hist2004
03-28-2004, 06:41 PM
With their own version of karate, and without many scruples, the Koreans imposed their iron control
over Dinh Binh Province. In February 1967, a large force of NVA made the fatal error of engaging a
company of Koreans at close quarters. In the bloodbath that followed they lost 243 KIA and were
forced into chaotic withdrawal. That was the first major collision between North Vietnamese and Korean
forces. It would be a good while before there was another.
The first Koreans troops arrived in-country in February 1965, and although they were officially assigned
to non-combat duties, they first came under fire on 3 April of that year. By this time there were 200 ROK’s
in-country and their numbers would eventually rise until there were 44,829 superbly trained Koreans stationed
in Vietnam. Most of them were in II Corps, on the central coastal plain around Qui Khon and Na Trang. Binh
Dihn Province was somewhat hidden from the mainstream of the war, and the Koreans there were reduced to
a sideshow-but an effective one.
Besides the American effort, South Korea’s was the second largest fighting force in Vietnam, and the last out,
leaving in March 1973. The South Korean President at the time Chung Lee Park, proudly explained that fighting
in Vietnam would not only solidify their national security, but also contribute towards strengthening the anti-
communist front of the free world.
They had vivid memories of their own vicious fight against communists just over a decade before to remind them
what communism meant, and it made them fanatics. In general terms, Korean fighting methods were identical to those
of the Americans. Using the same basic weapons and tactical doctrines, ROK units were expected to carry out village
searches, ambushes, and cordon operations, contributing to the general strategy of search and destroy. But there were
differences of detail. On the positive side, most ROK actions involved more careful planning than those of their allies,
with greater fire discipline and better co-ordination of sub-units.
During village searches, ROK soldiers would subject the settlement to a series of detailed sweeps while interrogating
subjects on the spot. By comparison, American units tended to favor a single sweep followed by a removal of all
civilians for screening. Such a painstaking approach certainly paid dividends in terms of weapons seizures and reduced
VC activity in ROK areas.
But ROK soldiers were renowned for carrying out brutal interrogations and for silent killing techniques involving the
garrote or karate. This struck fear into the hearts of the enemy, but it went far beyond the norm of Western warfare.
The three main units deployed to Vietnam were the Capital (Tiger) Division, the ROK Marine Corps’ 2nd (Blue Dragon)
Brigade and the 9th (White Horse) Division. Various ROK special forces units were also deployed.
British photographer Tim Page spent time with the ROK’s at Hui An, I Corps, and in Binh Dinh Province, II Corp in
1967. The following quoted text is that of Tim Page:
“It was surprising to walk into the officer’s mess at the ROK Blue Dragon Brigade and, prior to being seated, hear a
very fierce sounding, totally unintelligible grace. The only words I could understand were, Westmoreland, America,
and Viet Cong. An escort officer explained that the prayer was to give the Dragons and their allies strength to kill
VC. The detached Marine brigade based at Hui An, near Quang Ngai in I Corps, was the model of military propriety.
Their camp was enhanced by the debris of war: shell casings lined the graveled walkways, flattened C-ration cartons
shingled and lined the buildings, and ammo cases became hootches.
There was no scarp of litter anywhere, and they had even planted flowerbeds and Kentucky blue grass borders.
Lurking sentries, spotlessly turned out even in the worst of conditions, would snap to attention as I slouched past.
My escort told me it was a greeting, though every evening at their Tae Kwon Do exercise they screamed it before
they bisected a brick with bare head or hand. Every trooper was trained in this deadly form of karate.
My batman woke me before five. The same unit I had patrolled with the day before had gotten hit in a night laager
in a cemetery. I rode a beat up H-34 out to the battle. We dropped in a combat spiral from 1500 feet into a tight
defensive perimeter around an ancient Viet cemetery, with foxholes dug into graves. A few wide-eyed, disheveled
Korean Marines ran up to the bird and threw in a body wrapped in a poncho. Two walking wounded followed.
Everywhere there were bodies, mostly in black pajamas, some in green NVA uniforms.
I stopped counting after 50, that was just inside the perimeter, and they were still bringing in the kills from the bamboo
tree line. I found the Marines I had buddied up with, and they told me the story. They knew they were going to be hit-
maybe it takes an Asian to know what another Asian is going to do- so their ambush patrols were some way out.
They had gone unarmed except for garrotes and knives, and the first VC hadn’t known what zapped them.
The ambush patrols pulled back, ****y-trapping the KIA’s, arming the trip wires and calling artillery onto the tree
line 50 meters away. Some of the bodies hardly had a scratch on them. I flipped one over to get the already gone
belt buckle, the neck flopped like a broken doll, the sergeant giggled and made hand-chopping signs.
The Koreans did not have to exaggerate their body counts for the computers in the Pentagon: in that one action
they had 85 confirmed VC, whilst taking three of their own KIA and 10 wounded. The trees around the cemetery
were splattered with bits of once-human beings, and blood trails ran everywhere”.
Another company unit of 150 men working up on the Cambodian border with the US 4th Infantry Division got
ambushed by the NVA 101st Regiment. When the action was finished, the NVA withdrew, leaving 182 KIA-
the ROK’s had seven. Captured VC documents showed the respect they were treated with, stipulating contact
with the Koreans is to be avoided at all costs unless a victory is 100 per cent certain.
The Koreans learned a bastardized version of the Vietnamese language, freed themselves of unnecessary inter-
preters, and discovered a lot of their assigned ARVN translators were deep cover VC. They took them out
and executed them. Korean intelligence was hard and new.
The text by Tim Page continues:
“After a rare chopper assault ferrying in two companies (rare because the US could ill afford choppers for their
seconded allies), the Tigers flushed out a dozen VC suspects while I was with them. The suspects were wizened
old men, too old for military service, probably VC sympathizer farmers. However, the LZ had been hot with sniper
rounds. Terrified woman and children were flushed from the corn breaks claiming “no VC”, but everywhere we
found fighting holes and bunkers.
As the CO took a couple of suspects aside to get some updated information, the US forward artillery observer
and his radioman drifted off. In bad Vietnamese, the captain barked questions at the cringing suspect. I hardly saw
his hands move, and the VC was doubled over, a vivid mark on his neck. Still no answer. Next time, I saw the
hand move and heard the forearm break. Writhing now, but still not talking, he was led over to kneel on the edge
of one of the fighting holes.
The CO backed up a couple of paces, brought up his M-2 carbine and, with great pantomime, jacked one up the
snout and snicked the safety off. At 15 yards he put a burst of automatic fire a millimeter to the side of the VC’s
head”. The Koreans didn’t allow Page to photograph the incident. “I slumped off to join the Americans while the
VC spilled his story. Minutes later, when I was taking a leak, he was led down the hill by three ROK’s. There was
a single pistol shot and the troopers plodded back alone. The ROK’s did not believe you could reeducate a
communist”.
South Korea’s devotion was not cheap: the US paid the $1 billion of their budget from 1965-70, besides another
$150 million in development loans. The Koreans also cleaned up to the tune of $650 million for military procurements.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004
over Dinh Binh Province. In February 1967, a large force of NVA made the fatal error of engaging a
company of Koreans at close quarters. In the bloodbath that followed they lost 243 KIA and were
forced into chaotic withdrawal. That was the first major collision between North Vietnamese and Korean
forces. It would be a good while before there was another.
The first Koreans troops arrived in-country in February 1965, and although they were officially assigned
to non-combat duties, they first came under fire on 3 April of that year. By this time there were 200 ROK’s
in-country and their numbers would eventually rise until there were 44,829 superbly trained Koreans stationed
in Vietnam. Most of them were in II Corps, on the central coastal plain around Qui Khon and Na Trang. Binh
Dihn Province was somewhat hidden from the mainstream of the war, and the Koreans there were reduced to
a sideshow-but an effective one.
Besides the American effort, South Korea’s was the second largest fighting force in Vietnam, and the last out,
leaving in March 1973. The South Korean President at the time Chung Lee Park, proudly explained that fighting
in Vietnam would not only solidify their national security, but also contribute towards strengthening the anti-
communist front of the free world.
They had vivid memories of their own vicious fight against communists just over a decade before to remind them
what communism meant, and it made them fanatics. In general terms, Korean fighting methods were identical to those
of the Americans. Using the same basic weapons and tactical doctrines, ROK units were expected to carry out village
searches, ambushes, and cordon operations, contributing to the general strategy of search and destroy. But there were
differences of detail. On the positive side, most ROK actions involved more careful planning than those of their allies,
with greater fire discipline and better co-ordination of sub-units.
During village searches, ROK soldiers would subject the settlement to a series of detailed sweeps while interrogating
subjects on the spot. By comparison, American units tended to favor a single sweep followed by a removal of all
civilians for screening. Such a painstaking approach certainly paid dividends in terms of weapons seizures and reduced
VC activity in ROK areas.
But ROK soldiers were renowned for carrying out brutal interrogations and for silent killing techniques involving the
garrote or karate. This struck fear into the hearts of the enemy, but it went far beyond the norm of Western warfare.
The three main units deployed to Vietnam were the Capital (Tiger) Division, the ROK Marine Corps’ 2nd (Blue Dragon)
Brigade and the 9th (White Horse) Division. Various ROK special forces units were also deployed.
British photographer Tim Page spent time with the ROK’s at Hui An, I Corps, and in Binh Dinh Province, II Corp in
1967. The following quoted text is that of Tim Page:
“It was surprising to walk into the officer’s mess at the ROK Blue Dragon Brigade and, prior to being seated, hear a
very fierce sounding, totally unintelligible grace. The only words I could understand were, Westmoreland, America,
and Viet Cong. An escort officer explained that the prayer was to give the Dragons and their allies strength to kill
VC. The detached Marine brigade based at Hui An, near Quang Ngai in I Corps, was the model of military propriety.
Their camp was enhanced by the debris of war: shell casings lined the graveled walkways, flattened C-ration cartons
shingled and lined the buildings, and ammo cases became hootches.
There was no scarp of litter anywhere, and they had even planted flowerbeds and Kentucky blue grass borders.
Lurking sentries, spotlessly turned out even in the worst of conditions, would snap to attention as I slouched past.
My escort told me it was a greeting, though every evening at their Tae Kwon Do exercise they screamed it before
they bisected a brick with bare head or hand. Every trooper was trained in this deadly form of karate.
My batman woke me before five. The same unit I had patrolled with the day before had gotten hit in a night laager
in a cemetery. I rode a beat up H-34 out to the battle. We dropped in a combat spiral from 1500 feet into a tight
defensive perimeter around an ancient Viet cemetery, with foxholes dug into graves. A few wide-eyed, disheveled
Korean Marines ran up to the bird and threw in a body wrapped in a poncho. Two walking wounded followed.
Everywhere there were bodies, mostly in black pajamas, some in green NVA uniforms.
I stopped counting after 50, that was just inside the perimeter, and they were still bringing in the kills from the bamboo
tree line. I found the Marines I had buddied up with, and they told me the story. They knew they were going to be hit-
maybe it takes an Asian to know what another Asian is going to do- so their ambush patrols were some way out.
They had gone unarmed except for garrotes and knives, and the first VC hadn’t known what zapped them.
The ambush patrols pulled back, ****y-trapping the KIA’s, arming the trip wires and calling artillery onto the tree
line 50 meters away. Some of the bodies hardly had a scratch on them. I flipped one over to get the already gone
belt buckle, the neck flopped like a broken doll, the sergeant giggled and made hand-chopping signs.
The Koreans did not have to exaggerate their body counts for the computers in the Pentagon: in that one action
they had 85 confirmed VC, whilst taking three of their own KIA and 10 wounded. The trees around the cemetery
were splattered with bits of once-human beings, and blood trails ran everywhere”.
Another company unit of 150 men working up on the Cambodian border with the US 4th Infantry Division got
ambushed by the NVA 101st Regiment. When the action was finished, the NVA withdrew, leaving 182 KIA-
the ROK’s had seven. Captured VC documents showed the respect they were treated with, stipulating contact
with the Koreans is to be avoided at all costs unless a victory is 100 per cent certain.
The Koreans learned a bastardized version of the Vietnamese language, freed themselves of unnecessary inter-
preters, and discovered a lot of their assigned ARVN translators were deep cover VC. They took them out
and executed them. Korean intelligence was hard and new.
The text by Tim Page continues:
“After a rare chopper assault ferrying in two companies (rare because the US could ill afford choppers for their
seconded allies), the Tigers flushed out a dozen VC suspects while I was with them. The suspects were wizened
old men, too old for military service, probably VC sympathizer farmers. However, the LZ had been hot with sniper
rounds. Terrified woman and children were flushed from the corn breaks claiming “no VC”, but everywhere we
found fighting holes and bunkers.
As the CO took a couple of suspects aside to get some updated information, the US forward artillery observer
and his radioman drifted off. In bad Vietnamese, the captain barked questions at the cringing suspect. I hardly saw
his hands move, and the VC was doubled over, a vivid mark on his neck. Still no answer. Next time, I saw the
hand move and heard the forearm break. Writhing now, but still not talking, he was led over to kneel on the edge
of one of the fighting holes.
The CO backed up a couple of paces, brought up his M-2 carbine and, with great pantomime, jacked one up the
snout and snicked the safety off. At 15 yards he put a burst of automatic fire a millimeter to the side of the VC’s
head”. The Koreans didn’t allow Page to photograph the incident. “I slumped off to join the Americans while the
VC spilled his story. Minutes later, when I was taking a leak, he was led down the hill by three ROK’s. There was
a single pistol shot and the troopers plodded back alone. The ROK’s did not believe you could reeducate a
communist”.
South Korea’s devotion was not cheap: the US paid the $1 billion of their budget from 1965-70, besides another
$150 million in development loans. The Koreans also cleaned up to the tune of $650 million for military procurements.
Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004