TaurunumBoys1987
09-08-2006, 06:17 PM
Copied from Russian-Arms forum:
Russians officials' apparent refusal to join demands that Serbia and Kosovo conclude an international agreement to grant the Albanian-majority province independence by year's end, highlights a thorny issue for Moscow.
Not least because, with the advance of the European Union across Eastern Europe, Serbia is one of the few allies Moscow has left in this region and it does not want to antagonise Belgrade.
But the Kremlin is looking much further than this: it worries about the implications of accepting the principle that ethnic minorities may have the right to form breakaway states.
For seven years, it has fought Chechen rebels over this very issue: the overwhelming majority of inhabitants in this Russian province appear to favour independence, but Russia says such a breakaway can only come by mutual consent.
The Kremlin worries that if Chechnya wins the right to secede, other Caucasian republics may follow. This in turn could lead to other parts of Russia going the same way, not least Tartarstan.
Equally, Russia is presently supporting secessionist republics along its southern peripheries: Russian troops guarantee security in the ethnic Russian enclave of Trans Dnistre in Moldova, as well as in the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And then there is Crimea. This famous peninsular has spent almost all of its frenetic history as part of Russia, and is inhabited by Russians. But in a piece of administrative reorganisation, former Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev gave it to the then-Soviet republic of Ukraine in the 1950s.
The move was cosmetic, but caused consternation in Crimea when, in 1991, the Soviet Union broke up and its administrative republics, including Ukraine, adopted the existing administrative boundaries as their frontiers.
Russia has its key Black Sea bases in Crimea and would dearly love to see it return to Russia, but its wariness about encouraging separatism elsewhere has tempered encouragement of separatists.
There is another aspect to Russia 's lack of enthusiasm for Kosovo independence: alarmed by America 's willingness to invade Iraq, it has become a strong supporter of the powers of the UN Security Council, where it has a veto. The Kremlin is motivated by the need to buttress a collective security mechanism which it feels gives it some control over world affairs.
Hence Moscow 's insistence that one of the UN's guiding principles is observed - that which states that no frontier can be altered without the agreement of both sides.
The fact that the population of Kosovo wants to secede overwhelmingly has no bearing on this idea: for the UN to endorse Kosovo to become a new state, there must be the consent of the Serbs.
Russian officials also point out that under Yugoslavia 's original constitution, only full republics have any possibility of separating - a right most recently exercised by Montenegro in separating from Serbia. Kosovo, as a province within Serbia, was given no such right.
Legally, Russia is on strong ground, but the law is itself flawed. Some commentators compare the separation of one part of a state from another to a divorce - most famously in the so-called Velvet
Divorce that saw the Czechs and Slovaks break from each other in the 1990s.
But for the divorce analogy to be applicable, the partners must have entered into the marriage as free parties. The complaint of Albanians - and Chechens, and South Ossetians and Crimeans for that matter - is that they were never given the choice.
Russia, like other big powers, would rather ignore this point: few large states want to encourage a situation where separatists know they can gain independence from any geographical area if only they agitate hard enough.
But Russia 's position hugely complicates the search for a solution in Kosovo. It will leave Serbs knowing that, if they dig their heels in and refuse to give up what many consider their ancient spiritual home, Russia will back them - if necessary by a veto in the Security Council which would scrap an independence plan.
The reality is that a final agreement with Kosovo is unlikely any time soon. Any Serb leader who signs away this most historic part of the state knows their name will go down in infamy. Even the promise of international aid may not be enough.
Russians officials' apparent refusal to join demands that Serbia and Kosovo conclude an international agreement to grant the Albanian-majority province independence by year's end, highlights a thorny issue for Moscow.
Not least because, with the advance of the European Union across Eastern Europe, Serbia is one of the few allies Moscow has left in this region and it does not want to antagonise Belgrade.
But the Kremlin is looking much further than this: it worries about the implications of accepting the principle that ethnic minorities may have the right to form breakaway states.
For seven years, it has fought Chechen rebels over this very issue: the overwhelming majority of inhabitants in this Russian province appear to favour independence, but Russia says such a breakaway can only come by mutual consent.
The Kremlin worries that if Chechnya wins the right to secede, other Caucasian republics may follow. This in turn could lead to other parts of Russia going the same way, not least Tartarstan.
Equally, Russia is presently supporting secessionist republics along its southern peripheries: Russian troops guarantee security in the ethnic Russian enclave of Trans Dnistre in Moldova, as well as in the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And then there is Crimea. This famous peninsular has spent almost all of its frenetic history as part of Russia, and is inhabited by Russians. But in a piece of administrative reorganisation, former Soviet premier Nikita Krushchev gave it to the then-Soviet republic of Ukraine in the 1950s.
The move was cosmetic, but caused consternation in Crimea when, in 1991, the Soviet Union broke up and its administrative republics, including Ukraine, adopted the existing administrative boundaries as their frontiers.
Russia has its key Black Sea bases in Crimea and would dearly love to see it return to Russia, but its wariness about encouraging separatism elsewhere has tempered encouragement of separatists.
There is another aspect to Russia 's lack of enthusiasm for Kosovo independence: alarmed by America 's willingness to invade Iraq, it has become a strong supporter of the powers of the UN Security Council, where it has a veto. The Kremlin is motivated by the need to buttress a collective security mechanism which it feels gives it some control over world affairs.
Hence Moscow 's insistence that one of the UN's guiding principles is observed - that which states that no frontier can be altered without the agreement of both sides.
The fact that the population of Kosovo wants to secede overwhelmingly has no bearing on this idea: for the UN to endorse Kosovo to become a new state, there must be the consent of the Serbs.
Russian officials also point out that under Yugoslavia 's original constitution, only full republics have any possibility of separating - a right most recently exercised by Montenegro in separating from Serbia. Kosovo, as a province within Serbia, was given no such right.
Legally, Russia is on strong ground, but the law is itself flawed. Some commentators compare the separation of one part of a state from another to a divorce - most famously in the so-called Velvet
Divorce that saw the Czechs and Slovaks break from each other in the 1990s.
But for the divorce analogy to be applicable, the partners must have entered into the marriage as free parties. The complaint of Albanians - and Chechens, and South Ossetians and Crimeans for that matter - is that they were never given the choice.
Russia, like other big powers, would rather ignore this point: few large states want to encourage a situation where separatists know they can gain independence from any geographical area if only they agitate hard enough.
But Russia 's position hugely complicates the search for a solution in Kosovo. It will leave Serbs knowing that, if they dig their heels in and refuse to give up what many consider their ancient spiritual home, Russia will back them - if necessary by a veto in the Security Council which would scrap an independence plan.
The reality is that a final agreement with Kosovo is unlikely any time soon. Any Serb leader who signs away this most historic part of the state knows their name will go down in infamy. Even the promise of international aid may not be enough.