venture160
04-14-2004, 04:00 PM
Dont know if anyone picked this up today, but the CIA knew in 1996 that Osama Bin Laden had sent Al Queda operatives to mogidishu to train and equip fighters on how to fight the american military and down our helicopters, it is also highyl believed that they might have been directly involved in downing of the blackhawks
KERREY: What he said was that Al Qaida was a significant military force. What he said was that Osama bin Laden headed a terrorist organization of his own. He said it was an organization that was far more than a mechanism to raise money for his terrorist financing role. What he said was that this organization was intended to be the foundation for an Islamic army, and it declared the United States as its main enemy long before the public declaration in August of 1996.
What he said was that Osama bin Laden had sent top leaders of its weapons trainers into Somalia to shoot down -- to provide the Somalis with the weapons used to shoot down the U.S. helicopters and train them in how to use them to accomplish exactly they did in October of 1993. What he said was that bin Laden's organization had done the same thing for the Yemeni squad that carried out the attack aimed at the United States troops in Aden less than a year before.
And you heard again in the staff statement, we had a national intelligence assessment in '96, I believe, or '95.
TENET: '95 and '97.
KERREY: And what we got was an update that didn't include any of this. What we got was an update that didn't include the information that this individual says in court that he delivered to us, and he said it was corroborated.
So why? Why wasn't it not in the update? Why didn't the president of the United States and the key policy-makers get this information?
TENET: I'm sure -- well, now you're making the assumption that because it was not in the national intelligence estimate, this data was not broadly disseminated, explained and understood by people at the time, and I believe it was.
MCLAUGHLIN: I don't recall, Senator, whether that particular individual, in his testimony, was included specifically in the '97 update.
What I do know is that in the staff statement, the staff statement failed to note that in the '97 update we included information that people associated with bin Laden had been surveiling institutions in the United States, and that therefore we concluded the likelihood was growing that he would attack in the United States. That was, I think, the most significant finding in the '97 NIE. And it was also in this period, 1996, that we formed the bin Laden issue station. So we were very focused on this issue.
TENET: This is a critical issue.
KERREY: I think so.
TENET: No, it's a critical issue. You're making an assumption that because of it's not in a national intelligence estimate that the way we were organized to brief people, pass product out, talk to them about this meant that people weren't getting this kind of data. That's just not true.
KERREY: Well, I'm not making that presumption. I'm making, first of all, the presumption that the NIE is a foundational document that lots of people use and that -- I mean, this is a very specific set of information that he said in trial he provided to us. And we continue to regard bin Laden -- you heard in the staff statement -- we continue to regard him as a relatively small threat.
I didn't know. I didn't know in 1996 or 1997 that bin Laden was responsible for sending forces down into Somalia to shoot down our Black Hawk helicopters. I didn't have a sense that this is what he was doing.
And let me just ask you -- I mean, I know that this is your transitional moment, so -- this is '96 to '97. Did you ever have a conversation with President Clinton where you told him that Al Qaida was a substantial military effort, that they were responsible for shooting down our helicopters in Mogadishu, that there was a substantial military threat to the United States of America, that we ought to ramp this guy up to the top of the list?
TENET: Sir, I will go back and look at my -- I didn't come prepared with what happened in '97. I'll go back and look at my records, look at the data dissemination, go back through the meetings that were held at the time and give you an answer to the question.
KERREY: Director, the reason I think this is central because we have heard -- I mean, I have heard a series of excuses from Sandy Berger, Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Don Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice -- all kinds of rationalizations. And one of the things I've heard over and over and over was, The American public wouldn't have supported any action had we taken action before 9/11.
Now, I've got to tell you, I think if the president of the United States of America had come and said that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida is responsible for shooting down a Black Hawk helicopter in Mogadishu in 1993, I believe that speech would have galvanized the United States of America against bin Laden and would have prevented -- I think would have given you permission to do operations that you didn't have permission to do; would have changed the whole dynamic.
I mean, I just can't believe that if the president of the United States had said that in 1994, '95, '96 -- I mean, whenever -- you've got the walk-in in '96 -- if he'd have done it in '96 or '97, I just can't believe that public opinion wouldn't have been on his side just like that. Don't you think so?
TENET: Sir, I'll go back and look at it all and come back to you.
MCLAUGHLIN: I might mention, in that connection, since, Senator, you're talking about the extent to which various publications in this period included warnings about bin Laden and also his activities and the role of Afghanistan and so forth, I mention what I had said earlier about the '97 NIE.
In 2001, there was an NIE that I don't think your staff statement mentions about Afghanistan. It included a extensive discussion of the camp structure, the camp architecture, in Afghanistan. It noted that the Cole bombers had trained in those camps. It noted that Ressam, who had been involved in the millennium plot, had been in those camps.
So that's something that was laid out in a national intelligence estimate. And as the director has pointed out, it's a matter of argument whether that galvanizes policy to do something or not.
KERREY: I appreciate -- we heard -- now that we've seen this August 6th presidential daily briefing -- after we've seen that August presidential daily briefing, it was causing me to, sort of, have serious questions about how these daily briefings are organized.
But my guess is, the president has not seen the -- President Bush has not seen the information about who Al Qaida was; that -- my guess is that President Bush today -- he may be discovering it for the first time, that we knew in 1996 that bin Laden was responsible for shooting down helicopters in Mogadishu. You know, and this was in the trial in 2001. And it doesn't appear to me that he was briefed in transition. It doesn't appear to me that that was brought to his attention.
In other words, I think even as late as 2001, we were describing bin Laden as a terrorist, not somebody that had a substantial army and substantial capability and a history that went back long before 1998.
I mean, you -- the president says you meet with him practically every day.
KERREY: Did you bring that presentation to him? Did you describe, as the walk-in did in 1996 -- as he described in the trial in 2001? Did you bring that information to the president and say, This is an army that's been engaged in an effort against the United States of America all the way back at least until 1993 ?
TENET: Well, whether I took it back in '93 or not, sir, I don't recall. But we certainly walked through Al Qaida, its organization, the threat it posed, its previous affiliation with bombings and activities over a concerted period of time.
But I'll go back and look at whether that was specifically raised. I don't recall it.
KERREY: I appreciate it. I'm going to do something I shouldn't do, which is yield back my time before my green light -- my red light goes on.
KEAN: First time you've done that, sir.
KERREY: What he said was that Al Qaida was a significant military force. What he said was that Osama bin Laden headed a terrorist organization of his own. He said it was an organization that was far more than a mechanism to raise money for his terrorist financing role. What he said was that this organization was intended to be the foundation for an Islamic army, and it declared the United States as its main enemy long before the public declaration in August of 1996.
What he said was that Osama bin Laden had sent top leaders of its weapons trainers into Somalia to shoot down -- to provide the Somalis with the weapons used to shoot down the U.S. helicopters and train them in how to use them to accomplish exactly they did in October of 1993. What he said was that bin Laden's organization had done the same thing for the Yemeni squad that carried out the attack aimed at the United States troops in Aden less than a year before.
And you heard again in the staff statement, we had a national intelligence assessment in '96, I believe, or '95.
TENET: '95 and '97.
KERREY: And what we got was an update that didn't include any of this. What we got was an update that didn't include the information that this individual says in court that he delivered to us, and he said it was corroborated.
So why? Why wasn't it not in the update? Why didn't the president of the United States and the key policy-makers get this information?
TENET: I'm sure -- well, now you're making the assumption that because it was not in the national intelligence estimate, this data was not broadly disseminated, explained and understood by people at the time, and I believe it was.
MCLAUGHLIN: I don't recall, Senator, whether that particular individual, in his testimony, was included specifically in the '97 update.
What I do know is that in the staff statement, the staff statement failed to note that in the '97 update we included information that people associated with bin Laden had been surveiling institutions in the United States, and that therefore we concluded the likelihood was growing that he would attack in the United States. That was, I think, the most significant finding in the '97 NIE. And it was also in this period, 1996, that we formed the bin Laden issue station. So we were very focused on this issue.
TENET: This is a critical issue.
KERREY: I think so.
TENET: No, it's a critical issue. You're making an assumption that because of it's not in a national intelligence estimate that the way we were organized to brief people, pass product out, talk to them about this meant that people weren't getting this kind of data. That's just not true.
KERREY: Well, I'm not making that presumption. I'm making, first of all, the presumption that the NIE is a foundational document that lots of people use and that -- I mean, this is a very specific set of information that he said in trial he provided to us. And we continue to regard bin Laden -- you heard in the staff statement -- we continue to regard him as a relatively small threat.
I didn't know. I didn't know in 1996 or 1997 that bin Laden was responsible for sending forces down into Somalia to shoot down our Black Hawk helicopters. I didn't have a sense that this is what he was doing.
And let me just ask you -- I mean, I know that this is your transitional moment, so -- this is '96 to '97. Did you ever have a conversation with President Clinton where you told him that Al Qaida was a substantial military effort, that they were responsible for shooting down our helicopters in Mogadishu, that there was a substantial military threat to the United States of America, that we ought to ramp this guy up to the top of the list?
TENET: Sir, I will go back and look at my -- I didn't come prepared with what happened in '97. I'll go back and look at my records, look at the data dissemination, go back through the meetings that were held at the time and give you an answer to the question.
KERREY: Director, the reason I think this is central because we have heard -- I mean, I have heard a series of excuses from Sandy Berger, Bill Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Don Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice -- all kinds of rationalizations. And one of the things I've heard over and over and over was, The American public wouldn't have supported any action had we taken action before 9/11.
Now, I've got to tell you, I think if the president of the United States of America had come and said that Osama bin Laden and Al Qaida is responsible for shooting down a Black Hawk helicopter in Mogadishu in 1993, I believe that speech would have galvanized the United States of America against bin Laden and would have prevented -- I think would have given you permission to do operations that you didn't have permission to do; would have changed the whole dynamic.
I mean, I just can't believe that if the president of the United States had said that in 1994, '95, '96 -- I mean, whenever -- you've got the walk-in in '96 -- if he'd have done it in '96 or '97, I just can't believe that public opinion wouldn't have been on his side just like that. Don't you think so?
TENET: Sir, I'll go back and look at it all and come back to you.
MCLAUGHLIN: I might mention, in that connection, since, Senator, you're talking about the extent to which various publications in this period included warnings about bin Laden and also his activities and the role of Afghanistan and so forth, I mention what I had said earlier about the '97 NIE.
In 2001, there was an NIE that I don't think your staff statement mentions about Afghanistan. It included a extensive discussion of the camp structure, the camp architecture, in Afghanistan. It noted that the Cole bombers had trained in those camps. It noted that Ressam, who had been involved in the millennium plot, had been in those camps.
So that's something that was laid out in a national intelligence estimate. And as the director has pointed out, it's a matter of argument whether that galvanizes policy to do something or not.
KERREY: I appreciate -- we heard -- now that we've seen this August 6th presidential daily briefing -- after we've seen that August presidential daily briefing, it was causing me to, sort of, have serious questions about how these daily briefings are organized.
But my guess is, the president has not seen the -- President Bush has not seen the information about who Al Qaida was; that -- my guess is that President Bush today -- he may be discovering it for the first time, that we knew in 1996 that bin Laden was responsible for shooting down helicopters in Mogadishu. You know, and this was in the trial in 2001. And it doesn't appear to me that he was briefed in transition. It doesn't appear to me that that was brought to his attention.
In other words, I think even as late as 2001, we were describing bin Laden as a terrorist, not somebody that had a substantial army and substantial capability and a history that went back long before 1998.
I mean, you -- the president says you meet with him practically every day.
KERREY: Did you bring that presentation to him? Did you describe, as the walk-in did in 1996 -- as he described in the trial in 2001? Did you bring that information to the president and say, This is an army that's been engaged in an effort against the United States of America all the way back at least until 1993 ?
TENET: Well, whether I took it back in '93 or not, sir, I don't recall. But we certainly walked through Al Qaida, its organization, the threat it posed, its previous affiliation with bombings and activities over a concerted period of time.
But I'll go back and look at whether that was specifically raised. I don't recall it.
KERREY: I appreciate it. I'm going to do something I shouldn't do, which is yield back my time before my green light -- my red light goes on.
KEAN: First time you've done that, sir.