hist2004
04-16-2004, 11:33 AM
The Office of Strategic Services was initiated during World War II by General William J. Donovan with the approval and support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to improve, coordinate and provide intelligence needed for wartime activities, and was placed under the direct control of the Joint Chiefs of staff. Branches of the OSS included SI (Secret Intelligence), SO (Special Operations), OG (Operational Groups), MO (Morale Operations), and others.
While the O.S.S. in general is considered to have been the forerunner of the C.I.A. and its history has been much written about, the Operational Groups in particular have remained largely undocumented, even though they are recognized as the forerunner of the U.S. Special Forces.
The OG concept was based on General Donovan's belief that the rich ethnic makeup of our country would provide second generation American soldiers with language facility who, if organized in small groups and trained with commando capabilities, could be parachuted into enemy occupied territory to harass the enemy and to encourage and support local resistance organizations.
With a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 23 December 1942, which provided that OSS should organize "operational nuclei" to be used in enemy occupied territory, a recruiting program was initiated. Line outfits, officer candidate and specialty schools were targeted as pools for candidates who, at a minimum, had already received basic training. Infantry and engineer units were sources from which most OG candidates were sought; with radio operators coming from the Signal Corps and medical technicians from the Medical Corps.
Working knowledge of a foreign language was a priority consideration advanced in the recruiting promotions, though candidates with other special skills or foreign area knowledge were also considered for recruitment. Soldiers with language skills in Norwegian, Italian, French, Greek and German were the primary languages being sought.
Prospective candidates were given the opportunity to volunteer for "hazardous duty behind enemy lines." Interested individuals were interviewed, and possible operational situations were presented to enable the candidate to have an understanding of potential personal dangers. Only men with a real desire for such duty were chosen. Approximately ten percent of those interviewed volunteered.
Soon after interview, those selected received orders to report to OSS Headquarters at 2340 E Street in Washington, D. C. In the complex located there was the OG HQ unit in "Q Building". Most recruits then, after processing in, were transported to "Area F" (the Congressional Country Club in nearby Potomac, Maryland) The Club, which had been taken over by the OSS for it's use during the war, served as a base for several different OSS activities. Except for the OGs, most of those persons went home off base after their days work Apart from a base headquarters unit which included an MP detachment, the OGs were the only military personnel living there.
The main club house facility provided office and work space for the OSS non-OG personnel, office space for the military/MP HQ unit, living quarters for the OG officers, dining facilities for all, and recreation facilities in the ball room, bowling alleys and swimming pool for the OGs (when the training schedule, which went from early morning until about 9-10 PM each day, provided a break at the end of each two week period)
The golf course was fully used for OG training. Special obstacle courses, pistol firing ranges as well as open air class rooms were located there. Such resources as the Potomac River, the Potomac River Locks and other local landmarks and facilities nearby were also fully utilized for operational problems.
Basic OG training was built on physical conditioning, map reading, night reconnaissance, demolition's operations, special weapons use and hit-and-run commando tactics - with much of the latter taken from the British commando experience; and special visits by British Colonel Fairbaine who provided training in special uses of the 45 caliber pistol and for techniques for use in hand-to-hand combat; and for use of the stiletto, a special issue for the OGs. The courses were designed to make all OGs proficient in use of small arms of both American and foreign make; map reading and the use of compass for night operations in scouting, patrolling and reconnaissance; proficiency in the handling and use of demolitions and for living off the land.
During the period of basic training at Area F the formal T/O and command assignments of individual OG units (i.e., Norwegian, Italian, French, Greek and German) were generally completed and designated overseas station assignments established. From that point additional training was more specifically tailored for particular operational needs envisaged for the areas in which they would be working. Some of that training was conducted at other OSS and military facilities in the United States, and some at OSS, military and allied facilities overseas. For example, while all OGs received parachute jump training, for those who would be dropped using special exit holes that were cut in the belly of bomber aircraft, extra training was given. That training was given at OSS parachute training facilities overseas. Some OG units also received ski training and some received amphibious training.
The basic organizational structure of an OG section consisted of two officers and thirteen enlisted men ( the enlisted men were non-commissioned officers - no privates). As noted above, all members of the team were equally prepared in weapons and operational skills, with two being specialists - one a medical technician and the other a radio operator. The fact that all had the same operational capabilities (except for the medic and the radio operator specialties) was a major factor which enabled flexibility of assignment and deployment to fit varied mission requirements. As you read reports in other sections of this website you will find many examples of that flexibility; most notably the China Report where the OGs organized, trained and cadred the first Chinese Commandos into operations against the Japanese.
In the absence of a requirement for the OG units to submit end-of-mission reports, efforts to reconstruct a comprehensive history of the activities and accomplishments of the OG experience has required searching many sources. The “Operational Report, Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion” (the military designation given the Algiers-to-France OG) which was compiled in September 1944 in Grenoble, France is one end-of-mission report which was voluntarily produced under the direction of Major Alfred T. Cox, the unit’s commanding officer. Other information results from the sharing of information on occasions when unit reunions have been held. While commercially published works have also been screened, a most productive source of raw material has come from the diligent efforts of several former OG officers who have searched the National Archives—knowing what to look for and appreciating any nuances that were there.
Included in this latter source was basic reporting from the radio operator, in the field, which was provided using dots and dashes with the use of the telegrapher’s hand key. All of these messages, to and from the HQ unit, were encoded and decoded in five letter groups using a one time pad.
So it is with much appreciation to those who have given efforts to assemble from all of those sources the great story of the OSS Operational Groups which makes up the other sections of this report.
As soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the OSS Operational Groups and assigned the necessary allotment of personnel, recruitment began. On April 20, 1943 six officers from the Engineer School at Ft. Belvoir in Virginia reported for duty. They were immediately sent to an old Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Triangle, Virginia where they received some basic infantry orientation. Two weeks later they were transferred to Area F. There they met a contingent of enlisted personnel from the 100th Division. Soon they were followed by more officers and enlisted men as they were recruited from other Army units, including medics and radio operators. These personnel formed the first Operational Group to be activated and was identified as Operational Group A.
Plans were for Area F to serve as a basic OG training base for the OGs. Unfortunately for Operational Group A, that facility had not yet been established. The training which was available at that time consisted of patrolling, physical training, hand-to-hand and knife fighting and some use of foreign weapons. The unit was then sent to Ft. Benning, Ga. for a strenuous course on jungle warfare and some preliminary parachute training. Upon return to Area F, the radio operators, medics and demolition personnel were trained in their specialties.
At the end of July the unit was transferred to a staging area near "Shangri La" (later Camp David). While waiting for overseas orders mock attacks on the Marine Corps Detachment there were practiced. Later in August the unit arrived at the OSS Station X near Algiers consisting of a pine grove on sandy soil where they lived in pup tents. While at Station X it was planned that parachute training would be given. That training was barely started when, almost immediately, operations began.
One group went to Italian occupied Corsica together with a French force to liberate the island in conjunction with the local Maqui, and to harass the German 90th Panzer Division which was evacuating Sardinia by moving up the east coast of Corsica to the port of Bastia. On September 25, 1943, just a short four months after activation, Unit A suffered its first casualties—two enlisted men and an officer. A French officer who observed the action said it was the bravest thing he had ever seen.
Another group was parachuted into southeast Italy to help recover Allied prisoners released by the Italians upon their surrender September 8th. The officer commanding the group was captured and some of the men remained behind the lines for almost nine months. OG personnel jumped blind into Sardinia to notify the Italian command there of the armistice and with orders from their new government to cooperate with the Allies.
In mid-October the rest of Unit A moved from Station X to Ile Rousse in Corsica. This became Unit A’s base for nine months. Operating from the east coast port of Bastia and utilizing either American PT or British MT boats they captured the islands of Capraia and Gorgona and maintained outposts there to observe the enemy coastal shipping, furnish weather reports and provide early warning for Air Force units stationed in Corsica; and to administer the prison and civilian populations of the islands. Reconnaissance and sabotage of targets on the Tyrrhenian coast and the island of Pianosa were also conducted.
Meanwhile the Allied Armies in Italy moved slowly up the peninsula. Rome was not liberated until June 4, 1944. Two days later the Allies landed in Normandy. Seven of the most experienced divisions fighting in Italy were transferred to the Seventh Army for landings in southern France. Thus the weakened armies to remain were unable to breach the heavily fortified German Gothic Line to take Balogna and break into the Po Valley. The winter of 1944-1945 was one of the worst bitter cold in Italian history. The GIs asked, whatever happened to sunny Italy?
During the Allied advance to the Gothic Line some excellent partisan bands were overrun and proved to be very valuable in tactical situations. The bands in the north occupying the mountains were in a position to attack the German lines of communication. Obviously they had to be supplied and their operations coordinated with those of the regular army forces. This was the job for which the OGs were created. At the end of August Unit A was transferred to Sienna. Now designated Co. A 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, they were placed under operational control of Special Operations , G-3 15th Army Group. In mid-August 1944 the first military mission in uniform was dropped in the Liguria area near the important port of Genoa. It consisted of an OG section of two officers and 13 enlisted men. By May 3, 1945 when the Germans formally surrendered, in spite of bad weather and limited availability of aircraft and supplies, there were ten OG missions with a total of 120 men in strategic areas of northern Italy.
In some cases as much as two weeks elapsed after the surrender before being overrun by Allied troops and the arrival of Allied military governors. In the interim food and essentials for the civilian population were dropped to the OG teams. They and the partisans administered the areas and maintained order. Recalcitrant Fascists and Germans suspected of being war criminals were rounded up and arrested. During the winter when parachute operations were difficult the OGs were used for a variety of tasks. The responsibility for partisan bands at the front in tactical situations belonged to the OSS and to the Fifth and Eighth Army Detachments. On the western front the Fifth Army did not have sufficient personnel so five OG officers and twenty OG enlisted men were loaned to the Fifth Army until that unit came up to full strength. Early in 1945 a packing station was opened at an airbase near Leghorn and a Troop Carrier Group flying Dakotas (C-47s) was stationed there to resupply forward positions. Lacking dispatchers for that mission, OGs performed that dangerous mission until Airforce dispatchers could be found or trained. In northern Italy OG missions regularly furnished weather reports and bomb assessments to the Air Force and provided assistance to downed airmen.
The numerous operations of support to the regular military operations in Italy, plus the special OG operations with the partisans, drew unanimous praise from the Allied commanders. In recognition, the Italian Operational Group received the Distinguished Unit Citation, 2 Distinguished Service Crosses, 20 Silver Star Medals, 10 Legion of Merit Medals, 30 Bronze Star Medals, 25 Air Medals, eight with Oak Leaf Clusters and 29 Purple Heart were individually awarded to members of the unit.
The following operations pages will provide summaries of the individual OG operations and provide a listing of the personnel in those operations.
The Balkan Group was Company "C" of the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion. It had two parts, "Unit A" and "Unit B." The men of Unit A were originally selected for operations in Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslavakia, Bulgaria, Austria and Poland. It eventuated that Yugoslavia was the only country for which these men were used. Most of those in Unit B had close connections with Greece. The Greek OGs were divided into 8 small groups: "I" through "VIII." Of these, III, IV and VIII with Hq were assigned to operate with the Yugoslavian Group on Vis from February to June of 1944. Troops of Unit A and those from Unit B totalled about 400 men.
Yugoslavian Operations:
Objectives were to engage in as many offensive missions as possible to the Dalmatian coastal islands where there were concentrations of German forces, and to perform reconnaissance and intelligence activities.
Troops of Company "C" destined for Yugoslavian operations started arriving at Bari, Italy, the rear echelon base in January, 1944. As more components came from the states they transferred first to the vicinity of Manfredonia for additional training and next to Torre a Mare, a larger facility. Troops then were sent to the Dalmation coastal island, Vis, the first ones arriving January 20. At this base for Yugoslavian missions they became part of the Allied garrison which included British Commandos, a Raider Support Regiment and other British units, and Partisans. Also available was Navy and Airforce support. Total troops on the island numbered several thousand.
Greek Operations:
At the request of the Greek Government in exile a Greek Operational Group was formed from the 122 Infantry Bn. at Camp Carson, CO, in February, 1943. With additions, rejections and further training nearly 200 enlisted men and officers were ready for foreign duty. In Greece the armed resistance was by the Andartes, Greek guerrillas living in the mountains. Withdrawal of the 80,000 German troops was foreseen and plans were based on delaying, harassing and making costly this withdrawal. OGs and a British unit, the Raider Support Regiment, would work with the resistance to accelerate the plans. The first OG unit entered Greece April 23, 1944.
The first contingent of some 200 volunteers who had been selected to form the French Operational Group completed OG training at Area F in the fall of 1943, and Major (later Lt. Col.) Alfred T. Cox who had been the Chief of OG training at Area F was then designated commanding officer of that Group. In filling out the projected T/O for overseas assignment for the unit, Major Cox included many of the personnel from the Area F teaching staff, the quartermaster/supply unit, communications unit and medical unit to establish a complete operational group to include a Field Service Headquarters Unit (FSHQ).
The French OGs were ready for deployment. But circumstances similar to those which the Italian OGs experienced before they embarked in August 1943 were again causing delays, while the military leaders in each command needed to be briefed and familiarized with the OG operational concept. As a part of that process to “sell” the OG concept, a section of the French OGs participated in a combined Airborne maneuver in North Carolina in December 1943 as a demonstration.
Meanwhile, to utilize the extra time to advantage and to avoid a waning of morale, the group was sent to Area B, a CCC Camp near Quantico Virginia which had been taken over for wartime use by OSS. Training at that site provided opportunity to use operational practices they had earlier worked out but in a different locale and environment. Also further concentration was given to physical fitness as well as giving special attention to what could be used in that locale if necessary to "live off the land."
In December the Group went to Camp Hale, Colorado for ski training. Upon their arrival at Camp Hale word was received that the group had been ordered for attachment to the Seventh Army in Algiers. On 1 January 1944 Major Cox and his executive officer departed by military air transport as the advance party to establish facilities for the Group to be near that headquarters in Algiers.
Crossing the Atlantic by ship convoy, the Group found its North African base in February 1944 at Domaine de la Trappe, a site near Algiers where Trappist Monks had managed extensive vineyards at an earlier period. While there awaiting operational deployment the group undertook parachute jump training at the nearby OSS parachute school, using both American and British equipment; and to practice jump techniques for parachuting from bombers through an opening in the airplane belly where normally the gunner's turret would be.
Major Cox was concerned and very mindful of the need to keep the men active to avoid any drop off of morale, and as a part of such effort organized additional field training for the Group in the Atlas Mountains. Plans were also being explored to conduct operations with the French Foreign Legion at its base in that area, but before the latter could be arranged, the call came to prepare for the first OG operation into southern France in support of the June 6th Normandy invasion.
Soon thereafter, two additional French Groups arrived in Algiers for parachute jump training at the OSS parachute school before proceeding to England where, under the command of Lt. Colonel Serge Obolenski, they would join the Norwegian OG unit stationed there under administrative control of OSS Special Operations. Working together they would become the second French OG unit to operate in France; and on August 1, 1944 their first section parachuted into France.
The England-to-France Group operated north of Lyons,with the Algiers-to France Group operating in southern France south of the Lyons level. Combined, the French OGs deployed a total of twenty teams into France.
The missions assigned to all French OGs were:
a) Cutting enemy lines of communication
b) Attacking vital enemy installations
c) Organizing and training local resistance elements
d) Boosting morale and effort of local resistance elements
e) Furnishing intelligence to local Allied Armies
It was late summer of 1943 when the 99th Mountain Battalion arrived at Area F (Congressional Country Club) for basic OG training. The battalion, which had been stationed and trained at Camp Hale Colorado, had been recruited as a unit to form the Norwegian Operational Group.* Discipline and professionalism were readily demonstrated in the manner these officers and men responded to the OG training exercises and field problems that were given at Area F. And in December 1943 the Norwegian Operational Group of about 100 officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to England where they were attached to the OSS Special Operations (SO) Headquarters, Scandinavian Section. In anticipation of possible operations in Norway the unit then underwent additional training in Scotland.
Come summer of 1944 with no approved missions in Norway, the Norwegian Operational Group was committed to operations in France and became the major component of the UK-to-France unit of the French Operational Group.
In December 1944 following the liberation of France, all OG personnel who had served in France were rescreeened for assignments in other countries or returned to regular military units. Some of those reassigned returned to the United States for home leave and further training before assignment to Far East operations; some transferred to Italian OG operations; and approximately 50 of the original Norwegian OGs were rescreened to meet tentative plans for operations in Norway.
At that time there were approximately 150,000 German troops concentrated in the Narvik-Tromsc area of Northern Norway who, according to intelligence information, were to be transferred southward through Norway to be employed in the defense of Germany.
The only available transportation routes available to them were the snow blocked roads, the sea and the single track Nordland Railway running down to Trondheim. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces (SHAEF) hoped the Germans could be forced to take the sea route to the south.
Opportunities for OG operations from England that were being considered to meet the rail disruption objective were to be under the direction of Lt. Col. Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief, Norwegian Special Operations (NORSO). Major William E Colby, a former Jedburg, was appointed commanding officer of the Operational Group.
Major Colby split the group into two units. The main unit of 3 officers and about 30 enlisted men would be under the direct command of Colby and identified as NORSO I. The second unit of 1 officer and 18 enlisted men under the command of Lt. Roger Hall, and identified as NORSO II, was intended to serve as a reserve or reinforcement unit to NORSO I or be available for a separate mission.
The mission of the Chinese Operational Group was the formation, training, equipping, and attachment of American personnel for twenty Chinese Commandos. This mission was decided upon at conferences between Maj. Gen. Donovan, CG of O.S.S., Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during the month of January 1945, and it was based upon their belief that small units of Chinese properly trained and equipped with veteran American officers and soldiers assigned would fight more effectively than the normal Chinese division.
The nucleus of the American personnel consisted of the Operational Groups who had parachuted into France from North Africa and from England, and an OG unit which operated amphibiously against the Burmese coast from Ceylon. Additional officers and men were recruited from replacement centers in the States. Total American personnel reached 160 officers and 230 men, under the control of Lt. Col. Alfred T. Cox.
A Commando was made up of 154 Chinese, 19 Americans and 8 interpreters. It had a small headquarters, three rifle sections, one 60 mm mortar section, one LMG section and one demolition section. Americans included an SI officer and NCO.
Although plans called for over 3000 Chinese troops, only about a quarter of this number were in good physical condition, enough for only five commandos initially. Although thousands of "able bodied men" in uniform were available, screening yielded limited numbers whose physical condition and military training were adequate for additional units. Better food, physical training and good instruction by the Americans soon produced good results in the planned eight-week training period, and in the following parachute training consisting of four days of ground activity and four jumps. Greatly admired in the Chinese soldiers were their high spirits, eagerness to be selected, and pride in being a Commando.
Seven Commando units went on missions. Training of the remainder was interrupted by the end of hostilities.
http://www.ossog.org/
Regards,
Hist2004
While the O.S.S. in general is considered to have been the forerunner of the C.I.A. and its history has been much written about, the Operational Groups in particular have remained largely undocumented, even though they are recognized as the forerunner of the U.S. Special Forces.
The OG concept was based on General Donovan's belief that the rich ethnic makeup of our country would provide second generation American soldiers with language facility who, if organized in small groups and trained with commando capabilities, could be parachuted into enemy occupied territory to harass the enemy and to encourage and support local resistance organizations.
With a Joint Chiefs of Staff directive of 23 December 1942, which provided that OSS should organize "operational nuclei" to be used in enemy occupied territory, a recruiting program was initiated. Line outfits, officer candidate and specialty schools were targeted as pools for candidates who, at a minimum, had already received basic training. Infantry and engineer units were sources from which most OG candidates were sought; with radio operators coming from the Signal Corps and medical technicians from the Medical Corps.
Working knowledge of a foreign language was a priority consideration advanced in the recruiting promotions, though candidates with other special skills or foreign area knowledge were also considered for recruitment. Soldiers with language skills in Norwegian, Italian, French, Greek and German were the primary languages being sought.
Prospective candidates were given the opportunity to volunteer for "hazardous duty behind enemy lines." Interested individuals were interviewed, and possible operational situations were presented to enable the candidate to have an understanding of potential personal dangers. Only men with a real desire for such duty were chosen. Approximately ten percent of those interviewed volunteered.
Soon after interview, those selected received orders to report to OSS Headquarters at 2340 E Street in Washington, D. C. In the complex located there was the OG HQ unit in "Q Building". Most recruits then, after processing in, were transported to "Area F" (the Congressional Country Club in nearby Potomac, Maryland) The Club, which had been taken over by the OSS for it's use during the war, served as a base for several different OSS activities. Except for the OGs, most of those persons went home off base after their days work Apart from a base headquarters unit which included an MP detachment, the OGs were the only military personnel living there.
The main club house facility provided office and work space for the OSS non-OG personnel, office space for the military/MP HQ unit, living quarters for the OG officers, dining facilities for all, and recreation facilities in the ball room, bowling alleys and swimming pool for the OGs (when the training schedule, which went from early morning until about 9-10 PM each day, provided a break at the end of each two week period)
The golf course was fully used for OG training. Special obstacle courses, pistol firing ranges as well as open air class rooms were located there. Such resources as the Potomac River, the Potomac River Locks and other local landmarks and facilities nearby were also fully utilized for operational problems.
Basic OG training was built on physical conditioning, map reading, night reconnaissance, demolition's operations, special weapons use and hit-and-run commando tactics - with much of the latter taken from the British commando experience; and special visits by British Colonel Fairbaine who provided training in special uses of the 45 caliber pistol and for techniques for use in hand-to-hand combat; and for use of the stiletto, a special issue for the OGs. The courses were designed to make all OGs proficient in use of small arms of both American and foreign make; map reading and the use of compass for night operations in scouting, patrolling and reconnaissance; proficiency in the handling and use of demolitions and for living off the land.
During the period of basic training at Area F the formal T/O and command assignments of individual OG units (i.e., Norwegian, Italian, French, Greek and German) were generally completed and designated overseas station assignments established. From that point additional training was more specifically tailored for particular operational needs envisaged for the areas in which they would be working. Some of that training was conducted at other OSS and military facilities in the United States, and some at OSS, military and allied facilities overseas. For example, while all OGs received parachute jump training, for those who would be dropped using special exit holes that were cut in the belly of bomber aircraft, extra training was given. That training was given at OSS parachute training facilities overseas. Some OG units also received ski training and some received amphibious training.
The basic organizational structure of an OG section consisted of two officers and thirteen enlisted men ( the enlisted men were non-commissioned officers - no privates). As noted above, all members of the team were equally prepared in weapons and operational skills, with two being specialists - one a medical technician and the other a radio operator. The fact that all had the same operational capabilities (except for the medic and the radio operator specialties) was a major factor which enabled flexibility of assignment and deployment to fit varied mission requirements. As you read reports in other sections of this website you will find many examples of that flexibility; most notably the China Report where the OGs organized, trained and cadred the first Chinese Commandos into operations against the Japanese.
In the absence of a requirement for the OG units to submit end-of-mission reports, efforts to reconstruct a comprehensive history of the activities and accomplishments of the OG experience has required searching many sources. The “Operational Report, Company B, 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion” (the military designation given the Algiers-to-France OG) which was compiled in September 1944 in Grenoble, France is one end-of-mission report which was voluntarily produced under the direction of Major Alfred T. Cox, the unit’s commanding officer. Other information results from the sharing of information on occasions when unit reunions have been held. While commercially published works have also been screened, a most productive source of raw material has come from the diligent efforts of several former OG officers who have searched the National Archives—knowing what to look for and appreciating any nuances that were there.
Included in this latter source was basic reporting from the radio operator, in the field, which was provided using dots and dashes with the use of the telegrapher’s hand key. All of these messages, to and from the HQ unit, were encoded and decoded in five letter groups using a one time pad.
So it is with much appreciation to those who have given efforts to assemble from all of those sources the great story of the OSS Operational Groups which makes up the other sections of this report.
As soon as the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the OSS Operational Groups and assigned the necessary allotment of personnel, recruitment began. On April 20, 1943 six officers from the Engineer School at Ft. Belvoir in Virginia reported for duty. They were immediately sent to an old Civilian Conservation Corps camp near Triangle, Virginia where they received some basic infantry orientation. Two weeks later they were transferred to Area F. There they met a contingent of enlisted personnel from the 100th Division. Soon they were followed by more officers and enlisted men as they were recruited from other Army units, including medics and radio operators. These personnel formed the first Operational Group to be activated and was identified as Operational Group A.
Plans were for Area F to serve as a basic OG training base for the OGs. Unfortunately for Operational Group A, that facility had not yet been established. The training which was available at that time consisted of patrolling, physical training, hand-to-hand and knife fighting and some use of foreign weapons. The unit was then sent to Ft. Benning, Ga. for a strenuous course on jungle warfare and some preliminary parachute training. Upon return to Area F, the radio operators, medics and demolition personnel were trained in their specialties.
At the end of July the unit was transferred to a staging area near "Shangri La" (later Camp David). While waiting for overseas orders mock attacks on the Marine Corps Detachment there were practiced. Later in August the unit arrived at the OSS Station X near Algiers consisting of a pine grove on sandy soil where they lived in pup tents. While at Station X it was planned that parachute training would be given. That training was barely started when, almost immediately, operations began.
One group went to Italian occupied Corsica together with a French force to liberate the island in conjunction with the local Maqui, and to harass the German 90th Panzer Division which was evacuating Sardinia by moving up the east coast of Corsica to the port of Bastia. On September 25, 1943, just a short four months after activation, Unit A suffered its first casualties—two enlisted men and an officer. A French officer who observed the action said it was the bravest thing he had ever seen.
Another group was parachuted into southeast Italy to help recover Allied prisoners released by the Italians upon their surrender September 8th. The officer commanding the group was captured and some of the men remained behind the lines for almost nine months. OG personnel jumped blind into Sardinia to notify the Italian command there of the armistice and with orders from their new government to cooperate with the Allies.
In mid-October the rest of Unit A moved from Station X to Ile Rousse in Corsica. This became Unit A’s base for nine months. Operating from the east coast port of Bastia and utilizing either American PT or British MT boats they captured the islands of Capraia and Gorgona and maintained outposts there to observe the enemy coastal shipping, furnish weather reports and provide early warning for Air Force units stationed in Corsica; and to administer the prison and civilian populations of the islands. Reconnaissance and sabotage of targets on the Tyrrhenian coast and the island of Pianosa were also conducted.
Meanwhile the Allied Armies in Italy moved slowly up the peninsula. Rome was not liberated until June 4, 1944. Two days later the Allies landed in Normandy. Seven of the most experienced divisions fighting in Italy were transferred to the Seventh Army for landings in southern France. Thus the weakened armies to remain were unable to breach the heavily fortified German Gothic Line to take Balogna and break into the Po Valley. The winter of 1944-1945 was one of the worst bitter cold in Italian history. The GIs asked, whatever happened to sunny Italy?
During the Allied advance to the Gothic Line some excellent partisan bands were overrun and proved to be very valuable in tactical situations. The bands in the north occupying the mountains were in a position to attack the German lines of communication. Obviously they had to be supplied and their operations coordinated with those of the regular army forces. This was the job for which the OGs were created. At the end of August Unit A was transferred to Sienna. Now designated Co. A 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion, they were placed under operational control of Special Operations , G-3 15th Army Group. In mid-August 1944 the first military mission in uniform was dropped in the Liguria area near the important port of Genoa. It consisted of an OG section of two officers and 13 enlisted men. By May 3, 1945 when the Germans formally surrendered, in spite of bad weather and limited availability of aircraft and supplies, there were ten OG missions with a total of 120 men in strategic areas of northern Italy.
In some cases as much as two weeks elapsed after the surrender before being overrun by Allied troops and the arrival of Allied military governors. In the interim food and essentials for the civilian population were dropped to the OG teams. They and the partisans administered the areas and maintained order. Recalcitrant Fascists and Germans suspected of being war criminals were rounded up and arrested. During the winter when parachute operations were difficult the OGs were used for a variety of tasks. The responsibility for partisan bands at the front in tactical situations belonged to the OSS and to the Fifth and Eighth Army Detachments. On the western front the Fifth Army did not have sufficient personnel so five OG officers and twenty OG enlisted men were loaned to the Fifth Army until that unit came up to full strength. Early in 1945 a packing station was opened at an airbase near Leghorn and a Troop Carrier Group flying Dakotas (C-47s) was stationed there to resupply forward positions. Lacking dispatchers for that mission, OGs performed that dangerous mission until Airforce dispatchers could be found or trained. In northern Italy OG missions regularly furnished weather reports and bomb assessments to the Air Force and provided assistance to downed airmen.
The numerous operations of support to the regular military operations in Italy, plus the special OG operations with the partisans, drew unanimous praise from the Allied commanders. In recognition, the Italian Operational Group received the Distinguished Unit Citation, 2 Distinguished Service Crosses, 20 Silver Star Medals, 10 Legion of Merit Medals, 30 Bronze Star Medals, 25 Air Medals, eight with Oak Leaf Clusters and 29 Purple Heart were individually awarded to members of the unit.
The following operations pages will provide summaries of the individual OG operations and provide a listing of the personnel in those operations.
The Balkan Group was Company "C" of the 2671st Special Reconnaissance Battalion. It had two parts, "Unit A" and "Unit B." The men of Unit A were originally selected for operations in Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslavakia, Bulgaria, Austria and Poland. It eventuated that Yugoslavia was the only country for which these men were used. Most of those in Unit B had close connections with Greece. The Greek OGs were divided into 8 small groups: "I" through "VIII." Of these, III, IV and VIII with Hq were assigned to operate with the Yugoslavian Group on Vis from February to June of 1944. Troops of Unit A and those from Unit B totalled about 400 men.
Yugoslavian Operations:
Objectives were to engage in as many offensive missions as possible to the Dalmatian coastal islands where there were concentrations of German forces, and to perform reconnaissance and intelligence activities.
Troops of Company "C" destined for Yugoslavian operations started arriving at Bari, Italy, the rear echelon base in January, 1944. As more components came from the states they transferred first to the vicinity of Manfredonia for additional training and next to Torre a Mare, a larger facility. Troops then were sent to the Dalmation coastal island, Vis, the first ones arriving January 20. At this base for Yugoslavian missions they became part of the Allied garrison which included British Commandos, a Raider Support Regiment and other British units, and Partisans. Also available was Navy and Airforce support. Total troops on the island numbered several thousand.
Greek Operations:
At the request of the Greek Government in exile a Greek Operational Group was formed from the 122 Infantry Bn. at Camp Carson, CO, in February, 1943. With additions, rejections and further training nearly 200 enlisted men and officers were ready for foreign duty. In Greece the armed resistance was by the Andartes, Greek guerrillas living in the mountains. Withdrawal of the 80,000 German troops was foreseen and plans were based on delaying, harassing and making costly this withdrawal. OGs and a British unit, the Raider Support Regiment, would work with the resistance to accelerate the plans. The first OG unit entered Greece April 23, 1944.
The first contingent of some 200 volunteers who had been selected to form the French Operational Group completed OG training at Area F in the fall of 1943, and Major (later Lt. Col.) Alfred T. Cox who had been the Chief of OG training at Area F was then designated commanding officer of that Group. In filling out the projected T/O for overseas assignment for the unit, Major Cox included many of the personnel from the Area F teaching staff, the quartermaster/supply unit, communications unit and medical unit to establish a complete operational group to include a Field Service Headquarters Unit (FSHQ).
The French OGs were ready for deployment. But circumstances similar to those which the Italian OGs experienced before they embarked in August 1943 were again causing delays, while the military leaders in each command needed to be briefed and familiarized with the OG operational concept. As a part of that process to “sell” the OG concept, a section of the French OGs participated in a combined Airborne maneuver in North Carolina in December 1943 as a demonstration.
Meanwhile, to utilize the extra time to advantage and to avoid a waning of morale, the group was sent to Area B, a CCC Camp near Quantico Virginia which had been taken over for wartime use by OSS. Training at that site provided opportunity to use operational practices they had earlier worked out but in a different locale and environment. Also further concentration was given to physical fitness as well as giving special attention to what could be used in that locale if necessary to "live off the land."
In December the Group went to Camp Hale, Colorado for ski training. Upon their arrival at Camp Hale word was received that the group had been ordered for attachment to the Seventh Army in Algiers. On 1 January 1944 Major Cox and his executive officer departed by military air transport as the advance party to establish facilities for the Group to be near that headquarters in Algiers.
Crossing the Atlantic by ship convoy, the Group found its North African base in February 1944 at Domaine de la Trappe, a site near Algiers where Trappist Monks had managed extensive vineyards at an earlier period. While there awaiting operational deployment the group undertook parachute jump training at the nearby OSS parachute school, using both American and British equipment; and to practice jump techniques for parachuting from bombers through an opening in the airplane belly where normally the gunner's turret would be.
Major Cox was concerned and very mindful of the need to keep the men active to avoid any drop off of morale, and as a part of such effort organized additional field training for the Group in the Atlas Mountains. Plans were also being explored to conduct operations with the French Foreign Legion at its base in that area, but before the latter could be arranged, the call came to prepare for the first OG operation into southern France in support of the June 6th Normandy invasion.
Soon thereafter, two additional French Groups arrived in Algiers for parachute jump training at the OSS parachute school before proceeding to England where, under the command of Lt. Colonel Serge Obolenski, they would join the Norwegian OG unit stationed there under administrative control of OSS Special Operations. Working together they would become the second French OG unit to operate in France; and on August 1, 1944 their first section parachuted into France.
The England-to-France Group operated north of Lyons,with the Algiers-to France Group operating in southern France south of the Lyons level. Combined, the French OGs deployed a total of twenty teams into France.
The missions assigned to all French OGs were:
a) Cutting enemy lines of communication
b) Attacking vital enemy installations
c) Organizing and training local resistance elements
d) Boosting morale and effort of local resistance elements
e) Furnishing intelligence to local Allied Armies
It was late summer of 1943 when the 99th Mountain Battalion arrived at Area F (Congressional Country Club) for basic OG training. The battalion, which had been stationed and trained at Camp Hale Colorado, had been recruited as a unit to form the Norwegian Operational Group.* Discipline and professionalism were readily demonstrated in the manner these officers and men responded to the OG training exercises and field problems that were given at Area F. And in December 1943 the Norwegian Operational Group of about 100 officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to England where they were attached to the OSS Special Operations (SO) Headquarters, Scandinavian Section. In anticipation of possible operations in Norway the unit then underwent additional training in Scotland.
Come summer of 1944 with no approved missions in Norway, the Norwegian Operational Group was committed to operations in France and became the major component of the UK-to-France unit of the French Operational Group.
In December 1944 following the liberation of France, all OG personnel who had served in France were rescreeened for assignments in other countries or returned to regular military units. Some of those reassigned returned to the United States for home leave and further training before assignment to Far East operations; some transferred to Italian OG operations; and approximately 50 of the original Norwegian OGs were rescreened to meet tentative plans for operations in Norway.
At that time there were approximately 150,000 German troops concentrated in the Narvik-Tromsc area of Northern Norway who, according to intelligence information, were to be transferred southward through Norway to be employed in the defense of Germany.
The only available transportation routes available to them were the snow blocked roads, the sea and the single track Nordland Railway running down to Trondheim. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces (SHAEF) hoped the Germans could be forced to take the sea route to the south.
Opportunities for OG operations from England that were being considered to meet the rail disruption objective were to be under the direction of Lt. Col. Hans H. Skabo, Section Chief, Norwegian Special Operations (NORSO). Major William E Colby, a former Jedburg, was appointed commanding officer of the Operational Group.
Major Colby split the group into two units. The main unit of 3 officers and about 30 enlisted men would be under the direct command of Colby and identified as NORSO I. The second unit of 1 officer and 18 enlisted men under the command of Lt. Roger Hall, and identified as NORSO II, was intended to serve as a reserve or reinforcement unit to NORSO I or be available for a separate mission.
The mission of the Chinese Operational Group was the formation, training, equipping, and attachment of American personnel for twenty Chinese Commandos. This mission was decided upon at conferences between Maj. Gen. Donovan, CG of O.S.S., Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek during the month of January 1945, and it was based upon their belief that small units of Chinese properly trained and equipped with veteran American officers and soldiers assigned would fight more effectively than the normal Chinese division.
The nucleus of the American personnel consisted of the Operational Groups who had parachuted into France from North Africa and from England, and an OG unit which operated amphibiously against the Burmese coast from Ceylon. Additional officers and men were recruited from replacement centers in the States. Total American personnel reached 160 officers and 230 men, under the control of Lt. Col. Alfred T. Cox.
A Commando was made up of 154 Chinese, 19 Americans and 8 interpreters. It had a small headquarters, three rifle sections, one 60 mm mortar section, one LMG section and one demolition section. Americans included an SI officer and NCO.
Although plans called for over 3000 Chinese troops, only about a quarter of this number were in good physical condition, enough for only five commandos initially. Although thousands of "able bodied men" in uniform were available, screening yielded limited numbers whose physical condition and military training were adequate for additional units. Better food, physical training and good instruction by the Americans soon produced good results in the planned eight-week training period, and in the following parachute training consisting of four days of ground activity and four jumps. Greatly admired in the Chinese soldiers were their high spirits, eagerness to be selected, and pride in being a Commando.
Seven Commando units went on missions. Training of the remainder was interrupted by the end of hostilities.
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Regards,
Hist2004