Photos from the battle of Hürtgen forest (Image Request)

[Ivan1]

Does anyone have some photos from the bloody WW2 battle of Hurtgen forest that lasted for 6 months?

[RGRBOX]

You know you need to change the title of this thread.. I was hoping to see some pics..

[Beer Monster]

There are a few here (http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/983328/posts).

[B25Hmitchell]

Does anyone have some photos from the bloody WW2 battle of Hurtgen forest that lasted for 6 months?

You forgot to say the magic word.

[ex1cdo]

Does anyone have some photos from the bloody WW2 battle of Hurtgen forest that lasted for 6 months?
Allow me to introduce you to google images (http://images.google.com). Using "hurtgen forest" as a search string will find you a number of interesting things.

[Ivan1]

Man, of course I did google search, but I was hoping someone here has some more pics. Scans from books, private collections, etc. that aren’t on net, yet.

[East Scout]

Man, of course I did google search, but I was hoping someone here has some more pics. Scans from books, private collections, etc. that aren’t on net, yet.


Be careful man..People go nuts about requests if they dont know EVERY LITTLE DETAIL about what you already have tried in a search before asking for help...Those keyboard buttons are just so hard for some people to push and reading request threads just kills em too but they cant help themselves and read them anyhow just to have something to bitch at.......

ES

[Dexx]

I thought that this battle is know in the US as the Battle of the Bulge. Do you know the term Hürtgen Wald (forest) as well?

[Hellfish6]

I thought that this battle is know in the US as the Battle of the Bulge. Do you know the term Hürtgen Wald (forest) as well?
It's kinda been swept under the rug because it was such a bloody, useless debacle. People would rather concentrate on our victories than our defeats. There's info out there but you have to go looking for it.

[foxtrot023]

It's kinda been swept under the rug because it was such a bloody, useless debacle. People would rather concentrate on our victories than our defeats. There's info out there but you have to go looking for it.

you know that tha forgetfullness of defeats have cost US servicemen lots of blood- places like Kaserline pass, the eastern seaboard on the battle of the Atlantic, in Iron Botton sound. Of ocurse not just the US but many other folks as well. They used to say that the military fought their wars like the previous ones

[Hellfish6]

We do tend to fight our wars like the last war. Look at Vietnam. Korea was practically an extension of WWII. OIF was, in some respects, fought like ODS but without serious concern for the fighting abilities of the Iraqi military.

[RGRBOX]

The Battle for the Hurtigen Forest took place before the German Counter attack of 1944. The US was trying to take the dams north of the Aera to keep the germans from destoying them and flooding the lower Rhine, (If I'm Correct) and to clear the forest area along with Hurtigen of any German units in the area. It was hard going for the American forces because of the think forest, the cold, and the arty that the Germans used daily.. the men felt inclosed and closterphobic. It was difficult for them to fight in this area, because mainly the Us army at the time was an open country massive tank formation army that had been fighting mostly in open country until they entered Belgum, and Luxemburg.

[Macs.]

http://img87.imageshack.us/img87/9510/578pxmuddyroadinthehurtgenfore.jpg

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/skipatrouille_400h.jpg


Umhänge tarnen US-Soldaten im Schnee


http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/westwall_400q.jpg

Nur fünf Monate nach der Landung in der Normandie überqueren GIs Mitte September '44 die deutsche Grenze bei Aachen.


http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/haubitze_400q.jpg


Im Hürtgenwald, kurz hinter der Grenze, wird der Vormarsch gestoppt. Die Amerikaner kämpfen gegen den Winter, das Gelände und verschanzte deutsche Soldaten.

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/germeter_400q.jpg

US-Militärwagen in Vossenack. Nach schweren verlustreichen Kämpfen besetzen die Amerikaner die vollkommen zerstörten Dörfer im Hürtgenwald.

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/gey_alt_400q.jpg

Auch der Ort Gey wurde völlig zerstört. Die amerikanischen Soldaten sprachen von der "Hölle im Hürtgenwald".

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/huertgen_400q.jpg

Aus dem Namen des Dorfes Hürtgen machten die Amerikaner die Bezeichnung "hurtgen forest". Darin steckt das englische "to hurt" für schmerzen

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/minenfeld_400q.jpg

Verkohlte Baumstümpfe ragen in den Himmel: Weite Waldflächen wurden zerstört. Im Minenfeld "Wilde Sau" bei Hürtgen starben nach dem Krieg Gefangene bei der Minensuche



http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/verwundeter_400q.jpg

Dieses US-Militärfoto ist auf dem Plakat im Wald zu sehen: Ein verwundeter Amerikaner wird versorgt. Vor 60 Jahren wurde an dieser Stelle erbittert gekämpft.

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/plakat_wald_400h.jpg

An dreizehn Orten im Hürtgenwald hat der Geschichtsverein Plakatwände mit Fotos aus der Kriegszeit aufgestellt. Hier das Plakat an der Mestrenger Mühle im Kalltal.

http://www.wdr.de/themen/politik/deutschland/kriegsende_1945/allerseelenschlacht/_img/gedenk_voss_400q.jpg

Allein an der Gedenkstätte Vossenack sind rund 2.400 deutsche Soldaten begraben. Die amerikanischen Toten ruhen auf Friedhöfen in Belgien und den Niederlanden.

[RGRBOX]

Good pics Macs.. thanks..

[Bockson]

There's nice movie "When Trumpets Fade", whose topic is that battle. I haven't seen it yet but people say that it's good, not as other realistic WWII movies but good.

[Hellfish6]

I thought it was a pretty good movie.

[RGRBOX]

I thought it was a pretty good movie.

you got some info on the film??

[Hellfish6]

Like what?

[RGRBOX]

Like what?

Dumbass, I talking about the film that you just said was good... you get lost or something... (I'm refering to a link or something.. nevermind.. I'll just look on Amazon for it myself..)

Bockson: There's nice movie "When Trumpets Fade", whose topic is that battle. I haven't seen it yet but people say that it's good, not as other realistic WWII movies but good.

Hellfish6: I thought it was a pretty good movie.

[Bockson]

This could help: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0135706/

[Amethystfretchen]

Hürtgen Forest in a nutshell:


http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/art/A&I/Hurtgen-T.jpg

World War II histories about the European theater spend much of the time talking about the D-Day invasion, Operation Cobra, Market Garden, The Battle of the Bulge, and the final surrender of Nazi German. These events all occurred between June-September 1944 and December-May 1944-1945. Very little time is spent on the events that occurred between September and December of 1944. Before September the Allies had been doing many exciting things, opening up a second front on the beaches of Normandy, liberating Paris, and chasing the German Army across France. At the beginning of September, S.H.A.E.F, “Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force” believed that the German Army was on the brink of defeat. During the months of June, July, and August alone, the German Army had suffered 1,210,600 casualties in campaigns in the east and west. It was during the months of September to February that the Battle of the Huertgen Forest occurred. The Huertgen Forest, a wooded area of 50 square miles sits on the border of Belgium and Germany about 5 miles south of the city of Aachen. Not much has been written about the events that took place in the forest and there are several reasons. Operation Market Garden overshadowed the beginning of the battle and the Battle of the Bulge overshadowed its end. American forces did most of the fighting in the Huertgen and British historians, who wrote many of the post war histories, spent little if any time concentrating on the Huertgen. In fact, very few American historians have written about it either, and when they do, they are highly critical about the decision to attack into the forest. Most of the books on the subject concluded that the American commanders made a huge mistake by entering the forest and should have bottled it up and gone around it. They are right, when they argue that the forest itself has very little strategically value. However, what makes the forest important is the Roer River. More important than the Roer River are the dams that control the river’s flow. The only way the Americans could capture the dams was to enter the forest. Without control of those dams, the Allies could not move over the Roer River because the Germans could blow up the dams, cutting off any American troops that had crossed it. Therefore, two out of three of the Allied Army groups would have troops that would not be able to cross the river into Germany.
....
When Holitzinger encountered the Siegfried Line, he and his men found that most of the pillboxes and the defenses were unmanned. General Collins, on reading this report, felt that if they attacked the Siegfried Line now, they could easily break through it, before the Germans had time to reorganize from their hasty retreat from France and adequately began to defend their homeland. General Collins requested permission from General Hodges to form a reconnaissance group to probe the defenses of the Siegfried Line. The group was not going in to scout the area; it was going to attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. Collins hoped that if he were successful, he would be given more troops and supplies to advance his attack into Germany. General Hodges agreed to allow General Collins to form a reconnaissance group to probe the defenses of the Siegfried Line. He also let General Gerow of V Corps form a similar reconnaissance group south of the Huertgen. XIX Corps was still very low on fuel and still about 20 miles away from the German border. Collins planned to move into the Stolberg Corridor, an area between the city of Aachen to its north and the Huertgen Forest to its south. The goal was to try and break the Siegfried Line before the Germans had time to man it.

http://members.aeroinc.net/breners/buckswar/graphics/map.jpg
During World War I, General Pershing had major problems with German troops attacking his flanks out of the Argonne Forest. Well aware of Pershing’s problem, Collins was adamant on making sure his flanks were protected. To secure his flank Collins decided to move troops to the north and take the hills surrounding Aachen. He briefly flirted with the idea of invading the city but decided that it would be better just to surround it and wait for the XIX Corps to catch up. Aachen held no real significant military importance, but it was where Charlemagne was born and had once been the capital of the Holy Roman Empire, the first Reich. Losing the birthplace of the First Reich would be a demoralizing blow to Hitler and the Nazis. To protect his right flank Collins would move troops into the northern part of the Huertgen Forest. The goals would be to capture some of the northern towns and keep the Germans in the forest. Collins could then be sure that his flanks would be protected. This is how the battle of the Huertgen Forest began.
...
Because of low fuel, General Collins ordered his troops to stop west of the Roer River until more supplies could arrive. That was assuming his troops were able to make it that far, which they did not. Had his troops had enough gas, it would have been a disaster to cross the Roer River without controlling the Roer River dams, especially the Schwammenauel and the Urft. If Collin’s troops crossed the Roer and the Germans destroyed the dams, the Americans on the east bank would have been completely cut off and could have been wiped out by the Germans. The dams were a crucial factor that was overlooked, not just by Collins, but by just about everybody involved in the process. It was just like the hedgerows of Normandy. No one considered them in the planning of the attack.
...
The Germans sent in the 7th Army Group to stop the attack. On 17 September the 12th Division of the 7th German Army group counterattacked the American 3rd Armored Division in the town of Stolberg, where the Americans took heavy losses and were halted in their tracks. On September 18, Collins had the 3rd Armored Division retreat. The Germans laid an all out attack on the Americans and the fighting was brutal. The Americans had managed to gain a foothold in the northern part of the Huertgen Forest and the hills around Aachen, but the main objective had failed. The Americans’ initial success was due to the fact that the Germans believed the main American attack would focus on Aachen and had left the Stolberg Corridor and the Huertgen with minimal defenses. When the Germans realized their mistake they were able to counterattack and throw the Americans off base. By 13 September more German reinforcements had also begun arriving in the forest to further improve the defense.

http://home.scarlet.be/~cv920172/images/Misty_Forest.jpg
The ill supplied Americans were inexperienced and did not know how to fight against pillboxes. Their training at home had not taught them the techniques they would need to survive in the wooded areas. “When the Germans, secure in their bunkers, saw the GIs coming forward, they called down presighted artillery fire, using shells with fuses designed to explode on contact with the treetops. When men dove to the ground for cover, as they had been trained to do and as instinct dictated, they exposed themselves to a rain of hot metal and wood splinters. They learned to survive a shelling in the Huertgen by hugging a tree. That way they only exposed their steel helmets.” The Americans, as Sgt. Mack Morris reports, had not realized the extent of the German defenses in the forest. “In one break there was a teller mine every eight paces for three miles. In another there were more that 500 mines in the narrow break. One stretch of road held 300 teller mines, each one with a pull device in addition to the regular detonator. There were 400 anti tank mines in a three-mile area.”
Even if it had achieved its goals, the first attack into the forest was a complete failure because the Americans were not going after the Roer River dams.
...
After General Collin’s failure to break through the Stolberg Corridor, there was no question as to why American troops should attack into the Huertgen Forest. There were Germans in the forest and Hodges wanted them cleared out. He ordered General Collins to make his main attack into the forest and move towards the Roer River.
...
The Americans were making the right attack for the wrong reasons. The Americans often underestimated the Germans’ will to defend the forest. Hitler came to this conclusion after meeting with his Generals: “In subsequent discussions about which terrain might be relinquished with least impunity, it was decreed that holding in Aachen sector was paramount."
...
The Germans knew that if the Americans crossed the Roer River and moved towards the Rhine, they probably would discover the forces Hitler was massing for the Ardennes Offensive. General Omar Bradley would later conclude “Had we secured them (the dams) early in November and pushed across the Roer, the enemy would never dared counterattack us in the Ardennes.”
German Field Marshal Walter Model was brought in to command most of the German forces in the Huertgen. Model had served in World War One, where he had been wounded twice. During World War II he had been credited with saving the German Army on the eastern front numerous times and raised from the rank of Corps Commander to Army Commander. Hitler was already beginning to plan a massive offensive and needed to buy time. Model was thought to be a great defensive General, and seemed to be a perfect fit for the forest.
...
While Model was busy organizing the defense of the forest, the Allied commanders were trying to decide their next course of action. The big question among themselves was whether they should they continue attacking German troops and try and end the war quickly, or wait until after the winter months when the weather would grow more favorable to attack. If Eisenhower waited, he could use the time to secure his supply lines and give his troops much needed rest, yet in doing so he would give the Germans time to develop new weapons and dig in deeper and deeper. Though the town of Aachen had fallen on October 21st, the Siegfried Line remained intact everywhere else.

Ike made his choice and predicated it in part on a measure of hope. We would hammer the enemy with all possible force in an effort to split his Armies west of the Rhine. Perhaps then when we reached that river, the morale of the Reich would crack and bring the war to an end…In his plan, 12th Army Group was to attack north of the Ardennes with the First and Ninth Armies, and south of that wooded barrier with the Third. All three were to push to the Rhine and seize the crossings there if they could.
General Omar Bradley

For a plan like this to succeed, the Allies must control the Roer River dams. Patton’s attack from Metz through the Saar would be fine, but the First and Ninth Armies would have to cross the Roer River in order to reach the Rhine. Montgomery’s troops in the north would also have to cross the Roer.
....
After the July attempt on Hitler’s life, Hitler began to take more and more control of the German armed forces. Hitler believed that the Germans would lose the war if they kept defending the Siegfried Line and then if it fell, the Rhine River. Germany needed an attack that would halt the Americans and British in the west and give him time to reinforce troops in the east. The plan was for Germans to march through the Ardennes Forest all the way to Antwerp, separating the American and British forces and denying the Allies a port that they could use to escape. The Americans never anticipated such a move because the German Army did not have the resources to carry out such an attack. The German Generals also thought the attack would not succeed. Had they gotten their way, they would have attacked at Aachen and the Huertgen.
“At the same time we suggested a modified plan. In this, the 15th Army with a strong right flank would deliver an attack north of Aachen, towards Maastricht. The 6th Panzer army would attack south of Aachen, and cut in behind that place with the eventual object of establishing a bridgehead there.” The most they really hoped for, Manteuffel said, “was to pinch out the American forces that had pushed beyond Aachen as far as the Roer River.”
It is hard to guess what would have happened if the Germans had attacked Aachen and moved back into the forest. It was not a strategy that would have won the war, but it might have prolonged it for a time. However the Germans did not attack Aachen, they attacked through the Ardennes. Their attack was not as strong as Hitler wanted, because the Germans had put so much effort into the forest.

In the Aachen sector alone, at least five Panzer or Panzer like divisions had been reduced severely in strength and their rehabilitation dangerously delayed. One parachute and at least six Volks Grenadier Divisions, the latter originally scheduled to have been spared active commitment before the counteroffensive, had been similarly effected. The Siegfried Line fighting had also delayed use in the Ardennes of two corps headquarters and two assault gun brigades.
It can be concluded that the fighting in the forest probably slightly limited what the Germans could send to the Ardennes offensive, but the goal of fighting in the forest was not to eliminate German troops, it was to capture the Roer River dams.
...
CONCLUSION

The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest lasted from 13 September to 10 February, roughly five months. The Americans were forced to put the 1st, 4th, 8th, 9th, 28th, 78th, and the 83rd Infantry Divisions, the 505th and the 517th parachute regiments, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and the 5th and 7th Armored Divisions into the forest. They suffered 24,000 combat casualties along with 9,000 cases of diseases like trench foot and combat fatigue. The Germans were forced to employ eight divisions in the forest fighting, and it is estimated that they took slightly fewer casualties than the Americans. If the battle is examined by the casualty reports, it could be considered a failure. It took the Americans five months to control a forest, and the fighting cost them more casualties than the Germans. However, in Huertgen, the objective was not a war of attrition, it was to capture the dams, and the objective was completed. The first attempt to break through the Siegfried Line during Market Garden failed and the Americans needed to cross the Roer River to get to the Rhine. To do this they would have to fight through the forest to capture the Roer River dams. There is a lot of criticism about the planning, and some of it is justified. It was not until November, after a month and a half of fighting, that the American commanders realized what was their real objective should be. Once they did, they still had to deal with Germans who were determined to give their lives to protect the Fatherland. They would fight to the last man, no matter what the odds, to defend Germany. After the October campaign into the forest failed, Eisenhower could have waited until after the winter to begin Allied attacks into Germany. This would have allowed him to secure the supply lines and give the troops time to rest. However, he would have also given the Germans more time to prepare for the oncoming attack, and their counterattack in December would have been much stronger. So the Americans attacked even though the troops were tired and they were low on supplies. Eisenhower had to attack and he needed to control the Roer River for his plan of a broad attack along all German fronts. Maybe this was not that best strategy, but it was the one that was used and the control of the Roer River dams was essential. Some would argue that if the capture of the Roer River dams was so essential, why did the Americans also spend time fighting in the middle of the forest. The first two attacks on the town of Schmidt failed because the Germans controlled the northern sections of the forest. They were able to use the high ground they controlled to observe the American troops movement and call down artillery on them. They controlled all the roads in the northern part of the forest and could move troops to reinforce the southern part. VII Corps’ march through the middle of the forest was necessary to capture Schmidt and the Roer River dams. The Americans could not have simply attacked the southern part of the forest. They tried twice and failed. The Americans could have attempted to bottle up the forest and move south of the Roer River, but because Eisenhower wanted a broad attack, going south of the Roer was out of the question.
The battle of the Huertgen forest seems to underlie a huge problem that the American Army faced. The Americans continued to ignore the effects of terrain on their plans. Most of the attack plans were made far from enemy lines without having someone there to observe what the troops were going up against. This is quite evident in the Thanksgiving Dinner incident when the commanders ordered that the men be served hot meals, not realizing that they had to remain in their foxholes at all times or face the wrath of German artillery. “None of the brass ever came forward to our positions; we were too far up front for them,” remarked soldier John Chernitsky.
The Americans were not used to fighting in the forest and their training at home did not prepare them for what they would face. They had not been taught about fighting in the woods: things like hugging a tree instead of diving for the ground when artillery was coming your way. By the end of October a five-page report was issued to the troops, which explained how to fight in the woods, but there should have been more training. The new troops that were coming into the forest were often replacing casualties. Instead of whole units being replaced, individuals were added to units, as they were needed. This was a very unproductive practice.

"My partner and I were assigned to the extreme left flank as an outpost there. By now it was dark and we took turns on watch. When dawn arrived, we discovered that we and the GIs in the adjacent hole had been left alone—evidently the company had moved out and forgotten us. Replacements meant so little that we were never really integrated into the unit with the rapid turnover in squads and platoons from the terrific casualties being sustained in the Huertgen."
Soldier Jerry Alexis

The problems with training and replacements were not specific to the Huertgen Forest, but the whole war. However, they were a factor in the high casualty rates.
One of the reasons that the Huertgen Forest is not well know is because the American Generals spent little time talking about it. In his book Crusade in Europe, General Eisenhower had this to say about the Huertgen Forest: “Nevertheless, progress was slow and the fighting intense. On the right flank of this attack the First Army got involved in the Huertgen Forest, the scene of the most bitterly contested battles of the entire campaign. The enemy had all the advantages of strong defensive country, and the attacking Americans had to depend exclusively on infantry weapons because of the thickness of the forest. The weather was abominable and the German garrison was particularly stubborn, but Yankee doggedness finally won. Thereafter, whenever Veterans of the American 4th, 9th,and 28th Divisions referred to hard fighting they did so in terms of comparison with the Battle of the Huertgen Forest, which they placed on top of the list.”

General Omar Bradley also has little to say about the affair in his autobiography A General’s Story: “What followed over the next several weeks was some of the most brutal and difficult of the war. The battle—known as the Huertgen Forest—was sheer butchery on both sides. In three weeks, Collins advanced a mere six miles in miserable weather at a terrible cost.”
This is not much information from the commander of the European theater and the commander of the 12th Army Group. The main reason is that they had little to do with the planning of the attacks in the forest. Hodge, Gerow and Collins did most of it. The only time they were really concerned about the fighting is when the lack of control of the dams prevented them from moving forward into Germany. General Joe Collins does talk about the battle in detail in his autobiography, Lightning Joe: “While it took two weeks, October 7-21, for the 1st and the 30th Divisions to capture Aachen, it required until December 9 for the VII Corps to clear the Hurtgen Forest, an essential preliminary to the seizure of the Roer dams, which in turn would determine when the Roer was safe to cross.”
Collins argues that in order to take the Roer River dams he would have to go through the forest, and he concludes with the observation: “Costly as was the Aachen-Stolberg-Hurtgen battle to the First Army in casualties, ammunition, and equipment, it cost the Germans far more, and forced Rundstedt to deploy divisions, tanks, and gasoline intended for the Ardennes counteroffensive, weakening that supreme German effort and the subsequent defense of the Rhine.”
While the American Commanders have always defended the Huertgen as a necessary battle, most historians have not. The main reason is the comparisons that can be made to the Vietnam War. “The same terrible war [Vietnam] of attrition, with no apparent strategically purpose, save that terrible “body count” had commenced. It was Hurtgen’s Death Factory all over again”, writes Charles Whiting, author of The Bloody Forest. In his book, Citizen Soldiers, Stephen Ambrose remarks, “The forest they held, for which they had paid such a heavy price, was worthless. The battle did not shorten the war by one minute.” Charles Whiting also comments, “Here is the true story of the ill-conceived, ultimately useless, six-month long Hurtgen Campaign…of thousands of American soldiers that died, and the generals who refused to give up long after their objective had lost real meaning.” These are the same arguments that people make about the Vietnam War. There are some similarities between the Huertgen and Vietnam. There was similar terrain and because of it, the Americans had trouble moving around. In Vietnam and the Huertgen, the Americans would fight enemies who were outnumbered and out-manned, but would sacrifice anything to protecting their homeland. Despite these comparisons, the Huertgen was no Vietnam. After a rough start, the Americans formed a clear objective and went about the task of completing it. It was not the best situation for making an attack, but the Americans had no choice. In the end they completed their objective, and the Allies were able to cross the Roer River and defeat Germany.

http://www.loyno.edu/history/journal/index.html [vol.33 2001-2002]


The Battle of the Hürtgen Forest:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=31270&start=0

Hürtgen Forest- Factory of death (3 pages):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=66893&start=0

Hürtgen Forest - Got pictures? (3 pages):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=35121&start=0

German units in Hurtgen Forest:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=35639start=0

where can I find the map of Huertgen Forest campaign? (3 pages):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=26595&start=0

When Trumpets Fade (2 pages):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=6374&start=0

when trumpets fade best ww2 movie ever!(2 pages):
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=20372&start=0

[Ivan1]

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg354.jpghttp://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg356.jpghttp://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg370.jpghttp://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg375part5.jpghttp://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg387.jpghttp://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg423.jpg

[Ivan1]

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg494part6.jpg
http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg504.jpg
http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg483.jpg

[Ivan1]

more

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg256.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg443.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg447.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg449.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg456.jpg

http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/wwii/Siegfried/Pics/pg458.jpg

[Song of November]

Bockson: "not as other realistic WWII movies but good"

Depends on what you consider "realistic"; realistic as in SPR, guts and blood being flung all over the place? no, it's not like that. But from a historic P.O.V. it's a great movie. I'f you've ever read up on the Huertgen forest, you'll appreciate this one.

[Amethystfretchen]

...123...123..

[Amethystfretchen]

BATTLE OF HURTGEN FOREST
Written by: Ernie Herr His Web Page.
Provided by Joe Thompson

The Worst of the Worst: The Battle for the Hürtgen Forest

http://www.huertgenwald.de/bilder/image026.jpg

There are stories that may need a half century or more to age before being told, giving memories and bitterness a chance to fade and giving those involved, time to have passed into history. The story of the battle for the Hurtgen Forest is one of those stories. Please read it, not for enjoyment, but as an honor to those whose sufferings were never properly recognized and whose remarkable accomplishments never celebrated. And, like the stories of Europe's holocaust, please read it so that these memories might lessen the chances of it happening again.

http://www.huertgenwald.de/bilder/image032.jpg
The Hurtgen Forest, covering roughly fifty square miles just south of ancient city of Aachen along the German-Belgium border, was described by those who were there, as a "weird and wild" place. Here "the near one hundred feet tall dark pine trees and dense tree-tops gave the place, even in daytime , a somber appearance which was apt to cast gloom upon sensitive people." It was like a green cave, always dripping water, the firs interlocked their lower limbs so that everyone had to stoop, all the time. The forest floor, in almost perpetual darkness, was devoid of underbrush. Add to this gloom, a mixture of sleet, snow, rain, cold, fog and almost knee deep mud. This was to be setting for the most tragic battle of World War II.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen19.jpg
After the war, German General Rolf van Gersdorff commented, "I have engaged in the long campaigns in Russia as well as other fronts and I believe the fighting in the Hurtgen was the heaviest I have ever witnessed." Still, the Germans were delighted that the Americans wanted to throw their weight into an attack against dug-in troops in a forest where the American preponderance of artillery and command of the air would be of little value. Also, delighting the Germans was that the Hurtgen Forest was of little military value and, if lost to the Americans, could be flooded since the Germans held flood control dams above the level of the forest. It was a battle that the Germans really couldn't lose.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen07.jpg
Both German and American troops fighting here had to share these deplorable conditions: exposed to incessant enemy fire, fighting daily without relief, receiving little support from their own artillery, drenched in frequent rain, and without the possibility of changing clothes. Forsaken as they were they had no choice but to hold out and die in hopeless resignation. Oddly enough, one-half of the Americans who fought here had German - American ancestry which meant that three quarters of all the combatants in the Hurtgen Forest were either German or of German origin.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen11.jpg
When American troops, who had fought in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Holland, finally took the forest, they said they had never seen anything that could compare to this for the amount of shattered military equipment scattered throughout and the countless American dead. They referred to this as death valley. What the British staff officer said after inspecting the Somme battlefield in France during the First World War could have very well applied here. He cried out, "My God: Did we really send men to fight in this?" Those that fought the battle from the American side were mostly from the high school classes of 1942, 1943 and 1944.
They were to pick up the battle and move on after the classes of 1940 and 1941 had driven this far to the German border but now were too few in numbers to press on. These mostly still teenagers included championship high school football teams, class presidents, those that had sung in the spring concerts, those that were in the class plays, the wizards of the chemistry classes, rich kids, bright kids. There were sergeants with college degrees along with privates from Yale and Harvard. America was throwing her finest young men at the Germans. These youths had come from all sections of the country and from every major ethnic group except the African - American and the Japanese - American. Due to an Army policy in force at the time, these two groups did not participate in this battle.
The training these young men had gone through at State-side posts such as Fort Benning was rigorous physically but severely short on the tactical and leadership challenges that the junior officers would have to meet. British General Horrocks (one of the few generals, if not the only general to do so) made a surprise front line visit to the 84th division and described these young men as "an impressive product of American training methods which turned out division after division complete, fully equipped. The divisions were composed of splendid, very brave, tough young men. "But he thought it was too much to ask of green divisions to penetrate strong defense lines, then stand up to counter attacks from first-class German divisions. And he was disturbed by the failure of American division and corps commanders and their staffs to ever visit the front lines. He was greatly concerned to find that the men were not even getting hot meals brought up from the rear, in contrast to the forward divisions in the British line. He reported that not even battalion commanders were going to the front. Senior officers and staff didn't know what they were ordering their rifle companies to do. They did their work from maps and over radios and telephones. And unlike the company and platoon leaders, who had to be replaced every few weeks at best, or every few days at worst, the staff officers took few casualties, so the same men stayed at the same job, doing it badly.

http://www.chakoten.dk/images/huertgen_skov.jpg
When Capt. John O'Grady of Ninth Army's Historical Section visited the Forest in late November, he sent back a memorandum to Ninth Army: "On 23rd November the battalion was attacking a superior German force entrenched on an excellent position. The only thing that higher headquarters contributed to the debacle was pressure, and God only knows where the pressure started, perhaps Corps or perhaps Army. It had the effect of ordering men to die needlessly." O'Grady was furious: "Tactics and maneuver on battalion or regiment scale were conspicuous by their absence. It never seemed to occur to anyone that the plan might be wrong; but rather the indictment was placed on the small unit commanders and the men who were doing the fighting. The companies went into battle against the formidable Siegfried Line with hand grenades and rifle bullets against pillboxes. The 84th Division walked into the most touted defensive line in modern warfare without so much as the benefit of a briefing by combat officers." These were the magnificent kids of the American high school classes of 1942, 43 and 44 and while over 50,000 German soldiers were executed for desertion during this time period, only one American soldier was executed for the same offense, remarkably demonstrating the patriotism and devotion to duty of this group.

That this patriotism and devotion was so abused and never recognized even to this day, should be cause for a heavy heart. If there were ever a group of Americans for which a tear should be shed, this would be the group.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen18.jpg
The battle began on September 19, 1944 when the 3rd Armored Division and the 9th Infantry Division moved into the forest. The lieutenants and captains quickly learned that control of formations larger than platoons was nearly impossible. Troops more that a few feet apart couldn't see each other. There were no clearings, only narrow firebreaks and trails. Maps were almost useless. When the Germans, secure in their bunkers, saw the Gis coming forward, they called down pre sighted artillery fire, using shells with fuses designed to explode on contact with the treetops. When men dove to the ground for cover, as they had been trained to do, they exposed themselves to a rain of hot metal and fragmented wood. They learned that the only way to survive a shelling in the Hurtgen was to hug a tree. This way they exposed only their steel helmets to steel and fragments coming straight down from the top of the trees.

http://www.faem.com/mywar/2ndplt.jpg
With air support and artillery almost useless, the GIs were committed to a fight of mud and mines, carried out by infantry skirmish lines plunging ever deeper into the forest, with machine guns and light mortars their only support. For the GIs, it was a calamity . In the September action, the 9th and 2nd Armored Divisions lost up to 80 percent of their front-line troops, and gained almost nothing. "Call it off" is what the GIs wanted to tell the generals, but the generals shook their heads and said, "Attack." On November 2, the 28th Infantry Division took up the fight. The 28th was the Pennsylvania National Guard and was called the "Keystone Division" referring to their red keystone shoulder patch. So many of the Pennsylvania National Guard were to fall here that the Germans decided their name should be changed from the "Keystone Division" to the "Bloody Bucket Division," since the keystone looked somewhat like a bucket. When the 28th tried to move forward, it was like walking into hell. From their bunkers, the Germans sent forth a hail of machine-gun and rifle fire and mortars. The GIs were caught in thick minefields. Their attack stalled. For two weeks, the 28th kept attacking, as ordered.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen14.jpg
On November 5, division sent down orders to move tanks down a road called the Kall trail. But, as usual, no staff officer had gone forward to assess the situation in person, and in fact the "trail" was solid mud blocked by felled trees and disabled tanks. The attack led only to more heavy loss of life. The 28th's lieutenants kept leading. By November 13, all the officers in the rifle companies had been killed or wounded. Most of them were within a year of their twentieth birthday. Overall in the Hurtgen, the 28th suffered 6,184 combat casualties, plus 738 cases of trench foot and 620 battle fatigue cases. Those figures meant that virtually every front-line soldier was a casualty. The 28th Division had essentially been wiped out.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen16.jpg
However, Generals Bradley and Hodges remained determined to take the Hurtgen Forest. Having eliminated the 28th Division, they put in the 4th Infantry Division. This division had led the way onto Utah Beach on June 6th, and had gone through a score of battles since. Not many D-Day veterans were still with the division -- most were dead or badly wounded. Here in the Hurtgen Forest, the 4th Infantry Division would be asked to pour out its lifeblood again. Between November 7 and December 3, the 4th Division lost over 7000 men, or about ten per company per day. "Replacements flowed in to compensate for the losses but the Hurtgen's voracious appetite for casualties was greater than the army's ability to provide new troops." Lieutenant Wilson recorded his company's losses at 167 percent for enlisted men. "We had started with a full company of about 162 men and had lost about 287." Sgt. Mack Morris was there with the 4th and reported: "Hurtgen had its fire-breaks, only wide enough to allow two jeeps to pass, and they were mined and interdicted by machine-gun fire. There was a mine every eight paces for three miles. Hurtgen's roads were blocked. The Germans cut roadblocks from trees. They cut them down so they interlocked as they fell. Then they mined and booby trapped them. Finally they registered their artillery on them, and the mortars, and at the sound of men clearing them, they opened fire." After the 4th Division was expended, the First Army put its 8th Infantry into the attack. On November 27, it closed in on the town of Hurtgen, the original objective of the offensive when it began in mid-September. Orders were given to Lt. Paul Boesch, Company G, 121st Infantry, to take the town. At dawn on November 28, Boesch put one of his lieutenants on the left side of the road leading to the town while he took to the other side. When he gave the signal, Company G charged. "It was sheer pandemonium," he recalled. Once out of that damned forest, the men went mad with battle lust.

http://www.techwarrior.cx/~roliver/8th/images/photo-page-44.jpg
Boesch described it as "a wild, terrible, awe-inspiring thing. We dashed, struggled from one building to another shooting, bayoneting, clubbing. Hand grenades roared, fires cracked, buildings to the left and right burned with acrid smoke. Dust, smoke, and powder filled our lungs, making us cough, spit. Automatic weapons chattered while heavier throats of mortars and artillery disgorged deafening explosions. The wounded and dead -- men in the uniforms of both sides -- lay in grotesque positions at every turn. Lt. Paul Boesch was wounded later that night by a German shell and was sent to a hospital in the States. He would be one of the few left to report the battle. "Dead men tell no tales." The 8th Division did not get far beyond the town before it was used up. A staff officer from regiment visited the front and reported, "The men of this battalion are physically exhausted. The spirit and will to fight are there; the ability to continue is gone. These men have been fighting without sleep for four days and last night had to lie unprotected from the weather in an open field. They are shivering with cold, and their hands are so numb that they have to help one another on with their equipment. I firmly believe that every man up here should be evacuated through medical channels." Many had trench foot, all had colds or worse, plus diarrhea.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen03.jpg
It was time to send in another division. The 2nd Ranger Battalion was brought in. It had fought on Omaha Beach on D-Day and fought costly battles in Normandy and although it had taken 100 percent casualties, the core of the force that Lt. Col. James E. Rudder had led ashore on June 6 was still there. The battalion was assigned to the 28th Division in the Hurtgen and moved into the line. It immediately took casualties from mines and artillery, then the men sat in foxholes and took a pounding. On December 6, orders were given to attack Hill 400 (named after its height in meters). It was on the eastern edge of the forest and therefore the ultimate objective of the campaign.
The hills provided excellent observation as the highest point in an area of mixed farmland and forest around it. The Germans had utilized it so effectively that neither GIs nor vehicles moved during the day as the slightest movement around it would bring down 88's and mortars. The First Army had thrown four divisions at Hill 400 but after every attempt, the Germans were able to hold it. More blood would be needed.

http://www.skylighters.org/supportourtroops/images/fallen44.jpg
Ranger companies A, B, C, D, E and F moved to the base of the hill under cover of darkness ready with fixed bayonets to charge at first light. Sgt. Bill Petty, who had distinguished himself on D-Day, recalled that "tension was building up to the explosion point." At first light, he shouted, "Let's go get the bastards!," and firing from the hip, he led the Rangers as they charged. Sgt. Bud Potratz remembered hollering "Hi ho, Silver!" It was worse than D-Day but the Rangers had caught the Germans by surprise and although the Germans were good that day, they were not good enough! When Sgt. Petty reached the top of the hill, he "found a situation of turmoil." With another Ranger named Anderson, he approached the main bunker and heard Germans inside. They pushed open the door and tossed in two grenades. Just as they were ready to rush in and spray the room with their BAR, a shell exploded a few feet away -- the Germans were firing back on their own positions. The explosion blew Anderson into Petty's arms. Anderson was dead, killed instantly by a big piece of shrapnel in his heart. Sgt. Petty had the unusual and very sad experience of having another Ranger named Anderson (brother of the Anderson who had just died in his arms) get hit by German fire and had him die in his arms within the hour. The Germans were not going to give up the hill no matter what the cost. By 9:30, the first of five counterattacks that day began. They used machine guns, burp guns, rifles, and three potato masher grenades. Hand-to-hand fights developed on top of the hill often with bayonets.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen21.jpg
German Field Marshal Model offered Iron Crosses and two weeks' leave to any of his men who could retake the hill. The Germans threw in everything they had. On the American side, Ranger Lt. Lomell remembered, "we were outnumbered ten to one. We had no protection, continuous tons of shrapnel falling upon us, hundreds of rounds coming in." At one point, Lt. Lomell saw his platoon sergeant, Ed Secor, "out of ammo and unarmed, seize two machine pistols from wounded Germans and in desperation charged a large German patrol, firing and screaming at them. His few remaining men rallied to the cause and together they drove the Germans back down the hill." Lomell was a legend among the Rangers for what he did on D-Day, but in 1995 he commented, "June 6, 1944 was not my longest day. December 7th, 1944 was my longest and most miserable day on earth during my past 75 years." As Ranger numbers dwindled and ammunition began to run out, American artillery saved the day. During the night, ammo bearers got to the top of the hill and brought down the wounded on litters. Lt. Lomell was among the wounded and hence lived to tell the tale. The combined strength of the three companies left on top of the hill was five officers and eighty-six men. Just after daylight, the Germans shelled the hill with such intensity that one explosion would cover the sound of the next approaching shell. But when the Germans attacked the hill with infantry, a combination of artillery and small arms fire of the rangers drove them back. Late on December 8, an infantry regiment and tank destroyer battalion relieved the surviving Rangers. The Rangers had suffered 90 percent casualties and once again would have to be replenished with very few of the originals alive to be part of the new Ranger Battalion.
A week and two days later, the Germans retook the hill and not until February 1945 would the Americans get it back. When the Americans took Hill 400 again, the campaign would come to a close but since the Americans did not have the dams upstream, the Forest for which they had paid such a high price would be worthless. The battle had lasted ninety days and involved nine American Divisions and their supporting units. More than 24,000 Americans lost their lives and there were another 9,000 casualties from trench foot, disease and combat exhaustion. So ended the battle for the Hurtgen Forest.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen09.jpg
How and why so many wonderful young people were sacrificed and for what purpose poses an interesting question. It has been said that the battle for the Hurtgen Forest was based on a plan that was grossly, even criminally stupid. There does not appear to be any arguments to the contrary. The statement that, "The months-long battle of the Hurtgen Forest was a loser that our top brass never seemed to want to talk about" seems to say it all. Who can be blamed? Probably no one, or everyone who had anything to do with its planning. Headquarters personnel from battalion on up to Corps and Army found themselves good billets and seldom strayed near the front. Of course there were notable exceptions, but in general the American officers handing down the orders to attack and assigning the objectives had no idea what it was like at the front. Combat veterans said that only on the rarest of occasions was any officer above the rank of captain or officer from the staff were ever seen.

The first step down the road to this disaster can be traced to the following order:
COMBAT UNITS ARE AUTHORIZED TO BASE DAILY REPLACEMENT REQUISITIONS ON ANTICIPATED LOSSES FORTY EIGHT HOURS IN ADVANCE TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF REPLACEMENTS. TO AVOID BUILDING UP OVERSTRENGTH, ESTIMATES SHOULD BE MADE WITH CARE. SIGNED EISENHOWER.

This order was based on the necessity of providing replacements for battle losses in time to insure that the initiative would not be lost in battle situations where the enemy was on the run but might recover if replacements were not quickly available. Unfortunately, the order enabled inept staff officers to bring in replacements at such a fast pace that companies and even divisions could take tremendous losses that only could be acceptable because of this replacement policy. The officers making these decisions were never close enough to the front lines to be in danger themselves so they were always around to continue to make more costly mistakes.

At the Hurtgen Forest battle, it was Generals Bradley and General Hodges who were responsible for these costly mistakes. They used this procedure but failed to put into place any checks to determine if this policy could be causing excessive loss of troops. This was the weakness of the plan and unfortunately, no one ever bothered to check it out. The blame for this catastrophe was a failure of the generals at the highest levels. The officers from the level of captain down to freshly commissioned lieutenants and enlisted men from sergeants down to the newest recruits, performed and died with such courage that all Americans should be forever proud of them. Taking the time to read this account and consider its implications might diminish the possibility of this type of disaster happening again. Then again, maybe not.

http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/hurtgen02.jpg

source: http://www.5ad.org/hurtgen_joe.htm


BLOODY HUERTGEN: THE BATTLE THAT SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN FOUGHT
from American Heritage, DECEMBER 1979,Volume 31/Number 1.:
http://www.hurtgen1944.homestead.com/AmericanHeritageStory.html

Battle of Hürtgen Forest: Fight for Schmidt and Kommerscheidt:
http://www.historynet.com/magazines/world_war_2/3033146.html

Flyer 60. anniversary of the battles in Huertgen Forest:
http://www.huertgenwald.de/60-hwei.html

Allerseelenschlacht memorials (german):
http://www.huertgenwald.de/mahnmale.html

Photos:
http://sgm.zonadictos.net/opguerra/galeriahurtgen.htm

[Amethystfretchen]

I thought that this battle is know in the US as the Battle of the Bulge. Do you know the term Hürtgen Wald (forest) as well?

The Battle for Hürtgen Forest = Die Schlacht im Hürtgenwald or Allerseelenschlacht

Battle of the Bulge = Operation "Wacht am Rhein" or Ardennenschlacht

In the movie "When trumpets fade" there is in the end some mention of "...the Battle of the Bulge". The german syncronisation of the movie translated it as "Die Schlacht an der Bulge" (= Battle on the Bulge) like if they think that there is some river called "Bulge" in the Ardennes. So this german movie people have also no idea what they are talking about...

[Song of November]

In the movie "When trumpets fade" there is in the end some mention of "...the Battle of the Bulge".

I'm not entirely sure I understand what you are saying/asking, but I think you are under the impression the the Battle for the Huertgen forest and the Battle of the Bulge are the same battle perhaps? If this is the case, I am sorry to say that you are incorrect.

The battle of the Huertgen forest took place right before the Bulge. In fact, one of the reasons I am having such a hard time finding out any information about my Uncles unit in the 28th, is that (according to the 28th Infantry Association) all their records were kept to the west, in Bastogne during the fall of 44, and subsequentially, were destroyed during the shelling of Bastogne.

If I have misunderstood you, then please forgive me.

[Amethystfretchen]

Yes, you have misunderstood, but its no prolem. I will try to make it clear:

The movie "When trumpets fade" is about the Hürtgen. The story of the movie ends in November or early December. In the End of the movie there is some remark in the kind that all this fighting was useless and in just a few weeks the Battle of the Bulge would start and the Hürtgen would be forgotten.
The german people who transleted the english (american) movie for Germans, translated "...in just a few weeks, the Battle of the Bulge would start and the Hürtgen would be forgotten.", as "...in wenigen Wochen würde die Die Schlacht an der Bulge beginnen und der Hürtgen vergessen sein..." (or something like that.)

Dexx asked: "I thought that this battle is know in the US as the Battle of the Bulge. Do you know the term Hürtgen Wald (forest) as well?"

And I was telling this to show that this German movie people dont even know exactly, what the Battle of the Bulge is, because then they had translated it as "Wacht am Rhein" oder "Ardennnenschlacht". But they translated it as "Die Schlacht an der Bulge". This sounds like "The Battle on the Mississippi" or "The Battle on the Danube". But the "The Bulge" is not a river. It is an english word and describes the frontline from the allied perspective.

I was telling that all to show , that when even german "movie translation people", who translate a movie about the Battle in the Hürtgen, don`t know, what the Battle of the Bulge exactly is, than there is no shame, if somebody not knows exactly what the Battle of Hürtgenforest is.

Are Bulge and Hürtgen different battles?

The fighting in Hürtgen was from September till December 1944. It was the prerequisite condition that the Battle of the Bulge could take place at all. As the Battle for the Bulge started in mid December, the front in Hürtgen became quiet again. But as "the Bulge" was over, the Americans had still to clear the Hürtgenwald in February 1945. So the Hürtgen actually takes place before and again after "the Bulge".

One can argue that for the Germans Hürtgen Forest in autumn 1944 was "Operation Wacht am Rhein - Phase One".
And Hürtgen forest in February 1945 was the very last end chapter of a story that had be begun some 4-5months ago, but was interrupted because the fighting in the Ardennes.
Or you can say The Bulge was an big interruption of Hürtgen. After the escape from France the Germans managed in the Hürtgen to stop the American march on Germany for so long, that they where able to organize *THE* big counterattack on the Westfront through the Ardennes, known to history as "The Battle of the Bulge". After the failure of The Bulge (from german point of view), situation in january 1945 was again like before The Bulge in December 1944, which means the Americans had to clear the Hürtgenwald to be able to continue their march on Germany, which had been interrupted through the defence in the Hürtgen in September-December 1944 (and the failure of Market Garden).

One, who is doing this, is General James M. Gavin in his article BLOODY HUERTGEN: THE BATTLE THAT SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN FOUGHT.
He was the one, who was ordered to take up the fighting in the Hürtgen for the Americans when the Bulge was over in Feb 1945.
I can recommend his article to all who are interested in Hürtgen Forest. It is a great summary of this forgotten episode of WW2.

The Link to his article: http://www.hurtgen1944.homestead.com/AmericanHeritageStory.html



Greetings.

[Jo_GER]

Hello all!

I hope this is not a repost.

www.huertgenmovie.com

or the same Site in German:

www.huertgenwald-film.de

Merry Christmas!!

[Buckeye67]

Hey, thanks for posting that! Good to see an 83rd Infantry Division vet (Tony Vaccaro) talking about his experiences.

[loganinkosovo]

Hurtgen Forest was the Verdun of the ETO in WWII. Senseless slaughter on a grand scale. Whole Divisions were chewed up and spit out of this butcher shop of horrors. After a while it just wasn't reported on anymore.

Some photos.....

http://home.scarlet.be/~cv920172/ScoWeb.htm

http://1-22infantry.org/history/hurtgen.htm

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A50381-2004May23.html

http://bellsouthpwp2.net/e/a/ea_herr/

http://www.historynet.com/magazines/world_war_2/4655911.html

http://www.historynet.com/historical_conflicts/3037131.html?page=1&c=y

http://www.gewehr43.com/battle3.html

http://www.olive-drab.com/od_history_ww2_ops_battles_1944hurtgen.php

http://www.pbs.org/thewar/detail_2724.htm

http://members.cox.net/edgartiemann/wwii.htm

http://members.aeroinc.net/breners/buckswar/index.html

http://www.owensarchive.com/index.php?act=viewCat&catId=9&page=7



Some Reinactor stuff

http://www.flickr.com/photos/shadows_8th_id/sets/

[8739edmond]

There are a few here (http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-vetscor/983328/posts).
Thank you for sharing.

[Thor]

It's amazing how you learn something new about this war all the time. I had never heard about this battle before. Thanks for posting.

[Sheikh Al Stranghi]

Hurtgen wasn't just a bloody battle, it was HELL FROZEN OVER. The weather conditions just made it unbearable. ice cold mud and snow all over the place, and no way to get dry or warm.

[KB]

Russell Weigley, a noted US WWII historian said "an army which depends for its superiority on its mobility, firepower, and technology should never give battle where those assets are at a discount; the Hurtgen Forest was surely such a place...the motives for fighting in the Hurtgen remained largely negative."

How Omar Bradley was able to overcome this debacle plus the tactical surprise of the Battle of the Bulge and still become Army CoS is a bit of a mystery.

[herman30]

Hello all!

I hope this is not a repost.

www.huertgenmovie.com (http://www.huertgenmovie.com)

or the same Site in German:

www.huertgenwald-film.de (http://www.huertgenwald-film.de)

Merry Christmas!!

I ordered the film through that site and got it in the mail today.
It´s going to be really interesting to see it. 104 min long + 18 min bonus.

http://i17.tinypic.com/8fb1tzk.jpg

[Amethystfretchen]

I've bought it too. It's a good made documentation about the "battle" (Disaster whould be a better description). I can recommend it.

[Song of November]

Interesting; in looking thru the website, I did not see how to order the movie stateside, and I would dearly love to find a copy of it. My Uncle was with the 28th there, and it would mean a lot to me to have more info to pass on to my two sons when they are old enough to understand such things.

Does anyone have any info on it?

[Macs.]

Interesting; in looking thru the website, I did not see how to order the movie stateside, and I would dearly love to find a copy of it. My Uncle was with the 28th there, and it would mean a lot to me to have more info to pass on to my two sons when they are old enough to understand such things.

Does anyone have any info on it?

Hey,

you just have to fill out the form on this website: http://www.rheinische-edition.de/

Leave your personal details and your e-mail adress there, since you are not from Germany they will contact you and tell you how the payment/shipment works etc.

[herman30]

Hey,

you just have to fill out the form on this website: http://www.rheinische-edition.de/

Leave your personal details and your e-mail adress there, since you are not from Germany they will contact you and tell you how the payment/shipment works etc.

I did not get contacted in advance. They just sent me the video with a bill including all the necessary info (IBAN and SWIFT-codes) to make the payment. But then again I´m from a memberstate of EU so perhaps itś different ordering to the states.

[Clayton Gold]

Found these today while browsing around.

This guy has a pretty interesting story.

http://www.youtube.com/v/PTE9BPmiZNo&rel=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PTE9BPmiZNo

http://www.youtube.com/v/680AlBjvB2s&rel=1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=680AlBjvB2s

[MrApLewis85]

I read of a book about the topic, it was Americas greatest defeat, around 30,000 dead or wounded, I believe.

[GIJOEJK]

you got some info on the film??

I found this;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYTfcif-q4U

[loganinkosovo]

I read of a book about the topic, it was Americas greatest defeat, around 30,000 dead or wounded, I believe.

It wasn't a "Defeat". We were never pushed out of the forest. In fact we eventually pushed all the way through the forest. It just took too many lives to do it.

If you are using the casualty figures for "Defeat" then the civil war would outweigh this by quite a bit.

[Hellfish6]

Yeah, it wasn't a defeat. I think Bradley (?) said it was a wholly unnecessary battle - meaning all those dead and wounded died for no major military gain.

Pelilieu was another American battle that was considered unnecessary.

[Amethystfretchen]

Maybe no defeat, but "Mission Objective Failed" (grant colossal-epic style).

-> ...When Holitzinger encountered the Siegfried Line, he and his men found that most of the pillboxes and the defenses were unmanned. General Collins, on reading this report, felt that if they attacked the Siegfried Line now, they could easily break through it, before the Germans had time to reorganize from their hasty retreat from France and adequately began to defend their homeland. General Collins requested permission from General Hodges to form a reconnaissance group to probe the defenses of the Siegfried Line. The group was not going in to scout the area; it was going to attempt to break through the Siegfried Line. Collins hoped that if he were successful, he would be given more troops and supplies to advance his attack into Germany. ...

[Amethystfretchen]

some new article:

http://www.spiegel.de/static/sys/v8/headlines/spiegelonline_print.gif
09/09/2008 04:23 PM

WORLD WAR II GRAVES

US Military Searches German Battlefields for Fallen Soldiers

By Angelika Franz

Experts with the United States military expend enormous resources to search for the bodies of missing soldiers. A team is currently at work in the northern Eifel Mountains region of western Germany, where tens of thousands of Americans died during World War II.

http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,1295740,00.jpg
Denise To heads the JPAC team that is searching for the remains of missing World War II soldiers.

"We can make French fries for lunch out of those," jokes archeologist Denise To, pointing to three rows of potato plants on the edge of a field. The leaves have shriveled and turned brown, and a few potatoes sticking out of the ground have already turned green -- high time for the potato harvest.

Nearby, in a field of wheat stubble, the driver of a small excavator is carefully digging a trench into the soil. It looks like a miniature version of a much larger machine visible in the distance as it eats its way through brown coal. The field, which borders the northern Eifel Mountains in western Germany, is where To and her team work. They believe that it harbors the gravesite of an American who crash-landed his burning P-38 "Lightning" during the Battle of Hürtgen Forest.

To and her team are part of the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), a special division within the United States Department of Defense. In many places around the world, JPAC teams are searching for American prisoners of war, or POWs, and soldiers missing in action, or MIA.

The people at JPAC have a lot on their plates. According to official statistics, 78,000 Americans are still missing from the World War II era, about 8,100 from the Korean War, 1,800 from the Vietnam War, 120 from the Cold War and one from the 1991 Gulf War. To do its work, JPAC relies on 400 military and civilian employees, an annual budget of about $50 million (€35 million) and the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) in Hawaii, the world's largest forensic anthropology laboratory. The bones recovered by the JPAC teams are taken to the CIL, and only after anthropologists there have clearly identified them are the families allowed to bury the remains.

One of the 78,000 MIA from World War II was a 20-year-old Texan, whose body was believed to have gone down in a wheat field in the Hürtgen forest. He flew for the 474th Fighter Group, which was based in Florennes, Belgium and provided air support for American ground forces. On Nov. 5, 1944, the Texan pilot was caught in German anti-aircraft fire and his plane burst into flames. At that moment Therese Rick, who was 15 at the time, was hanging up laundry outside. "I saw a plume of smoke coming from the airplane," she says today. "The pilot flew one more loop, and then I heard the crash. I would have liked to run over the plane, but my mother told me not to."

It would have been grim sight. The bodies of those who died in Hürtgen Forest were often left where they had fallen. Therese Rick and her mother were evacuated a few days later, and were thus spared the worst of the battles. Ernest Hemingway, who experienced the Battle of Hürtgen Forest as a war correspondent, wrote remarkable accounts of the conflict. In less then five months, the Americans lost between 22,000 and 32,000 soldiers, or about half as many as would later die in the entire Vietnam War.

'In Hürtgen They Froze up Hard'

The series of battles in the Hürtgen Forest lasted from September 1944 to February 1945. Snipers perched in the trees made every movement a life-threatening gamble. The ground was furrowed with trenches and studded with landmines. And it was cold. "In Hürtgen they just froze up hard; and it was so cold they froze up with ruddy faces," Hemingway wrote in his novel, "Across the River and into the Trees."

But while American literature and the film industry never seem to tire of celebrating other battles, especially the Allied landing in Normandy, relatively few people, besides Hemingway, remember the suffering in Hürtgen Forest. This is not that surprising when one considers that not only did the Americans suffer high casualties there, but they were also relatively unsuccessful. Their goal was to secure the way for an unobstructed advance on the Rhine River. To this end, the Germans had to be driven out of the forests and away from the reservoirs tucked into mountain valleys.

http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,1295857,00.jpg
The Battle of Hürtgen Forest

But the Germans knew the terrain all too well. The Rur Reservoir is hidden away, deep in the forests. In February 1945, when all resistance had become pointless, the German troops opened the discharge valves, transforming the Rur River into a wide band of swampy land impregnable for men or tanks. By doing so, they held up the eastward advance of Allied troops for almost two weeks.

But today the sun is shining over the Hürtgen Forest, and To is happy. After spending a week digging exploratory trenches at all angles through the field of wheat stubble, they have finally found their first aircraft parts.

It has not been an easy task. It has been 64 years since the Texan pilot's plane went down in this field, and the eyewitnesses who still live in the area, like Therese Rick, remember a confusing hodgepodge of details. "The plane went down over there, near the road," said one eyewitness. "I remember quite clearly how the airplane crashed into the hill back there," another said. But the two supposed crash sites were almost two kilometers (1.25 miles) apart. "It's just that it was a very long time ago, and they were still kids back then," says To.

With the Help of Amateur Historians

But as elusive as some memories may be, the JPAG team relies heavily on the help of local residents to dig up a handful of bones here in the northern Eifel Mountains each year. Since the program began in 1986, the remains of eight US soldiers have been recovered and identified in Hawaii, and the scientists are currently working on four additional cases. The JPAC searchers have benefited from the fact that amateur historians in the region are well organized. This comes as no surprise, given the many stories they were told by their parents while growing up, stories about tanks discovered in gardens and soldiers' graves in the forest. Besides, many local residents are avid walkers and, during daily walks through the fields and forests with their dogs, they frequently find pieces of shrapnel, old helmets and even the occasional food ration embedded in metal. Everyone knows everyone else in the region's villages, places with names like Strass, Gey and Vossenack, and everyone knows whom to inform when their retriever happens to dig up something unusual from a rabbit hole.

http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,1294507,00.jpg
US artillery men fighting in Hürtgen Forest in 1944.

Bernd Henkelmann is one of these people. A retired sergeant major who spent many years working as a trainer in Kentucky, Henkelmann assists the JPAC teams. He introduces people, works as an interpreter during discussions with local residents and serves as a middleman between American and German interests. "You have to be careful what you ask Bernie," says group leader Captain Alexander Vanston. "If you tell him, in jest, that you'd like the evening news to cover the dig, you'll see a field full of TV teams out here two hours later."

Vanston, working from his office in a small hotel room, is in charge of coordinating all JPAC teams currently operating in Germany. In addition to To's team, two other excavation groups are working in the northern Eifel region. In addition, a so-called Investigation Team (IT) is scouting out locations for new excavation sites near the eastern city of Dresden.

The ITs do the advance work, digging through archives, meeting with eye witnesses and negotiating with landowners. Vanston is the point man for all requests and problems his teams encounter. Archaeologist To explains what this can mean: "When I say that I'd like, right here next to the potatoes, a wet washing system for rinsing out the excavated soil, with 25 work stations, he'll build me one."

But this time the soil in the field is dry enough to use rudimentary wire screens to sift through the earth for bones or small pieces of metal. Each member of a JPAC excavation team is highly specialized. A typical team includes an aircraft expert, someone who knows how to defuse bombs, a doctor, a linguist and a forensic photographer. But everyone is required to work with the shaker screens.

For most team members, this is not their first project. Many have already searched for the remains of fellow Americans in Vietnam or Korea. Compared with the work in Asia, the dig in the northern Eifel region is child's play. In Vietnam, in particular, crash sites are often on dangerously steep and slippery slopes, the underbrush is teeming with poisonous snakes and scorpions, and instead of a dry hotel room, team members spend their nights in clammy tents.

The men and women of JPAC see it as their duty to dig up as many of their dead fellow soldiers as possible -- in keeping with the group's motto, "Until they are home."

Despite the huge laboratory in Hawaii, the small army of archaeologists and anthropologists who work there and the logistical feats that JPAC completes around the world every year, its budget is modest compared with the total US military budget. The $50 million (€35 million) that JPAC costs American taxpayers is the equivalent of only three Longbow Apache helicopters, of which the US military has 600 in operation.

But whether archaeologist To will be able take along a crate of the bones of the P-38 pilot to Hawaii this time is still unclear. So far she and her team have only dug up engine parts and the unused ammunition from a machine gun -- and two half-ton bombs. In 1944, eyewitnesses saw the dead pilot lying next to his plane, although this does not mean that To will find his bones there.

It could be that whoever cleared the larger aircraft parts from the field after the war hastily buried his remains. Or perhaps animals did the work. "But at least we'll try," says the excavator, with determination in her voice.

She even knows for whom she is doing the work. The pilot's mother is still waiting, back in Texas. She has spent 64 years hoping for certainty about the fate of her son.

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

URL:

* http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,577244,00.html

[Amethystfretchen]

IMMEDIATE RELEASE No. 756-08
September 09, 2008

Missing WWII Soldier Is Identified

The Department of Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) announced today that the remains of a U.S. serviceman, missing in action from World War II, have been identified and are being returned to his family for burial with full military honors.

He is Pvt. James W. Turner, U.S. Army, of Altus, Okla. He will be buried on Sept. 11 in Arlington National Cemetery near Washington, D.C.

Representatives from the Army met with Turner’s next-of-kin to explain the recovery and identification process and to coordinate interment with military honors on behalf of the Secretary of the Army.

In November 1944, the 112th Infantry Regiment, 28th Infantry Division was attacking east through the Hürtgen Forest in an attempt to capture the German towns of Vossenack and Schmidt. On Nov. 4, the Germans counterattacked in what would become one of the longest running battles in U.S. history. Turner, a member of G Company, 112th Infantry Regiment, was reported missing in action near Vossenack on Nov. 9.

In 2005, a German citizen who was searching for wartime relics in the Hürtgen Forest, near Vossenack, found human remains and other items, including Turner’s military identification tag. The remains and items were turned over to the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) for further analysis.

Among other forensic identification tools and circumstantial evidence, scientists from JPAC also used dental comparisons in the identification of Turner’s remains.

For additional information on the Defense Department’s mission to account for missing Americans, visit the DPMO web site at www.dtic.mil/dpmo or call (703) 699-1169.

http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12194
...................