Arab Casualties in Israeli wars

[born_to_kill]

http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/casualties.html

[army cadet_ngcsu]

LOL, the arabs are pretty shabby at modern warfare....

[born_to_kill]

especially how they outnumbered us so much and there technology was so much more advanced then ours in 1948 AND 1967, i think trainign wins wars not technoology. The egyptians alone were armed by the most state of the art russian technology, the USA only started helping israel during and after 1973 in which we almost lost

[Marmot1]

but only israeli are actual ones rest is estimated and from history I know that estimates vary depending who is estimationg... also combat forces are overal values not actual forces involved in combat. (well for israel it is actual one but i.e for iraq only part of their armed foces were involved in combat

[M_S]

It seems like the arab nations could easily have overwhelmed israel.

They could have sent a sovjet stile massive attack.

The casualty procentege of both sides is very small, why didnt the arabs continue attacking in say 1973?

[UkrainianAmerican]

It seems like the arab nations could easily have overwhelmed israel.

They could have sent a sovjet stile massive attack.

The casualty procentege of both sides is very small, why didnt the arabs continue attacking in say 1973?
Cuz they are pants-****ting pussies.
That is all.

[S'13]

It seems like the arab nations could easily have overwhelmed israel.

However they never did manage to do so, strange don't you think? ;)


They could have sent a sovjet stile massive attack.

They did this in 1973 but it didn't really help them...


The casualty procentege of both sides is very small, why didnt the arabs continue attacking in say 1973?

Because the IDF destroyed their ability to attack...
The IDF did this by pushin the Syrian forces back beyond the 1967 frontier and stoping the advancement only 40 km from Damascus (well within the range of IDF artillery), also 1,150 out of the 1,650 tanks that the Syrians had prior to the war were destroyed.
The Egyptian forces in the Sinai peninsula were halted and the IDF was on the west bank of the Suez Canal and only 100 km from Cairo. Also over 45,000 Egyptian soldiers of the Third Army were surrounded and encircled by the IDF.
How could they keep on fighting?

[M_S]

Well, if the 1973 war continued then the war would have got much more bloody.

I make this conclusion on the fact that the israeli army had to enter those capitals and that countries like iraq and maybe iran would have sent troops and material.

Considering israels human resources israel wouldnt be able to keep such vast areas

In those days there were no "smart weapons" and the fighting would had looked like stalingrad..? or something like that.

I think that israel at that time wasnt able to completely defeat the arab nations and at the same time the arab nations weren't able to invade israel.

[S'13]

Well, if the 1973 war continued then the war would have got much more bloody.

I make this conclusion on the fact that the israeli army had to enter those capitals and that countries like iraq and maybe iran would have sent troops and material.

The IDF didn't need to enter the Arab capitals, if it did it would have done so.

Iraq did send forces to aid Syria and Egypt. It sent a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war itself, Iraq sent a division of 18,000 men and a few hundred tanks, which were deployed in the central Golan, these forces, including some of Iraq's MiG fighter aircraft, did play a role in the war.

As for Iran joining the fight, I highly doubt this since the Shah was very friendly with the west, even with Israel.


Considering israels human resources israel wouldnt be able to keep such vast areas

Israel takes this fact into consideration and that's why it never took over vast areas.


In those days there were no "smart weapons" and the fighting would had looked like stalingrad..? or something like that.

Israeli soldiers who took part in the fighting in the Egyptian city of Suez which was on the west bank of the canal did say the fighting there was like a Stalingrad situation.


I think that israel at that time wasnt able to completely defeat the arab nations and at the same time the arab nations weren't able to invade israel.

What do you mean by "completely defeating the Arab nations", taking over a Arab country? p-) :lol:

[Mr. Nielsen]

[quote]I think that israel at that time wasnt able to completely defeat the arab nations and at the same time the arab nations weren't able to invade israel.

Perhaps it's a bit academic as the situation can't be looked at out of context of the cold war. If Israel was able to capture Damascus, the Soviet Union wouldn't allow it. If the Syrians were able to overrun Israel, the US wouldn't allow that either.

[IDFM203]

Considering israels human resources israel wouldnt be able to keep such vast areasPerhaps but Israel has never had any intention in the first place to go after those areas or even wants those places.




In those days there were no "smart weapons" and the fighting would had looked like stalingrad..? or something like that.

I think that israel at that time wasnt able to completely defeat the arab nationsI disagree for yes it could have but it chose not to.

Hell the Arab armies were defeated by Israel and NOTHING militarily stopped Israel from doing anything that it wanted to if it so chose to (again I speak only in a military realm)

But it did not for Israel had not/nor ever had any intentions to fight for anything else other then mere self defense, unlike our adversaries whose stated goals were to annihilate us




If the Syrians were able to overrun Israel, the US wouldn't allow that either. I am not sure that they could have done anything if indeed Syria had broken through.

I don’t remember who, but some Israeli ( I believe it was Golada Mair) who said something to the effect, that by the time a call came to the U.S. to send troops, it would be too late.

In other words if Syria had broken through (and it came very close to doiing so before Israel pushed them back) even if the U.S. would send in troops (which is a big IF) it wouldnt matter for it would be too late by the time any got here.

As for other methods like acting against Syria’s patriarch like Russia, well I too doubt that for I cant see the U.S. risking a nuclear war over Israel (that’s just my POV).

Shalom :D

____________________________________________________

"If the Palestinians/Arabs put down their weapons today, there would be no more violence. If the Israelis put down their weapons today, there would be no more Israel"!! (Or to put it more bluntly..” if the military capabilities of Israel and the palestinians/Arabs were reversed, all Israelis would be killed in a matter of 24 hours or less”)

[ALBANIA]

Gretaest respect for Israel, but if USA didn't help them, I don't know how the war would finish.
And we must reknow, that Israeli was very much more motivated, as they were fighting for their own survive. No choice fro Israeli, fight and win!

[Mr. Nielsen]

I don’t remember who, but some Israeli ( I believe it was Golada Mair) who said something to the effect, that by the time a call came to the U.S. to send troops, it would be too late

Perhaps. But would it be the end of Israel? Having Syrian armor columns rampaging down the coast road would surely be messy. But they would still need time and supplies to really make irreversible facts on the ground.



In other words if Syria had broken through (and it came very close to doiing so before Israel pushed them back) even if the U.S. would send in troops (which is a big IF) it wouldnt matter for it would be too late by the time any got here.

I was thinking more in terms of the US convincing, the USSR to convince the Syrians not move on from the plateau.



As for other methods like acting against Syria’s patriarch like Russia, well I too doubt that for I cant see the U.S. risking a nuclear war over Israel (that’s just my POV).

None the less, the US put their nukes on high alert in response to USSR threathening to move it's paratroop divisions into the middle east.

[Vance]

It seems like the arab nations could easily have overwhelmed israel.

They could have sent a sovjet stile massive attack.

The casualty procentege of both sides is very small, why didnt the arabs continue attacking in say 1973?
Cuz they are pants-****ting pussies.
That is all.

[MaDuce]

To much praying to little training.

[S'13]

Gretaest respect for Israel, but if USA didn't help them, I don't know how the war would finish.


If your refering to the airlift made by the U.S to Israel I fully agree with you.
Same could be said about the support and supplies the U.S sent to Great Britain in the Second World War (prior to the their entry).
Also the U.S airlift to Israel was made after the USSR had sent its own airlift to Egypt and Syria.

[IDFM203]

”
I don’t remember who, but some Israeli ( I believe it was Golada Mair) who said something to the effect, that by the time a call came to the U.S. to send troops, it would be too late”

Perhaps. But would it be the end of Israel? Having Syrian armor columns rampaging down the coast road would surely be messy. But they would still need time and supplies to really make irreversible facts on the ground. yes it would be the end of Israel for if they broke through (again which they came very close to doing) because of the small size of Israel, all what you said can certainly happen in a fast time before any outside intervention can take place (if indeed that would ever happen, which in itself is highly debatable and most probably highly unlikely)



In other words if Syria had broken through (and it came very close to doiing so before Israel pushed them back) even if the U.S. would send in troops (which is a big IF) it wouldnt matter for it would be too late by the time any got here.

I was thinking more in terms of the US convincing, the USSR to convince the Syrians not move on from the plateau. well I cant see how they would do that for the USSR backed Syria and Syria goals was for all of Israel as well as Egypt, iraq etc was that as well….

So if they broke through as planned, well things would have moved too quickly and as planned, for any U.S. efforts to stop it even diplomatically.


As for other methods like acting against Syria’s patriarch like Russia, well I too doubt that for I cant see the U.S. risking a nuclear war over Israel (that’s just my POV).

None the less, the US put their nukes on high alert in response to USSR threathening to move it's paratroop divisions into the middle east.yes all that was merely posturing with no real intentions to actually act.

I think we might disagree with this, but my POV is that if indeed Syria had broken through, they would have gone through unopposed without the U.S acting against the USSR to force them to stop them



Gretaest respect for Israel, but if USA didn't help them, I don't know how the war would finish.


If your refering to the airlift made by the U.S to Israel I fully agree with you.
. I am happy you agree with him ;) for I don’t but I do recognize that it is a debatable position as your agreement shows.

I say debatable for some historians as well as military historians recognize that by the time the airlift came about, Israel had already turned the tide and while the airlift was certainly appreciated it didn’t save Israel for it came after the tide was turned in Israel’s favor.

Shalom :D

[MEGR]

Well God said in the good book that anyone who attacks Israel will get cut to peaces... I believe that.

[Flagg]

the USA only started helping israel during and after 1973 in which we almost lost

Incorrect......Israel had already procured and fielded, with US assistance, F4 Phantoms, A4 Skyhawks, helicopters, munitions, etc. since the late 1960's.

[IDFM203]

the USA only started helping israel during and after 1973 in which we almost lost

Incorrect......Israel had already procured and fielded, with US assistance, F4 Phantoms, A4 Skyhawks, helicopters, munitions, etc. since the late 1960's.Just to be clear, I didn’t write that above incorrect statement

And yes you are correct Flagg, the U.S. started to help out only AFTER the 1967 six-day war was over.

So it was indeed in the late 60’s but I just want to be clear on when in the late sixties it was.

Shalom :D

[Flagg]

Just to be clear, I didn’t write that above incorrect statement

And yes you are correct Flagg, the U.S. started to help out only AFTER the 1967 six-day war was over.

So it was indeed in the late 60’s but I just want to be clear on when in the late sixties it was.

Agreed......actually I was responding to born_to_kill's post

I think the US began OVERTLY supplying/helping/etc soon after the French turned their backs on Israel...interesting time....I think I recall a story around that time frame where a bunch of Israeli sailors "stole" french made missile boats Israel had paid for, but france had refused to deliver...too funny

[S'13]

[quote]

I think the US began OVERTLY supplying/helping/etc soon after the French turned their backs on Israel...interesting time....I think I recall a story around that time frame where a bunch of Israeli sailors "stole" french made missile boats Israel had paid for, but france had refused to deliver...too funny

Yes, the Cherbourg Boats :)

Here is an article I had already brought about this event.


The Cherbourg Boats
By Doron Geller

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The story of the "stealing" of the five Israeli missile boats - which had already been paid for - from the French shipyard of Cherbourg at the end of 1969 is one of great daring, resourcefulness, drama, and ingenuity. Few condemned Israel in the world arena at that time - the massive condemnation Israel was to endure in the world arena came mainly in the wake of Israel's victory in the 1973 War.

The Cherbourg boats were, in Israeli military thinking, essential for the modernization of her navy and the security of the state. The point was vividly brought home one day in October 1967 - a few months after Israel's lightning victory in June.

It was a Saturday, at 5:20 p.m., and the War of Attrition was already in full gear (although the worst fighting occurred in 1969-70). Israeli Brigadier-General Alex Argov was captain of an Israeli-converted vintage World War II British Destroyer, formerly known by the British as HMS Zealous. During World War II the ship "had accompanied British convoys to Russia bearing vital wartime supplies over one of the stretches of water in the war to assist Russia" to survive their common enemy after June 1941, Hitler's Germany. In the 1940's HMS Zealous was a formidable ship. The Israelis had purchased her and renamed the ship the Eilat.

If the Israeli Navy had been debating whether to upgrade her fleet or not, the events of October 21, 1967 definitely influenced her thinking. On that day, as the Eilat was 14 miles off of Egypt's Port Said, two Russian-built Egyptian missile boats lay in wait armed with Styx missiles. The Egyptians had been tracking the Eilat all day with Russian advisers aboard. Only when the Russians were convinced that they could hit the Eilat did they permit the Egyptian seamen to fire on the Israeli ship.

Brigadier-General Argov had to make a quick decision as "Something in the sky caught his eye and he looked up. Two balls of fire hung momentarily at their zenith high on the horizon before making what appeared to be a slow descent down into the Mediterranean." Captain Argov knew he was looking at incoming missiles and with "a sickening sense of dread pressed the general alarm." There were 191 Israeli officers and men aboard the ship, and they began firing at will. It was useless. The two missiles struck the Eilat and nearly split the ship in two. The men struggled to keep the ship seaworthy for the next two hours, increasingly to little avail. Two hours later another missile hit the ship.

Captain Argov gave the order to abandon ship. A fourth and last missile fired at the ship hit the water, and the underwater shock waves injured many of the survivors.

Somehow, of the 190 sailors aboard the Eilat, 152 survived. Of them, 41 were wounded. Forty-seven Israeli sailors were killed.

The sinking of the Eilat was not highly publicized at the time, for reasons of prestige, but its impact was enormous. It galvanized the Israeli Navy into seeking out more and better naval craft, more suited to the modern conditions of missile combat. The day of the great warship - for the Israelis at least (but not for the Great Powers) - was over. Israel would be looking for small and efficient ships able to patrol her shores and undertake offshore operations at high speed, while at the same time able to evade enemy tracking and missiles as much as possible. The new ships would also have to have more offensive capabilities than they previously had - namely, the new generation of ships would need to be equipped with missiles.

The West had few boats of the kind Israel was looking for, "so the Israelis began designing their own boats. These were to be fast and maneuverable, and packed full of on-board instrumentation." The boats were originally supposed to be built in Germany, and indeed production did begin. The Germans were already building the most advanced missile craft until then, called the Jaguar, and the Israelis thought it could be a good match. Israel was also developing her Gabriel missile, which would be perfect for the fast-moving Jaguar missile boats. "The Gabriel missile had an advantage over its Soviet counterparts in its ability to fly low over the sea after launching, and thus avoid detection by radar."

Accordingly, in late 1962 Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion sent Deputy Defense Minister Shimon Peres to Germany, "where he met Chancellor Adenauer. Adenauer had agreed to supply Israel with arms as part of an attempt to make reparations for Germany's crimes against world Jewry, and now he signed an agreement as requested to supply Israel with twelve of the Jaguar vessels." They were to be built in German shipyards but Adenauer asked that the deal remain secret, so as not to incur the wrath of Arab countries should they find out.

By the end of 1964 three of the twelve missile boats had been built and delivered from Germany to Israel. But a German member of the government leaked news of the deal to the New York Times at that time. He apparently still harbored Nazi sympathies and did not wish to help Israel.

When the news appeared the Arabs were enraged, and Germany caved in to Arab threats of economic sanctions, and even a boycott, of German goods.

The Germans, however, agreed that the boats could be constructed elsewhere. The Israelis gave the work to Cherbourg shipyards in the southern coast of France. Thus there was little damage incurred by the German renunciation of their agreement to build the boats, other than a lingering feeling that the Germans should have been more considerate of Israeli sensibilities than Arab ones.

In the mid 1960's the French were supplying Israel with perhaps three quarters of Israel's arms. It made good sense to work with the French, and it also gave a boost to Cherbourg's under-employed work force. For the time being everyone was happy.

The Cherbourg shipyard workers had little experience of building ships of this kind, but with the German designs and the Israelis on hand, they were able to begin construction of the ships. The Gabriel missiles were being built simultaneously in Israel - and they would cost more than the ships themselves.

Within a few months "over 200 Israelis were living and working in the port town of Cherbourg." Many of them were French speakers - often Israelis who were born in and emigrated from the French provinces of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. The Israelis, with linguistic and cultural affinity with their French hosts, fitted into their surroundings smoothly.

Brigadier General Mordecai Limon oversaw the Cherbourg Project. Limon had served in the Palmach during World War II, and later served in the British Army, where both Palestinian Jews and the British temporarily found a confluence of interests. After the war ended in 1945, Limon participated in the Haganah's naval group running the British blockade of Palestine. He was involved in many daring and courageous operations, and by 1950, when he was only 26, he was "made commander-in-chief of Israel's…navy." Four years later he left the navy in order to study for a Business Degree at Columbia University in New York. With a business background now under his belt, he "played a vital role in Israel's attempts to modernize its armed forces in the late 50's and early 60's."

The first boat to leave Cherbourg did so in April 1967 (it was the fourth ship overall to arrive in Israel, including the three ships delivered from Germany already), and the second left about a month later.

These boats arrived too late to be armed and of use during the Six-Day War of June 1967. But that was inconsequential. An event was to occur soon after with much greater implications. On June 2, 1967, just a few days before Israel's preemptive strike on Egyptian airfields on June 5, 1967, French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle declared that France would no longer supply weapons of "offensive nature" to the Middle East - which basically meant Israel. On the eve of war, Israel was cut suddenly cut off from her major source of arms.

This event may have hastened Israel's decision to make a preemptive strike, in that a hoped-for quick end to the war would not obviate the need for spare parts and a resupply of weapons from the French - which would not be forthcoming.

Mordecai Limon headed an Israeli delegation to Paris "which argued furiously with the (French) government in an effort to get them to honor their commitments." But the French would not. With the end of the war with Algeria and the French withdrawal from her former Arabic-speaking provinces in North Africa a few short years before the 1967 War, France was interested in rebuilding her relations with Arab states and assuring a free supply of oil and economic concessions in the Middle East. Israel only figured into their calculations negatively.

But no one seemed to have noticed the embargo in Cherbourg. Two more boats sailed for Israel in the Fall of 1967. But things took a turn for the worse. On December 26, 1967, Palestinians attacked an Israeli aircraft at Athens airport. In retaliation, two days later Israeli commandos attacked Beirut airport and blew up 13 Lebanese aircraft on the ground.

French Premier de Gaulle was enraged. He "declared that the French arms embargo would now be total." This meant the Cherbourg boats too.

Mordecai Limon immediately sent Defense Minister Moshe Dayan news of the total embargo. Dayan was one of the many who were deeply disappointed by the change of relations between de Gaulle and Israel. In the 1950's, Dayan had agreed with Ben-Gurion when he called de Gaulle "'a true friend, a true ally.'" De Gaulle "had sent Dayan a personal letter of congratulations on his book The Sinai Campaign 1956."

Now de Gaulle was refusing to remove the embargo from the boats that had already been paid for by Israel.

Three more missile boats were almost complete in Cherbourg Harbor. On January 4, 1969, a week after de Gaulle made news with his announcement of the complete embargo on weapons bound for Israel, small crews made their way onto the boats. The Israeli crews spent three hours getting them ready. When all was set, they "raised the Israeli flag and set off. No one challenged them. They simply sailed into the English Channel and never returned."

The French Minister of Defense demanded to know what had become of the ships. Mordecai Limon responded: "'They were given orders to sail to Haifa. They belong to us.'" Prime Minister de Gaulle was furious. So were others in the French Cabinet. But they got little help from the locals in the French coastal town of Cherbourg. "In Cherbourg, naval authorities and customs men simply shrugged their shoulders. By an extraordinary coincidence, no one seemed to have read a newspaper, watched television or listened to a radio during the preceding days. Said one of the local people: 'We did not know anything of the embargo.'" Israel was lucky to have made some firm friends among the local population.

Officials in Cherbourg "claimed that they first heard of the embargo in a letter of instructions received from Paris on (January) 6th - 2 days after the boats had left. They produced documents and a statement from the post office supporting their claims." They said something must have been wrong with the postal service.

While accusations flew between the government in Paris and the locals in Cherbourg, construction continued on the last five missile boats "as if nothing had happened." Still, French naval and customs authorities were bothered by claims of negligence and kept a sharp eye on the last remaining boats.

In the summer of 1969, Mordecai Limon, still in France, "renounced all further Israeli interest in the boats and opened negotiations with regard to compensation." But the Israelis purposely quibbled over details of the negotiations for months. Meanwhile, construction of the boats continued, and an Israeli team remained in Cherbourg.

The Israelis, of course, had no intention of renouncing their boats, and had every every intention of getting them. The question was how to do so - and legally, because Israel did not want to worsen the already aggravated relations between France and herself over the issue.

On the other hand, the War of Attrition was by then in full swing, and the Egyptians had no difficulty in obtaining advanced armaments from the Russians. Meanwhile, 5 missile boats remained in Cherbourg Harbor, and Israeli pre-paid orders for Mirage aircraft went unfulfilled.

Israel decided to get the boats, but in a way the French would not suspect.

In November 1969 a man named Martin Siem came to visit Felix Amiot, the French supervisor of the missile boats in Cherbourg, and expressed an interest in purchasing the boats. He presented himself as a Norwegian shipping owner, who was involved in oil exploration off the coast of Alaska. He claimed his company was based in Panama.

The two quickly closed the deal, and the French government approved it.

Government officials didn't check the deal as clearly as they might have. The Panamanian-based Norwegian firm had in fact only been created a few weeks before. Martin Siem, who was in truth a very big shipping magnate in Norway, was friends with an Israeli shipping magnate named Mila Brenner. Brenner persuaded Siem to work as a front man on behalf of Israel.

It seems quite likely that the French ministerial committee assigned to examine all French arms exports must have contained at least one, if not several, people who were sympathetic to Israel and were willing to help her get the missile boats. This would seem to be so because the cover story Israel used seemed highly improbable. But "there was nothing the Israelis could think of which would make more sense." As Stewart Steven writes: "These were missile boats, and there was no way that fact could be disguised."

But the French were apparently eager to get rid of these boats and their problems quickly, and at the same time they would be paid enough to cover the costs of repaying Israel. Moreover, there was even a clause in the contract that affirmed that the boats could not be re-exported. From the French point of view, this meant the boats would not find their way into Israeli hands.

Young sailors began arriving in Cherbourg. It was explained to the locals that they were Norwegians, part of the team that had purchased the ships, which also explained why so many were blonde-haired and blue-eyed. The fifty or so young men were in fact Israelis, perhaps with backgrounds in Nordic countries, but Israelis nevertheless.

Meanwhile, about 70 other Israelis remained in Cherbourg. No one seemed to question their presence. They even reserved space at a local restaurant for a festive meal on Christmas Eve - so as to give the impression that they weren't going anywhere.

The Mossad plan was to take the boats on Christmas Eve, when all of France would be celebrating and it seemed very unlikely that many people would be paying attention to the goings-on at Cherbourg Harbor.

Cherbourg residents began to get used to the "Norwegians" and the more veteran Israelis as well. Even so, there was some odd behavior a discerning citizen could recognize. As Dennis Eisenberg, Uri Dan, and Eli Landau write in The Mossad: Inside Stories, some locals "noticed that some of the 'Norwegians' were such accomplished linguists that they included Hebrew among their repertoire of languages." The 'Norwegians', as we saw, were really Israelis.

Ezra Kedem, a naval officer who had been involved with the taking of three of the Cherbourg boats in January 1969, was there again in December. He scanned the harbor and the sea beyond with high-powered binoculars. He peered at the two channels used by ships coming to or leaving Cherbourg. The more commonly used western channel was 65 feet deep. The eastern channel was used less often, "not only because it was narrower than the other, but because of the unstable submerged rocks which had accumulated in it for years." The Israelis had used this channel when taking out the three boats in January. Radar was unable to detect every nuance of that channel - a fact Ezra Kedem knew from his conversations with the French authorities.

The Israelis would use the same channel again this time.

By late afternoon, about 20 Israeli sailors were aboard each of the five boats. But a storm had arisen and a strong wind was blowing. These were bad conditions for any ship, but even more so for the missile boats, which were not designed for such conditions. But there was no choice. They had to sail that night.

As the engines started up around 9 p.m., seats reserved for 70 Israelis at the local restaurant we mentioned above remained unfilled, and the meals uneaten.

French Intelligence had noticed the many unwarranted coincidences in the previous few weeks, but either they or their superiors decided not to take action against the Israelis. At some point on the night of December 24/25, 1969, the five missile boats engined their way out of the harbor into the English Channel.

Two men came to watch the last boats leave Cherbourg. One was Mordecai Limon. The other was Felix Amiot, the French supervisor of the construction of the ships at Cherbourg. He had concealed it, but he had known about the Israeli operation from the beginning.

Amiot was not the only one who participated in this "conspiracy of silence." In a "dockside cafe, the barman remarked to customers huddled over their glasses of red wine: 'I see the Norwegians have left for Alaska.' His audience roared with laughter."

On December 26 local and then international news picked up wind of the story. The French government soon knew what had happened and were furious again. But with the boats on the high seas already, they recognized there was little they could do. Nevertheless, the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, did summon two Israeli diplomats to his office in the Quai D'Orsay. He had just returned from a tour of Algeria "where he had promised friendly relations and large supplies of armaments in return for Arab oil." And then the Israelis took the Cherbourg boats. Schumann was sure that the Arabs would see it as French collusion in the matter, and he felt humiliated. He warned the Israeli diplomats that if the boats did show up in Israel, "the consequences will be very grave indeed…"

The Israeli government did not accept direct responsibility at first. The boats did receive attention on the high seas however, as the sailors aboard viewed a myriad of French Mirages flying overhead. Later they encountered American and even Soviet ships. But the boats motored on to Israel unimpeded. As the ships approached the shores of Israel, an escort of Israeli fighter planes accompanied them.

They were safe then, and they were received with public jubilation when they arrived in Israel.

There were repercussions in France. Mordecai Limon, who had lived in France for seven years, was asked to leave. Two French generals were dismissed from their posts for their part in approving the sale of the missile boats to the fictitious Norwegian/Panamanian firm. Felix Amiot was blamed for his part in the affair, but he vigorously defended himself. "'Security is not my problem. My job was to build ships. I got along very well with the Israelis, but as far as I know that is not a crime.'"

The citizens of Cherbourg continued to keep quiet about the whole affair. And their silence - which the French government was well aware of - was a boon to Israel, for without it she may never have gotten the boats of Cherbourg.

[S'13]

Also thanks to the French embargo Israel built this...
http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/israel/pics/kfir-pic10.jpg

http://www.aeronautics.ru/img003/iai-kfir-02.jpg
The IAI Kfir

[Mark_Aspen]

Somewhere along the line this thread deviated. I think the Arabs' problems come back to education and motivation. On top of the Soviet doctrine which discourages flexibility, is the inherent lack of motivation within Arab society as a whole, and within the militaries in general.

What I mean is; what is the cause you're fighting for, and what are the consequences? Does the Jordanian or Syrian conscript fight for Jordan or Syria? Is there an Arab equivalent to mom and apple pie? We know it certainly isn't the Palestinians. Early on Ben Gurion singled out the diffrence.

"Our catastrophe" Ben-Gurion told the IDF General Staff, "is that, as far as we are concerned, defeat is forbidden. Once or twice [the Arabs] can lose; we can defeat Egypt ten times and nothing will happen. [But] if we [let them] defeat us once—it's all over."
Individually the Arab can be as good a fighter as the Israeli, witness the fight at Ammunition Hill in Jerusalem in 1967, or the discipline required to make the Golan assault and canal crossings in 73.
Not to make too much of it, but 73 was a failure of Israeli Military Intel, and of the Israeli psyche. Even a pre-emptive strike wouldn't have changed the outcome of the initial Egyptian assault, all the crossing infrastructure was already in place, and under the SAM umbrella.

[S'13]

What was important prior to the Yom Kippur War was to mobilize reserves.
The initial successes of the Syrian and Egyptain armies was mostly due to the fact that our reserves weren't mobilized.
Just look at the numbers: 1,100 Syrian tanks versus 157 Israeli tanks in the Golan and in the Suez region just 500 Israeli soldiers faced 80,000 Egyptian soldiers.
And when the reserves were mobilized nothing was ready, it was all a big mess, IDF tanks were going on the roads to the front lines with thier caterpillar tracks!
This was due to the failure of the military intelligence and the failure of the PM and the military leadership to make the critical decision to mobilize more forces.

[Mark_Aspen]

And thats part of the point. Had MI not so stubbornly insisted that the Arabs would not / could not go on the offensive, and had the mentality not been so cavalier regarding the Arab capabilities, there would have been more than several plugot on the Golan or along the canal. The emphasis on relying on the reserve call-up indicates that we expected them to "play" by the rules we think they should. Thats what they said about Moked in 67.

[S'13]

The odd thing about the 1973 Yom Kippur War is that most Arabs see it as a victory... :|

[Mr. Nielsen]

The odd thing about the 1973 Yom Kippur War is that most Arabs see it as a victory... :|

If the goal of Syria and Egypt was indeed the total annihilation of Israel, then calling the outcome of the war a victory would be quite comical.

But what if the goal's were less far reaching? Six years before their entire armed forces had been destroyed by Israel. Now to believe they could annihilate Israel only six years later, seems in my eyes a bit ambitious.

At least I believe Egypt had clearly realised this. For one thing, they were quite content with having captured the east bank of Suez. Only when Syria were in serious trouble, did they venture out of the SAM umbrella and into the Sinai, with predictable outcome.

Prior to the 1973 war, no one really took the arabs serious as a fighting force. No one thought they would dare to fight another war for decades. That's why, the egyptian built up was ignored. Why spend a fortune mobilizing the reserves, when the arabs didn't dare fight anyway?

The 1973 war broke the arab perception of Israeli invincibilty, and it broke the status quo.

From that point of view I believe it's possible to understand, why they could be tempted to call the outcome a victory.

[S'13]

The goal of the Egyptians and the Syrians was to recapture the Golan Heights and the Sinai peninsula.
In the end what they got was IDF forces on the west bank of the Suez Canal and only 100 kilometers from Cairo and 40 kilometers from Damascus.

The Arabs probably have a very strange perception of what victory is... :lol:

[IDFM203]

Not to make too much of it, but 73 was a failure of Israeli Military Intel, and of the Israeli psyche. I would have to disagree with this a bit.

While yes there was some "conflict" between Israeli military Intel and the Mossad, for they differed on who knew what before and who insisted what was going to happen, what is quite clear is that Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir both knew well in advance or certainly in enough time in advance to call up and mobilize the reserves etc. and it was their DUTY to make the right decisions and to at least err on the side of caution and they not preempting or at least calling up and mobilizing the reserves IMO due to their fear of the outside (hypocritical and biased) world condemnations (boy when will we ever learn that it makes no difference and our vital security cannot ever be dictated by this outside hostile world) was the real failure more then anything (or any military failure) of that war from Israel’s perspective.



Even a pre-emptive strike wouldn't have changed the outcome of the initial Egyptian assault, all the crossing infrastructure was already in place, and under the SAM umbrella. well firstly even a call up of the reserves and a mobilization of them in place IMO on the Syrian front, it would have made a HUGE difference and on the Egyptian front yes perhaps the crossing of the canal and the bar lev line would have perhaps been achieved regardless, but not much else, and actually perhaps not even that would have happened.

What’s not in doubt is that a preemptive strike or a call up and a mobilization of the reserves in advance would have defiantly made the war shorter and as a result would have saved numerous lives that wouldn’t have been lost if there was this initial actions taken by Israel.


If the goal of Syria and Egypt was indeed the total annihilation of Israel, then calling the outcome of the war a victory would be quite comical.

But what if the goal's were less far reaching? Six years before their entire armed forces had been destroyed by Israel. Now to believe they could annihilate Israel only six years later, seems in my eyes a bit ambitious. key words here are in your eyes.

For yes it is ONLY a western view and more importantly ONLY in SOME western circles and not a wide held view (or at least I hope so) on things that perhaps their goal was just to strike a blow at Israel and for Syria to capture the Golan heights and nothing more.

But that is not true for all their announcements and most of the Arab world were calling for the complete destruction of Israel and they in fact came very close to doing so and breaking through and it is clear that was their goals.


Prior to the 1973 war, no one really took the arabs serious as a fighting force. No one thought they would dare to fight another war for decades. That's why, the egyptian built up was ignored. Why spend a fortune mobilizing the reserves, when the arabs didn't dare fight anyway? Yes and that’s why the Arabs thought that they could destroy Israel this time around.



The 1973 war broke the arab perception of Israeli invincibilty, and it broke the status quo. Well again I think this is ONLY a perception of SOME westerners.

For actually the 1973 war broke the Arab perceptions that they could ever militarily destroy Israel.

Hell that’s why sadat finally signed that “peace deal” and that’s why Syria and others haven’t attacked Israel since the yom kipper war in 1973..


From that point of view I believe it's possible to understand, why they could be tempted to call the outcome a victory. No they call every war they lost a victory ;)

The bottom line is that it was a huge victory for Israel for Israel survived ( which for Israel is the sole barometer on whether a war is a victory or a defeat) and it did NOT lose a inch of land by the wars end.

The Arabs did not meet their goals of destroying Israel nor did they meet their minimum goals (or as some in the west naively believe, it was their main and ONLY goals) of at least getting back the lands lost in the 1967 war and lastly it finally drove home to the Arabs that they could not militarily defeat Israel even after they “surprised” them and had the latest soviet technology etc..

It was a clear defeat but of course the Arabs have to spin it and that is no surprise, what is really surprising and sad is that some in the west need to buy their BS as well (well actually there too it isn’t too surprising ;) )

Shalom :D

[Mark_Aspen]

IDFM... writes:
what is quite clear is that Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir both knew well in advance or certainly in enough time in advance to call up and mobilize the reserves etc.

Unless they have a different source of information, and some of the reports indicate that King Hussein gave them some, then they would have been relying on MI and Mossad data too. They'd already had a partial call up in May of 1973, and then stood down at a cost of 11 million.

That they had the data isn't an issue. Its the conclusions of AMAN and their acceptance, even if reluctantly, by the major players that the Arabs didn't have the political or psychological will to follow through on what they were being seen to train for.

[IDFM203]

IDFM... writes:
what is quite clear is that Moshe Dayan and Golda Meir both knew well in advance or certainly in enough time in advance to call up and mobilize the reserves etc.

Unless they have a different source of information, . No I believe they had a lot of the same.

I mean some in the Mossad clearly were adamant about what was going to happen while indeed in the AMAN they had a different focus.

And that’s normal for there to be some divisions in your intelligence apparatus, however it is the DUTY for the top politicians that are responsible for making the decisions to make the correct and right decisions on this and I believe they did not due…..well I will explain why in my response to your next point.



That they had the data isn't an issue. Its the conclusions of AMAN and their acceptance, even if reluctantly, by the major players that the Arabs didn't have the political or psychological will to follow through on what they were being seen to train for. Well I think we might disagree here a bit.

For I believe that while certainly AMAN dropped the ball on this one, Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan had enough reliable intelligence from others in the intelligence community (like some in the Mossad) to have a good idea of what was coming and they didn’t react not out of any complacency or any feelings that the Arabs werent going to act, but rather like I said before, it was based more on “their fear of the outside (hypocritical and biased) world condemnations and as to not look like the aggressors (boy when will we ever learn that it makes no difference and our vital security cannot ever be dictated by this outside hostile world) which was the real failure more then anything (or any military failure) of that war from Israel’s perspective.

IMO it was more or a political failure then any intelligence or any military failure.

Shalom :D

[born_to_kill]

too many ****in israelis here think they own this place woot

[W(M)D]

The odd thing about the 1973 Yom Kippur War is that most Arabs see it as a victory... :|

They never were too good on the academic front (not really the brightest stars in the sky) and therefore their propaganda machine depicts it for a victory.