Citadel Offensive

[Lt. Wittmann]

In June of 1943 the Germans launched their last great offensive on the Eastern Front: Operation Citadel. It was a last ditch effort to thwart the ever- growing threat posed by the Soviet Military. Everything about it was massive, and it culminated in the largest tank battle ever, that of Prokhorovka. Many consider this the death knell of the German army on the Eastern Front and I am just curious as to what others think.

[Canuck Farrier]

I think they would have done better using all of the men and equiptment defensivley It was such a waste of good veteran troops and good equiptment there was a large representation of good waffen ss troops and regular army The Luftwaffe was also present in force with good planes and pilots.The Russians could more easily replace equiptment losses than Germany could.It is easy for us to look back at how things unfolded but in their times things were uncertain and they believed they could be victorious.I think the Russian campaign was useless alltogether they should have used all the extra men and equiptment in North Africa and to defend the rest of their occupied Europe.Not that i wanted them to win.It would have been smarter on their part not to invade Russia.

[gaijinsamurai]

I agree with canuck farrier. Basically, the war was lost for Germany once Hitler decided to invade the USSR. Of course, there were hundreds of other decisions which made matters worse for Germany (letting Goring screw over the 6th Army at Stalingrad, waiting until June '41 to launch Barbarossa, treating potential allies in the Ukraine/Beylorussia, etc. as "untermensch, micro-managing his generals and field marshals, etc., etc., etc.,)

[TheRussian1]

It is easy to say now that the offensive should never have been launched....but it was the Wermacht's last chance to deliver a crushing victory over the Red Army which would actually have some strategic meaning. The Kursk salient was a juicy target...and the German high command had trouble believing that the Red Army had improved so much over the past year and had been to very succesfully replace tank and gun losses. To summerize, I think the operation was a fairly realistic courseof action given the then current events, although ofcourse the sever numer of men, tanks and airplanes lost could have been used to slow down the soviet offensives for Kharkov and Orel.

[TheRussian1]

http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/pictures/elefant1.jpg

elephantsv at Kursk....scary!

[duck]

Manstein had actually been planning a "backhand" offensive instead of a head-on clash. This would have included major German withdrawals to lure the Russian armor forward and then pinning them against the Sea of Azov.

[Ea$y-8]

I will just wait for Kitsune (our greatest WWII expert) to find this thread.

[Lt. Wittmann]

Manstein had actually been planning a "backhand" offensive instead of a head-on clash. This would have included major German withdrawals to lure the Russian armor forward and then pinning them against the Sea of Azov.

True, Manstein did have a good understanding of fluid battle tactics as the Blitzkrieg demanded, and he was also pushing for withdrawals so he could pull another Kharkov, but those defensive tactics would have just hampered the Germans more in the long run. The retreat and counter-attck method would have boiled down into a war of attrition which would have been won by the numerically superior Russians. What Germany needed was a decisive victory like those they had on the West Front Early in the war. That would give them the momentum they needed to march right to moscow (again) and attept to take it again. They should have just launched the attack when it was first scheduled they still had the tactical superiority to take on the Russians and win.

[Lokos]

I will just wait for Kitsune (our greatest WWII expert) to find this thread.

Maybe our greatest German WW2 expert.

Lokos

[duck]

I don't know if I can agree fully with you. While Kursk was purely war of attrition the offensive Manstein was planning would have separated the Russian infantry and mobile units just like at Kharkov.

Manstein orginally wanted to attack Kursk as part of the Kharkov operation before the spring thaw. I think that was the only chance the Germans ever had of taking Kursk in 1943.

True, Manstein did have a good understanding of fluid battle tactics as the Blitzkrieg demanded, and he was also pushing for withdrawals so he could pull another Kharkov, but those defensive tactics would have just hampered the Germans more in the long run. The retreat and counter-attck method would have boiled down into a war of attrition which would have been won by the numerically superior Russians. What Germany needed was a decisive victory like those they had on the West Front Early in the war. That would give them the momentum they needed to march right to moscow (again) and attept to take it again. They should have just launched the attack when it was first scheduled they still had the tactical superiority to take on the Russians and win.

[Pvt.Anderson]

Maybe our greatest German WW2 expert.

Lokos

Well Lokos and you're surely the biggest smartass of the forum ;)

[Lokos]

Nothing like that. I just know for a fact that there are several people on this forum with better knowledge of Soviet, British and American experiences in the Second World War. Kitsune is very capable in the German sphere, though.

Lokos

[Crassus]

Personally I think that von Manstein´s "backhand" tactic would not have worked. Soviets simply had too good intelligence network, secondly soviets probably wouldn´t have done same mistake twice (Kharkov spring 1943) by overextending their thrust.

Best policy for Germans would have been to do nothing i.e. cancel Citadel and divert some forces to Italy, clear the Donest and Mius area. This could have been possible only if Hitler had been willing to give up ground in order to exhaust Soviet forces. This ofcourse was not an option to Hitler whose strategy was "not an inch back".
To give Hitler some credit, it must be said that after Citadel failed his "intuition" was right when he suspected that Stalin had laid his eyes on Kharkov (fourth battle).
So it would have been better for Germans to let Soviets bleed themselves white while taking Kharkov as Model did in the Orel area. Kharkov would have been a "mini-Stalingrad" if von Manstein had not pull all six division back at the time. This ofcourse made Hitler angry and Manstein paid the price later.

Even if Germans had chosen defensive strategy with limited counterattacks instead Citadel, I would say that the end of 1943 they would have been forced to retreat behind Dnper. Germany was doom anyway even without Citadel but Citadel made a victory lot easier for Soviets in the eastern front.

[Lt. Wittmann]

Personally I think that von Manstein´s "backhand" tactic would not have worked. Soviets simply had too good intelligence network, secondly soviets probably wouldn´t have done same mistake twice (Kharkov spring 1943) by overextending their thrust.

Best policy for Germans would have been to do nothing i.e. cancel Citadel and divert some forces to Italy, clear the Donest and Mius area. This could have been possible only if Hitler had been willing to give up ground in order to exhaust Soviet forces. This ofcourse was not an option to Hitler whose strategy was "not an inch back".
To give Hitler some credit, it must be said that after Citadel failed his "intuition" was right when he suspected that Stalin had laid his eyes on Kharkov (fourth battle).
So it would have been better for Germans to let Soviets bleed themselves white while taking Kharkov as Model did in the Orel area. Kharkov would have been a "mini-Stalingrad" if von Manstein had not pull all six division back at the time. This ofcourse made Hitler angry and Manstein paid the price later.

Even if Germans had chosen defensive strategy with limited counterattacks instead Citadel, I would say that the end of 1943 they would have been forced to retreat behind Dnper. Germany was doom anyway even without Citadel but Citadel made a victory lot easier for Soviets in the eastern front.

Russians would have made the same mistake they did at Kharkov, almost immediately after Kursk the Soviets launched the Bagration Offensive and did so until they were exhausted and overextended, if the Germans had waited and pulled back they could have produced another Kharkov they just did not have sufficient numbers to stem the Soviet offensive after Kursk. Even before Kursk was planned the Russians were preparing for Bagration and the destruction of Army Group Centre which is why the Kursk defense was so important once the Russians knew about it. If the Germans had attacked at the original time they would have surprise on their side and would have managed to hamper the Bagration plans. In 1943 the Germans were not doomed yet, they still had the tactical edge over there Soviet counterparts. They were forced to retreat because of Bagration which could have been prevented by one of two pheasable ways: 1. The withdrawal and limited counter- attack method, and 2. The offensive on the Kursk Salient. The latter would have been more effective since it would allow the Germans the offensive edge and ability to mantain momentum after they destroyed the Kursk defenses. The former would have been effective, but not to the extent of the Kursk offensive because it would not allow for as much of an offensive push and the Russians would have sufficient time to prepare defenses as the German attack petered out.

[Canuck Farrier]

ya i guess your right you made some good pointsp-)

[TheRussian1]

Russians would have made the same mistake they did at Kharkov, almost immediately after Kursk the Soviets launched the Bagration Offensive and did so until they were exhausted and overextended, if the Germans had waited and pulled back they could have produced another Kharkov they just did not have sufficient numbers to stem the Soviet offensive after Kursk. Even before Kursk was planned the Russians were preparing for Bagration and the destruction of Army Group Centre which is why the Kursk defense was so important once the Russians knew about it. If the Germans had attacked at the original time they would have surprise on their side and would have managed to hamper the Bagration plans. In 1943 the Germans were not doomed yet, they still had the tactical edge over there Soviet counterparts. They were forced to retreat because of Bagration which could have been prevented by one of two pheasable ways: 1. The withdrawal and limited counter- attack method, and 2. The offensive on the Kursk Salient. The latter would have been more effective since it would allow the Germans the offensive edge and ability to mantain momentum after they destroyed the Kursk defenses. The former would have been effective, but not to the extent of the Kursk offensive because it would not allow for as much of an offensive push and the Russians would have sufficient time to prepare defenses as the German attack petered out.

what the hell are you talking about?????????
Bagration was launched much later-the Soviet side was superbly prepared...Bagration was probably the Red ARmy's best succes.

[Crassus]

Russians would have made the same mistake they did at Kharkov, almost immediately after Kursk the Soviets launched the Bagration Offensive and did so until they were exhausted and overextended,
I do not want to be a crass but do we have a same time table? Operation Bagration started 22.6.1944 so I´m afraid that we have in this discussion a year in the time table apart.

[Lt. Wittmann]

what the hell are you talking about?????????
Bagration was launched much later-the Soviet side was superbly prepared...Bagration was probably the Red ARmy's best succes.

True but by immediate I meant that it was the next major offensive of the war in that theater undertaken by either side. In terms of the vastness of the offensive it was fairly immediate. Sure they had been planning it since the days of '43, but it faced the disruption caused by the Kursk Offensive and the the sheer problem of hording and controlling all of the men and material involved. Along those lines I believe it was fairly immediate. Bagration was only Russias greatest success because of their sheer numbers and the fact teh Germans blundered at Kursk. Even in 1944 the Germans were tactically superior, their problem was the lack of men and material in sufficient numbers, I should hope that an overwhelming amount of men and material should be able to push back the thinly held German line, the Germans simply did not have enough bullets nor armored units to stop them all.

[duck]

One difference between 1943 and 1944 was that in the latter year the lend-lease trucks enabled Russian infantry and artillery to become fully mobilized for the first time in history.

[TheRussian1]

True but by immediate I meant that it was the next major offensive of the war in that theater undertaken by either side. In terms of the vastness of the offensive it was fairly immediate. Sure they had been planning it since the days of '43, but it faced the disruption caused by the Kursk Offensive and the the sheer problem of hording and controlling all of the men and material involved. Along those lines I believe it was fairly immediate. Bagration was only Russias greatest success because of their sheer numbers and the fact teh Germans blundered at Kursk. Even in 1944 the Germans were tactically superior, their problem was the lack of men and material in sufficient numbers, I should hope that an overwhelming amount of men and material should be able to push back the thinly held German line, the Germans simply did not have enough bullets nor armored units to stop them all.

by 1944 germans were most certianly not tactically superior. hence the fact that bagration cost them far more casualties than the red army suffered.

[Lt. Wittmann]

Ok well you do have me with the losses part but the Germans still were a fine fighting army and I do believe they were still tactically superior to the Germans. The losses Germany incurred were thanks to bad planning on the part of OKH which directed much of Germanys forces on the Eastern Front to Army Group South where the attack was expected. The Germans were caught basically with their pants down. While this shows fine planning, coordination, and direction on the Soviets part the Germans would still end the war with nearly 1/3 the losses of the Russians. This is just one of those very scarce times in military history when near everything goes right and a fine victory is the result.

[Lt. Wittmann]

Another question that puzzles me is Prokhorovka. If it were to continue to the end which side would win the ground. This battlefield basically determined the outcome of the operation and if the Germans had won it a victory at Kursk was possible.

[Lokos]

This battlefield basically determined the outcome of the operation and if the Germans had won it a victory at Kursk was possible.

Prokhorovka was not the decisive battle most claim it to be, but a series of proximate, confused engagements that decided nothing. If the Germans had 'won' (and they certainly inflicted greater armoured losses in the Kursk offensive), the Soviets would have been forced to begin the simultaneous counter-offensives north and south of the salient (both of which, by the way, are considered more decisive than Kursk by recent historians) at an earlier stage. The Germans actually suffered greater losses in the Kursk counteroffensives than during their own offensive phase.

Too many reserve formations were crammed into the Kursk salient for an outright German victory to have been possible.

While this shows fine planning, coordination, and direction on the Soviets part the Germans would still end the war with nearly 1/3 the losses of the Russians

The losses in the final two years of the war were only slightly skewed against the Soviets. In 1941 and 1942 the Soviets suffered well over half of their permanent losses. Bagration was certainly not the only example of German losses being higher than Soviet losses. The first phase of the Oder operation had German losses running at many times higher than Soviet. The Iassij operation. Lake Balaton. Crimea. Korsun. The Germans had the advantage of being on the defensive as well as the advantage (in terms of casualty infliction) of the Soviet doctrine of using infantry to force a breakthrough. First echelon infantry battalions suffering 50% casualties in a single engagement was not uncommon.

OKH which directed much of Germanys forces on the Eastern Front to Army Group South where the attack was expected.

It was expected in the south because of MASSIVE Soviet efforts to mask troop concentrations in the north. Entire tank armies were faked, and great formations were held back in the south, so as to give the impression that the next offensive would be against AGS.

True but by immediate I meant that it was the next major offensive of the war in that theater undertaken by either side

Major Soviet offensive between 1 July 1943 and 22 June 1944:

Orel-Belgorod Offensives (July-August 1943)
Kharkov Offensive (August 1943)
Smolensk Offensive (September 1943)
Dnepr Offensive (September-October 1943)
Kiev Offensive (November 1943)
Korsun-Cherkassy Operation (January 1944)
Leningrad Offensive (January 1944)
Novgorod Operation (January 1944)
Crimean Offensive (April-May 1944)

The yellow and orange portions of this map will graphically illustrate the effect of the above offensives:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png

One difference between 1943 and 1944 was that in the latter year the lend-lease trucks enabled Russian infantry and artillery to become fully mobilized for the first time in history.

Russian infantry was still only about as motorized as German infantry.

Soviets launched the Bagration Offensive and did so until they were exhausted and overextended, if the Germans had waited and pulled back they could have produced another Kharkov they just did not have sufficient numbers to stem the Soviet offensive after Kursk.

I don't think you understand the scale of what you're asserting, and the differences between the factors that made the 'backhanded strike' possible in mid 1942 to what was happening in 1944.

Lokos

[duck]

Another question that puzzles me is Prokhorovka. If it were to continue to the end which side would win the ground. This battlefield basically determined the outcome of the operation and if the Germans had won it a victory at Kursk was possible.

Model didn't do too well in the North so all Russian armored reserves were available against the Southern pincer.

[Minardiau]

It could of been possible for Germany to achieve an overwhelming victory. Throughout the battle there was instances when Germany was on the verge of victory.

However even if Germany had of achieved victory. What then?

Considering losses, length of front, distance from supply lines, occupying people that don't want to be occupied. You are looking at no more then 6-12 months respite for the people of Berlin.

[Lt. Wittmann]

Prokhorovka was not the decisive battle most claim it to be, but a series of proximate, confused engagements that decided nothing. If the Germans had 'won' (and they certainly inflicted greater armoured losses in the Kursk offensive), the Soviets would have been forced to begin the simultaneous counter-offensives north and south of the salient (both of which, by the way, are considered more decisive than Kursk by recent historians) at an earlier stage. The Germans actually suffered greater losses in the Kursk counteroffensives than during their own offensive phase.

Too many reserve formations were crammed into the Kursk salient for an outright German victory to have been possible.



The losses in the final two years of the war were only slightly skewed against the Soviets. In 1941 and 1942 the Soviets suffered well over half of their permanent losses. Bagration was certainly not the only example of German losses being higher than Soviet losses. The first phase of the Oder operation had German losses running at many times higher than Soviet. The Iassij operation. Lake Balaton. Crimea. Korsun. The Germans had the advantage of being on the defensive as well as the advantage (in terms of casualty infliction) of the Soviet doctrine of using infantry to force a breakthrough. First echelon infantry battalions suffering 50% casualties in a single engagement was not uncommon.



It was expected in the south because of MASSIVE Soviet efforts to mask troop concentrations in the north. Entire tank armies were faked, and great formations were held back in the south, so as to give the impression that the next offensive would be against AGS.



Major Soviet offensive between 1 July 1943 and 22 June 1944:

Orel-Belgorod Offensives (July-August 1943)
Kharkov Offensive (August 1943)
Smolensk Offensive (September 1943)
Dnepr Offensive (September-October 1943)
Kiev Offensive (November 1943)
Korsun-Cherkassy Operation (January 1944)
Leningrad Offensive (January 1944)
Novgorod Operation (January 1944)
Crimean Offensive (April-May 1944)

The yellow and orange portions of this map will graphically illustrate the effect of the above offensives:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Eastern_Front_1943-08_to_1944-12.png



Russian infantry was still only about as motorized as German infantry.



I don't think you understand the scale of what you're asserting, and the differences between the factors that made the 'backhanded strike' possible in mid 1942 to what was happening in 1944.

Lokos

Prokhorovka was basically a draw with neither side giving way, I understand that, but the battle itself decided the fate of the Kursk Offensive. Model did falter in the North largely because of the "Crumbling" tactics he unfortunately borrowed from Montgomery, after that the offensive was entirely dependant on the southern thrust. The Germans were attempting to create a larger encirclement of the Russians and avoid their strong points while the Russians under Rotmistrov were attempting to outflank the Germans. They just happened to bump into each other at Prokhorovka. Initially the Germans faired pretty well taking the high ground, like hill 252.2, though they lost it shortly after when Rokossovsky arrived. When the two tank armies butted heads finally, neither side gave way, though the Germans were in more of a precarious state due to lack of service on their armor and the like.
I highly doubt the Russians would have risked beginning counter offensives, at least in the south, with Hoth's Panzers still charging towards Oboyan and, finally, Kursk(this of course assuming that the Germans won at Prokhorovka). The Germans would have been very numerous and a liability to the security of their flanks in their counter offesives, it is more likely the Soviets would have taken more of their reserves to try and plug their holes and push the Germans back or stop the offensive. Of course the Russian counter offesives were more decisive than Kursk. When they were launched the Germans were utterly exhausted and very disorganized. The Russians inflicted so many casualties on the Germans because they could afford to keep up the pressure. They had so many men that when the frontline troops were sapped of strength reserve units were ready to go while the Germans had few troops to bring up to replace the exhausted ones, as Stalin said, "...quantity has a quality all its own." I guess here you could say the Russians were superior, tactically, just by sheer numbers. They had utterly exhausted the Germans and no matter how great of an army you have you cannot fight forever, your men will get exhausted eventually and this hamperes efficiency and effectivety severely.
Yes, there were too many units for the Germans to attack the Kursk salient which is why Hoth opted to move a little farther east and attack around Oboyan to bypass the Russian strtong points, and the Russians were attempting to do the same to the Germans. This culminated in the largest tank battle ever in history.
Well as I said before, the Russians simply overwhelmed the Germans with numbers. They completely sapped the Germans strength and brought in reinforcements to continue the attack. When one offensive ended, the Russians launched another one elsewhere.
Well as I said in a previous posting, the whole deception thing involved in Bagration was very well done and resulted in a complete surprise attack. Very well done operation on the Russians part.
The first few operations you list were just Russian counter offensives after the German failure at Kursk. They were able to exploit the German weaknesses and push them pretty far back. The last few are just offensives undertaken to mask where Bagration was going to happen. In effect, it was a giant deception plan designed to do two major things: 1. Hide the true point of origin for Bagration, and 2. Maintain pressure on the Germans so they were unable to reorganize and rebuild and thus maximize the effectiveness of Bagration.
I do not understand what you mean in your last attack. What differences do you mean that I am asserting between 1942 and 1944?

[Lokos]

I understand that, but the battle itself decided the fate of the Kursk Offensive

The fate of the Kursk offensive was decided before the offensive started. You think the 5GTA was the last Soviet strategic reserve in the operational area? Look at the daily rates of penetration into the Kursk salient, look at the tempo of the offensive, look at relative strengths and tell me that there was a chance that the Germans could have sustained the effort and pinched off the salient...

The Germans were attempting to create a larger encirclement of the Russians and avoid their strong points while the Russians under Rotmistrov were attempting to outflank the Germans. They just happened to bump into each other at Prokhorovka

Don't recount the details of the battle to me. I know the details of the battle.

I highly doubt the Russians would have risked beginning counter offensives, at least in the south, with Hoth's Panzers still charging towards Oboyan

1) There was still plenty of materiel and many men between Hoth and his objectives.

2) I'm fairly certain the Germans would have stopped any thrust following a wider Soviet offensive that looked to be encircling the encirclement. Or do you think the SS Corps would have just kept going forward, until the encirclement was complete, and their fate decided?

The Germans would have been very numerous and a liability to the security of their flanks in their counter offesives

And which German divisions not part of the Kursk offensives were available for counter-offensive action in the case of a Soviet attack?

it is more likely the Soviets would have taken more of their reserves to try and plug their holes and push the Germans back or stop the offensive.

That would have been one option, yes. In either case, a German success would have been impossible. The Soviets were already planning where they'd be three months down the road - they knew how Kursk would turn out.

They had so many men that when the frontline troops were sapped of strength reserve units were ready to go while the Germans had few troops to bring up to replace the exhausted ones, as Stalin said, "...quantity has a quality all its own."

That the Soviets managed to concentrate their forces more successfully than the Germans is no fault of the Soviets. They were working with a manpower pool drawn from the remaining ~130 million people still under Soviet control in 1943. Germany, at that time, had ~80 million - without taking into account the available manpower of its various allies. 'Quantity' wasn't simply a natural Soviet advantage in 1942-1943. It was a hard earned one, achieved through incredibly total mobilization efforts.

I guess here you could say the Russians were superior, tactically, just by sheer numbers.

*rolls eyes*

Okay, they were just more capable operationally and strategically than the Germans, then. Soviet tactics were adequate for the task at hand with the resources available. That they utilized a greater manpower base as a resource isn't something that should be seen as 'negative', or 'lower' than German concentration on Auftragstaktik and such. It was simply different. And, by 1944, the tactics gap was largely closed, anyway, leaving the Soviets with a superior warmachine in every respect. That is not to say that the Germans were still not a formidable foe, however.

This culminated in the largest tank battle ever in history.


Read Glantz's and House's account of Kursk. Read Zetterling's. It wasn't one battle. It was a series of proximate, confused engagements. The myth that's often perpetuated is hundreds of Soviet tanks charging at hundreds of German tanks on a flat plain. That's rubbish.

Well as I said before, the Russians simply overwhelmed the Germans with numbers

Don't forget to blame the weather, Hitler, bad luck and everything else under the sun. I mean, the Red Army couldn't have become a formidable fighting force in its own right between 1942 and 1943, could it?

The first few operations you list were just Russian counter offensives after the German failure at Kursk.

Mate, most of the offensives named weren't even launched against the same troops that fought at Kursk. Got it? Furthermore, you're talking about a YEAR'S worth of offensives. Should we just name all offensives after Kursk as 'counter offensives after the German failure at Kursk'? Orel-Belgorod is the only set of operations that can be named 'counter offensives following Kursk'. The rest were just offensives.

The last few are just offensives undertaken to mask where Bagration was going to happen.

That aspect was largely secondary. Especially considering that the Germans were an expecting an attack on a central-southern axis.

You had originally stated that there was no significant offensive action on the part of the Soviets after Kursk, until Bagration in 1944. Look at the map I provided. Look how much land was cleared between the two offensives. You don't call that significant?

I do not understand what you mean in your last attack. What differences do you mean that I am asserting between 1942 and 1944?

The 'backhanded stroke' worked in 1942 because the Soviets blundered forward into the staging area for Operation Blau without any cognisance of the fact. In early 1943 it worked because the Soviets overreached in a very big way after months of hard campaigning. In 1944 what you're talking about was impossible. The Germans could only muster corps-level, localized counterattacks at that point. After the mauling of AGC, the Germans actually DID what you're talking about. They failed, repeatedly. The Soviets finally stopped in Poland, their offensive power having finally run out of steam, after two months of constant offensive effort. By that time the Soviets only stopped when they outran their logistics - not because of German defensive success.

Lokos

[Canuck Farrier]

It could of been possible for Germany to achieve an overwhelming victory. Throughout the battle there was instances when Germany was on the verge of victory.

However even if Germany had of achieved victory. What then?

Considering losses, length of front, distance from supply lines, occupying people that don't want to be occupied. You are looking at no more then 6-12 months respite for the people of Berlin.

Ya thats a good point more likely yanks brits and canucks would have taken Berlin instead of waiting for the red army to catch up.And possibly occupied the rest of Germany for that matter meaning no wall through Germany just on Poland German frontier.p-)

[johanness]

fine reading....looks like a fair a fair view from bird's perspective
( vogelsperspektive,opposite from Froschperspektive(frogs point of view)
if this term exist in english)

thanks a lot Lokos

best regards

johanness

[Lt. Wittmann]

The fate of the Kursk offensive was decided before the offensive started. You think the 5GTA was the last Soviet strategic reserve in the operational area? Look at the daily rates of penetration into the Kursk salient, look at the tempo of the offensive, look at relative strengths and tell me that there was a chance that the Germans could have sustained the effort and pinched off the salient...

2) I'm fairly certain the Germans would have stopped any thrust following a wider Soviet offensive that looked to be encircling the encirclement. Or do you think the SS Corps would have just kept going forward, until the encirclement was complete, and their fate decided?

And which German divisions not part of the Kursk offensives were available for counter-offensive action in the case of a Soviet attack?

That would have been one option, yes. In either case, a German success would have been impossible. The Soviets were already planning where they'd be three months down the road - they knew how Kursk would turn out.

That the Soviets managed to concentrate their forces more successfully than the Germans is no fault of the Soviets. They were working with a manpower pool drawn from the remaining ~130 million people still under Soviet control in 1943. Germany, at that time, had ~80 million - without taking into account the available manpower of its various allies. 'Quantity' wasn't simply a natural Soviet advantage in 1942-1943. It was a hard earned one, achieved through incredibly total mobilization efforts.

Okay, they were just more capable operationally and strategically than the Germans, then. Soviet tactics were adequate for the task at hand with the resources available. That they utilized a greater manpower base as a resource isn't something that should be seen as 'negative', or 'lower' than German concentration on Auftragstaktik and such. It was simply different. And, by 1944, the tactics gap was largely closed, anyway, leaving the Soviets with a superior warmachine in every respect. That is not to say that the Germans were still not a formidable foe, however.

Read Glantz's and House's account of Kursk. Read Zetterling's. It wasn't one battle. It was a series of proximate, confused engagements. The myth that's often perpetuated is hundreds of Soviet tanks charging at hundreds of German tanks on a flat plain. That's rubbish.

Don't forget to blame the weather, Hitler, bad luck and everything else under the sun. I mean, the Red Army couldn't have become a formidable fighting force in its own right between 1942 and 1943, could it?

Mate, most of the offensives named weren't even launched against the same troops that fought at Kursk. Got it? Furthermore, you're talking about a YEAR'S worth of offensives. Should we just name all offensives after Kursk as 'counter offensives after the German failure at Kursk'? Orel-Belgorod is the only set of operations that can be named 'counter offensives following Kursk'. The rest were just offensives.

That aspect was largely secondary. Especially considering that the Germans were an expecting an attack on a central-southern axis.

You had originally stated that there was no significant offensive action on the part of the Soviets after Kursk, until Bagration in 1944. Look at the map I provided. Look how much land was cleared between the two offensives. You don't call that significant?

The 'backhanded stroke' worked in 1942 because the Soviets blundered forward into the staging area for Operation Blau without any cognisance of the fact. In early 1943 it worked because the Soviets overreached in a very big way after months of hard campaigning. In 1944 what you're talking about was impossible. The Germans could only muster corps-level, localized counterattacks at that point. After the mauling of AGC, the Germans actually DID what you're talking about. They failed, repeatedly. The Soviets finally stopped in Poland, their offensive power having finally run out of steam, after two months of constant offensive effort. By that time the Soviets only stopped when they outran their logistics - not because of German defensive success.

Lokos

The fate of the Kursk offensive was not a forgon conclusion. The Russians were extremely worried about it otherwise they would not have packed around say 1.3 million men into it. If they lost Kursk their offensive plans for the summer would have been completely hampered, and no I do not believe that the entire Soviet defense in the south depended upon the 5th Gaurds it was independant of the situation. The physical battle itself was the pivotal situation at hand, it just so happened that the 5th Gaurds was the Russian unit at the place. I know how slowly the offensive was going for the Germans and the Germans were dangerously close to breaking them in the South. Wether the salient could have been closed or not I do not know. Perhaps if the Germans had tried for a wider encirclement it would have worked better given the same situation and historical start.
No doubt the Germans would have tried to break a counter encirclement, but I do not believe the Russians would have done such a thing. They were using the fixed positions they had constructed and attempting to thwart the offensive that way keeping as much in reserve and allowing the Russians an easier time when they struck back at the exhausted Germans.
I was talking about the units involved in the offensive. It is another reason that I believe the Russians would not have launched a counter encirclement. The Panzers already committed would jeopodize the advanced units flank.
Again if the Russians knew what was going to happen they would not have been so worried about it. The Soviet plans were based on the idea that they hold Kursk. Take a look at the units the Russians packed into Kursk, quite a large portion of their army.
The mobalization efforts were started a long time ago beginning with the 5 year plans. Those plans began the industrialization and collectivization which allowed the Russians such an abundant manpower pool and ability to more successfully move their industry farther east they had been perfecting their mobalization for quite some time all they had to do was gear it for war. There is the whole allied bombing campaign against industrial Germany that ended in 1942 which managed to disrupt a good bit of German infrastructure while Russia was able to produce without even the fear of bombings.
I never said that the Russians were lower than the Germans for using there numbers, I said they were tactically behind the Germans (largely thanks to Stalin who managed to kill off most of his good generals). Granted by 1943 Stalin began relaxing control over the army and letting his generals take command, but they were still not the equals of the Germans. I will admit though that they were learning fast from the Germans, that is why Kursk failed. What they lacked in strategy they made up for in their numbers and the constant delays the Germans had before the offensive allowed the Russians time to train and prepare the Salient. If Germany had attacked when they had originally intended they could have pulled it off I believe. By 1944, I have to admit that tactically the Russians were on par with the Germans. There were more reasons for that than just learning though, for example, while Stalin allowed his commanders greater tactical freedom, Hitler took away and meddled in military affairs effectively violating the basic rule of Blitzkrieg: fluidity. In doing so Hitler reverted to a more Great War type of combat with a strict chain of command, et cetera.
Prokhorovka was one battle and you are right it was a series of confused engagements, most battles are(especially fluid ones). The area was a very small one indeed for an entire tank Army and Corps to do battle on only being about 3 miles across (Psel to RR area). The Psel River was flooded remember, a strict left boundry for the armor, and just to the right of the Kursk- Belgorod Railroad Line the echeloned SS Das Reich Division held the flank against 2nd Gaurds Corps. A very concentrated battle area for so many tanks and men. Units were very close together and constantly engaged. I never said that the units charged at each other on a flat, open plain (it was slightly tilted in favor of the Russians) that both sides charged each other on, but they might as well have with such a small battle area.
The Red Army did not become a good army through its own right, it became so through much loss at the hands of the Germans. The Russian Army learned the hard way.
Yes it is a significant amount of land that was retaken but as I said it was dependant on the successfull defense of the Kursk Salient. Most of those actions were undertaken to keep the Germans under pressure, to never let them recover and it culminated in the Bagration Offensive. Without Kursk, most of those offensives would probably have been a lot less successfull designed simply to keep Germany busy on all front parts of the front, unable to regroup. Bagration would have been the real breakthrough (as it was bringing Russia to the prewar Russo- German border in occupied Poland).
Irregardless of wether OKH expected it or not, those offensives' primary goal was to keep Germany in a disorganized state and to hopefully confuse them as to where the big offensive was to come from. As you said earlier, the Russians had numbers as one of their "hard earned" advantages, they simply used this to its full effectiveness leading up to Bagration.
Yes, I understand what happened historically, but what was being considered was if the Germans had opted not to undertake the Kursk offensive and instead withdraw and counter with those forces when the Soviets were weak and exhausted after their offensive, under those conditions it is a viable option, but seeing as Hitler felt he should meddle, it never came to pass.

[Lt. Wittmann]

As a side note, it seems our little arguement seems to have taken on the praportions of the Eastern Front, each time we counter with more points and more detail in those points, as the Russians and Germans did with more weapons and more advances to those weapons, maybe im wierd, but I find that rather interesting.

[Lt. Wittmann]

It could of been possible for Germany to achieve an overwhelming victory. Throughout the battle there was instances when Germany was on the verge of victory.

However even if Germany had of achieved victory. What then?

Considering losses, length of front, distance from supply lines, occupying people that don't want to be occupied. You are looking at no more then 6-12 months respite for the people of Berlin.

Well if the Germans had won, they would have effectively wiped out the majority of the Russian army (I saw a program on the History Channel that put the estimate as high as 70% of the Russian army crammed into the Salient, wether thats close or not I do not know) either way, the Germans would have given themselves the ability to perhaps reverse the war in Russia, or at least, to make it possible for a peace to come about, could have even returned to the gates of Moscow.

[Lokos]

(I saw a program on the History Channel that put the estimate as high as 70% of the Russian army crammed into the Salient, wether thats close or not I do not know)

Less than 25%. The strength of the Soviet army was over six million in June 1943.

The Russians were extremely worried about it otherwise they would not have packed around say 1.3 million men into it

Is that why they also packed to the brim the north and south shoulder of the salient in preparation for the counter-offensives - and never touched those formations during the battle? Here's a simpler explanation: they allotted the forces necessary to provide an adequate 'defence in depth'.

The physical battle itself was the pivotal situation at hand

The 'physical battle' itself mattered not in the least. If the 5GTA was defeated, there were numerous other formations available on hand to plug any German advance. Or, as I said, they could have just started an encirclement operation of their own on the shoulders of the salient.

and the Germans were dangerously close to breaking them in the South

No, not really. The Soviets weren't that worried about it, in any case. Read their General Staff Study (done at the time) about Kursk.

The Panzers already committed would jeopodize the advanced units flank

The Panzers you're talking about would be getting flanked, if the advance continued.

Perhaps if the Germans had tried for a wider encirclement it would have worked better given the same situation and historical start

You mean it could have worked better if they tried to combat 1.7 million Soviet soldiers with 900,000, instead of 1.3 million? Pray tell, how so?

They were using the fixed positions they had constructed

There were no fixed positions on the shoulders of the salient. The Soviets had ALREADY planned the counter-offensives. Get it? We're not talking about the same troops, here, that were defending the salient. Fresh formations!

Again if the Russians knew what was going to happen they would not have been so worried about it

Who says they were worried about it?

Soviet plans were based on the idea that they hold Kursk.

And... they did.

Those plans began the industrialization and collectivization which allowed the Russians such an abundant manpower pool and ability to more successfully move their industry farther east they had been perfecting their mobalization for quite some time all they had to do was gear it for war.

Okay, if I was you, I'd stay away from making assertions about the Soviet side of the war and the homefront. You clearly are badly, badly underinformed. I'm not saying this to mock you, but the statement above is LUDICROUS. It's just silly. If I responded to it point by point, I think I'd just be saying 'This is rubbish' the whole way through. What are your sources, exactly?

There is the whole allied bombing campaign against industrial Germany that ended in 1942 which managed to disrupt a good bit of German infrastructure while

What in the hell are you talking about? The Allied bombing campaign - which never stopped - only began to have an effect (and a small one, as German industrial output rose by leaps and bounds until December 1944) in late 1944. In 1942 the Luftwaffe still controlled the skies above Germany...

Get your facts straight, please.

and letting his generals take command, but they were still not the equals of the Germans

Says you and... who?

Rokossovsky, Malinovskiiy, Zhukov, Konev, Vatutin etc. were as good as anyone in the German general officer pool.

I will admit though that they were learning fast from the Germans, that is why Kursk failed

LOL.

From the Germans? Soviet Field Regulations of 1943 and 1944 have nothing in common with their German equivalent. The Soviets were developing their own way of war.

If Germany had attacked when they had originally intended they could have pulled it off I believe

Says who? Their underprepared divisions? Their understrength panzer battalions? Or a Soviet defensive effort that was already extremely advanced in May 1943 (when the Germans originally wanted to attack).

Yes it is a significant amount of land that was retaken but as I said it was dependant on the successfull defense of the Kursk Salient

1) the successfuly defence of the salient was never in question.

2) since German losses at Kursk were fairly low, what is it about their defeat at Kursk that you think made the counteroffensives inevitably successful?

The rest of what you say in your post is just more of the same, and I don't have that much time.

Lokos

[foxtrot023]

Zitadelle for me in a nutshell-

The soviets accomplished what they set up to do, destroy german armor.

[Sergei]

Russians would have made the same mistake they did at Kharkov, almost immediately after Kursk the Soviets launched the Bagration Offensive and did so until they were exhausted and overextended, if the Germans had waited and pulled back they could have produced another Kharkov they just did not have sufficient numbers to stem the Soviet offensive after Kursk. Even before Kursk was planned the Russians were preparing for Bagration and the destruction of Army Group Centre which is why the Kursk defense was so important once the Russians knew about it. If the Germans had attacked at the original time they would have surprise on their side and would have managed to hamper the Bagration plans. In 1943 the Germans were not doomed yet, they still had the tactical edge over there Soviet counterparts. They were forced to retreat because of Bagration which could have been prevented by one of two pheasable ways: 1. The withdrawal and limited counter- attack method, and 2. The offensive on the Kursk Salient. The latter would have been more effective since it would allow the Germans the offensive edge and ability to mantain momentum after they destroyed the Kursk defenses. The former would have been effective, but not to the extent of the Kursk offensive because it would not allow for as much of an offensive push and the Russians would have sufficient time to prepare defenses as the German attack petered out.

A bad example really, Bagration was a complete success for Soviets, Army Center destroyed and the german front in dissarray.
What is a good example, is the counter attack of 5th Viking SS division after the Soviets recaptured Kiev in November 1943. They captured Kiev and advanced 100 km westward yet were pushed back almost to loose Kiev to the germans again.
My grandma told me that the fighting was so close back again that the last remaining windows??? in a shattered Kiev were breaking from the thunder of tank-on-tank engagements.

[Kilgor]

Well if the Germans had won, they would have effectively wiped out the majority of the Russian army (I saw a program on the History Channel that put the estimate as high as 70% of the Russian army crammed into the Salient, .

well.. according to richard ovary's "russia's war" the figure is 40% of manpower and 75% of armor

[Crassus]

What is a good example, is the counter attack of 5th Viking SS division after the Soviets recaptured Kiev in November 1943. They captured Kiev and advanced 100 km westward yet were pushed back almost to loose Kiev to the germans again.
My grandma told me that the fighting was so close back again that the last remaining windows??? in a shattered Kiev were breaking from the thunder of tank-on-tank engagements.
You probably talking about Balck´s counterattack? Here is some info:

In November 1943, Balck's task as defined by Colonel-General Erich Rauss, the commander of the Fourth Panzer Army, was the recapture of Zhitomir and the stabilization of the front west of Kiev. For this he was given the largest concentration of armor available, including the 1st, 7th, 19th and 25th Panzer Divisions, the 1st SS Panzer Division LSSAH and a battlegroup from the 2nd SS Panzer Division Das Reich, plus the 68th Infantry Division. Following the German tradition, Balck and von Mellenthin, corps commander and chief of staff of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, respectively, sat down separately to prepare plans and then accepted the best features of both. The XLVIII Panzer Corps advanced northwards to Zhitomir, smashing the armored fist through the Soviet line on 15 November, with the LSSAH swinging right to form a protective shoulder. The Russian Third Guards Tank Army mounted counter-attacks east of Zhitomir, and Balck promptly took the decision to entrap the enemy army within a pocket. Throughout the 20th the LSSAH hammered away at the Russians from the west, serving to focus their attention in that direction. Simultaneously, the 1st Panzer Division was driving east along the Zhitomir-Kiev highway, and other divisions covering flanks. With the coming of darkness, many divisions went into leaguer, little realizing that in Balck's world people seldom halted, rested or slept. The enraged corps commander ordered them to complete the encirclement after dusk, and by 24 November the pocket had been eliminated.
On 15 December, the XLVIII Panzer Corps was directed against more Russian formations which were believed to be on the point of effecting a penetration of the front, and Balck started hammering the enmy from three sites. However the enemy was not intimidated, and when a map was found on the body of a Soviet officer, it became clear that the XLVIII Panzer Corps was tackling no fewer than three tank and four rifle corps which had been assembled. Balck abandoned his attempt at encirclement and went onto the defensive, after having destroyed two Russian armies, mauled a third and captured or destroyed 700 tanks and 668 guns.


As you can see 5. SS "Wiking" did not take part of these battles. And what comes to recapturing Kiev, well that only existed in Balck´s dreams. He was notoriously overoptimistic and quick to putting on blame to his subordinates when his plans proved to be impossible to execute.

Von Manstein made a right call when he dropped the idea of recapturing Kiev and limit the advance of the counterattack. Germans lacked the proper forces.

[Lokos]

well.. according to richard ovary's "russia's war" the figure is 40% of manpower and 75% of armor

That would be roughly 2.4 million men IN the salient, then?

...

Lokos

[duck]

One aspect that has been left out so far is the impact of air assets. Could the Luftwaffe or the Soviet Air Force have done more to support their respective combatants? I've understood that OKH and OKW badly underestimated Soviet defences. Could this be partly blamed on lacking Luftwaffe recon?

[Lokos]

it became clear that the XLVIII Panzer Corps was tackling no fewer than three tank and four rifle corps which had been assembled

Just a small note:

A Soviet tank corps was roughly equivalent to a German panzer division. The 1943 deployed rifle division rarely had more than 6,500-7,000 men.

Could the Luftwaffe or the Soviet Air Force have done more to support their respective combatants?

Kursk was the Luftwaffe's last real 'show of force' on the Eastern Front. It performed well - as did the Soviet VVS. I'm not sure what else they could have done.

I've understood that OKH and OKW badly underestimated Soviet defences. Could this be partly blamed on lacking Luftwaffe recon?

The OKH (OKW wasn't as relevant on the Eastern Front) was not fooled, and the extent of Soviet defences - whilst not fully appreciated - was known to be quite imposing. The unfortunate fact (for them) was that Kursk was still the best option, if they wanted to retake the initiative. You must understand: at the time (just before Kursk) the Soviets had never mounted a successful operational defence in the open field against German panzer forces. Stalingrad was seen as a failure stemming from involvement in a city battle. Everything that had preceeded it still bespoke of a massive German operational and tactical superiority.

But they weren't treating it as a be-all and end-all battle. After the offensive's strength was sapped, they pulled back. German losses were fairly low. Soviet losses - whilst significant (especially in armour) - were also proportionally low. Contrary to popular belief, more German tanks were lost in the Soviet counteroffensives that followed Kursk than in the battle itself.

Lokos

[Mastermind]

Man...you guys are loaded with all kinds of great history and reading references...very enjoyable reads...thanks..MM

[foxtrot023]

The unfortunate fact (for them) was that Kursk was still the best option, if they wanted to retake the initiative.
Lokos

I don´t know Lokos, The USSR was well informed in advance about german intentions on Kursk. It also helped that the offensive was somewhat delayed by preparations. Also, take into consideration that the majority of the german ¨thinking¨ brass were against Kursk, but Hitler pushed it non the less.

[Lokos]

I don´t know Lokos, The USSR was well informed in advance about german intentions on Kursk. It also helped that the offensive was somewhat delayed by preparations. Also, take into consideration that the majority of the german ¨thinking¨ brass were against Kursk, but Hitler pushed it non the less.

Everything you say is true. But where else could they have retaken the strategic initiative? Only by attacking and defeating the Soviets on their own terms could they hope to destabilize the Soviet build-up of reserves and materiel. The Kursk salient was an obvious strategic danger zone.

I agree that the Kursk attack itself was a bad, bad idea. Yet there were few other choices, given German objectives that summer.

Lokos

[Canuck Farrier]

The last major luftwaffe effort in the east was before the battle for berlin when the Germans still held the high ground on the Seelow Heights in april 45 and the dirt soviet airfileds were bogged down in mud the luftwaffe flew a hundreds of sorties against russian armour.I'm bad with dates and names but i know it happened.I'll be back

[StukaJr]

I will just wait for Kitsune (our greatest WWII expert) to find this thread.

Panzerphlile left all alone?

Sorry, Kitsune got banned for a month (couple of weeks to go) once I pointed out his neo-nazionalistic rant to a mod - the kid got some knowledge but he lives in the world that's better off with the Third Reich and Nazi Germany was overly ambitious and misunderstood. :D I'd really like him to know that I got him banned -after his rant how germany got attacked in WWII and British didn't have grand enough sense of humour. I welcome his insight but it's too often that I find it skewed by... ahem... a will to change history.

I'm still out on vacation and pine cones are in my head - promise to be back in force on Monday... This forum is like crack :D I'm too drunk on Rum :(

[Kalasj]

The last major luftwaffe effort in the east was before the battle for berlin when the Germans still held the high ground on the Seelow Heights in april 45 and the dirt soviet airfileds were bogged down in mud the luftwaffe flew a hundreds of sorties against russian armour.I'm bad with dates and names but i know it happened.I'll be back
You mean the actions of Stukageschwader 2? That wasn't a real 'show of force', but just the remnants of what used to be an airforce. Since new year's day 1945, the Luftwaffe never again showed up on the battlefield as a large force.

[duck]

Lokos-san:

Wasn't Kursk the first major battle where the JU-87G "tank buster" entered service? Would you or anyone else know if the Stuka development was as much hindered by personal rivalries as the struggle between the Henschel and ( the useless ) Porsche Tiger in the tank sector? Sorry for the ignorance but did the VVS already have the IL-2 Shturmovik widely deployed during "Citadel"?

What I also find interesting about "Citadel" is the Soviet adaptation of the German "pakfront" antitank defence system. Do you know if this was the first time that groups of antitank guns were under united command in the Red Army? Any references to development of Red Army ( antitank ) mine tactics would also be greatly appreciated.



Just a small note:

A Soviet tank corps was roughly equivalent to a German panzer division. The 1943 deployed rifle division rarely had more than 6,500-7,000 men.

Kursk was the Luftwaffe's last real 'show of force' on the Eastern Front. It performed well - as did the Soviet VVS. I'm not sure what else they could have done.

The OKH (OKW wasn't as relevant on the Eastern Front) was not fooled, and the extent of Soviet defences - whilst not fully appreciated - was known to be quite imposing. The unfortunate fact (for them) was that Kursk was still the best option, if they wanted to retake the initiative. You must understand: at the time (just before Kursk) the Soviets had never mounted a successful operational defence in the open field against German panzer forces. Stalingrad was seen as a failure stemming from involvement in a city battle. Everything that had preceeded it still bespoke of a massive German operational and tactical superiority.

But they weren't treating it as a be-all and end-all battle. After the offensive's strength was sapped, they pulled back. German losses were fairly low. Soviet losses - whilst significant (especially in armour) - were also proportionally low. Contrary to popular belief, more German tanks were lost in the Soviet counteroffensives that followed Kursk than in the battle itself.

Lokos

[Lokos]

duck:

If you're willing to wait about a week, I'll find my copy of the Red Army Handbook and get back to you with some answers. At the moment, my research capacities are limited by a lack of time.

Lokos

[Canuck Farrier]

You mean the actions of Stukageschwader 2? That wasn't a real 'show of force', but just the remnants of what used to be an airforce. Since new year's day 1945, the Luftwaffe never again showed up on the battlefield as a large force.

Ya thats the one.One of my fathers old friends taped a good program from the 80s or 90s Battle for Berlin parts one and 2.Great footage they covered everything including that last ground attack effort by the luftwaffe.They took their toll of red armour.

[KB]

In June of 1943 the Germans launched their last great offensive on the Eastern Front: Operation Citadel. It was a last ditch effort to thwart the ever- growing threat posed by the Soviet Military. Everything about it was massive, and it culminated in the largest tank battle ever, that of Prokhorovka. Many consider this the death knell of the German army on the Eastern Front and I am just curious as to what others think.

The death knell for German Army was when Hitler declared war on the US. The outcome of the campaign was always uncertain given the harsh treatment the Nazis accorded the population of the territories they occuppied in the East, but declaring war on the US eliminated any chance of a successful outcome.

1) without US involvement a "second front" in Western Europe would not have happened.

2) how successful would Bagration have been had the German forces massed in France and Belgium (63 divisions) at the time been available for commitment in the East?

3) The US daylight bombing campaign forced Luftwaffe to strip many fighter groups from Eastern Front (JG3, III/JG54, I/JG5, II/JG5) and cannibalize the ones that remained (JG52, JG51, I, II/JG54) to reinforce units engaged in Homeland defense. German ability to maintain air superiority on the Eastern Front became much more tenuous.

[foxtrot023]

The death knell for German Army was when Hitler declared war on the US. The outcome of the campaign was always uncertain given the harsh treatment the Nazis accorded the population of the territories they occuppied in the East, but declaring war on the US eliminated any chance of a successful outcome.

1) without US involvement a "second front" in Western Europe would not have happened.

2) how successful would Bagration have been had the German forces massed in France and Belgium (63 divisions) at the time been available for commitment in the East?

3) The US daylight bombing campaign forced Luftwaffe to strip many fighter groups from Eastern Front (JG3, III/JG54, I/JG5, II/JG5) and cannibalize the ones that remained (JG52, JG51, I, II/JG54) to reinforce units engaged in Homeland defense. German ability to maintain air superiority on the Eastern Front became much more tenuous.

KB, while the second front was important, keep in mind that the majority of the Heer was always in the east from the peak of 75% percent to 60+% (during Normandy). The death knell was the declaration of war on the USSR, not on the US, which merely was the confirmation that Germany was going to lose the war.

[Cpt. Spaulding]

http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/avenue/vy75/pictures/elefant1.jpg

elephantsv at Kursk....scary!

too slow, too heavy, too............bad

and no infantry with them

[KB]

KB, while the second front was important, keep in mind that the majority of the Heer was always in the east from the peak of 75% percent to 60+% (during Normandy). The death knell was the declaration of war on the USSR, not on the US, which merely was the confirmation that Germany was going to lose the war.

I think we are debating semantics. As I mentioned in my earlier post, the outcome of the decision to invade the Soviet Union was doubtful, but not impossible for Germany; after all, it had defeated the Czar's forces during the First World War.

Had there not been a second front in 1944, 63 divisions (including 2PZ, Panzer Lehr, 116PZ, 9thPZ, 1stSSPZ, 2ndSSPZ, 12thSSPZ & 17thSSPZGR) are deployed into the East, together with 1000 fighter aircraft committed to Reichsverteidigung; under these conditions, can you say with certainty Bagration would have succeeded?

In addition to reasons stated earlier, here are some others:

the tyrannical racial policies of the Germans alienated the non-Russian populace and similarly stiffened the resolve of the Russian soldiers to fight. A different approach to the peoples of the occupied territories (who suffered terribly under the collectives) might have yielded a whole new source of fighting forces.

Likewise, with a looming threat of invasion from the East, would the nations of western Europe not have mobilized to assist Germany in holding off the Soviet Union?

And lest we forget, Hitler's meddling in the affairs of OKH and his wavering focus on his war objectives played a factor as well.

[Zvucni Efekti]

Had there not been a second front in 1944, 63 divisions (including 2PZ, Panzer Lehr, 116PZ, 9thPZ, 1stSSPZ, 2ndSSPZ, 12thSSPZ & 17thSSPZGR) are deployed into the East, together with 1000 fighter aircraft committed to Reichsverteidigung; under these conditions, can you say with certainty Bagration would have succeeded?
Just for reference, the number of German Divisions per front:


Month Germany Eastern Western Norway Finland South-Eastern Africa Italy
1944
Jan 1944 7 166 54 13 7 25 0 21
Feb 1944 6 163 60 13 7 23 0 22
Mar 1944 6 160 63 13 7 23 0 22
Apr 1944 2 163 60 12 8 23 0 23
May 1944 1 160 63 12 8 24 0 23
Jun 1944 7 150 66 12 8 24 0 27
ul 1944 19 124 69 11 8 23 0 27
Aug 1944 2 130 72 10 8 21 0 29
Sep 1944 2 127 64 11 8 20 0 25
Oct 1944 1 134 67 11 8 20 0 25
Nov 1944 2 133 70 18 0 21 0 26
Dec 1944 2 135 76 17 0 22 0 25
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288

If all of the Divisions on the Western Front were facing the Soviets, including those in Italy and Norway, there would have been between 88 and 115 more Divisions on the Eastern Front, depending on the month.

[Mastermind]

Even if German Forces and production at home had been perfectly handled, I doubt very seriously it would have made any difference in the final outcome.Germany was simply not capable, economically, or population wise to compete with the forces arrayed against her. she was doomed from the very beginning...in my opinion. The only possible succes for Germany would have been a proper alliance in strength with the Soviet Union against the west or to have built an alliance with France and Britain against the real threat of the Soviet Union. Before you scoff at these suggestions, consider the attitude in both the Soviet Union and the West at the time before hostilities began.....both sides were courting Herr Hitler. The tragedy of Germany was, Hitler chose his own independant way...and failed miserably in foreign diplomacy. Every worthy General on all sides knew full well what the ultimate outcome would be as early as 1940...the only question was when the utter defeat of Nazi Germany would take place.

[Lt. Wittmann]

The death knell for German Army was when Hitler declared war on the US. The outcome of the campaign was always uncertain given the harsh treatment the Nazis accorded the population of the territories they occuppied in the East, but declaring war on the US eliminated any chance of a successful outcome.

1) without US involvement a "second front" in Western Europe would not have happened.

2) how successful would Bagration have been had the German forces massed in France and Belgium (63 divisions) at the time been available for commitment in the East?

3) The US daylight bombing campaign forced Luftwaffe to strip many fighter groups from Eastern Front (JG3, III/JG54, I/JG5, II/JG5) and cannibalize the ones that remained (JG52, JG51, I, II/JG54) to reinforce units engaged in Homeland defense. German ability to maintain air superiority on the Eastern Front became much more tenuous.

True, but do you believe that the United States would have remained neutral in such a war? There was also the whole political reason for the German declaration of war. Germany was hoping to alleviate their Russian army problem by having the Japanese attack from behind. The act was a gamble that happened to fail since Japan was still fearfull of the vast Russian Bear able to bleed away Japanese forces as they did in the Russo- Japanese war (granted Japan showed her military prowess quite sufficient in the conflict).

Well I believe that Bagration would have been just as successful if you consider the Kursk Offensive a failure because the German units, even with a significantly larger force, would still have been exhausted and unable to stem the red attack. Germany used nearly everything it had in the Kursk Offensive, those 63 divisions would have been thrown into the fire as well. Now if they had been avaliable for the Offesive then things would most likely have turned out in favor of the Germans for many reasons, larger army, being able to attack at an earlier date, et cetera.

I do agree that the US daylight air campaign had many significant impacts upon the German military predicament, with the stripping and canabalizing of the various parts of the Luftwaffe being a very significant one. As Rommel knew, without air superiority, the orthadox Prussian style tactics of encirclement favoured for the defense of Western Europe would be stopped short by allied planes, and so it was, irregardless the Germans still managed to hold their own for quite a while on both fronts. Hitler's meddling more than anything was what hampered the Germans in the West. If allowed to work as they wished, the Germans would have been able to conduct tactical retreats followed by limited counter attacks. On the smaller, warmer (most of the time) feilds of Western Europe such tactics were possible, the Russian front was, however, another matter.

[foxtrot023]

I think we are debating semantics. As I mentioned in my earlier post, the outcome of the decision to invade the Soviet Union was doubtful, but not impossible for Germany; after all, it had defeated the Czar's forces during the First World War.

Had there not been a second front in 1944, 63 divisions (including 2PZ, Panzer Lehr, 116PZ, 9thPZ, 1stSSPZ, 2ndSSPZ, 12thSSPZ & 17thSSPZGR) are deployed into the East, together with 1000 fighter aircraft committed to Reichsverteidigung; under these conditions, can you say with certainty Bagration would have succeeded?



yes some very good divisions could have been in the East, on the other hand many divisions in the west were of very low quality per example the static divisions. However let me point out that even without the west Germany would have had trouble to win against the USSR. Bear in mind that in 1941, the USSR stopped cold the Werhmacht without any help. It would have cost the USSR more, but they would have prevailed in my opinion, specially with the racial policies that Hitler had towards the slavs (unlike the 1914-18 period) that alienated the locals. Let me reverse the situation- Could the western allies do a D-day with the whole german army in Western Europe?

[Sergei]

You probably talking about Balck´s counterattack? Here is some info:


As you can see 5. SS "Wiking" did not take part of these battles. And what comes to recapturing Kiev, well that only existed in Balck´s dreams. He was notoriously overoptimistic and quick to putting on blame to his subordinates when his plans proved to be impossible to execute.

Von Manstein made a right call when he dropped the idea of recapturing Kiev and limit the advance of the counterattack. Germans lacked the proper forces.

My mistake about 5th Viking, although SS units were present, that's for sure. The SS emblems and pathces are still a nice collection among the "black archeologists" throughout here.
so that was 1st SS

[KB]

Let me reverse the situation- Could the western allies do a D-day with the whole german army in Western Europe?

Highly doubtful. However, as long as we're playing "what if", if the US weren't involved in its own second front with Japan and threw its entire naval power into the War in the Atlantic (together with the entire British fleet), who's to say a landing on the European continent wouldn't succeed?

Could the western allies have even conducted a successful second front if the UK had been invaded and occupied by Hitler in 1940-41?

[Mastermind]

RE above: Could the western allies have even conducted a successful second front if the UK had been invaded and occupied by Hitler in 1940-41? Yes...they would have attacked from Bases in Africa or Ireland. It would have been tougher almost certainly. Don't forget, one of the viable options for D-Day was to attack exclusively through the South of France...that's what the Italian invasions were all about. Also, don't forget the Sicily invasion was highly successful and would have been one heck of a staging area. The real question is, if Germany had been successful in taking Britian, would there have then been a motivation for the US to invade. It might have been a moot point had that happened. JMHO ...MM

[foxtrot023]

Highly doubtful. However, as long as we're playing "what if", if the US weren't involved in its own second front with Japan and threw its entire naval power into the War in the Atlantic (together with the entire British fleet), who's to say a landing on the European continent wouldn't succeed?

Could the western allies have even conducted a successful second front if the UK had been invaded and occupied by Hitler in 1940-41?

To me it is unlikely. In 1944 the major worries that faced the allied planers was to place enough divisions on the mainland at Normandy before german reinforcements could arrive. A month before the D-Day landings, the bombing campaign, as well as the maquis, attacked german road and specially rail infraestructure. This was possible with the use of the UK as a staging point and unsinkable aircraft carrier. Naval power in Europe was used mainly to support the troops (battleships and cruisers, et al)

To answer MM, the Italian campaign was viewed by the germans as a minor theatre, and had low priority in the allocation of troops. Even then the germans fought a succesfull defensive campaign for several years, helped in no small measure by the conditions of the terrain in Italy, and that in 1944 the Allies shifted divisions and priorities to the 2nd front. Could an invasion of Europe been easier from the South? hard to tell, since on ecould argue that the german could have also sent more troops there, making it a harded proposition for the allies.