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hist2004
03-25-2004, 09:19 AM
The invasion of Crete in May of 1941 was the first major airborne assault in history. It became known as “Der Kirchhof der Deutschen Fallschirmjäger”
(The graveyard of the German paratroopers) Although the Germans ultimately prevailed in the battle, it was extremely costly. Hitler was said to be so
shocked by the casualties of the German forces that he never allowed the German paratroopers to jump into combat in such large numbers ever again.
While reading this account, keep in mind that the German paratroopers of the day didn’t jump with their equipment. It was parachuted in bundles with
them and the Jagers then recovered their weapons from these containers. Doing so in a fire swept drop zone armed only with a P-38 automatic pistol
and maybe a few stick grenades are a testament to the “Ethos” of the German paratrooper. Additionally, when the German paratrooper exited the Junkers
JU 52, they took a door position and then dove head first toward the ground, which must have resulted in a pleasant “opening shock”. The paratrooper
would then be suspended in his harness canted slightly forward, which guaranteed a hands-knees landing.(they wore knee protection) The paratrooper had
virtually no control of the chute during descent, which because of the altitude they jumped at, was mercifully short. –Hist2004

The Invasion and Battle for Crete (Operation Merkur)

Airborne Landings (20 May 1941)

Early on the morning of May 20, waves of dive bombers and low flying fighter planes subjected the Maleme, Canea, and Suda Bay areas to the heaviest bombing and strafing attacks yet experienced by the seasoned troops manning the defenses. Most of the antiaircraft guns were put out of action and the defenders were forced to seek shelter. Bombs were dropped at the approaches to the airfields to put the telephone lines out of order.

At 08:00 the first gliders, each carrying twelve men, landed near the airfield and on the beaches near Canea. At the same time, approximately 2,000 parachutists jumped in waves of 200 each at fifteen-minute intervals. Two of every three parachutes in each wave carried containers with weapons and supplies. At Maleme, the parachute troops jumped into strong enemy fire from infantry weapons, emplaced in positions built into the hills south of the airfield. Many of the paratroopers were killed during the descent or shortly after landing. Because of the concentrated enemy fire most of the men were unable to recover the weapons containers and had to rely on the pistol, four hand grenades, and large knife they carried. One battalion of the assault regiment landed too far to the east among olive groves and vineyards near Maleme and was greeted by murderous machine gun and heavy weapons fire. Casualties were very heavy, and the medical platoon that had set up a first aid station in a farmhouse was overwhelmed by the constant influx of seriously wounded men. The gliders would have been completely destroyed by enemy fire, had they not been covered by clouds of dust which formed as soon as they touched ground.

The commander of the 7th Airborne Division, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Suessmann was killed during the approach flight, while Generalmajor Eugen Meindl, who was in command of the Maleme group, was critically wounded shortly after landing. Both the Maleme and Canea groups were therefore without their commanders.

The success of the Maleme operation depended on the quick capture of the airfield so that reinforcements could be landed without delay. To achieve this the British forces had to be dislodged frown Hill 107, which dominated the airfield and the surrounding terrain. The remnants of the initial force launched simultaneous attacks on the hill and the airfield at 15:00. Despite heavy opposition and fire from the British antiaircraft guns emplaced near the airfield, the attackers captured the northern and northwestern edge of the airfield and advanced up the northern slope of Hill 107. Two German transport planes tried to land on the airfield toward evening but machine gun fire prevented them from doing so.

The Canea group, which was to capture the village of Suda and the town of Canea and eliminate the British command staff, located in that area, landed on rocky ground and suffered many jump casualties. The few men who were not wounded attempted to gather weapons and ammunition and establish contact with their comrades. Here the German paratroopers were opposed by New Zealanders who engaged them with small arms and heavy weapons fire from olive groves offering perfect camouflage for snipers and machine gun positions. The isolated German elements made little headway against the well-entrenched enemy forces.

Meanwhile, the German command in Greece assumed that the operation was progressing according to plan because all troop carriers with the exception of seven returned to their bases. On this assumption, which was proved erroneous only after several hours had passed, the troop carriers were readied for the afternoon landings at Heraklion and Retimo. Because of a delay in the refueling, these planes arrived too late over the designated drop points and the paratroops were therefore without direct fighter and bomber support. One parachute combat team in regimental strength jumped over each of the two points between 15:00 and 16:30. Running into very heavy British fire, the parachutists suffered even more casualties than at Maleme and failed to capture the airfields, towns, or ports. Some of the troops landed at the wrong points because the troop carriers had difficulty in orienting themselves. After they touched ground the Germans found themselves in an almost hopeless situation. Surrounded by greatly superior enemy forces, they struggled for survival. Their signal equipment had been smashed during the airdrop and they were therefore unable to establish contact with the nearest friendly forces. Although they were completely on their own and faced by an uncertain fate, they were determined to hold out to the end in the vicinity of the two airfields so that they would tie down the enemy forces and thus assist their comrades in the western part of the island.

Air reconnaissance and radio messages had meanwhile rectified the erroneous picture of the first landings in western Crete. By the evening of 20 May not a single airfield was securely held by the Germans. The most favorable reports came from Maleme, where the defenders were falling back from Hill 107 and their perimeter defenses around the airfield which, however, was still under British artillery fire. Moreover, crashed aircraft and gliders obstructed parts of the field. Thus, no field was available for the airborne landing of the 5th Mountain Division, which was scheduled for the next day. Canea was still in enemy hands and the isolated troops landed at the four drop points had so far been unable to form airheads, let alone establish contact among themselves. While the attacker had run into unexpectedly strong resistance and had failed to reach the objective of the day, the fury and strength of the onslaught surprised the defenders.

Seaborne Invasion (20-22 May)

During the night of May 20-21, a British light naval force broke through the German aerial blockade and searched the waters north of Crete. Admiral Schuster thereupon decided to call back to Milos the first naval convoy, which was approaching Crete under escort of an Italian destroyer. At dawn on May 21, German planes sighted the British ships and subjected them to heavy air attacks. One destroyer was sunk and two cruisers damaged. At 09:00 the waters north of Crete were cleared of enemy ships and the convoy was ordered to continue its voyage in the direction of Maleme. During the day German dive bombers based on Skarpanto and Italian planes flying from Rhodes scored several hits on British ships returning to Crete waters, thereby preventing them from intercepting the Axis convoy. The German troops on the island were anxiously awaiting the arrival of artillery, antitank guns, and supplies, but poor weather conditions so delayed the convoy that it could not reach the island before darkness.

When it finally came around Cape Spatha at 23:00, a British naval task force suddenly confronted the convoy, which was on the way to Suda Bay to land reinforcements and supplies. The British immobilized the Italian escort vessel and sank most of the motor sailers and freighters. Many German soldiers, most of them mountain troops, were drowned. Sea rescue planes, however, picked up the majority of the shipwrecked. The second convoy, which had meanwhile reached Milos, was recalled to Piraeus to save it from a similar fate. No further seaborne landings were attempted until the fate of Crete had been decided.

On the morning of 22 May, VIII Air Corps started an all-out attack on the British fleet, which was forced to withdraw from the Aegean after suffering heavy losses. The battle between the Luftwaffe and the British Navy ended in the victory of German air power, which from then on dominated the air and waters north of Crete.

21 May-1 June

On the morning of May 21, a few planes were able to make crash landings on the beaches near Maleme and bring in badly needed weapons and ammunition to the assault troops in that area. Enemy artillery fire interdicted any landing on the airfield proper. It was therefore decided to drop additional parachute troops behind the enemy positions dominating the airfield.

Oberst Bernhard Ramcke assembled 550 paratroopers who had been left behind on the first day and formed a reserve battalion. He was ordered to jump west of Maleme airfield and assist in clearing the British positions in its vicinity. Mountain infantrymen already seated in their transport planes were hastily unloaded and immediately replaced by Ramcke's men. In the early afternoon four companies of parachute troops jumped from low altitudes above the vineyards near Maleme. The two that were supposed to land behind the enemy lines descended directly into well-camouflaged enemy positions and were almost completely wiped out. The other two joined the assault troops which, by 17:00, succeeded in dislodging the enemy infantry from the town of Maleme and the hills surrounding the airfield. The airdrop was effectively supported by tactical air force attacks on enemy defenses. Throughout this fighting, however, the dive bombers were unable to silence the British artillery pieces which were particularly well camouflaged and which, in order not to uncover their position, held their fire whenever German planes were in sight.

Troop carriers with the 5th Mountain Division troops began to land at Maleme airfield at 16:00, even though the field was still under intermittent artillery and machine gun fire. Low-flying planes kept the defenders' fire to a minimum and the landings proceeded without major losses. A captured British tank was used as prime mover to clear the airfield of burned-out and damaged planes. As soon as the landing strip was cleared, planes came in and left without interruption.

From that point on, reinforcements and supplies kept pouring in and the fate of Crete was sealed. Little by little the entire 5th Mountain Division was flown in. Even more important to the attack forces were the artillery pieces, antitank guns, and supplies of all types, which had been missing during the initial stage of the invasion and which were now being airlifted into Maleme.

On May 22, Generalmajor Julius Ringel, the commander of the 5th Mountain Division, assumed command of all the German forces in the Maleme airfield. His first task was to establish contact with the Canea forces and to clear the western part of the island of enemy troops. For this purpose his mountain troops used the same tactics they had employed so successfully at Mount Olympus and Thermopylae. By climbing along paths that were not even real trails and over heights previously considered to be unscalable, the mountain troops, loaded with everything they needed to fight and supply themselves, broke their own ground as they advanced and then attacked the enemy in the flank or rear at points where he expected them the least. They had no mules and were therefore forced to hand-carry their heavy weapons and ammunition across the rugged terrain. Throughout the struggle for Crete they adhered to the motto that sweat saves blood. In their heavy uniforms the mountain soldiers withstood days of scorching heat with temperatures rising up to 130 degrees F, and nights when the mountain air at altitudes ranging up to 7,000 feet was so cold that they were unable to sleep.

On D + 5 the mountain troops outflanked the British positions east of Maleme, and on the next day they entered Canea, the capital of Crete, and occupied Suda Bay after a forced march across the mountains. During this fighting the British offered strong resistance and showed no signs of willingness to give in. They made very skillful use of the terrain and delayed the German advance by sniper and machine gun fire. Wire and mine fields protected some of their positions. Armed bands of Cretans fought fiercely in the mountains, using great cunning and committing acts of cruelty such as mutilating dead and wounded German soldiers.

The air-ground coordination of the attackers occasionally failed to function during these days. At 13:10 on May 26, for instance, Dornier planes subjected elements of the 85th Mountain Regiment to a heavy bombardment, although the latter had laid out Swastika flags and fired white flares. The air attack continued until 14:00 and had a very detrimental effect on the ground troops' morale.

While the struggle for western Crete was raging, German reconnaissance planes reported that a few British planes had returned to Heraklion airfield on May 23, and that reinforcements were arriving by sea in the eastern part of the island. If complete air superiority over Crete was to be maintained by the Luftwaffe, the return of British planes en masse had to be prevented by all means. It was therefore decided to reinforce the German troops in the Heraklion pocket by dropping hastily assembled parachute units. They were to take possession of the airfield and, until relieved by approaching ground forces, prevent the landing of British planes. Four companies of parachute troops were formed at Maleme and dropped in the vicinity of the Heraklion pocket west of the town. Immediately after landing on 28 May, the parachute units contacted the embattled pocket force and launched a concerted attack against the British positions, eliminating several enemy strongholds with the support of dive-bombers. After regrouping his forces during the night the German commander at Heraklion set out to capture the town and the airfield early on the next morning. At daybreak the German troops closed in on the British positions. Not a shots was fired. British naval vessels had evacuated the Heraklion garrison during the preceding night.

By that time British resistance had crumbled everywhere. German supplies and equipment were landed at SudaBay without interference from enemy naval or air units. On 29 May, motorized reconnaissance elements, advancing through enemy-held territory, established contact with the German forces in the Retimo pocket and reached Heraklion the next day. A small Italian force that had landed at Sitia Bay on the eastern tip of the island on 28 May, linked up with a German advance detachment two days later.

After repeated encounters with enemy rear guards, the German forces reached the south coast of the island on 1 June. The struggle for Crete was thereby terminated. Despite the long delay in the issuance of evacuation orders, the British Navy was able to embark approximately 14,800 men and return them to Egypt. Subjected to severe losses and constant harassment by German planes, the Navy performed the evacuation during four nights.

http://www.standto.com/qorcrete.html

http://www.gebirgsjaeger.4mg.com/kreta.htm

http://www.2worldwar2.com/fallschirmjager.htm

http://www.explorecrete.com/preveli/battle-of-crete.html

http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/2116/hptll.htm

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

El'Potato
03-28-2004, 06:45 AM
Now that was a bloody battle :| But the site doesn't mention any casualties, or they've too afraid to show themselves to me :P Do you have any figures on that?

hist2004
03-28-2004, 07:54 AM
The Battle for Crete was a German victory but a costly one. Out of an assault force of just over 22,000 men, the Germans suffered some 5,500 casualties, of which 3,600 were killed or missing in action. Almost a third of the Ju52s used in the operation were damaged or destroyed. The Allies suffered almost 3,500 casualties (of which just over 1,700 were killed) and almost 12,000 were taken prisoner. The Royal Navy suffered 1 aircraft carrier, two battleships, six cruisers and seven destroyers badly damaged and another three cruisers and six destroyers sunk with the loss of over 2,000 men. The RAF lost some forty-seven aircraft in the battle. Exactly how many Greek soldiers and Cretan civilians died during the fighting will never be known.

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

Kitsune
03-28-2004, 04:31 PM
Until Crete, the British had only lost against the Germans, mainly in France and Greece. They were determined to make Cete a disaster for the Germans and since they had knowledge from the invasion they secretly had incresed the troops on Crete to 40.000 Commonwealth troops.

As the German paratroopers arrived, they more or less ran into a trap: just over 20.000 German paratroopes against 40.000 enemy soldiers, who were well entrenched in defensive positions and that does not even include Crete guerillas (who were quite a problem, they knew the terrain and took no prisoners).

Although the German paratroopers suffered heavy casualties (many were killed while still in the air or just after touch down) they prevailed.

Kitsune
03-28-2004, 04:36 PM
Double post, sorry.

hist2004
03-31-2004, 07:30 PM
The Fallschirmjager’s, along with Otto Skorzeny pulled off a major political coup with the Raid at Gran Sasso
to free Mussolini.-Hist2004

The rescue of Mussolini from the Gran Sasso. 12th September 1943

Propoganda coup for the SS
SS Hauptsturmfuhrer Otto Skorzeny was the man personally chosen by Hitler to lead the mission to rescue Mussolini, after the Duce had been removed from power by the King of Italy in July 1943 and replaced by Marshal Pietro Badoglio, whom Hitler feared may surrender Italy to the Allies. If this happened then southern Europe would be opened up to allied invasion.
If Mussolini were to be successfully rescued then troops loyal to him might stay on the side of the Germans.
The rescue mission was to be codenamed Operation Eiche (Oak), and was one of four operations ordered by Hitler to counter any attack on Italy by the Allies, or the early capitulation of his axis ally.
Operation Achse (Axis), was aimed at destroying or capturing the Italian fleet in the event of capitulation or invasion.
Operation Schwarz (Black), was aimed at the complete German occupation of Italy and disarming of Italian forces.
Operation Student, was aimed at the occupation of Rome and with the successfull execution of Operation Eiche, the restoration of Mussolini's regime.
Skorzeny was subordinated to the Luftwaffe for the mission and took his orders from General Kurt Student.
The first problem to overcome was the location of the Duce. After his arrest he was spirited away to an unknown destination and it was several weeks before the first lead came in. He was supposedly being held on the Island of Ponza off the West Coast of Italy.
By the time investigations had been carried out on this report he had been moved on, this time to the island of La Maddalena off the north east coast of Sardinia.
Plans were drawn up for a rescue attempt but before they could be carried out Mussolini was once again spirited away to a new destination.
The leads had now dried up and his whereabouts remained a mystery, until German radio intercepts confirmed that he had been moved to the Gran Sasso d'Italia, (an unusually high amount of signal traffic, which regularly referred to an person of importance) a high peak in the Appenine mountain region 80 miles north east of Rome. It was the best lead they had and preparations could now begin for the mission.
Built on the peak of the Gran Sasso was the Campo Imperatore hotel, part of a winter ski resort constructed a few years before the war. The only access to this hotel was via a cable car that ran up the side of the mountain from the valley below.
Any plans had to include the taking of the cable car station in the valley to stop any re-inforcements getting through. If Mussolini was being held on the Gran Sasso then it was guaranteed that he was being well guarded.
On September 10th 1943, Skorzeny, his adjutant and Luftwaffe planners carried out the first aerial reconnaissance over the Gran Sasso, which revealed an ideal landing place for an assault, a small meadow only yards from the front of the hotel.
Now only the method of assault was left, Skorzeny decided that a parachute assault was out of the question because of the risk of scattering the men, so a glider assault was planned.
It was decided to use 12 fully manned DFS-230 light assault gliders for the assault, consisting of several men from Skorzeny's Friedenthal Battalion and men of the 1st Kompanie, 1st Battalion, 7th Regiment, (the Fallschirm - Lehr Battalion), under the command of Oberleutnant Georg von Berlepsch.The remainder of the Battalion under the command of Major Otto-Harald Mors were to travel by road and take the nearby airfield at Aquila and the cable car station in the valley below. Another group of Skorzeny’s men were tasked with the job of freeing the Duce's family.
On the afternoon of the 12th September the gliders and their towing aircraft took off from the Practica de Mare airfield near Rome on their 1-hour flight to the Gran Sasso.They took with them a pro-german Italian officer called General Soletti who could be useful in negotiations if things became bloody.
Gliders #11 &#12 never made it off the airfield as they became damaged during takeoff (the airfield had been bombed shortly before H-hour), Skorzeny who was travelling in glider #3 took the lead as gliders #1 & #2 and their tows disappeared in dense cloud midway through the flight, they were only left with 8 gliders for the mission.
As they approached the Gran Sasso visibilty was still bad, it was only recognised because of the previous reconnaissance carried out by Skorzeny, they immediately prepared to be cast from their tows.
As they approached the target they saw that the meadow previously planned as the landing area was in fact covered in large rocks not observed during the reconnaissance. They made a crash landing only yards from the front of the hotel, the obstacles helping to brake the gliders.
Skorzeny led his men into the hotel, overcoming the resistance at the entrance and headed straight for the Duces room, which was guarded by two Italian officers. They offered no resistance and within minutes the commanding officer of the garrison had promised no resistance from the rest of his men . The whole complex fell into in German hands quickly and without bloodshed.
The hotel had been taken so quickly that gliders #6 & #7 were just coming in to land. Glider #8 made its approach shortly afterwards but crash-landed, badly injuring all those on board.
Mussolini had been released from his detention and now only the problem of getting him off the Gran Sasso remained.
There were 3 options for escape, the first was by road to Rome through the valley below which was now in the safe hands of Major Mors and the Fallschirm Lehr Battalion, this was risky due to the partisan activity in the area. The second was to transport the Duce to the nearby airfield at Aquila which was due to be attacked by paratroops and fly him out.
Skorzeny chose the third option, fly him directly off the Gran Sasso using the Feisler Storch recconaisance aircraft piloted by Student’s personal pilot Captain Gerlach, which was flying overhead.
Captain Gerlach made an emergency landing on an improvised airstrip and made preparations to take off with his precious cargo. German war correspondents were allowed up to the Gran Sasso after the battle, via the cable car to record the event and many photos and cine recordings were made for propoganda purposes. Many show the Duce being escorted to the Storch and being buckled in by Skorzeny himself. Some show the wreckage of the damaged gliders. Some photos show the Italian soldiers who were Mussolinis former guards escorting him to the plane and helping to make the makeshift airstrip. Mussolini and Skorzeny climbed aboard and the plane took off barely making it off the plateau, as the Fiesler Storch was not made with 3 men in mind as well as the Duce's luggage.
They were flown to the Practica de Mare airfield where they changed planes and carried on with the journey to Vienna, where Mussolini was re-united with his family. Whilst staying in Vienna, Skorzeny was awarded the Knights Cross for his part in the mission.
Skorzeny flew with Mussolini to meet the Fuhrer on the 15th september at the Wolfs Lair in Eastern Prussia.
Skorzeny became the hero of the Gran Sasso raid, although the Fallschirmtruppe played a major part in the planning and execution of the operation.The argument over who should have got the credit for the mission will probably go on for years to come, but at the end of the day the plan was a daring exploit that turned in to a complete success.
It was even mentioned in the British Parliament when the news broke. The British took part in a kidnap raid themselves, although not an airborne operation it was still a daring mission. They kidnapped General Heinrich Kreipe from occupied Crete on 26th April 1944 and spirited him away by sea.
http://www.eagle19.freeserve.co.uk/gransasso.htm

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

csqnsas
04-02-2004, 03:37 PM
Hist 2004,

I am assuming you are American? .

I have been very lucky in my service to visit or serve in many / most of the places you write about. Gran Sasso, again is one of them. Superb Skiing today but if you talk to the Hotel owner they will also show you around the whole site. The radio room is left , much as it was then, the rest has been changed. As a pilot of small single engine aircraft, today the escape is not a big thing,but back then there were a lot of rocks and boulders on the airfield as well as the risk of Allied aircraft.

Still a very impressive view from the hotel and its surroundings. nice place to visit but not much of a battle field tour, more a vacation.

hist2004
04-02-2004, 03:55 PM
Yes, I’m American but of Italian decent. Both of my parents were born in Italy.

Regards,
Hist2004

hist2004
04-02-2004, 08:28 PM
All through the war the German Fallschirmjäger earned their reputation as outstanding fighters of high quality and always gave a good account of themselves in action, a truley elite fighting force.
During World War Two, 54,449 Fallschirmjäger lost their lives and to this day an additional 8000 are still listed as missing in action.


Operation Mercury - 20th May 1941

Crete was the scene of the largest German Airborne operation of the war, and the first time in history that an island had been taken by airborne assault.
Afterwards, Crete was dubbed the graveyard of the Fallschirmjäger, casualties were high:
Killed - 1915 Officers and Men.
Missing - 1759 Officers and Men
Wounded - 1632 Officers and Men
(These figures are taken from a document written by Der Chef Der Luftflotte 4 und Befehlshaber Südost - Generaloberst Lohr, in 1941.)
It was also the first time the Germans had encountered stiff partisan activity, with women and even children becoming involved in the battle.
The XI Fliegerkorps was responsible for ferrying the paratroops to Crete using 530 JU-52’s and 70 DFS-230 light assault gliders, all together 8100 Fallschirmjäger were dropped on to Crete, 1680 men at Maleme, 2460 men at Chania, 1380 men at Rethymno and 2360 men at Heraklion. (approximately 150 JU-52's were lost during this operation, but only 7 were shot down. The others were destroyed by enemy fire when landing or by landing accidents, this loss of valuable transport aircraft would have a knock on effect for future operations)
Crete was chosen because of the British airfields on the island, which were more than capable of striking the vital Ploesti oil fields in Rumania. Hitler's forces needed all the oil they could get for the impending assault on Russia. One major problem was the lack of transport aircraft, there was not enough to ferry all of the forces across in one go.
There would have to be two waves, one in the morning (Maleme and Chania) and another in the afternoon (Rethymno and Heraklion), so there would be enough time in between for the aircraft to return from Crete, refuel and return again back to the island. The lack of ships for the amphibious forces was overcome by the confiscation of caiques and fishing vessels from the coastal areas.
The allied commanders on Crete had been aware of the impending assault through Enigma intercepts, the Germans had been provided with inaccurate intelligence and dropped into stiff resistance of nearly three times the amount of men they were expecting. The garrison had been re-inforced by allied troops who had retreated from the Greek mainland.
As the battle wore on and casualty reports started to come in to General Student's HQ at the Hotel Grande Bretagne in Athens, it seemed that the battle was lost, but luck was on their side, the allies made some tactical mistakes and withdrew from positions around Hill 107, overlooking the airfield at Maleme, which gave the Germans the upper hand and enabled them to land the desperately needed air landing troops of the Gebirgsjäger on the airfield, although still under sporadic artillery fire.(which did not cease until the night of 23rd May) The allies pulled back in the face of a constant flow of fresh German re-inforcements and began their retreat, first southwards across Crete and then by sea to North Africa.
Although the assault on Crete had finally proved to be a success the losses were high, not only to the Fallschirmtruppe but to transport aircraft, which would be desperately missed in future operations in Russia, so they were never again used in an airborne operation of this size.
Below is the order of battle and their objectives in the assault:
General Alexander Lohr – Commander Luftflotte IV and overall commander of Operation "Mercury".

General Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen – Commander VIII Fliegerkorps, responsible for providing close air support.

General Kurt Student – Commander XI Fliegerkorps and Planner of the airborne operations for Operation "Mercury"


Luftlande Sturmregiment
Stab
Kommandeur - Generalmajor Eugen Meindl (commander Group West) WIA, evacuated in the morning of May 21st and replaced by Oberst Bernhard Hermann Ramcke when he dropped with 850 re-inforcements at 1800 on May 21st.
Adjutant - Oberleutnant von Seelen (WIA)
Stab Major - Major Franz Braun (KIA)
O.-Offizier - Oberleutnant Schächter (WIA)
N.-Offizier - Oberleutnant Göttsche (briefed Ramcke on his arrival)
Rgt.Arzt - Oberstabsarzt Dr.Heinrich Neumann
Stab Hauptmann - Hauptmann Pettelkau
Kampfzugführer - Oberfeldwebel Gutheil
N.-Zugführer - Feldwebel Erich
Offizier for special use - Oberleutnant Zierach
Stabskompanie Hfw - Hauptfeldwebel Koskialowski


1st Battalion
Kommandeur - Major Walter Koch (Group West) - (WIA) : (replaced by Oberstabsarzt Heinrich Neumann)
Adjutant - Oberleutnant Gerbershagen (KIA)
Stab Hauptmann - Oberleutnant Ofmann (KIA)
Battalion Arzt - Stabsarzt Dr.Jäger
N.-Zugführer - Feldwebel Urban
Communications Kompanie - Oberleutnant Osius (KIA)
1.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Alfred Genz
2.Kompanie - Hauptmann Gustav Altmann (POW)
3.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Wulf von Plessen (KIA) (replaced by Oberarzt Dr.Weizel)
4.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Kurt Sarrazin (KIA)

6 x Heavy Machine Gun & 6 x Heavy Mortars
1 Platoon of Jäger (reserve)

2nd Battalion
Kommandeur - Major Edgar Stentzler (Group West)
Adjutant - Oberleutnant Wolf
Stab Hauptmann - Oberleutnant Stoltz
O.-Offizier - Oberleutnant Schelske
Kradfahrzug Offizier - Oberleutnant Goßmann
N.-Zugführer - Leutnant Braun
Battalion Arzt - Stabsarzt Dr.Rodpewig
Kampfzugführer - Hauptfeldwebel Barabas
5.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Herterich
6.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Pissin
7.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Barmetler
8.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Reinhardt

6 x Heavy Machine Gun & 6 x 8cm Mortars
3 x 37mm Anti-Tank guns

3rd Battalion
Kommandeur - Major Otto Scherber (Group West) - (KIA) (replaced by Oberleutnant Horst Trebes)
Adjutant - Oberleutnant Heinz (KIA)
Stab Hauptmann - Oberleutnant Horst Trebes
O.-Offizier - Oberleutnant Leiß (KIA)
Battalion Arzt - Stabsarzt Dr.Ellenbeck (KIA)
N.-Zugführer - Oberfeldwebel Ziehm
9.Kompanie - Hauptmann Rudolf Witzig (WIA)
10.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Schulte-Sasse (KIA)
11.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Jung (KIA)
12.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Gansewig (KIA)

6 x Heavy Machine Gun & 6 x 8cm Mortars
4 x 37mm Anti-Tank guns
3 x 20mm Cannons

4th Battalion
Kommandeur - Hauptmann Walther Gericke (Group West)
Adjutant - Oberleutnant Engelhardt
Battalion Arzt - Stabsarzt Dr.Diehm
N.-Zugführer - Oberfeldwebel Daniels
13.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Sauer (WIA)
14.Kompanie - Hauptmann Kiesel (KIA)
15.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Dobke (KIA)
16.Kompanie - Oberleutnant Hoefeld

12 x 10.5cm Heavy Mortars
4 x 37mm Anti-Tank guns
2 x 20mm Cannon
6 x Heavy Machine Guns & 6 x 8cm Mortars
1 Sanitäts Zug

Kampftrupp Mürbe:
72 Jäger
3 x 37mm Anti-Tank guns
Kompanie Osius:
130 Jäger
Kompanie Hoefeld:
1 Kompanie of Fallschirm-Pioneers (16. Kompanie, IV Battalion, LL.Sturmregiment)
Kampftrupp Braun:
90 Jäger in 9 gliders (Major Braun of LL.St.Rgt.Stab was killed whilst assaulting the iron bridge over the River Tavronitis)

(LL-Sturmregiment casualties on Kreta ran to 38 Offiziere, 667 Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften killed and missing, with 31 Offiziere, 501 Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften wounded, out of a Regiment strength of 1860 men)

Gruppe West had 3 Glider Detachments, the men taken from the 1st Battalion, Sturmregiment. They were to spearhead the attacks on Maleme. The men for the paradrops came from the remainder of the St.Rgt.

1st Glider Detachment commanded by Oberleutnant Wulf von Plessen - (KIA) with 108 men in 14 Gliders. The objective, land at the mouth of the river Tavronitis and neutralise an AA position. (This Kompanie suffered 17 killed and 27 wounded on 20th May).

2nd Glider Detachment commanded by Major Walter Koch - (WIA) with 120 men in 15 Gliders. The objective, land near the southwest & southeast slopes of hill 107 and capture the RAF camp there. (Kompanie Sarrazin with Battalion Stab. Koch suffered a head wound within a few minutes of landing. Oberleutnant Sarrazin was killed)

3rd Glider Detachment commanded by Major Franz Braun - (KIA) with 90 men in 9 Gliders. The objective, take and hold the bridge over the river Tavronitis.

The Gruppe West Glider assaults were to be backed up shortly after by airdrops from the following units:

IV./LL.St.Rgt. and Regiment Stab The objective, land on the open ground on the West Bank of the river Tavronitis, cross the bridge and support Braun and Koch’s glider detachments. (Generalmajor Meindl was seriously wounded when he tried to cross the Tavronitis bridge, command was temporarily passed to Major Stentzler)

II./LL.St.Rgt.The objective, form the regimental reserve to the east of Spilia and provide protection from enemy forces that may come from the south.

III./LL.St.Rgt. The objective, land around the town of Maleme and attck the airfield from the East. (9.Kompanie became badly dispersed due to the wind and many men landed to their death in the sea)

Kompanie Osius. The objective, land west of the valley near Ropaniana and join up with 1st Battalion

Kompanie Hoefeld. The objective, land approximately 1000m south of the Tavronitis bridge and secure the river valley and the road to Kandanos. (took heavy casualties from armed civilians)

Reinforced Platoon of 72 men from the 2nd Battalion under the command of Leutnant Peter Mürbe. The objective, capture the unfinished airfield at Kastelli Kissamos. (This platoon landed upon 2 battalions of Greek troops and large groups of armed civilians. Leutnant Mürbe and 58 other Fallschirmjäger were killed. The 13 surviving paras under the command of Feldwebel Kroll were forced to surrender late in the morning. Were it not for the intervention of the New Zealand commander in the Kastelli area, Major Bedding, the paras would have been executed. Some of the killed and missing Fallschirmjäger of Kampftruppe Mürbe were later found to have been badly mutilated)

4/FJR1, 12/FJR1 and a handful of men from FJR2 (Oberleutnant Klein), the last of the reserves from Greece, were dropped east of Maleme on the afternoon of May 21st.

Hans Sack was a Gefreiter with 15.Kompanie/LL.St.Rgt who jumped near the airfield at Maleme on May 20th 1941. Once he landed he took cover and soon heard the sound of a sub-machine gun close by. He thought that his comrades were attacking British troops near Hill 107. He broke cover and was hit by this sub-machine gun fire. He learned minutes later that a quick thinking British soldier had found a weapons container and removed one of the Schmeisser's, opening fire upon the paratroops with it. Hans Sack was seriously wounded and in a bad condition. An enemy soldier found Hans Sack and dressed his wounds properly, saving his life. The soldier found some wine in the farmhouse where Hans was laid up. They drank together and then the soldier departed. Two days later Hans Sack was found by some Gebirgsjäger and evacuated by air to a hospital in Athens.
Hans Sack will be 80 years old this year.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

7th Flieger Division
Stab (landed in 4 gliders southwest of Galatas)
Kommandeur - Generalmajor Wilhelm Süssmann (commander Group Centre) KIA - *see N/B below
Chief of Staff- Major Count von Üxkull
Divisional Units
Leicht Flak Battalion
Artillery Battalion Hauptmann Schram
Anti-Tank Battalion
MG Battalion
Fallschirm-Pioniere Battalion Major Egon Liebach (Group Centre) - Dropped north of Alikianou (3.Kompanie were transported by sea with the Gebirgsjäger re-inforcements. Leutnant Häffner, the hero of the Corinth Canal Bridge was killed at sea)
Sanitats Abteilung 7 - Oberstarbzt Dr. Berg
1.Kompanie - Dr. Mallison (Group Centre)
2.Kompanie - Dr. Langemayer (Group East)
3.Kompanie - Dr. Siebert (KIA) (Group West)
4.Kompanie - Dr.Steidel, airlanded at Maleme with Field Hospital on May 22nd.
FJR1
Oberst Bruno Oswald Bräuer (commander Group East)
Hauptmann Rau
Hauptmann Wolf Werner Graf von der Schulenburg
1st Battalion - Major Erich Walther (Group East)
2nd Battalion - Hauptmann Burckhardt (Group East)
3rd Battalion - Major Karl-Lothar Schulz (Group East)

FJR2
Oberst Alfred Sturm (Group Centre)
Major Schulz
Hauptmann Hugo Paul
1st Battalion - Major Hans Kroh (Group Centre)
2nd Battalion - Hauptmann Gerhart Schirmer (Group East)
3rd Battalion - Hauptmann Wiedemann (Group Centre)

FJR3
Oberst Richard Heidrich (Landed later on in support of Group Centre)
Leutnant Heckel
1st Battalion - Hauptmann Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte (Group Centre)
2nd Battalion - Major Helmut Derpa (Group Centre) KIA
3rd Battalion - Major Ludwig Heilmann (Group Centre)

Gruppe Mitte (centre) had 2 Glider detachments, the men taken from I/LL.St.Rgt. Men of the 2nd and 3rd Parachute Regiments and the Fallschirm-Pioneer Battalion made the airdrops.

1st Glider Detachment commanded by Leutnant Alfred Genz with 90 men in 9 Gliders. The objective, attack and sieze British AA positions near Mournies, southeast of Chania

2nd Glider Detachment commanded by Hauptmann Gustav Altmann with 150 men in 15 Gliders. The objective, attack AA positions on the Akrotiri Peninsula, north east of Chania and make way for Oberst Heidrich’s 3rd Parachute Regiment. (This glider group suffered 108 casualties. Hauptmann Altmann along with 2 platoon commanders, Oberleutnant Möhr & Leutnant Rümmler were captured by British soldiers and remained in captivity until the end of the war. A third platoon commander, Oberleutnant Ebner was killed.)

The airdrops were made as such:

FJR2minus II/FJR2. The objective, drop onto open ground near Rethymno.

1st Battalion, 2nd Parachute Regiment. The objective, capture the airfield at Rethymno from the east.

3rd Battalion, 2nd Parachute Regiment. The objective, seize Rethymno town.

1st Battalion, 3rd Parachute Regiment. The objective, land south of Alikianou-Chania road and advance on Suda to link up with Genz.

2nd Battalion, 3rd Parachute Regiment. The objective, land north of Alikianou-Chania road, southwest of Galatas and form regimental reserve.

3rd Battalion, 3rd Parachute Regiment. The objective, land north-west of Galatas seizing two villages and attack Chania. (III/FJR3 landed amongst stiff resistance. 13/FJR3 were dropped over the Agia reservoir and suffered heavy casualties as well as losing most of their mortars and ammunition. The commander of 13/FJR3, Oberleutnant Schimkat drowned in the reservoir before he could be rescued.)

Fallschirm-Pioneer Battalion. The objective, land north of Alikianou and provide rear cover for main landings.


*NB:General Süssmann's glider crashed on to the Greek island of Aegina at 6am on May 20th. The glider caught in the slip stream of a Heinkel He-111 and the tow rope broke. All onboard were killed.


Gruppe Ost (east) had no Glider detachments.

FJR1 and an AA machine-gun Battalion.

1st Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment. The objective, drop east of Heraklion and seize a radio station. Regimental reserve.

2nd Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment. The objective, land east and west of the airfield at Heraklion and seize it.
(6/FJR1 & 7/FJR1, under the command of Hauptmann Dunz suffered almost 100% casualties when they were dropped west of the airfield at Heraklion. Only 5 men survived by swimming to safety around the coastland cliffs.)

3rd Battalion, 1st Parachute Regiment. The objective, land south west of Heraklion and take the town supported by the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Parachute Regiment.

The airlanding troops, used to support air assaults would land in their JU-52 transport aircraft after the Fallschirmjäger had secured the airfields. These men were supplied from the 5th Gebirgs (Mountain) Division as the 22nd Airlanding Division that usually supported Fallschirm operations had been diverted to guard the vital Ploesti oilfields in Rumania.

Generalmajor Julius Ringel commanded the 5th Gebirgs Division (approx 14 000 men) and consisted of the following units, some of which were airlanded, some of which were landed by sea:

85th Gebirgs Regiment – Oberst Krakau
1st Battalion / 85th Regiment – Major Dr.Treck
2nd Battalion / 85th Regiment – Major Esch
3rd Battalion / 85th Regiment – Major Fett
100th Gebirgs Regiment – Oberst Utz
1st Battalion / 100th Regiment – Major Schrank
2nd Battalion / 100th Regiment – Major Friedmann
3rd Battalion / 100th Regiment – Major Ehall
95th Gebirgs Artillery Regiment – Oberstleutnant Wittmann
1st Battalion / 95th Regiment – Major von Sternbach
2nd Battalion / 95th Regiment – Major Raithel
95th Gebirgs Motor-Cycle Battalion – Major Nolte
95th Gebirgs Pioneer Battalion – Major Schatte (as this unit fought its way westward to Kastelli, it took fire from groups of armed civilians, which included women and children. They also found many mutilated Fallschirmjäger who had been the victims of these partisans. During the night of May 20th/21st, these armed bandits roamed the countryside looking for dead and dying paras. Nearly 140 men from III/LL.St.Rgt were allegedly murdered or mutilated during that night at the hands of Cretan civilians.)
141st Gebirgs Regiment - Oberst Jais
95th Gebirgs Anti-tank Battalion – Major Bindermann
95th Gebirgs Reconnaissance Battalion – Major Graf Castell zu Castell
Some of the 5th Gebirgs Division were transported by sea in makeshift convoys, accompanied and protected by Italian warships. The British Mediterranean fleet and RAF intercepted many of these ships which resulted in heavy casualties amongst these amphibious groups.


Memorials to the Fallschirmjäger on Kreta
It was not until 1975 that the bodies of the German war dead on Crete were gathered together and re-interred all together on the slopes of Hill 107, which was the scene of bitter fighting and where so many Paratroopers had died to gain the nearby airfield at Maleme.
The dead are laid in rows beneath flat marble tablets, the names and dates of two soldiers inlaid on them. The memorial plaque reads:
"In this graveyard rests 4465 German dead from the war years 1941-1945. 3352 of them died during the battle of Crete between the 20th May and 1st June 1941........They gave their lives for their fatherland".
Another memorial exists outside Chania, to those men of II/LL.St.Rgt. It features the Diving Eagle grasping a swastika in its talons, the badge of the Fallschirmjäger. Of course, since the end of the war the swastika has been concreted over and although battered, the eagle still stands atop the monument. (see article on St.Rgt monument within this site)
The local people debated for years whether the memorial should stay or be pulled down. It stayed as a symbol for future generations, all conquerors and invaders in history had left something of beauty and value on the island, this was what the Fallschirmtruppe left behind.

In Memoriam: The Von Blücher brothers
The successful movie "Saving Private Ryan" was the story of a mission to bring home an American Paratrooper whose 3 elder brothers had been KIA. Many brothers died in action with some families losing 3 or 4 young sons. The German forces were not exempt from this. There were three brothers serving in the 7th Airborne Division during the invasion of Crete, all were killed in action during the fighting to take the airfield at Heraklion, although not all serving in the same kompanie. They were the Von Blücher brothers,
Wolfgang Graf von Blücher (Born, 31.1.1917), an Oberleutnant aged 24 and Zugführer in 2./FJR1 (awarded the Knights Cross on May 24th 1940 during operations in Dordrecht, Holland).
Leberecht Graf von Blücher (Born, 1922), a Sergeant, aged 19
Hans-Joachim Graf von Blücher (Born, 28.10.1923), a Private, aged 17.
The von Blücher family were not informed of the death of their 3 sons for 4 weeks until the regiment returned to Germany, where the regimental commander informed them of their loss.
Wolfgang and Hans-Joachim were buried on at Maleme with so many other Fallschirmjäger. Leberecht's body was never found.

(Another example of this, is the story of the Schneider twins. Both were members of 3.Kompanie, 5th Fj Regiment, whilst it was in Tunisia in early 1943. During the battle for Ridge 331 near Bou-Arada both were killed. One was killed coming to the assistance of the other mortally wounded brother. Both were aged 17.)





"Tote Fallschirmjäger sind nie allein, denn loyale Kameraden bleiben immer mit ihnen"
"Dead paratroopers are never alone, for loyal comrades will always remain with them"

http://www.eagle19.freeserve.co.uk/crete.htm

Regards,
Hist2004

aktarian
04-04-2004, 10:00 AM
The invasion of Crete in May of 1941 was the first major airborne assault in history.

No offence but should this honor belong to invasion of Netherlands?

hist2004
04-04-2004, 10:35 AM
The invasion of Crete in May of 1941 was the first major airborne assault in history.

No offence but should this honor belong to invasion of Netherlands?

Yes, but this was the first "large scale" involving thousands of paratroopers.

Regards,
Hist2004

aktarian
04-04-2004, 12:47 PM
Yes, but this was the first "large scale" involving thousands of paratroopers.

Regards,
Hist2004

Didn't invasion of Netherlands involve similar numbers? Altough they were more dispersed while on crete entire airborne force was commited agaisnt single objective.

hist2004
04-04-2004, 12:54 PM
No, from everything I've read the Invasion of Crete, or "Kreta" was the
largest Airborne invasion in the history of parachute forces. The US & UK
seeing the results, quickly followed suite in creating Airborne units. Although the US & UK would launch larger airborne assaults, Crete was
the first.

Regards,
Hist2004

aktarian
04-04-2004, 01:35 PM
Liddell Hart (History of Second World War) states that 4.000 paratroopers were used, backed by some 12.000 troops of light/airlanding division (22. IIRC) for Netherlands and some 3.000 for Crete (initial assault), backed by some 19.000 troops later. Other sources I read put numbers in that range.

So numbers can be compared.

While Crete was bigger, it wasn't first "major". It might appear so because troops were focused on single (altough big) objective, while in Netherlands they were tasked with capturing several objectives (including in Belgium) and weren't followed by troops arriving by air but by troops arriving on land. So you can say that individual landings in Netherlands weren't major, if you look at them from wider perspective (which, IMO, you have to) of offensive agaisnt West airborne offensive in Netherlands was major and can claim to be first major.

And I never said Netherlands was bigger, I said it was first big (or major) operation.

hist2004
04-04-2004, 09:09 PM
The invasion of Crete was the first time in history an objective(major) was taken with the use of paratroopers. Once the airhead was established, mountain troops were brought in.
I stand behind my first statement. If the Netherlands was taken with the sole use of paratroopers, then it would have that distinction. I ask other
forum members for their input.

Regards,
Hist2004

ronin2172
04-04-2004, 11:44 PM
It isn't a numbers game it is about the way they were employed. In Holland and Belgium they were tasked with supporting the main thrust (The Panzer and Infantry divisions were tasked with taking Holland and Belgium). There is no way you could take a country the size of Belgium or Holland with lightly armed paratroopers (remember the dutch and belgians had armor and the BEF wasn't far away). So securing the country with just paratroopers was suicide. So they were used in small drops to catch key targets in advance of a ground offensive.

Crete was just small enough to be doable (Besides with the Royal Navy in such strength in the Med no other way was feasible), so they were the offensive; everything else was to support them. Unfortunately (or fortunately depending on your POV) it was a tougher nut to crack then expected. Hitler called crete "The graveyard of the German paratrooper" and swore never again to conduct large scale airborne landings.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/programmes/timewatch/hitler_crete.shtml

Haiw
04-05-2004, 05:33 AM
It isn't a numbers game it is about the way they were employed. In Holland and Belgium they were tasked with supporting the main thrust (The Panzer and Infantry divisions were tasked with taking Holland and Belgium). There is no way you could take a country the size of Belgium or Holland with lightly armed paratroopers (remember the dutch and belgians had armor and the BEF wasn't far away). So securing the country with just paratroopers was suicide. So they were used in small drops to catch key targets in advance of a ground offensive.

Crete was just small enough to be doable (Besides with the Royal Navy in such strength in the Med no other way was feasible), so they were the offensive; everything else was to support them. Unfortunately (or fortunately depending on your POV) it was a tougher nut to crack then expected. Hitler called crete "The graveyard of the German paratrooper" and swore never again to conduct large scale airborne landings.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/programmes/timewatch/hitler_crete.shtml
Not to nitpick, but we didn't have any real armour. Yeah, we had like...18 armoured cars, but not a single tank (the orders were made, but they weren't delivered yet). Besides, the Fallschirmjäger failed their main objective in the Netherlands (to capture the government and the royalty).

ronin2172
04-05-2004, 12:29 PM
LOL, whoops on my part! I didn't know all that about the armour :oops: Even if you didn't have any real armour you had artillery and plenty of ammo, which the paratroopers didn't have and you would have cut them to pieces.

I remember reading that the Dutch cut the germans to pieces when they tried to take the bridge at Nijmegen ( I kno i f*cked the spelling up!), where they Fallschirmjagers? (I might be mistaken about the battle). And why did they fail to capture the government and the royal family?

hist2004
04-05-2004, 01:14 PM
Would the individuals that have responded consider Operation Merkur (Invasion of Crete)
the first major airborne assault in history?

Regards,
Hist2004

Haiw
04-05-2004, 01:15 PM
LOL, whoops on my part! I didn't know all that about the armour :oops: Even if you didn't have any real armour you had artillery and plenty of ammo, which the paratroopers didn't have and you would have cut them to pieces.

I remember reading that the Dutch cut the germans to pieces when they tried to take the bridge at Nijmegen ( I kno i f*cked the spelling up!), where they Fallschirmjagers? (I might be mistaken about the battle). And why did they fail to capture the government and the royal family?
Err the artillery wasn't exactely top-notch either... it was all old crap from the previous century.

Anyway, as far as I know the forces attacking from the east near for example Nijmegen were all regular troops. BTW the bridge at Nijmegen was blown up. The Germans also suffered heavy losses when trying to cross the Maas river, and while trying to cross the Afsluitdijk (a dike in the north of the country). We could have held out quite a while longer, if it weren't for the bombardments on the cities.

The main reason the German Fallschirmjäger failed in their objectives of capturing the government and Royal family was to my knowledge mainly due to unexpected resistance by the Marines that were in the area.

Haiw
04-05-2004, 01:18 PM
Would the individuals that have responded consider Operation Merkur (Invasion of Crete)
the first major airborne assault in history?

Regards,
Hist2004
I would. There were some pretty big operations in Belgium and the Netherlands, but it was all mainly a 'support effort', or for secondary objectives or 'bonuses'. While the attack on Crete was pretty much a big assault on their own.

hist2004
04-05-2004, 03:07 PM
I'm adding this information for clarity, and for those who want data on Germany's use of Airborne troops prior to the Invasion of Crete.-hist2004

Plans and Preperations

As the summer of 1939 turned to fall, Europe drifted closer to war. In response to Germany’s occupation of Czechoslovakia in March, the Dutch government granted “state-of-war” powers to General I. H. Reynders, Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. On August 23, 1939 Germany and the Soviet Union entered into a non-aggression pact. Belgium began mobilizing on August 26; Poland began calling up her reservists two days after that.The Dutch ordered a full military mobilization on August 29, quickly calling up about 250,000 troops.General Reynders, unable to agree on basic strategy with the defense minister, resigned in February 1940.

The quick German victory over Poland came as more of a surprise than the actual attack. On October 9, shortly after the last Polish center of resistance surrendered, Hitler issued his first directive for an attack in the west. German armies would attack through Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland “at the earliest possible moment”. Good reasons existed for an attack through the Low Countries. First, the Germans feared an allied move into the Low Countries giving the enemy a chance to attack into Germany’s vital Ruhr industrial region. On the other hand, German possession of the same area provided a way around the French Maginot line. Finally, Hitler wanted air and naval bases close to England.

Early in the planning stages for his western campaign Hitler directed that airborne forces be used to speed the advance through Belgium and Holland. The original German plan called for the main thrust (Schwerpunkt) to cross through southern most Holland near Maastricht and into Belgium south of Liège. When partial copies of the invasion plan fell into Allied hands the operation was revised, greatly reducing the part played by airborne units. The fact that the officer who lost the plans was the commander of the parachute school may have contributed to the reduction of the airborne mission. Lieutenant General Kurt Student, chief of airborne forces, immediately began lobbying for a bigger role for his Fallschirmjaeger (paratroopers). He proposed to use 7thFlieger(Airborne) and 22ndLuftlande(Airlanding) Divisions in Holland. Proceeding up the chain of command from Army Group B commander through Army Chief of Staff with no luck, he turned to Hans Jeschonnek, Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, who had direct access to Hitler. Jeschonnek told Student “There was considerable argument over your proposal - it was called an act of Columbus - but it is agreed that we should try.”Student was also tasked to take out Fort Eban-Emael in Belgium and secure bridges leading to it. Student is credited with carefully and methodically planning the airborne operations in Holland and Belgium, personally specifying landing zones and objectives down to company level.He preferred what he called the “short method” of dropping right on the objective. Thanks to Student’s careful planing and extensive rehearsals, most of the operations succeeded, if not always precisely according to plan.

The German Eighteenth Army had the task of conquering Holland, and it was directed to do so quickly with strong support form the Luftwaffein the form of paratroopers and aircraft. General Georg Kuechler’s Eighteenth Army included the 9thPanzer Division, one SS motorized division, six infantry divisions and the German Army’s only cavalry division, along with corps and army level troops.Although the Dutch had more troops (ten divisions and several independent brigades and regiments), the German force possessed total control of the air, superior firepower and maneuverability, and the initiative. The campaign plan called for the Luftwaffeto drop 4,500 paratroopers and land 12,000 troops in transport planes. This airborne operation was to seize key bridges, and capture the Royal Family, government and Dutch high command at The Hague. Commandos, wearing Dutch uniforms, would capture bridges along the frontier. Strong armored and motorized forces would advance across the frontier, proceed south of the Maas and Waal rivers, and link up with the airborne troops deep in Holland.

The Dutch defense plan was fairly straightforward. Holding the 200-mile long Dutch-German frontier was an impossibility. The Dutch Army would delay along the frontier and again along the Ijssel river in the center. Approximately two thirds of the 250,000 available troops were deployed along the Grebbe and Peel lines. The “Peel Line”, situated behind the Peel marshes, was the main line of resistance south of the Waal. The “Grebbe Line” (Grebbestelling), placed behind inundated areas and more heavily fortified and carefully planned than the “Peel Line”, served as the main line in the center. In the north the Dutch planned to hold any attackers at the eastern end of the “Great Dike” (Afsluitdijk). Behind the Grebbe and Peel Lines lay Fortress Holland, first used by Maurice of Nassau as a center of resistance in the sixteenth century. This last redoubt contained the major population centers of Amsterdam, Utrecht and Rotterdam, along with the capital. Fortress Holland was anchored in the south along the Maas (Meuse) estuary and in the east by extensive flooding and modern fortifications (the East Front or Holland Water Line).

When the Germans invaded Norway in April they used small numbers of paratroopers and landed transports with reinforcements. The new Dutch CinC, General Henri Winkleman, moved troops to guard airfields and had vehicles parked along straight stretches of road to prevent any attacker from using them to land troops. In actuality, Dutch intelligence obtained information on both the airdrop, and the armored attack. Unfortunately, the disbelieving General Reynders locked them in his safe, and failed to brief his replacement, General Winkelman. Major G. J. Sas, the Dutch Military Attaché in Berlin, sent another report outlining the German plan two weeks before the attack, but this information somehow got lost.

The Dutch asked Belgium to support their southern (Peel) defense line, but received no firm answer. Disheartened by the lack of Belgian cooperation, the Dutch pulled most of their southern forces back to the north, behind the Waal river.This increased the distance between the Belgians and Dutch, and unknowingly opened the way to Rotterdam for German mechanized forces.

After the initial invasion scare of November12, intelligence on the ever-changing German invasion dates, and associated postponements, continued to cause tension and occasional alerts. On May 4 the Dutch received information that Germany planned to invade within a few days. This was confirmed the next day, and Major Sas soon reported the invasion date, May 8. Leave was again canceled, and all forces were on full alert. When the attack failed to materialize, the defenders relaxed. They had witnessed the last of twenty-nine postponements. Late on May 9 Major Sas received word that the final German attack orders had gone out that afternoon. He made a last call to The Hague with the message “Tomorrow morning at dawn!”

Before leaving his office on May 9, General Winkelman issued an alarm to Dutch forces along the frontier with Germany, including permission to destroy some bridges along the frontier. Regrettably the CinC left alert levels in other areas up to local commanders. In particular, the Dutch Air Force was not placed on alert, nor was it notified of the first German incursions.

The German Assault

German commandos moved into Holland as early as midnight and the first reports of Germans crossing the frontier reached Dutch supreme headquarters at 0300 on May 10. Germany began the main attack at 0355, when bombers struck at The Hague, airfields, barracks, and bridge garrisons in and south of Rotterdam. Dutch supreme headquarters issued a general alarm at 0415, too late to alert defenders at many key points.The fact that the Dutch and Belgians had already endured eight months of Sitzkrieg, punctuated by numerous false alarms, greatly enhanced the chance of surprise.

At about 0400 475 Ju-52 transport aircraft arrived over their targets, covered by fighters which strafed drop zones, landing areas, and nearby towns. Although Germany employed two divisions in the air assault, only 4,500 of the 16,500 men were trained parachutists (Fallschirmjaeger). The bulk of the force landed by transport aircraft. As part of the bid to decapitate the Dutch government, six companies of Fallschirmjaeger from Lt. Gen. Student’s Fliegerdivision 7 attempted to capture three airfields near The Hague. Paratroopers got scattered at two of the airfields, due to inaccurate drops. Construction had not been completed at the third air base, where transports attempted to land anyway. Many of the Ju-52s sank into the soft soil. Unable to take off, a large number were soon destroyed. These mishaps caused the operation to capture the Dutch government to fall apart. Airdrops near the bridges at Rotterdam, Moerdijk and Dordrecht proved more successful. In a different style of air assault, seaplanes landed near some of the bridges and disgorged assault troops. A few companies of Germans surprised and defeated two regiments of Dutch infantry, capturing the bridges intact.

A combined parachute and glider assault captured the Waalhaven airfield south of Rotterdam, and it was here that most of the transports carrying the 22d LuftlandeDivision landed. General Student’s vertical assault achieved its most important objective; the bridges into Fortress Holland were taken. Although landings near The Hague did not go as planned, those troops took up defensive positions and tied down a large part of the Dutch First Corps, the main reserve of the Dutch Army.

Commando-style attacks along the frontier met with few successes. Alerted the night before, Dutch frontier guards destroyed nearly all of the bridges. German commandos and Dutch Nazis did capture a railway bridge at Gennep by posing as Dutch soldiers. North of the Waal, bridges along the Ijssel river were destroyed. This did not significantly delay German forces, which arrived at the Grebbe Line as early as the afternoon of the tenth. In the far north the German 1st Cavalry Division met little resistance, nearly reaching the shore of the Ijsselmeer (Zuider Zee) by the end of the first day.

At about 0700 General Maurice Gamelin, the French Army Commander in Chief, ordered the initiation of the Allied defense plan. Leading elements of the French 25th Motorized Division crossed the Belgian border at about noon on May 10, and made the 150 kilometers to Antwerp by midnight. Other units from French Seventh Army advanced to the Dutch port of Breskens and crossed the Schelde estuary to Walcheren Island.

At the end of the first day Dutch fortunes looked reasonable good. Although German airborne operations met with some success, Dutch forces fell back on their prepared defenses in good order. The Dutch First Corps had gained the upper hand in fighting around the capital, the French Army was on its way, and counterattacks were planned against Student’s positions at Waalhaven and the bridges leading into Fortress Holland.

That night German infantry forced the Dutch to withdraw from the Peel Line, and Colonel Schmidt, commander of the Dutch “Peel Division” started to lose contact with his subordinate units.[20] General Student sent his last available battalion at Waalhaven to reinforce the tenuous position in Dordrecht. This left the airfield temporarily undefended, but no Dutch attack materialized that night. The next morning more German troops were airlifted in, and by dark on the eleventh, Student had 4,500 troops and several light artillery batteries in his airhead south of Rotterdam.

Major General Dr. Ritter von Hubicki’s 9th Panzer Division crossed the railway bridge at Gennep on the morning of May 11, followed by the motorized SS Verfuegungsdivision. Although most of the 9th Panzer’s 229 tanks were older vehicles, armed with machineguns instead of cannons, the Dutch could do little to stop them.After crossing the Peel Line, General Hubicki divided his force. The SS division and one armored group turned south toward Tilburg. A second armored group, and the newly arrived SS motorized regiment Leibstandarte Adolf Hitlercontinued westward toward the paratroopers in Moerdijk. German cavalry reached the eastern shore of the Ijseelmeer by the end of the day on the eleventh. The Germans however, made no progress against the four Dutch infantry divisions holding the Grebbe Line.

French motorized units reached Tilburg ahead of the Germans, but outnumbered in tanks, were forced to fall back on Breda under heavy air attack. Two battalions of the French 25th Motorized Infantry Division also moved to Breda, one suffering heavy casualties from air attack while on the road.

Although General Winkelman managed to reinforce Rotterdam with four battalions, all French and Dutch attempts to attack the German position in Moerdijk and Dordrecht failed. Dutch artillery (including guns from the destroyer van Galen) and British air raids forced the Germans to suspend air operations at Waalhaven.The Germans quickly switched to alternate landing areas, and General Student continued to receive supplies and reinforcements. “Within thirty-six hours of the opening of battle, Gamelin’s Breda Variant, upon which was wagered his irreplaceable mobile reserves, had already been rendered null and void.”This turn of events profoundly impacted both the battle in Holland, and the campaign as a whole. Allied leaders were just becoming aware of the German attack in the Ardennes, but had not yet realized the extent of the problem they faced. The Dutch Government, now beyond effective allied help, faced crumbling civilian and military morale.

During May 12 the Dutch continued to hold in the center and north. Along the Grebbe Line German infantry made some headway, but not enough to force the Dutch out of their fortifications. At the northeastern end of the Afsluitdijk, Dutch soldiers fought a numerically superior opponent to a standstill, despite strong German air and artillery support.The main German attack continued to unfold in the south of Holland, and it was here that the fate of the country rested.

Tanks of the 9thPanzer Division arrived in Moerdijk on the morning of May 12. After crossing the Maas estuary at Moerdijk, the column turned north, linking up with Student’s Fallschrimjaegerssouth of Rotterdam in the early afternoon. German infantry continued mopping-up operations behind the armored spearhead, but there was no coherent resistance by the Dutch south of the Maas.

On May 13 the military situation continued to deteriorate. Queen Wilhelmina and the cabinet boarded destroyers and sailed for England. Before leaving the Cabinet turned over full military and civil authority in Holland to General Winkelman. “A last-minute instruction, phoned from the quay, ordered him ‘to continue the struggle to the utmost,’ but, significantly, ‘with avoidance of unnecessary sacrifices.’”

Along the Grebbe Line Dutch units had been under constant pressure, and some were running low on ammunition. Fresh German units attacked and broke through the line at Rhenen. With its reserves tied down around the capital, the Dutch Army could not mount a counterattack, and began preparations to fall back to the “East Front” defense line. Controlled flooding constituted a major part of this final defense line. Unseasonably low water levels in the rivers caused the inundation to be far less effective than planned.

At Rotterdam Dutch forces sealed off the German bridgehead. With no room to deploy their tanks the Germans were temporarily stalemated. General Kuechler brought Lieutenant General Rudolf Schmidt’s 39thCorps headquarters out of reserve to command the attack on Rotterdam. Schmidt had an infantry division, part the 9th Panzer, the airborne troops and the SS Leibstandarte Regiment at his disposal. Elsewhere in the south, Germans expanded their narrow penetration. The Dutch still held part of Dordrecht, but with the assistance of a Dutch officer (Lieutenant Colonel Mussert, brother of the Dutch Nazi party leader), German tanks broke into the town center.

French units were forced out of Breda on May 13. With Germans crossing the Meuse at Sedan that same day, the French Army could no longer afford to attempt a rescue. Dutch units withdrew from the Grebbe Line to Fortress Holland during the night of May 13-14, with German forces pursuing the next morning. During this advance 207thInfantry Division entered the Dutch town of Doorn, where the ex-Kaiser resided. An honor guard was posted, and German soldiers saluted Wilhelm II for the first time since 1918. Hitler ordered the guard withdrawn and declared the town off-limits to German forces.

In Rotterdam events were moving toward a conclusion. At 0800 on May 14 the Germans presented an ultimatum demanding the city surrender by 1230 that day, but the German note was refused over a technicality. Before the corrected note reached the Dutch commander about sixty German bombers arrived. German soldiers tried to warn off the planes, but only a few turned away. Bombs hit the center of the old city and an uncontrollable fire soon developed.

At 1500 Colonel Scharoo, Commandant of the Rotterdam garrison, in the presence of Generals Schmidt and Student, signed a cease fire order. Winkelman accepted the German surrender terms at about 1800, and the formal surrender was signed in Rotterdam at 0820 on May 15, 1940.

Dutch troops in Zeeland had been transferred to allied command prior to the surrender, and continued the struggle until May17. Ground, naval and air forces which escaped The Netherlands continued to serve the Queen, as did all the forces stationed in Dutch overseas possessions. About 2,500 members of the Dutch military died in the five-day war, along with a similar number of civilians. Dutch prisoners of war were soon released, but the country endured five years of increasingly restrictive occupation.

Although 22ndLuftlandesuffered heavily and landings near The Hague did not go as planned, those troops did tie down a large part of the Dutch First Corps, the main reserve of the Dutch Army.The remaining forces under Student fought off successive Dutch counterattacks and held open an “airborne carpet” for five days, facilitating a rapid German advance over several water obstacles, and ensuring the collapse of Dutch resistance. 7thFliegerhad only 180 killed and wounded, with Student among the wounded.It is believed that an SS sniper fired the bullet which penetrated Student’s skull, leaving him with permanent speech impairment.

Hitler congratulated his victorious forces by saying: “In five days you have attacked, broken the air defenses and in the end forced the surrender of a strong well prepared army defending itself bravely behind seemingly unbeatable obstacles....”

The Dutch Army prepared a set-piece defense, but Germany failed to provide the accompanying set-piece attack. A post-war Dutch inquiry commission concluded “any really effective defense strategy would have required large-scale preparatory talks with the Belgians and French.” Under the prevailing circumstances, better Dutch decision making would have resulted in a slightly longer battle, and ultimately, in the same outcome to an unequal struggle.


http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~broszies/generalstab/schule/airborne/airborne_03.html

Regards,
Hist2004

Haiw
04-05-2004, 03:52 PM
In particular, the Dutch Air Force was not placed on alert, nor was it notified of the first German incursions.
Not that it would have made any difference... :roll: The Dutch airforce at the time consisted of some WW1 era museumpieces...


Hitler congratulated his victorious forces by saying: “In five days you have attacked, broken the air defenses and in the end forced the surrender of a strong well prepared army defending itself bravely behind seemingly unbeatable obstacles....”
'Broken the air defences'...we hardly had any. 'Strong well prepared army'. rofl We didn't have any tanks, few antitank guns, antique artillery, practically no air force... Hitler gave the Dutch armed forces at the time too much credit. :D

hist2004
04-05-2004, 04:01 PM
Haiw-

I didn't write the article, the link is there... ;)

Regards,
Hist2004

Haiw
04-05-2004, 04:52 PM
I kneww...still just giving my two cents anyway. :)

ronin2172
04-05-2004, 06:35 PM
geez haiw u r killing all of my points!lol :lol: But thanks for the info; even with ww1 vintage artillery i still think they would have torn the german paratroopers up (unless the shells were crap too!).

I agree with u hist2004 about crete being the first major airborne operation, and thanks for the info everybody, this is a pretty good thread!

2RHPZ
05-19-2005, 07:30 AM
The British took part in a kidnap raid themselves, although not an airborne operation it was still a daring mission. They kidnapped General Heinrich Kreipe from occupied Crete on 26th April 1944 and spirited him away by sea.

Daring of agents who snatched Nazi general on Crete


May 19 2005
Darren Devine, Western Mail

THE heroics of two British agents who captured a leading general from under German noses in Nazi-occupied Crete are to be recreated by a businessman and a mountain guide.

............

In one of the most daring exploits of the Second World War the two Special Operations Executive men captured German com-mander General Kreipe and spent 18 days crossing the island before escaping with the Nazi officer.

Helped by Cretan resistance fighters the agents snatched Kreipe in April 1944 as he was being driven from his office in Ano Archanes to his home.

After passing through 22 road blocks and driving for several hours, Moss and some of the Cretans left the car and set off with Kreipe on foot towards the mountain village of Anogia.

Leigh Fermor and another Cretan took Kreipe's car a little further on to make it look as though they had left the island by submarine. But the ruse failed and they spent 18 days hiding out in caves to avoid capture.

Resistance fighters arranged for the two men and the general to be taken off the island's south coast. The two heroes were later awarded the Distinguished Service Order while Kreipe was held in a prisoner of war camp in Cardiff for the rest of the conflict.

http://images.icnetwork.co.uk/design/regional/icwaleslogo.gif (http://icwales.icnetwork.co.uk/0100news/0200wales/tm_objectid=15533219&method=full&siteid=50082&headline=daring-of-agents-who-snatched-nazi-general-on-crete-name_page.html)

baboon6
05-19-2005, 12:20 PM
An excellent book about the invasion of Crete and its aftermath is Antony Beevor's "Crete: The Battle and the Resistance" (ISBN 0-141-00852-0). Beevor shows vividly how British dithering helped the Germans to win a battle they very nearly lost. The commander of "Creforce", the New Zealand General Freyberg, simply could not grasp that the airborne invasion was the main German effort, even though he had full access to their order of battle. Therefore he kept troops in reserve to fight off a major seaborne landing which was never going to come, those German elements which were coming by sea already having been sunk or dispersed by the Royal Navy. A full counter-attack in brigade strength on the paratroopers at Maleme would have been perfectly feasible on the first or second day and probably would have resulted in a German defeat. Intead when a counter-attack was finally mounted it was too late and comprised only two companies and was doomed to failure. The German paratroopers were excellent soldiers but they had some help.

Of course none of this addresses the question of whether the Allies should have tried to hold Crete in the first place. It was a serious drain on resources needed in North Africa and without air cover, ultimately doomed.

fantassin
05-20-2005, 04:26 AM
The US & UK seeing the results, quickly followed suite in creating Airborne units.


The Russians and the French had already created airborne units by the mid 30s; Churchill ordered the creation of the British Parachute Regiment in the summer of 1940.

So this pre-dated Crete anyway.

mwe
05-22-2005, 11:00 PM
Anyone got any information on the German airborne assault and land operation which was supposed to take out Tito (not the Jaskson...)?

Had it in a magazine a few years back but lost it while moving...

Belrick
05-25-2005, 12:46 AM
baboon6 your comments are made with the aid of 20/20 vision. Freyberg made the safest choice there was no way to predict the seabourne invasion was to be so successfully repulsed by the RN alone. Besides in all honesty the Brits had the numbers assigned to airbourne assualts.

achilles
05-25-2005, 05:10 AM
Interesting info Hist2004, thanks.

Most Cretans back then, had no idea that such a thing as a 'parachute' exists, so they were calling them 'umbrellas' and the parachuters 'ombrallades', i.e. "umbrella-men".
Many of them went to the battle with knives, swords, pistols, whatever they had available.

Indeed, the Germans do not really want to remember what happened there p-)

hist2004
05-25-2005, 11:43 AM
As the battle wore on and casualty reports started to come in to General Student's HQ at the Hotel Grande Bretagne in Athens, it seemed that the battle was lost, but luck was on their side, the allies made some tactical mistakes and withdrew from positions around Hill 107, overlooking the airfield at Maleme, which gave the Germans the upper hand and enabled them to land the desperately needed air landing troops of the Gebirgsjäger on the airfield, although still under sporadic artillery fire.(which did not cease until the night of 23rd May) The allies pulled back in the face of a constant flow of fresh German re-inforcements and began their retreat, first southwards across Crete and then by sea to North Africa.


This was the key factor...if the Allies held Hill 107 they could of isolated
the jagers and destroyed them in time...and prevented reinforcements.

Regards,
Hist2004

weissent
06-20-2005, 01:17 PM
I found an excellent gallery of the invasion of Crete. (Careful: a couple of the pictures are graphic.)

http://home.online.no/~vestil/crete/invasjon/index.htm

Although the content of this page is copyrighted, I'll give you three samples, which hopefully will be alright with the owner.

http://home.online.no/~vestil/crete/invasjon/pak%20kanon.jpg

http://home.online.no/~vestil/crete/invasjon/fj%20med%20mg34.jpg

http://home.online.no/~vestil/crete/invasjon/allierte%20fanger%20ved%20mg.jpg

The link to the homesite of the above photos is WW2 German Research&Collectible (http://home.online.no/~vestil/index.htm). Pay these pages a visit, they have much to offer.

fantassin
06-21-2005, 07:32 AM
http://livres.histoireetcollections.com/images/produits/numero_1297_1097841597.jpg$

If you are looking for never-published-before pics on Crete, get this book....all the pics come from the collections of German veterans.

K-9s BEST
06-22-2005, 12:49 AM
Interesting, but fallacious. The mission of the German Paras was only to secure the airfields, not the island of Crete. Once secured, Ju-52s were to land with more troops, followed by seaborne reinforcements. As the German plans had little respect for the Commonwealth troops guarding those airfields, they paid the price. If the Brits/Aussies/NZealanders had more aggressive Generals, and were dedicated to HOLD crete, not use it as a delaying action, the airborne assault would have been been a total failure. Poor tactical decisions all around.

ogukuo72
06-22-2005, 03:32 AM
K-9 has put his finger on one of the most significant problems for the British in 1941: they didn't have good enough generals that could make the most of what they had. By all counts, Crete should have been a British/Commonwealth victory, whatever the fighting quality of the German paratroopers. The true cost for the British for this defeat lay not only in the 13,000 POWs lost, but also in the heavy losses of Royal Navy ships, including a number of precious destroyers, during the evacuation of Crete.

Eight months later, the British would again be defeated by a numerically inferior enemy suffering from a precaurious logistic situation, this time to the Japanese in Singapore. It was another battle that shouldn't have ended the way it did. Even if Singapore would inevitably be lost given the power of the Japanese air forces, it should have been more expensive for the Japanese and less of a walkover. The Americans on the Philippines certainly performed much better in 1941. And who can forget how the Marines on Wake Island fought against overwhelming odds?

The qualities of the Australian, British and New Zealand troops could not be questioned. We have only to look at their performance at key battles such as Arnhem, Dunkirk, Kokoda, Burma, El Alamein and Normandy. They were steadfast soldiers who fought on doggedly despite the screw-ups of their generals. It was the generals that often displayed defiency.

gaijinsamurai
06-22-2005, 10:15 AM
Thanks for this thread Hist2004. It's interesting. Of all the Axis units of WWII, the Fallshirmjagers are the most interesting to me.

achilles
06-24-2005, 06:11 PM
Very interesting material.


Everywhere on the island, Cretan civilians, armed and otherwise, joined the battle with a savagery unexpected by either side. In one notable incident, an elderly Cretan beat a German parachutist to death with his walking stick. This was not an isolated case, and many Germans met their end by knife or club in the Cretan olive groves and villages. Once they had overcome their shock at such unprecedented resistance from a civilian population, the Germans reacted with equal ferocity.


The Germans admitted losses of 6,200 men: 3,714 dead and 2,494 wounded. Today however, there are around 4,500 German graves at Maleme alone. Allied soldiers claimed to have buried 900 German corpses in Rethimnon and 1,250 corpses at Heraklion by the fifth day of battle. German losses may have been considerably higher than admitted. Winston Churchill claimed the Germans must have suffered well over 15,000 casualties and Admiral Cunningham felt that 22,000 had become casualties. Christopher Buckley in the book "Greece and Crete 1941" gave a cautious estimate of 16,800 casualties.

The Allies lost 3,500 soldiers: 1,751 dead, with an equal number wounded, and an enormous number captured (12,254 Commonwealth and 5,255 Greeks). There were also 1,828 dead and 183 wounded among the Navy. A total sum of 3,579 dead and 1900 wounded.

A large number of civilians were killed in the crossfire and died fighting as partisans. Many Cretans were murdered by the Germans in reprisals, both during the battle and in the occupation that followed. One Cretan source puts the number of Cretans killed by German action during the war at 6,593 men, 1,113 women and 869 children.

Kitsune
06-24-2005, 08:06 PM
While the German dead seem indeed to be somewhat higher than 3,714, the numbers given by Churchill and Cunninham are completely beyond the pale. (Those numbers were British propaganda after a humiliating defeat, the German ones counter-propaganda). Most likely, the real number of dead are in the 5000 to 6000 range. Quite a few FJ landed on fields just before Allied positions and were mowed down without a chance. Also the Crete partisan activity was considerable, the English seem to have told the Crete people horror stories about what the Germans would do to them, which resulted in captured FJ's tortured to death in a downrigth bestial way. Also, there was atleast one incident where quite a couple of the German Paras were killed by Luftwaffe "friendly bombing".

Fliptape
06-25-2005, 04:04 PM
Dont know the largest airborne assault in ww2 but the first operational airborne assault/operation was in Norway

9th April 1940 against Sola Airport near Stavanger.