 km is more common due to the support of forward ground unit’s artillery. Units will land directly on their target if possible. Once on the ground, units conduct operations using standard infantry tactics.
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
Aircraft Troops Range
AN-2 Colt 10 300 km
MD-500 4 600 km
MI-2 Hoplite 8-10 340-580 km
MI-4 Hound 12-16 120 km
MI-8 Hip 24 795 km

SNIPER/RECONNAISSANCE BRIGADES
The Sniper/Reconnaissance Brigades are the elite of the nKPA special operations forces. Their chain of command runs from their individual brigade to the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces. During peacetime these units are subordinate to and under operational control of the reconnaissance section of the corps headquarters in which they are deployed. During wartime, control of these units changes to the VII Special Purpose Corps.
MISSIONS
o Conduct "direct action" operations primarily concerned with the assassination or abduction of enemy military personnel and civilians, during peace and wartime.
o Conduct diversionary operations to seize and destroy strategic objectives that cannot be destroyed by conventional means
o conduct operations to create confusion and panic in rear areas (performing sniper missions, posing as military police and routing traffic along the wrong roads and into waiting ambushes, etc.).
o Conduct reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations (military and political).
o Provide support for other SOF operations by conducting pre-mission reconnaissance, raids, ambushes, etc.
o Conduct counter-guerrilla operations.
o Provide military training and assistance to foreign governments, revolutionary organizations, and terrorist groups.

PERSONNEL
Reconnaissance personnel are selected from each branch of the army as well as from other SOF brigades. One brigade is made of only women, it is known as the "Peony Brigade". Reconnaissance personnel are thought to be able to speak in English.
TRAINING
In addition to the normal SOF training of 12-24 weeks, reconnaissance brigade personnel attend an additional 3-18 months of guerrilla warfare training. This training consists of urban or rural guerrilla warfare, counter-insurgency, internal security, VIP kidnapping and assassination techniques, psychological warfare, use of explosives, communications, document forgery, etc.
TACTICS
Operations are carried out while reconnaissance brigade personnel are disguised in South Korean or American Army uniforms or civilian clothing. During combat operations the basic element is the reconnaissance team of 10 personnel, but during special operations the basic operational unit appears to be teams of three, five, or seven men. A reconnaissance and search element is composed of one or more of the following specialized teams: clearing and scouting, raiding, capture, security (with snipers), interdiction, and destruction. The mission of the clearing and scouting team is to traverse obstacles, conduct raids, and cover other teams. A raiding team raids the objective while the destruction team destroys the objective. The difference in the two teams is the destruction teams expertise with explosives. The capture team takes prisoners, finds enemy documents, and other material of intelligence value. The security team provides security through the use of snipers. An interdiction team deceives the enemy, disrupts reinforcements, and blocks enemy pursuit with obstacles.
EQUIPMENT
Team members carry equipment dependent upon their mission and situation. Standard equipment includes: AK-47/M-16 rifles, RPG-7/AT-3, flame throwers, antipersonnel mines, obstacle marking gear, and 60mm mortars.

INDEPENDENT LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS
These units train with, and work for, a specific division or corps. The individual soldier was trained with all other light infantry personnel before being assigned to this unit. The units missions are similar to those of other light infantry units, but are tailored to the needs of the parent unit. They include:
o Small unit infiltration 15 to 35 km from the FEBA.
o Assaults on battalion, brigade, and division command posts.
o Seizure of key terrain (i.e. bridges, tunnels, and defiles).
o Assaults on airfields, heliports, and artillery positions.
o Locate and destroy POL and supply storage facilities.

EQUIPMENT
Combat equipment carried is mission dependent. Each battalion probably has 60mm mortars, numerous RPG-7s, AT-3s and SA-7s
TYPE OF UNIT DEPTH (From FEBA)
Light Infantry Brigade 35 - 70 km
Airborne Brigade Throughout the ROK
Air Assault Brigade 50 km or less (15 - 20 km norm)
Independent Light Inf Bn 15 - 35 km
AMPHIBIOUS BRIGADE
North Korea has two amphibious light infantry brigades. These units provide the government with the capability to conduct amphibious operations in order to develop a two-front war. With only two brigades, any north Korean amphibious operation would be limited to a small, poorly defended target.
TACTICS
Missions are conducted using large boats capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots. These boats will travel roughly 100 km out to sea before turning south for the ROK. Before the infantry comes ashore, security teams are dispatched to check the landing sight. The security teams depart from the main body about 5 km from the shore in a small watercraft (i.e. rubber raft, small speedboat, etc.). After reaching the shore their mission is clear the immediate landing area and then return to the main body. The main body usually conducts their landing operations between 2200 and 2400.
GUERRILLA OPERATIONS
The north Korean government considers guerrilla warfare a necessary component of the revolutionary struggle. Guerrilla warfare is considered to be both a form of warfare and a continuation of defined political goals. Depending on the origin of these groups and their missions, the guerrillas are organized into units ranging in size from less than a platoon all the way up to a regiment. Conventional units may form guerrilla units, using soldiers from their unit, for a limited time. These units are used to establish and aid local guerrilla forces, conducting long-range reconnaissance, and conducting special operations in support of the parent unit. After completing the mission, the soldiers return to their original duty. These soldiers are also used to convert dispersed and defeated conventional units into long-range guerrilla units. Enemy rebel groups are recruited into the guerrilla force by disrupting them with propaganda and coercion. Also, former prisoners are often politically indoctrinated into guerrilla units.
MISSIONS
o Conduct operations to carry out political and military objectives by organizing the masses.
o Conduct operations to assist guerrilla units throughout South Korea.
o Conduct operations to "heighten revolutionary spirit" and be the role model for the masses.
o Conduct operations to destroy small enemy units and harass larger units.
o Conduct guerrilla operations in support of conventional units.
o Conduct espionage, terrorist activities, propaganda campaigns, and sabotage missions.
o Conduct operations to instigate riots, destroy property, and aid deserters.

TACTICS
The guerrilla units will attempt to force the population to carry out political tasks and into advocating armed insurgency. To seize control of the situation, guerrilla units will capitalize on any confusion among dispersed enemy troops, any lack of cooperation from the local populace toward the ROK/US forces, and any lack of experience in our leadership. The guerrillas will attempt to create a struggle of the masses and reinforce their forces using newly formed and trained units. Guerrilla units will avoid the strong and attack the weak.

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

hist2004
03-17-2004, 06:58 PM
Sorry for not including the authors name, I wasn't trying to omit it on purpose, as the article can be quickly looked up on the Web. Again my
apologies...

http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

I love Rachael Leigh Cook
03-17-2004, 07:18 PM
Upon reflection, I find that my previous post came off as sounding rather harsh, especially since I am little more than a lurker on this forum. Please think nothing more of it. I greatly enjoyed your thread on the Spetznaz and have nothing but respect for your writings.