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hist2004
04-01-2004, 02:41 PM
Author/Publisher Note:
The names of both the author and Sat Cong have been changed to protect everyone involved in the following article:
Operation date;
Sometime 1972.
(Tony Cop:) Tell me where you were based and about your recon mission of the NVA truck park near the Loas/Vietnam DMZ.
(Sat Cong:) We were based at Hue, inside the Imperial City citadel and the airstrip. Our Special Forces compound is there.
The Mission
Vietnamese Army Special Forces G-2 had told my unit of a large Communist camp next to the Laotian border and they wanted to know everything about it. The commanders tell us they believe there are maybe two or three hundred heavy transfer trucks there.
We know that there may have been other teams there before this, because someone found out for us exactly how the communists in there were dressed. Sometimes for a recon like this, our commanders will send in three, four or more teams in over a month to checking everything out very carefully, but the communists must never know about even one.
It's so secret that even we don't know about our own other teams and what they do. We are told only what our leaders want us to know.

Tony Cop: How many men were in your team for this job and how were you equipped and armed?

Sat Cong: We are a six man team. We each carry only food and water for nine days. For this job, we wear the same uniform as the communist soldier; even our back-pack is like theirs. Each man carry AK47, with two full mags (30 rnds ea.) taped in reverse in the rifle, two spares in our chest pack (`Harris' rig vest) and two more in our back pack. We have 12 small "cherry" type hand grenades (From Belgium) packed in double tape like strip slung around our sholder like bandoleer and one Willie Pete grenade each. (White-Phosphorus.) We carry packets of Korean style freeze dried cooked rice (LRRP ration), dry meat or fish. Most important, water, we each have nine canteens. It is very heavy but water is so important to us. We need at least one for each day. We all have a small emergency handie-talkie, it is the same as the survival radio that American pilot's have. "The Brick," (PRC-90) it has a locator beacon `beeper' too. One man in the team is the RTO and he carries a PRC-25, (Prick25) back-pack radio.
Tony Cop: How did you travel to the target and what was the method used to insert your team?

Sat Cong: One evening at twilight, they fly us by helicopter at low level to maybe 1.5 km from the target. We jump by para- chute from 200 feet above the trees. All six jump, 1-2-3, we need to stay close together. We drop into the trees almost at once. When you parachute jumping into a dense forest of triple- canopy trees, you have to have special training. It's not like jumping to a open field or rice paddy. Everything different and easy to get killed. The trees come up fast, it's keep your feet and legs together and arms straight up over your head, as you begin to penetrate the branches. After we stop falling. we hold onto the tree and unhook the parachute. We know that we are going to get hung up, we also have get the chute out of the tree. What we do is, use the next job for two things. First we cut all the shroud lines lose, pull the silk down, and tie shroud lines together to lower ourselve down. Next we hide and cover up everything. (We can not leave anything behind for the communists to know that we had been there.)

The helicopter has to fly at it's normal speed, they can't stand still over drop zone and let you down with a cable, it will draw too much attention.
Tony Cop: Tell me about how you began your approach to cover the distance to the communist base.
Sat Cong: That night we moved out toward the enemy base. We know it is a large base, about 4 km square. It was about 4-5 km from the Laos border. We have move through 1.5 km of jungle to our search area, which is to be inside of "2 squares" on the map of this camp. When we get there we must stay exactly inside those 2 squares. Other leaders may running other SF teams in that base at the same time. It's not a good idea for us to run into each other.

All of us have to move very quietly and slowly, just like over here when we hunt the deer. You call it "Still Hunting" where you move a few steps, stop, listen for a couple of seconds, look around very carefully. We are in heavy forest, deep woods, but at ground level it is almost open with only light undergrowth here and there, (The shade keeps things from growing under the triple-canopy.)
We move out using the trees for cover. I am walking in the head, "the point position." Each man of the team behind has his special job. Each man is separated at about 30 meters, just far enough ahead to be in sight of the following man. When we stop for our check, the second man turns and looks to the right, the third man looks to the left, and so on until the last man. I check the man behind me from time to time also. We comunicate with hand signals, the same system as the Americans. We are very careful not to disturb anything along our trail, even how the fallen leaves lay naturally on the ground.

The last man's job is to always check the rear, making sure that no one is following us, clean up our trail, so that it look like no one has been by there. Every time that we stop we change which way we look. Every man depends on the other; we can not miss anything. We have to watch for enemy patrols, when they come and so on. We don't care how long it take; the main thing is that we don't get caught. It takes us two days to reach the base.

Tony Cop: When you moved into the enemy compound, what did you find first?
Sat Cong: We found the fuel dump first. There were about 15 or 20 large fuel tanks or bladders, each about 20 by 20 feet, for gasoline. There were also many 55 gal fuel drums stored there.
Tony Cop: You did know that under International Law, you could be executed as spies if you were captured?
Sat Cong: Yes, we know that, but if they catch us, we would only live as long as they thought that they could make us tell something. We got a pill sewn into the corner of our shirt collar to take care of that. We can just bite down on it through the shirt and we done. There is no way that we can do the job unless we are dressed like them, we are right in there with them.

Tony Cop: What was your next step?
Sat Cong: When we get there it is about two o'clock in the afternoon. It is early, but it has been a ruff walk and we are all tired. So now we take a break and just stop there and check each other out. We find a place about 200 meters away from the gas tanks.
Before we start our mission inside the camp, we need to be fresh and rested. If we are too tired, we can make a careless mistake. We must have plenty of energy and fresh in our mind to take care of ourself. If we do this right, it will be an easy mission. We set a watch, eat something, try to sleep. We sit back to back, to watch for each other, we sleep that way. We never talk or take off our packs. Everyone has a roll of string in their pocket. We tie the string to each other and also run some around our position, so that we signal each other by pulling on the string, and if any stranger come to us, we know before he find us.

We make no sound of any kind. We got a little piece of paper that we write on about what we going to do next. Any communication have to be silent. We wait for everything to settle down over night; we sit there from about 1230 until about 6 O'clock in the morning.
Tony Cop: How did you go about scouting out this huge camp without being discovered?

Sat Cong: For the next four days we do our job to find out everything we can about this supply dump and base. At first we stick close together, each watching in a different direction, we are slowly moveing from spot to spot. We have to see how every- thing is laid out. You know, before we really go in there we must first learn how the communist do in there, and how they work, so that we know how to act just like them.
The communist leave the big trees, but they have cut down all the small trees and bushes under the triple canopy. This is in- order for it to be clear to move and store supplies easily. So we can see all around us. but the branches of the tall trees are so interwoven that nothing can be seen from the air, There are trails that they walk from the tank to tank, back and forth between the truck park and the other supply stores.
We see the men working there and sometimes they see us, but they all got a job to do and are busy doing their work. Since we look just like them, they don't pay us any attention. That way we move all around the camp. When they see us, we might wave or smile and then just go on. We never act like we try to hide, only just like we belong there.

Tony Cop: You mean that you really expected to get away with that?
Sat Cong: Of course. We make them think that we are just another one of their patrols or guard groups. You see, we are so far away from any Saigon government forces that the communist soldiers there never think that any of their enemy could be nearby.
Tony Cop: How are you able to record all that you see by just writing notes?
Sat Cong: We had been given a 35 mm camera and four or five extra rolls of film. Exposed film is locked in a special tough plastic carrying case. In the daylight we take a lots of pictures and write down notes about what we see.

Tony Cop: Are you completely on your own?
Sat Cong: Oh no, every move that we make, what we find, every little thing we check out, we report to our leader in the sky. He is flying in a L-19 (Bird-Dog) airplane, just far enough away not to be seen or heard. Our leader is a Special Forces captain. Since he has advanced through the ranks from the same as us, he usually understands exactly what we say. Our leaders become officers because they are smart and brave and not because of family connections. Our captain had passed some real tests for his promotions. He has a VNAF pilot trained to work with Special Forces. When we make contact with our leader by radio, we hold the radio mike down inside our shirt so no sound can be heard outside. We listen by ear-piece. We report to him what we see and where we are at that time. Then he tell us what he wants pictures of. We must act exactly like the communist soldier do.

Tony Cop: What did you find in there?
Sat Cong: That base has about a thousand men. We see what of supplies they store there and mark in our notes exactly were they. There are also sleeping quarters and the places that they cook and eat.
One suprise we see, they have the biggest VC flag that I ever saw, not even the Presidential Palace in Saigon got a South Vietnam flag that big. It was on a pole in the most open place that we see in there, although it still can not be seen from above.
Tony Cop: What kind of activity was going on?

Sat Cong: The men there do maintenance on trucks, move supplies, load trucks going south, unload trucks from the north, just like one of our transportation bases, only nothing can be seen from the air.
We do this for four and a half to five days. Everytime we move and what we see, report all of this to our group leader.
Tony Cop: Do you mean that your leader must stay on staion up there all day long? What has he been doing with all that information?
Sat Cong: Yes, except when he have to pull off to go back to refuel, but then another airplane takes his place while he gone.
After five days, our leader communicate the results to the commander at our headquarters. We normally are set up to stay out for nine days. We tell our leader that we think that we found out everything, all the information, we have a couple of days left, but we need that to get away to safe PZ.

Our leader in the air said, "We need to get that place down." That means that they want us to destroy that place. We say OK, but how? We just go in there as a recon team and we don't carry any explosive equipment. The captain say that they going to supply us by air drop. This means we have to move back away from the camp to someplace that the enemy can not see the drop.
Tony Cop: Why don't they just call in a air strike?
Sat Cong: We have the same idea, and talk this among our- selves. We don't understand, "They exactly know where everything is; why don't they send out some of our F-5s or American F-4s with bombs and napalm?" That's a big question on our minds.
Tony Cop: It sounds like your `Leader' is going to make your `smooth' job a `ruff' one.

Sat Cong: Yes. The leader told us to figure our how much explosive we need and they supply us. We got two days to get it set up. He tell us since it will take more time, that they will drop us some more food and water also. Our leader say that they talk it over at headquarters and along with the explosives they are going to send us some more personnel to help us. Boy, we don't like this at all; too many people make too much noise.
Tony Cop; I guess that every army has it's Strap-Hangers and REMFs. Good men just seem to think differently after they get a staff job.
Sat Cong: Most of the time what they think is right. I never understand why they think like this now. Anyone of us know now that it will go all wrong for us; the plan not right. We still got a little meat and rice, but you know after nine days it's going to be ruff and with only two days left we don't have time to go out to a drop point, pick up equipment and then work our way back inside to do the job. Also, too much risk. We are tired, wore out, it's too easy to make a mistake when a man is like that. We told our leader that it look like everyone want to get out. When he finally understand that, he say, "Ok, we pull you out and burn it down the next time."

He tell us that we must leave the enemy truck-park in a different direction than we go in. There is something more that he want us to check on the way out. He gave us the direction to take and the coordinates for our PZ. We must be there exactly on time when they come to pick us up. We have to be in and out before the enemy can respond.
Tony Cop: What did you do then?

Sat Cong: When our communication is over, the day is in deep twilight, the sun is in a thin line and you know that in the woods it will be completely dark in a few more seconds. I look at the map and I see that the PZ is about three squares away (3km). I think, " How we gonna move there in two days?" When you move through that kind of country, you don't know what you find on your way. If we have a road it only depend on how fast you walk, but this is jungle with NVA soldiers all around; we cannot estimate how much trouble that we will find.
That night we talk with each other (with pencil and paper). We know we do not have much time, so we decide to move as much as we can. We know that if we are not at the PZ on time that we gonna be stuck a couple more days. We have to move in the direction that our leader gave us. Our leaders never tell us what another team has seen. The secrecy is so that they can compare reports against one another as a check for accuracy. So, we thought that we were leaving the supply base behind and going into the jungle. We move maybe 2/3rds of a square distance on our track (600 m). It is now about 1130 and totally dark and we do not know when we are in relation to anything in the camp. So we stop and take a break. After rigging our strings and setting a watch, we set back to back the same as before. We try to sleep and get some rest.
The next day about 0530, the man on watch heard some noise, maybe a 100 feet away. He pull on the string to wake us all up, then we all listen. There are men moving around, talking right where we at. We are in a thicket hidden at the foot of a big tree. A little later we find out that the Communist camp Head Quarters is right there.

Our leaders know about this place but don't tell us. They want it checked on our way out too. In the dark, we got too close. Nobody see us yet. We look at each other and we know, "Don't be afraid of it, if we die we die, but the main thing is to get out of there."
The job is done now and we must look after ourselves. We began to move, we move as normally as we can, maybe a 100 feet from where the noise is, then one of our team make the sign that he go ahead to check out where we are. We agree. We say you come back as soon as you can.
So he move away, ahead and we move back 100 yards toward where start from last night. About 30 minutes later we heard gunfire. We fear the worse, because you know in that camp there is no reason for gunfire unless they shoot at one of us. That means that probably something our man do didn't look right and they know that he their enemy.

So we forget about what the danger is, we have to move back to see what is going on. We see the fire coming from a watching tower. They shooting in the direction away from us, so we believe it's to where our friend go. I wonder what has happened? We had been walking around and by these check-point watch towers for the last 5 1/2 days and no one had noticed us.
Well, it's too late to hide now, and what we have to do is shoot the bad guys in the tower in order to protect our friend. They don't see us yet. We kill the shooters in that tower and we run toward where our man go. We run almost to him, when we run into another check point (tower) and they fire at us and we have to lay down and work back away. Then we see our friend hauling- ass by that other tower check point, and they shoot him. Now they shoot at us too. Then another friend of mine run up there and he get shot. Four of us left now. I run up there, firing at the tower as I go. I move up to the second man that got hit and pull him back. It ain't doing no good; he already dead. The others lay down. The enemy hasn't located us yet. When I get back, I call our leader and tell him the situation; I tell him that we run into the enemy HQ and two of our team get killed. He said. "OK, we get you out. Make it to the pickup point as fast as you can. We wait for you." That means that he wants us to continue in the same direction past the HQ and watch towers, the same place our friends get killed. In his mind our job isn't done until we check it out.

Tony Cop: Your group leader's orders don't sound like they will make things much better. What do you do then?
Sat Cong: We talk it over and make a decision between ourselves to split up because if they catch us together there is a good chance they get us all. Just like if you are hunting and you kick up four rabbits and they run different ways. First you must make a decision about which one to shoot at and maybe by then they all get away. That's the way we think. So the other three head out separately in a slightly different track in the direction that our leader told us to go.
Tony Cop: Did you follow the rest of the team?
Sat Cong: I start to, then I think to myself, "We already lose two men in that direction and the enemy know we go that way; I don't think that it's good idea." So I move back to where we were the night before. I make it there and then I hear a lot of commotion from the direction my friends go. Lots of shouting, yelling commands, and shooting. I never see my friends again.
It's then that I know that I don't want to try to go that way. It's not that our leader wanted us killed; he just didn't understand how bad our situation was.

Tony Cop: Well, you broke the rules then. What did you report to your leader after that?
Sat Cong: I begin to work back toward the place where we were put in. I stop to check in with my leader. He say, "What happen down there? Where you at?" I say, "I can't tell you right now, I'll tell you later." I'm pretty sure now that my friends are gone and that maybe one of our radios fall into the enemy's hands. I don't want to reveal anything over the radio. I tell him I will call him again in 30 minutes. It's only about 10 o'clock in the day then.
I know that I am going to get into trouble because I don't follow orders, but I know that they are wrong and I must save my life and complete the mission the best way that I can.
I move back to our original drop point. I have to go slow because I still don't know what is out there and I have no one to watch my back anymore. The enemy may looking for me.

I don't call my leader in 30 minutes. I keep quiet and keep moving. About two hours later I call him. My leader answer, he say, "Where the hell you at? How are the "children?" No one else call in." (When he say, "children," he mean my other recon team members.) I say, "I don't know, they not with me." My leader ask,"What is your location?" I say, " Wait, I'll tell you later." I can't get him to understand that it's not safe to give information out the radio.
So I turn the radio off and continue to work my way toward the drop point. The less we talk the better. Finally I see the leader's plane turn around and he go home.
Tony Cop: How long did it take you to get back to the drop zone?
Sat Cong: I get almost back to the drop point about noon the next day. Then I hear the leader's plane returning. I take out my survival mirror and signal him with it. I identify myself and ask him if he understand. In the Special Forces, we had worked out answering signals that a airplane could give. By kicking the rudder pedals that meant "no", pushing the stick forward and back was "yes". A banking turn to the left was another thing, and so on.

Then I call him again on the radio and tell him that I am ready to be taken out. The leader say, "God damnit! Where in the hell have you been? We been missing you for a whole day now. Why aren't you at the PZ that I told you and where are the other `children'?" I tell him, "I'm here now, but I have to be quiet and I don't know where the children at. But I'm here and ready to be pulled out, no more water or food." My leader said, "I have to check it out with the commander back at the base." I said OK and then wait. I guess he talk back to our base.
Then he said. "I have to go back now, we return tomorrow at 10 o'clock to pull you out." I tell him, "OK, everything I'll tell you later." Then he leave. So I make myself a `hide' place the best I can to stay another night and wait.
The next day 10 o'clock come and go and I wonder if maybe my leader is going to leave me here?

Finally when my leader come back again he say, "OK, we get you out in few more minutes. Where is your location?" I said, "Good morning Sir! How are you!. I tell him the he knows the spot from yesterday when I use the signal mirror." I still don't want to use the radio to give my location away. My leader then ask, "How tall are the trees where you at? I tell him that most are 100 meters tall, some 60 meters. The leader said, "We have to find a place that is a little more open in order to pull you out.
I ask him since he can see from the air better, please find a good spot and direct me to it. He find one and tell which way to go and I work toward it. About that time I heard a screaming whoosh going over at tree top level and I know that they are almost here. It was VNAF F-5s' that we use for top cover. Next, it was the Slick over me at a high hover and dropped the cable for me. I hook up my carabiner from my vest "D" ring at my shoulder, to the cable ring, and away I go.

Tony Cop: I don't suppose that you minded being drug through a few tree tops that time? Were your commanders anixous to learn all about what you found inside the communist base and what went wrong at the end?
Sat Cong: You're right about that, they could have drug me through thorns and it would have been alright.
When get back to our base they meet me at the heli-pad. Someone is there to take the camera and the film; then they put me in a closed truck and take me to the SF camp. They let me take a shower and change to clean uniform, but that's all. I don't get to eat or anything.
They take me to the conference room and begin to ask questions about the mission and what went wrong. I tell them, but some of the things they don't like to hear. They talk everything over with each other and then they write me up for two things. (One) is that I didn't stay with the others and (two), I didn't follow orders and go to the PZ that my leader ordered me to.... Then they put me in jail for four days.
The "Jail" in our camp is converted CONEX shipping container. It get real hot during the day. While I sit there, I think, "This isn't fair, I work hard and do the best that anyone can. They got the information that they wanted and the other men lose their life for it." I think about that some more; then I think, "It's a lot better being here in jail than being back out there dead." I rest easy then; I had survived.
My leaders and my officers in command are very strict; we must always follow orders exactly. Most of the time, our survival depends on that. I don't want anyone to ever think that our commanders would send us out to get killed on purpose. We are too valuable to the government to throw away. It takes over two years just to train us. My officers and all the officers in command came up through the Special Forces just like me. They all know exactly what we know, they are tough and must always be obeyed.

There is always something that we don't want to do, but we must do it anyway. If we think that we can do what we want to, nothing get done. Sometimes they make a mistake, but they can't help it.
They also teach us in Special Forces training that first you save your life, and then the `mission' is the main thing. This time I knew that they were wrong and I had no way to explain that to my leader, so I must disobey my orders to save my life and to finish the job. But I had still disobeyed them and they have to show some punishment. I know and they know, that for me, it was worth it and after all, the punishment is really not very much. So we must do the best that we can.
Tony Cop: After this interview is over, Sat is sitting there thinking, remembering.

Sat Cong: "Tony, this is only one story. I been on operations most of the time from when I graduate in 1971 until April 1975, and maybe you think that it didn't bother me. Well, I'll tell you, I never got over being scared. I know that you been scared before and that you think that you know how to handle it, but I'd give you the easiest mission that I ever had and you'd piss your pants. I know that because the first ten missions that I made, I pissed in mine. After that I learned how to handle my fear, but I never quit being scared."

Tony Cop: If you ever run into a Special Forces type that says, "I ain't never been scared," stay away from him; he's a dead man on loan.
Sat Cong: When I was about 12 years old, I grow up in a beautiful valley near Quin Nhon, in central Vietnam. Our family is mama, daddy and four children. I have a older sister and a younger brother and sister. When the communists come to our valley in the north, we have to leave and move south to below Nha Trang, but my daddy still up there getting our belongings together. My sister go back up there with him to get some more of her stuff and the communists catch her. They make her go with them for supply transport, like a pack animal. We never see her again. Later we hear from some old people that stayed behind, that maybe airplanes bomb the VC on the trail and she die somewhere in the jungle. I always remember my sister and what the Communists do. I never tell anyone about this, not even my closest friend in the army, not even my wife after I marry, but I never forget my sister and when I am in the Special Forces I don't worry about getting even, I get ahead. I know that nothing will ever give me my sister back, but every time that I put another communist down, I think, "There is one more that will never bother someone's daughter or sister."

Sat Cong and The Recon Patrol
by Tony Cop

--Foreword--
This story comes from the life of a friend. I have known this ex-soldier of Vietnam for 20 years. We met shortly after he and his family had resettled in the same city that I lived in 1975. This came about where my wife attended the same English classes at a local Baptist church. Nguyen and I had in common, beautiful Vietnamese wives and we also loved the outdoors, hunting, and fishing.
From time to time over a few Brewski's, we would talk about my experiences in Vietnam with Army Aviation during the years between 1969 and 1973; then my VN friend would relate his tales of the `special operations' that he took part in. I've since given up the Brewski's and the wife, but I still have my VN hunting and fishing buddy.

When I recently asked Nguyen if I could write down these stories for possible publication, he expressed concern. He said, "Tony, I tell you these stories because I know that you have been there and I know that you understand about Vietnam, but I don't want to put my name on anything. I still have family there and my name is on a `list.' You and I can talk about these things, but none of the other Vietnamese around here know that I was Special Forces or what I do. I worry that the wrong word said to the wrong people will get back to the Communists and that they will take it out on my family. Even here, I don't know who were communists and who were not."
Names and places in the following have been changed to protect the innocent. I must change my name also, for through me, THEY could trace Sat Cong.

EDITED; Tony con Cop (Tony the Tiger, or the Vn would leave out the con and make it Tony Tiger.)
Nguyen would still say "Tony the Tiger." He agreed to let me write this story if I changed his name. Since "Nguyen" (Winn) is a family name that is as common as Smith or Jones here in the western world, we let that stay the same. His given name, I changed to [Chet cong-(san)] or "Sat Cong" either of which in Vietnamese loosely translates to "Death to Communists." I think that the name fits him, since he had terminated so many of the NVA, VC, and VCI cadre during his active duty, not to mention the tons of their supplies he caused to be destroyed.
If someone reading this, believes my friend's fears are unwarranted, just note a short time ago, Dr. Haing Ngor, the Cambodian actor from the movie "The Killing Fields" was gunned down in the car-port of his home in Los Angeles. This was not a robbery attempt! Other Vietnamese friends tell me of Vietnamese Communist agents posing as refugees to gain entrance to the US. Some are passing themselves off as Buddhist monks and one recently exposed agent had the robes of a Catholic priest, Communist spies and assassins are living in the Vietnamese communities and doing their evil work.

I have heard similar remarks from other former special operation types, Americans, they had tales to tell, but didn't want their names mentioned.
Twenty to thirty years have passed, and now we are older and with families. Now their families are the main concern. Most have seen more war than the average soldier would see in three lifetimes and do not care to see more.
I wrote Sat's story from taped interviews; using his words, I haven't tried to `Anglify' them.

http://www.wellston.net/magten/andwhat.htm

http://www.wellston.net/magten/abttony.htm

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

hist2004
04-02-2004, 09:21 AM
The Vietnamese Special Forces LLDB (Luc Luong Dac Biet), didn’t generally have a good reputation during the Vietnam War. U.S. Special Forces would refer to the Viet
Special forces acronym of LLDB as meaning, “Look long, Duck Back”. However, the
details of the recon mission in this thread show that there are definitely exceptions to
everything. The courage these troopers displayed is unquestionable.

Regards,
Hist2004

hist2004
04-02-2004, 03:34 PM
Here is some additional information on the special forces of the Republic of Vietnam-

NHA KY THUAT
STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE

SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

In early 1956 the French built Commando School at Nha Trang was re-established with US military assistance to provide physical training and ranger instruction for up to 100 students. Early the following year President Ngo Dinh Diem ordered the creation of a special unit to conduct clandestine external operations. Initial parachute and communication training for 70 officers and sergeants was conducted at Vung Tau; 58 of these later underwent a four month commando course at Nha Trang under the auspices of a US Army Special Forces Mobile Training Team. Upon completion, they formed the Lien Doi Quang Sat so 1 (First Observation Unit) on November 1957 at Nha Trang. The unit was put under the Presidential Liaison Office, a special intelligence bureau controlled by President Diem and outside the normal ARVN command structure. The commander was Lt. Col. Le Quang Tung, an ARVN airborne officer and Diem loyalist. Many of the Unit's members came originally from northern Vietnam, reflecting its external operations orientation.

In 1958 the Unit was renamed the Lien Doan Quang Sat so 1, or First Observation Group, reflecting its increase to nearly 400 men in December. By that time the Group was seen as an anti Communist stay behind force in the event of a North Vietnamese conventional invasion; however, because of its privileged position the Group stayed close to Diem and rarely ventured into the field.

By 1960 it was apparent that the main threat to South Vietnam was growing Viet Cong insurgency; the Group abandoned its stay behind role and was assigned missions in VC infested areas. Operations were briefly launched against VC in the Mekong Delta, and later along the Lao border.

In mid 1961 the Group had 340 men in 20 teams of 15, with plan for expansion to 805 men. In October the Group began operations into Laos to reconnoiter North Vietnamese Army logistical corridors into South Vietnam. In November the Group was renamed Lien Doan 77,or 77 Group, in honor of its USSF counterparts. Over the next two years members were regularly inserted into Laos and North Vietnam on harassment and psychological warfare operations. Longer duration agent missions, involving civilians dropped into North Vietnam, also came under the Group's auspices.

The Group's sister unit, 31 Group, began forming in February 1963. Following criticism of 77 Group's perceived role as Diem's 'palace guard', both groups were incorporated into a new command,, the Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) or Special Forces, on 15 March 1963.

The LLDB after President Ngo Dinh Diem

In the wake of the coup the Presidential Liaison Office was dissolved and its function assumed by the ARVN. The LLDB was put under the control of the Joint General Staff and given the mission of raising paramilitary border and village defense forces with the USSF. External operations were given to the newly formed Liaison Service, also under the JGS. The Liaison Service, commanded by a Colonel, was headquartered in Saigon adjacent to the JGS. It was divided into Task Force 1, 2 and 3, each initially composed of only a small cadre of commandos.

In 1964 the JGS also formed the Technical Service (So Ky Thuat), a covert unit tasked with longer duration agent operations into North Vietnam. Commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, the Technical Service comprised Group 11 (Doan 11), oriented toward agent operations in Laos and eastern North Vietnam; Group 68 (Doan 68 Thang Long), another infiltration unit; and the Coastal Security Service, a maritime commando group at Da Nang attached to the Technical service with its own contingent of PT boats for seaborne infiltration.

The post Diem LLDB was restructured for its proper role as a source of counter insurgency instructors for paramilitary forces. By February 1964, 31 Group had finished training and was posted to Camp Lam Son south of Nha Trang. In May the Group became responsible for all LLDB detachments in I and II Corps. A second reorganization occured in September when 31 Group was renamed III Group and given responsibility for the Special Operations Training Center at Camp Lam Son. Now 77 Group, headquartered at Camp Hung Vuong in Saigon, became 301 Group. In addition, 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion, a three company fast reaction para unit, was raised under LLDB auspices in November. Total LLDB force strength stood at 333 officers, 1270 non commissioned officers and 1270 men. The LLDB command at Nha Trang was assumed by Brig. Gen. Doan Van Quang in August 1965.

By 1965 the LLDB had become almost a mirror image of the USSF. LLDB Headquarters at Nha Trang ran the nearby Special Forces Training Center at Camp Dong Ba Thin. LLDB 'C' Teams, designated A through D Company, were posted to each of South Vietnam's four Military Regions; each 'C' Team had three 'B' Teams, which controlled operational detachments at the sub regional level; 'B' Teams ran 10 to 11 'A' Teams. 'A' Teams were colocated with USSF 'A' Teams at camps concentrated along the South Vietnamese border, where they focused on training Civilian Irregular Defense Force (CIDG) personnel.

In addition, the LLDB Command directly controlled the Delta Operations Center with its Delta teams and the four company 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion, both were used by Project Delta, a special reconnaissance unit of the US Military Assistance Vietnam Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG), which operated deep in VC/NVA sanctuaries.

On 30 January 1968 the Communists launched their TET general offensive across South Vietnam. Caught celebrating the lunar New Year, the Saigon government was initially ill prepared to counter the VC/NVA attacks. When Nha Trang was hit on the first day the LLDB Headquarters was protected by 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion, recently returned from one of its Project Delta assignments. At only 60 percent strength the Airborne Rangers turned in an excellent performance, pushing the major Communist elements out of Nha Trang in less than a day. The battle, however, cost the life of the battalion commander and wounded the four company commanders.

After a four month retraining in Nha Trang three companies from 91 Airborne Ranger Battalion were brought together with six Delta teams and renamed 81 Airborne Ranger Battalion. In early June the new battalion prepared for urban operations in Saigon after a second surge of Communist attacks pushed goverrunent forces out of the capital's northern suburbs. On 7 June the Airborne Rangers were shuttled into Saigon and began advancing toward VC held sectors around the Duc Tin Military School. After a week of bloody street fighting, much of it at night, the Airborne Rangers pushed the enemy out of the city.

Following the Tet Offensive 81 Airborne Ranger Battalion was increased to six companies, and continued to be used as the main reaction force for Project Delta; four companies were normally assigned Delta missions while two remained in reserve at LLDB Headquarters.

The Strategic Technical Directorate

In late 1968 the Technical Service was expanded into the Nha Ky thuat (Strategic Technical Directorate, or STD) in a move designed to make it more like MACVSOG, the US joint services command created in 1964 which ran reconnaissance, raids and other special operations both inside and outside South Vietnam. Despite internal opposition the Liaison Service was subordinated to the STD as its major combat arm. Like SOG, the STD also had aircraft under its nominal control, including 219 Helicopter Squadron of the Vietnamese Air Force. By the late 1960s the size of the Liaison Service had increased tremendously. Task Forces 1, 2 and 3, commanded by lieutenant colonels and larger than a brigade, were directly analogous to MACVSOG's Command and Control North, Central and South. Each Task Force was broken into a Headquarters, a Security Company, a Reconnaissance Company of ten teams, and two Mobile Launch Sites with contingents of South Vietnamese Army and paramilitary forces under temporary Liaison Service control. Although the Liaison Service was a South Vietnamese unit, all of its operations were funded, planned and controlled by MACVSOG, and recon teams integrated both MACVSOG and Liaison Service personnel.

In December 1970, in accordance with the 'Vietnamization' policy, all CIDG border camps were turned over to the South Vietnamese government and CIDG units were incorporated into the ARVN as Biet Dong Quan, or Ranger, border battalions. No longer needed as a CIDG training force, the LLDB was dissolved in the same month. Officers above captain were sent to the Biet Dong Quan; the best of the remaining officers and men were selected for a new STD unit, the Special Mission Service. At the same time 81 Airborne Ranger Battalion was expanded into 81 Airborne Ranger Group consisting of one Headquarters Company, one Recon Company and seven Exploitation Companies. The Group was put under the direct control of the JGS as a general reserve force.

During 1970 the Liaison Service had staged numerous cross border missions into Cambodia in support of major external sweeps by the US and South Vietnamese forces against Communist sanctuaries. Early the following year the Service sent three recon teams into the 'Laotian Panhandle' two weeks before the ARVN's February Lam Son 719incursion.

In February 1971 the STD underwent major reorganization in accordance with Vietnamization and its anticipated increase in special operations responsibilities. Headquartered in Saigon, STD command was given to Col. Doan Van Nu, an ARVN airborne officer and former military attache to Taiwan. As STD commander, and a non voting member of the South Vietnamese National Security Council, Nu took orders only from President Nguyen Van Thieu and the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam JGS.

The expanded STD consisted of a headquarters, a training center, three support services and six combat services. The training center was located at Camp Yen The in Long Thanh: Yen The, significantly, was the name of a resistance movement in northern Vietnam during the 11th century. Airborne instruction was conducted at the ARVN Airborne Division's Camp Ap Don at Tan Son Nhut. The three support services were Administration & Logistics; Operations & Intelligence; and Psychological Warfare, which ran the 'Vietnam Motherland', 'Voice of Liberty', and 'Patriotic Front of the Sacred Sword' clandestine radio stations. The combat services were the Liaison Service (Loi Ho), the Special Mission Service (Hac Long), Group 11, Group 68, The Air Support Service and the Coastal Security Service.

The Liaison Service (So lien Lac), commanded by a colonel in Saigon, was composed of experienced Loi Ho recon commandos divided among Task Force I (Da Nang), Task Force 2 (Kontum) and Task Force 3 (Ban Me thuot).

The Special Mission Service - SMS (So Cong Tac), also commanded by a Colonel, was headquartered at Camp Son Tra in Da Nang. It remained in training under US auspices from February 1971 until January 1972. Unlike the shorter duration raid and recon missions performed by the Liaison Service, the SMS was tasked with longer missions into North Vietnam and Laos. It was initially composed of Groups 71, 72 and 75, with the first two headquartered at separate camps at Da Nang. Group 75 was headquartered at Plei Ku in the former LLDB B Co. barracks, with one detachment at Kom Tum to provide a strike force for operations in Cambodia and inside South Vietnam.

Group 11, an airborne infiltration unit based at Da Nang, and Group 68, headquartered in Saigon with detachments at Kom Tum, was soon integrated under SMS command. Group 68 ran airborne trained rallier and agent units, including 'Earth Angels' (NVA ralliers) and 'Pike Hill' teams (Cambodian disguised as Khmer Communists). A typical Earth Angel operation took place on 15 December 1971, when a team was inserted by US aircraft on a reconnaissance mission into Mondolkiri Province, Cambodia. Pike Hill operations were focused in the same region, including a seven man POW recovery team dropped into Ba Kev, Cambodia, on 12 February 1971. Pike Hill operations even extended into Laos, e.g. the four man Pike Hill team parachuted onto the edge of the Bolovens Plateau on 28 December 1971, where it reported on enemy logistics traffic for almost two months. Pike Hill operations peaked in November 1972 when two teams were inserted by C-130 Blackbird aircraft flying at 250 feet north of Kompong Trach, Cambodia. Information from one of these teams resulted in 48 B-52 strikes within one day.

The STD's Air Support Service consisted of 219 'King Bee' Helicopter Squadron, the 114 Observation Sqn., and C-47 transportation elements. The King Bees, originally outfitted with aging H34s, were re-equipped with UH-1 Hueys in 1972. The C-47 fleet was augmented by two C-123 transports and one C-130 Blackbird in the same year. All were based at Nha Trang.

The Easter Offensive 1972

During the 1972 Easter Offensive the combat arms of the STD saw heavy action while performing recon and forward air guide operations. Meanwhile, 81 Airborne Ranger Group was tasked with reinforcing besieged An Loc. The Group was heli lifted into the southern edge of the city in April, and the Airborne Rangers walked north to form the first line of defense against the North Vietnamese. After a month of brutal fighting and heavy losses, the siege was lifted. A monument was later built by the people of An Loc in appreciation of the Group's sacrifices.

In October 1972, the SMS was given responsibility for the tactical footage between Hue and the Lao border. In early 1973 US advisors were withdrawn. The Air Support Service soon proved unable to make up for missing US logistical support, sharply reducing the number of STD external missions. STD personnel, as well as Lien Doan Nguoi Nhai SEALS, were increasingly pulled into President Thieu's Office for special assignments. Later in the year the Liaison Service's Task Force 1, 2 and 3 were redesignated Groups 1, 2 and 3; and Camp Yen The was renamed Camp Quyet Thang ('Must Win'.)

Following a brief respite in the wake of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, the STD was back in action against encroaching NVA elements in the countryside. In September 1973 two Liaison Service Loi Ho recon teams were inserted by helicopter into Plei Djereng, a key garrison blocking the NVA infiltration corridor down the Western highlands. They were unsuccessful in rallying the defenders after an NVA attack, however. In late 1974 the NVA increased their pressure; especially hard hit was the provincial capital of Phuoc Long in Military Region 3. After several weeks of NVA tank, artillery and infantry attacks the Phuoc Long defense started to crack. In an effort to save the city the government ordered 81 Airborne Ranger Group to reinforce the southern perimeter. After two days of weather delays one company was heli lifted east of the city on the morning of 5 January 1975; and by early afternoon over 250 Airborne Rangers were in Phuoc Long. After a day of relentless NVA assaults most of the original garrison fled; contact was lost with the Airborne Rangers as the NVA began to overwhelm the city. Early the next day Aiborne Rangers stragglers were spotted north of the city. A four day search eventually retrieved some 50 percent survivors.

By March 1975 the NVA had increased pressure on the Central Highlands, prompting Saigon to begin a strategic redeployment from the western half of II Corps. Although the Liaison Service's Groups 2 and 3 provided security for the withdrawing masses the redeployment soon turned into a rout. In the hasty withdrawal Group 2 had forgotten two recon teams in Cambodia; these later walked the entire distance back to the Vietnamese coast. After the fall of the Central Highlands government forces in I Corps began to panic, sparking an exodus to the south. In the confusion Group I of the Liaison Service attempted to provide security for the sealift to Saigon. Meanwhile, the SMS boarded boats on 30 March for Vung Tau.

With the entire northern half of the country lost, Saigon attempted to regroup its forces. 81 Airborne Ranger Group, which had arrived from II Corps in a state of disarray, was refitted at Vung Tau. The Liaison Service was posted in Saigon, with Groups I and 3 reinforcing Bien Hoa and Group 2 protecting the fuel depots. The SMS also reformed in Saigon.

On 6 April 1975 Special Mission Service recon teams sent northeast and northwest of Phan Rang discovered elements of two North Vietnamese divisions massing on the city. An additional 100 SMS commandos were flown in as re-inforcements, but were captured at the airport as the North Vietnamese overran Phan Rang. A second tak force of 40 Loi Ho commandos was infiltrated into Tay Ninh to attack an NVA command post; the force was intercepted and only two men escaped. By mid April 81 Airborne Ranger Group was put under the operational control of 18th Division and sent to Xuan Loc, where the unit was smashed. The remnants were pulled back to defend Saigon. By the final days of April the NVA had surrounded the capital. Along with other high officials, STD Commander Doan Van Nu escaped by plane on 27 April. On the next day 500 SMS commandos and STD HQ personnel commandeered a barge and escaped into international waters. The remainder of the Liaison Service fought until capitulation on 30 April.

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

NAVAL SPECIAL FORCES

In 1960 the South Vietnamese Navy proposed the creation of an Underwater Demolitions Team to improve protection of ships, piers and bridges. Later in the year a navy contingent was sent to Taiwan for UDT training; the one officer and seven men who completed the course became the cadre for a Lien Doi Nguoi Nhai (LDNN), or Frogman Unit, formally established in July 1961. The LDNN, with a proposed strength of 48 officers and men, was given the mission of salvage, obstacle removal, pier protection and special amphibious operations.

Soon after the creation of the LDNN a second unit was formed: Biet Hai,or 'Special Sea Force', paramilitary commandos under the operational control of Diem's Presidential Liaison Office and given responsibility for amphibious operations against North Vietnam. US Navy SEAL (Sea, Air and Land) commando teams began deploying to South Vietnam in February 1962 and initiated in March a six month course for the first Biet Hai cadre in airborne, reconnaissance and guerrilla warfare training. By October, 62 men had graduated from the firstcycle. A planned second contingent was denied funding.

In early 1964 the LDNN, numbering only one officer and 41 men, began special operations against VC seabome infiltration attempts. Six Communist junks were destroyed by the LDNN at Ilo Ilo Island in January during Operation 'Sea Dog'. During the following month the LDNN began to be used against North Vietnamese targets as part of Operation Plan 34A, a covert action program designed to pressure the Ha Noi regime.

In February a team unsuccessfully attempted to sabotage a North Vietnamese ferry on Cape Ron and Swatow patrol craft at Quang Khe. Missions to destroy the Route I bridges below the 18th Parallel were twice aborted. In March most of the LDNN was transferred to Da Nang and colocated with the remaining Biet Hai commandos. During May North Vietnam operations resumed by LDNN teams working with newly trained Biet Hai boat crews. On 27 May they scored their first success with the capture of a North Vietnamese junk. On 30 June a team landed on the North Vietnamese coast near a reservoir pump house. Ile team was discovered and a hand to hand fight ensued; two LDNN commandos lost their lives and three 57mm recoiless rifles were abandoned, but 22 North Vietnamese were killed and the pump house was destroyed.

In July a second class of 60 LDNN candidates was selected and began training in Nha Trang during September. Training lasted 16 weeks, and included a 'Hell Week' in which students were required to paddle a boat 115 miles, run 75 miles, carry a boat for 21 miles and swim 10 miles. During the training cycle team members salvaged a sunken landing craft at Nha Trang and a downed aircraft in Binh Duong Province. Thirty-three men completed the course in January 1965 and were based at Vung Tau under the direct control of the Vietnamese Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations).

In 1965 the LDNN was given responsibility for amphibious special operations in South Vietnam. Maritime operations against North Vietnam were given exclusively to the Da Nang based Biet Haicommandos and Hai Tuanboat crews, both incorporated into the new seaborne component of the STD, the So Phong Ve Duyen Hai (Coastal Security Service or CSS). The CSS, a joint services unit, was headed by an Army lieutenant colonel until 1966, then by a Navy commander. CSS missions focused almost entirely on short duration sabotage operations lasting one night, and had a high success rate. The CSS relied heavily on special operations teams temporarily seconded from other services. Teams on loan from the Vietnamese Navy considered most effective, were codenamed 'Vega'. Other teams came from the Vietnamese Marine Corps ('Romulus') and Army ('Nimbus'). The CSS also controlled 40 civilian agents ('Cumulus') until the mid 1960s. Unofficialy, the term Biet Hai was used for all CSS forces, regardless of original service affiliation. CSS training was conducted at Da Nang under the auspices of US Navy SEAL, US Marine, and Vietnamese advisors. Further support was provided by the CSS's Da Nang based US counterpart, the Naval Advisory Detachment, a component of MACVSOG.

By the mid 1960s US Navy SEAL teams were being rotated regularly through South Vietnam on combat tours. Specialists in raids, amphibious reconnaissance and neutralization operations against the VC infrastructure, the SEALs worked closely with the LDNN and began qualifying Vietnamese personnel in basic SEAL tactics. In November 1966 a small cadre of LDNN were brought to Subic Bay in the Philippines for more intensive SEAL training.

In 1967 a third LDNN class numbering over 400 were selected for SEAL training at Vung Tau. Only 27 students finished the one year course and were kept as a separate Hai Kich ('Special Sea Unit,' the Vietnamese term for SEAL) unit within the LDNN. Shortly after their graduation the Communists launched the Tet Offensive most of the LDNN SEALs were moved to Cam Ranh Bay, where a fourth LDNN class began training during 1968. During the year the Vietnamese SEALs operated closely with the US Navy SEALS. The LDNN SEAL Team maintained its focus on operations within South Vietnam, although some missions did extend into Cambodia. Some missions used parachute infiltration.


LDNN after Tet

In 1971, in accordance with increased operational responsibilities under the Vietnamization program, the LDNN was expanded to the Lien Doan Nguoi Nhai (LDNN), or Frogman Group, comprising a SEAL Team, Underwater Demolitions Team, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team and Boat Support Team. Headquarters remained in Saigon. For the remainder of 1971 the SEALs operated in 12 18-man detachments on neutralization operations and raids inside South Vietnam. SEAL launch sites included Ho Anh, north of Da Nang, Hue and Tinh An.

During the 1972 Easter Offensive the SEALs were transferred to Hue to conduct operations against NVA forces holding Quang Tri; after Quang Tri was retaken some of the SEALs went to Quang Ngai to resume VC neutralization operations. After US Navy SEAL advisors were withdrawn in late 1972 the LDNN SEAL Team, now 200 strong, took over training facilities at Cam Ranh Bay; training, however, was cut in half, with only one fifth given airborne training. The SEALs had been augmented by ten graduates out of 21 LDNN officer candidates sent to the US for SEAL training in 1971.

When the Vietnam ceasefire went into effect in 1973 the SEALs returned to LDNN Headquarters in Saigon. At the same time the CSS was dissolved, with the Navy contingent given the option of transferring to the LDNN.

In late December 1973 the government reiterated its territorial claim to the Paracel Island chain off its coast and dispatched a small garrison of militia to occupy the islands. By early January 1974 the Chinese, who also claimed the islands, had sent a naval task force to retake.the Paracels. On 17 January 30 LDNN SEALs were infiltrated on to the western shores of one of the major islands to confront a Chinese landing party. The Chinese had already departed; but two days later, after SEALs landed on a nearby island, Chinese forces attacked with gunboats and naval infantry. Two SEALs died and the rest were taken prisoner and later repatriated.

During the final days of South Vietnam a 50 man SEAL detachment was sent to Long An; the remainder were kept at LDNN Headquarters in Saigon along with 200 new SEAL trainees. During the early evening of 29 April all SEAL dependents boarded LDNN UDT boats and left Saigon; a few hours later the SEALs departed the capital, linked up with the UDT boats, and were picked up by the US 7th Fleet in international waters.

http://ngothelinh.topcities.com/History.html

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004

haze99
04-05-2004, 09:07 AM
Thank you hist2004, this is the history that needs to be written down for future generations. And not to mention, future special operations operators!
This was a unique war with unique fighting tactics. Again, much appriecated!
In 1997, I purchased John Plaster's (USAR Major, Retired) book, SOG.
Very shocking and informative! It covered the operations performed by the MAC-V-SOG Recon Teams. Your story by Sat Cong sounded just the same as some of Maj Plaster's!

Well, the RVN had an equivlent to the SEALs and SF. Did they (RVN) have a Marine Force Recon? Did the USAF train any RVN Combat Control or Para-Rescue style forces?

hist2004
04-05-2004, 09:45 AM
Thank you hist2004, this is the history that needs to be written down for future generations. And not to mention, future special operations operators!
This was a unique war with unique fighting tactics. Again, much appriecated!
In 1997, I purchased John Plaster's (USAR Major, Retired) book, SOG.
Very shocking and informative! It covered the operations performed by the MAC-V-SOG Recon Teams. Your story by Sat Cong sounded just the same as some of Maj Plaster's!

Well, the RVN had an equivlent to the SEALs and SF. Did they (RVN) have a Marine Force Recon? Did the USAF train any RVN Combat Control or Para-Rescue style forces?

I have both books by John Plaster, but I’ve known about MACV-SOG since Shelby Stanton wrote about it years before. ARVN didn’t have a force
Recon equivalent, but did have some elite marine infantry. There were no ARVN CCT or Pararescue units. Most of the special operations capability
was what was grown through US Army SF- Strategic Technical Directorate, Special Mission Service, and the US Navy created LDNN’s.
ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) also had other special warfare units, STRATA Teams (Short-Term Target and Acquisition), Earth Angel,
Singleton, and of course the PRU (Provincial Reconnaissance Units) that were part of the Phoenix Program.
There were also “Kit Carson Scouts” and the Chu Hoi (Open Arms) program that basically recruited EX-VC and NVA to work with both US Army
and Navy SF.
ARVN also had Rangers and some elite airborne units. I know that ARVN had a bad reputation overall, but when properly led, they were
every bit the equivalent of the forces they fought against.

I have a MACV-SOG story that isn’t mention in either of Plaster’s books, but I’m sure you’d be interested in reading. It will take me some
time to type it up, so I’ll be working on that for a future post. It will be titled “Special Operations Group”

Regards & Thanks,
Hist2004