Thanks for the pic's, Skyman! woot
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Thanks for the pic's, Skyman! woot
Just curious..
Since Thailand shares borders with many countries, which one did Thailand have most conflicts (or wars) with (now and past) and which one is most dangerous or threatening to the thais?
I don't think cambodia is a danger or a threat to Thailand but probably had more conflicts/war than other countries.. am I right?
And thailand had any clashes with the vietnamese?
[quote=ruffneckzz;3428193]Just curious..
Since Thailand shares borders with many countries, which one did Thailand have most conflicts (or wars) with (now and past) and which one is most dangerous or threatening to the thais?
I don't think cambodia is a danger or a threat to Thailand but probably had more conflicts/war than other countries.. am I right?
And thailand had any clashes with the vietnamese?[/quote]
Laos and Cambodia separates Thailand and Vietnam.
[quote=Ezekiel25:17;3428200]Laos and Cambodia separates Thailand and Vietnam.[/quote]
I know that Cambodia (and laos) is in between Thailand and Vietnam..
I just remembered hearing something about small clashes between Thai troops and vietnamese back in the days when vietnameses were in Cambodia. Maybe that never happened?
Just wondering if anybody here knows more about it.
[quote=ruffneckzz;3428220]I know that Cambodia (and laos) is in between Thailand and Vietnam..
I just remembered hearing something about small clashes between Thai troops and vietnamese back in the days when vietnameses were in Cambodia. Maybe that never happened?
Just wondering if anybody here knows more about it.[/quote]
I remember my dad said that he met some Thai mercenaries in Laos. Fighting the Pathet Lao and NVA. He said they were worthless.
Many Thai troops and Thai fighter pilots were hired by CIA to fight in Laos during the Vietnam war. (In CIA's secret war in Laos)
About the direct fighting with Vietname. It was in 1977 that Vietnamese troop enter Thai Border in In Ubon Ratchatani Province. There are a long massive fighting with many troop and aircraft involved. It's ended by Vietnamese troop retreated back to Cambodia (Where they were occupied)
You can find more in acig's article. :)
[quote][B][SIZE="4"]Underclared war with Thailand[/SIZE][/B]
Already the Khmer Rouge left nothing untried to isolate Cambodia from the outside world, once the Thais started supporting the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian armed groups, the new regime installed by the Vietnamese continued the politics of antagonizing its neighbours. The fighting between the Cambodians and the Thais was actually nothing new. As described above, the RTAF was flying combat operations in Cambodia already since 1966, and especially in the early 1970s. In July 1977, violent fighting between the Thai Army and the Khmer Rouge erupted in the Aranyaprathet area, and the RTAF F-5Es were called for CAS.
Of course, the RTAF also used helicopters massively for support of ground forces in heavy terrain. In fact, it seems that the Thai reaction at the time was so violent, that it was one of the reasons why the Khmer Rouge turned against Vietnam instead: the Khmer were never able to establish permanent bases along the Thai border. The situation worsened after the Vietnamese invasion as a considerable number of Khmers escaped into Thailand and established new bases there, and then even more when the insurgency against the Vietnamese increased. To make matters worse the Vietnamese then started supporting a communist opposition in Thailand, that was soon to grew to force of some 10.000 fighters. For the following 20 years the RTAF therefore became engaged in a protracted anti-guerrilla campaign inside and outside its borders, the first serious incident occurring on 23 June 1980 when the Vietnamese attacked NKPLF bases in the Aranyaprathet area. In response the RTAF and the Thai Army hit back, but the Vietnamese shot down a helicopter and also a O-1 FAC.
Meanwhile, by 1982 the situation in Cambodia was such that no Vietnamese supply convoy could be underway without a support of at least a single squad of T-55 tanks: namely, the Vietnamese troops had an insufficient number of M-113s and BTR-60s, and were suffering considerable losses in road ambushes. The Russians then started supplying increasing numbers of Mi-8s and Mi-24As, and the Vietnamese activated even a number of T-28Ds, left behind from the AVNK-times, but these were actually seldom used. The situation was not improving, however, and finally much more massive retaliation was needed: in 1981 there were rumours about the Vietnamese using a number of An-2s to spray chemical weapons on Khmer concentrations.
By 1982 the SRVAF was sometimes operating near and even over the Thai border: especially the Vietnamese An-26 transports, equipped as ELINT/SIGINT-gatherers were used to track operations of the Thai Army and search for guerrilla bases and activity. One of these crashed inside Thailand in February 1982 under unknown circumstances. The loss is not known to have been brought in connection with activity of RTAF interceptors, even if these are known to have flown CAPs in the area, and several times even attempted to intercept Vietnamese reconnaissance aircraft: neither Hanoi nor Bangkok was interested in widening the war, and consequently such operations were undertaken very carefully by both sides.
In April 1983 the Vietnamese attacked NKPLF bases in the Aranyaprathet area again, but meet a fierce resistance. On 4 April the first two RTAF F-5Es bombed the Vietnamese, and over the next few days additional strikes were flown before an A-37 was brought down by SA-7, on 8 of the month. In late March 1984, the Vietnamese launched an attack against the Khmer Rouge base in the Dongrek mountain range, opposite Sisaket province. When Vietnamese troops entered Thai territory, the Thai Army responded by shelling them and calling in A-37-strikes. The fighting continued into April and the RTAF increased its sortie rate forcing the Vietnamese to deploy anti-aircraft artillery units. On 14 April a Thai O-1 was brought down, followed the next day by an A-37B.
A Vietnamese gunner seen in his position inside the cargo bay of a SVRAF C-130A Hercules transporter: note the US-made Mk.82 bombs on palets around him and the makeshift "periscope" and targeting systemenabling him to see the target, so to activate and drop the bombs in time. The SVRAF made extensive use of C-130s and An-26s equipped in this way for attacks against guerrilla strongholds in the 1980s. (A. Grandolini collection)
A fully bombed-up RTAF A-37B from the 211 Squadron/21st Wing seen at Ubon in the 1980s. The Dragonflies were engaged extensively against the Vietnamese troops that made forays into Thai territory. (Albert Grandolini collection)
In November 1984 the Vietnamese concentrated a force of 75.000 troops for a large operation against the ANS and the Khmer Rouge along the Thai border. Not much was reported about this offensive, but it is known that by January 1985 the fighting spilled over the border into Thailand, in the Ampil area. The Vietnamese used plenty of artillery and tanks forcing the Thais to react. The RTAF was again called and A-37s flew a number of strike sorties. This time, however, the Vietnamese had their air defences ready, and also a number of Soviet MiG-23MLDs deployed at Cam Ranh Bay AB, and the last were seen flying CAPs along the Thai border. In fact, there were several unconfirmed reports about engagements between RTAF F-5Es and Soviet MiGs, as well as Vietnamese helicopters, but it seems these were all spread by the government in Bang Kong with the target of compelling Washington to supply more modern F-16 fighters. The RTAF was seriously concerned about the possibility that Vietnam would acquire some MiG-23s. Eventually, in March 1985, the USA finally agreed to sell eight F-16As and four F-16Bs, worth $318 million. This represented a substantial part of the RTAF budget at the time and the air force was therefore forced to cut back on other projects. For example, the acquisition of additional C-130s was postponed.
The fear of Soviet MiG-23MLD or an eventual acquisition of Floggers by the Vietnamese Air Force prompted the RTAF to purchase eight F-16As and four F-16Bs in March 1985. They re-equiped the 103rd Squadron/1st Wing at Korat AB. (General Dynamics via Albert Grandolini)
In fact, the only direct Soviet involvement in Cambodia was in the area of tactical transport operations. Shortly after the fall of Phnom Penh, in January 1979, Soviet Il-76s and An12s – all wearing the Aeroflot colours – were noticed flying in badly needed humanitarian relief. The same transports, however, were noticed off-loading equipment for the Vietnamese Army. When China invaded northern Vietnam, in February 1979, the Soviet transports were also used to move four Vietnamese divisions (10th, 304th, 320th, and 325th) from Cambodia to the Hanoi area. The Soviets maintained a detachment of An-12s in Cambodia between 1980 and 1982, which was then replaced by a number of SRVAF An-26s. These, however, had also to be flown by Soviet pilots, because the Vietnamese lacked qualified crews for them. This practice was to be continued through the rest of the 1980s.
Back to the Vietnamese offensive against the Khmer Rouge: by January 1985, the fighting spilled over the border around Ampil. The Vietnamese used artillery and tanks, forcing the Thai to react. The Thai Army called in RTAF for support and soon A-37s were flying bombing missions. The Vietnamese were prepared for this, and on 8 January, they brought down an A-37B with a SA-7. The RTAF continued to fly attack sorties with A-37s and F-5s until the Vietnamese withdrew a few days later. When the Vietnamese offensive was concluded, in March 1985, it was declared for “another success” by Hanoi. In fact, the Khmer were weakened, but not wiped out. Ever since, the Vietnamese altered their tactics: realized the pointlessness of expending immense efforts in skirmishes with the evasive guerrilla, the Vietnamese concentrated on winning the hearts and minds of the Cambodian population, while attempting to conserve their resources. On the other side, the guerrilla had their own problems as well: most of the KPNLF leaders were US-trained members of the former Cambodian Army, the training and previous experience of which made it difficult for them to adapt to the changing requirements of the guerrilla war. The Khmer had it easier, benefiting from their earlier experiences; the ANS, on the contrary, came out pretty badly shot-up from the campaign in 1984-1985, and subsequently attempted to avoid unnecessary confrontations, instead concentrating on penetrations deep into Cambodia, in order to increase its influence.
An RTAF F-5E from the 102nd Squadron/1st Wing of Korat is seen returning from a patrol along the Cambodian border in 1987. The Thai F-5Es were engaged in both escort and ground attack missions. (Albert Grandolini collection)
In addition, antagonizing Thailand proved not to be the best idea: in late May 1985 the Thai Marines were sent to attack Vietnamese troops dug-in along the southern part of the mutual border. This limited offensive was supported by the RTAF, which hit the Vietnamese hard. Thai fighter-bombers remained active in the following weeks and months, with F-5s and A-37s flying a large number of CAS sorties. The Vietnamese response was weak, then the Thais reported only eleven “attacks” of Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns or missiles. In fact, at the time the Vietnamese forces were overstretched. Hanoi was unable to support protracted offensives, and the Army could not operate offensively in several parts of Cambodia simultaneously. The SRVNAF was also facing considerable problems. The number of available Su-22M-3Ks – their only fighter-bombers capable of carrying heavier warloads – was always low, as some had to be held back for the defence of Vietnam, and some were always in maintenance, while the MiG-21s proved poor in COIN warfare. Consequently, they lacked firepower and started adapting C-130 and An-26 transport aircraft as bombers.
In an attempt to prevent the guerrilla from reaching deeper into Cambodia, from the mid-1980s the Vietnamese and the KPRAF reinforced especially the Military Region 4, in the north-western Cambodia, and even started undertaking preventive operations over the Thai border. By 1986, namely, the Khmer Rouge were so weakened by the Vietnamese attacks, that most of the Khmers took refuge in Thailand – in camps already overcrowded by their former opponents; the ANS and the KPNLF, however, became increasingly popular in Cambodia, as the population could still remember the times they ruled as those of (relative) peace and prosperity. Consequently, the Vietnamese concentrated some 45.000 troops – including their elite units, like E.117/Dak Kong (Special Action) brigade - in this region alone, and these were permanently engaged in intensive patrols.
The Thais were not to sit still, however. By January 1987 the regime in Phnom Penh claimed that RTAF aircraft violated the Cambodian airspace no less but 33 times: this is a very good indication of how massive the Thai operations along the mutual border actually were – especially given the fact that the poor radar coverage of the Cambodian airspace likely failed to detect dozens of other sorties, then the Thai Uh-1s, L-19s, A-37s, and F-5s were flying almost permanent combat air patrols along the border! The troops on the ground knew very well what was going on and soon enough the first reports became known about the Vietnamese regular troops being frequently hit by RTAF F-5Es, dropping napalm. Most of such operations were unopposed by the SRVAF or the KPRAF, even if these operated Mi-8s, Mi-24s, and T-28s in the area. But, in the same month a RTAF L-19 was shot down inside Cambodia. In return, the Thais started supplying SA-7 MANPADs to Khmer and KPNLF, and only a month later also a Vietnamese Mi-8 was shot down near Phnom Priel. Nevertheless, due to the low intensity of Vietnamese and Cambodian air operations, most of the expensive MANPADS rotted in the humidity long before there was any opportunity for their use.
Throughout the 1980s the SRVAF used mainly converted transports as bombers. Helicopter gunships - such as this Mi-8 - also saw extensive use for ground support. Fighter-bombers were brought in from Vietnam only during the annual dry season offensives. This SRVAF Mi-8 from the 917th Regiment is seen during preparations for another combat sortie. (A. Grandolini collection)
The Vietnamese meanwhile decided to change their tactics and start engaging Thais in a conventional war. Having cleared the border area of guerrilla camps they decided to take and hold portions of Thai territory, in order to deny guerrilla infiltrations. By January 1988 they therefore occupied the Chong Bok mountain pass, south of Ubon. The RTAF F-5s were sent to bomb the place several times and in April supported a Thai Army counteroffensive. The areas was not brought back under the control of Bang Kong, however, before another counterattack, staged by Thai special forces, which took the place only after it was heavily pounded by RTAF F-5s.
[url]http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_411.shtml[/url]
[/quote]
Today the situation in Cambodia border is remain peaceful (before the recent standoff) The main concerns is on Thai-Burmese border because there are always a fighting between Burmese government and Burmese ethnic groups so sometime the unknown side cross border or their artillery are accidentally fires to Thailand. Also there are many drug factory there. When they produce drugs they will send to Thailand as a channel to many country, sometime even to USA.
There are a recent heavy fighting in 1999. Please refers to acig's article again. :)
[quote][B][SIZE="4"]The Battle at Border Post 9631[/SIZE][/B]
How much is the situation in Myanmar dependable on actions of country’s neighbours, but also how complex the situation in that country meanwhile is (in regards to relations between the regime, drugs, and different rebel organizations) was perfectly illustrated by a series of sharp clashes between Burma and Thailand, in February 2001.
In order to support the UWSA in its fight against the SSA, and help it establish the full control of the areas along the border to Thailand, the Myanmar Army launched an operation that was to result in the fighting with Thai military as well. While the Myanmar regime would not comment about these operations, meanwhile it is known that the fiercest series of battles was fought for the Thai Border Post 9631, mounted on a hilltop one kilometre inside Thailand, at Ban Pang Noon, in the Mae Fae Luang district, on approach to the Mae Sai, a city some 440 miles away from Bangkok, in the northernmost tip of Thailand. The exact reasons for the attack on this border post remain unclear: some Thai sources indicated that the Myanmaris attacked the Border Post 9631 – garrisoned by 20 Tahan Pran Militia troops – either “by accident”, while pursuing Shon guerrilla, or in order to get a good fire-base for their artillery attacks against the nearby Shon positions. It is interesting to note, however, that this attack came on the evening of Friday, 9 February 2001, when most of the Thai military was on a leave. In fact, the unofficial sources within the Thai Army indicated that the attack was undertaken by no less but 900 Myanmar troops and 600 UWSA militiamen, and that its objective was to remove the Thais from a position from which the Myanmaris could smuggle drugs into Thailand. In the past, namely, the local commander of the Tahan Pran was several times offered money to let their convoys with drugs pass, but he refused all such offers (in fact, he should have told the Myanmaris to, “go feed fish” with their opium).
Regardless the backgrounds, the Tahan Pran detected the approaching Myanmaris in time and put up stiff resistance, holding out for four hours, killing 14 out of some 200 Myanmari attackers, and injuring another 30, while losing two dead and eleven wounded. After almost running out of ammunition, however, they had to pull out and the Post 9631 fell into Myanmari hands. Having taken all their injured with them, the Tahan Pran were relatively easy to pursue by the enemy, and a short running engagement developed until the 3rd Cavalry Regiment of the Thai 1st Armoured Division started a rescue effort. Having the Post 9631 in their hands, the Myanmaris actually needed no more fighting, but their intention was to use the post and the surviving Tahan Prans as a bait for a trap they attempted to set up for any intervening Thai unit. As the Tahan Pran held out longer than anticipated, however, their plan was spoiled, as instead of deploying their troops on the flanks on the main threat route, the Myanmaris were forced to involve their reservers in the fighting.
On 10 February, the Thai 3rd Cavalry Regiment assembled a battalion-sized task force from a part of a mechanized infantry battalion armed with M-113A-3 APCs, an infantry company and a company of M-60A-3 MBTs. The unit was put under command of Capt. Songkarn Nilphan, and instantly sent on its way. Approaching Mae Sai on the same evening, the Nilphan’s force counterattacked the Myanmaris that were still busy fighting the Tahan Prans. The Cavalry charged forward, hitting the enemy hit very hard, forcing them to retreat back towards the border, leaving 17 dead and 60 injured behind. The Thais had only seven wounded.
On the morning of 11 February, the Myanmar Army responded in strength, deploying three regiments supported by Chinese-supplied T-69 tanks and artillery into an attack against Mae Sae, the local military Headquarters, and the adjacent satellite communications site. The Thais first concentrated on repulsing the main column, engaging T-69s with their M-60A3s, and subsequently by RTAF F-5s, which flew several strikes armed with LGBs, after starting from the Chiang Mai AB. Later on Sunday, Thai forces were reinforced by some self-propelled artillery (M-109s) and several batteries of even more powerful guns, including some GCN-55s, and the remaining two Myanmar columns were stopped as well, after suffering some heavy losses in dead, injured and captured soldiers. While the whole 3rd Thai Army was mobilizing and deploying reinforcements towards Mae Sai, the RTAF continued mounting intensive strikes, hitting Myanmar positions and supply columns. Late on Sunday afternoon, the final counter-attack by Thai troops drove Myanmaris out of Thailand, re-capturing the Border Post 9631. There an injured Tahan Pran officer - previously assumed dead - was found alive.
A Royal Thai Army V-150 Com*mando vehicle deployed on the streets of Mae Sae in January 2001, at the time of "border incidents" with Myanmar. (Albert Grandolini collection)
Meanwhile, the fighting between Thai and Myanmari forces was reported also from a hill some two miles west of the city of Thachilek, which is separated by a canal from Mae Sai. Also, a RTAF UH-1H helicopter underway on a supply mission over Mae Aye was damaged by gunfire from the ground and forced to land. The crew was not injured.
At 19:30h local time, a cease-fire was agreed. This was generally accepted, but sporadic fighting continued as the Myanmaris were bringing in 2.000 fresh troops from Kengtung to Tachilek, together with some heavy weapons. Especially the artillery was involved in the sense of duels over the border and some additional strikes by RTAF aircraft. The RTAF Chian Mai AB was the main base for all Thai air operations during this battle, and the Royal Thai Air Force units deployed there proved highly successful in operations against Myanmar. RTAF fighters have flown up to 70 combat sorties between 10 and 12 February, including a LGB-strike against a Myanmar artillery battery placed on the Golf course at Thachilek. This mission was flown by one F-5F and three F-5Es. The F-5F was equipped with the Israeli Litening nav/attack and designation pod: the WSO in the F-5F designated the target, while his pilot tried to fly steady – while remaining out of range of air defences. The three F-5Es closed from different sides at a high speed and tossed two six 2.000pds Paveway LGBs each into the acquisition basket before disappearing the other way. The Myanmar anti-aircraft fire was reported as "light", and none of Thai aircraft was hit or damaged. According to Thai sources, except for at least a dozen of Myanmar troops, at least five civilians were killed and ten injured during this attack as well.
Two RTAF F-5Es seen displayed with an asortiment of US-made bombs, including GBU-16s and LITENING-pods - during a graduation ceremony in 2001. The same aircraft and weapons were used against the Myanmari troops. (Albert Grandolini collection)
[SIZE="4"][B]No Tandaw Lay in the Air[/B][/SIZE]
The RTAF F-5E/Fs were completely refurbished in the early 1990s, getting a Litton INS, and having their structure strengthened by a centreline pylon capable to carry 1.500kg, inner underwing pylons with payload of 1.000kg, and outer underwing pylons with payload of 500kg. During the operations against Myanmar, their usual warload consisted of two LGBs carried under inner pylons and two wingtips, but no drop tanks. Some pilots described their aircraft as "difficult to handle" and "ponderous" when loaded that way, and the response to control-inputs as "very slow" (probably due to the change of the centre of gravity), but otherwise no other restrictions were experienced.
On the other side, the TL failed to show during the crisis. At the time the regime in Rangoon officially claimed to that a squadron of Israeli-upgraded F-7s would be deployed to support the ground forces in the area along the Thai border: in fact, the junta ordered all the three F-7-units to deploy. Theoretically, in this way the TL was to concentrate at least 30 fighters against Thailand. However, in effect only six fighters were made operational and indeed deployed to Kengtung AB, some 150km north of Tachilek (opposite Mai Sai District in Thailand): this was actually on the verge of the F-7’s range when loaded with weapons and ammunition, and definitely a very poor performance. Worse was yet to come: when RTAF F-5s started hitting targets inside Myanmar with LGBs, the TL F-7s never appeared at all. Of the remaining aircraft, at the time of this clash the TL had some 17 PC-7s, four PC-9s, and four G-4 Super Galebs, some 50% of which were operational on average. The condition of the A-5Ms was even poorer than that of the F-7s, and the number of remaining operational helicopters too. Essentially, Myanmar had no air force to show at the time.
The Myanmari air defences also failed to prevent RTAF fighters from repeatedly hitting their targets: although the Army purchased at least 100 SA-16 Gimlet/Igla 1E MANPADs already in 1998 from Bulgaria, there were no reports about their use in combat. Obviously, the RTAF was in possession of air superiority during this clash. Without surprise, on 19 June 2001 Rangoon reported that Burma ordered ten MiG-29 fighters from Russia, including two one-seaters and two two-seaters, woth $130 million in total (30% of which were to be paid immediately, and the rest over the following ten years). The Burmese MiG-29s, which so far were never seen in the public, were drawn from a park of some 70 Fulcrums built in the late 1980s and early 1990s for Iraq and Syria, but never delivered, instead being stored at the Lukhovitsy Machine Building Plant. How much are the TL’s MiG-29 capable to offset RTAF’s superiority remains questionable, however, especially given the condition of the Myanmar Air Force at the time and ever since. Namely, by early 2002 reports from Meikhtila AB became known about TL’s pilots resigning in droves. Supposedly, the main reason was the low quality of the equipment they've got from China (foremost the F-7s and A-5s): most of the aircraft were inoperational and parked in their hangars for 99% of the time, and the arrogant behaviour of the Chinese technicians and instructors stationed in Myanmar (together with their families) to maintain these jets was the reason of severe complaints. Several AF pilots which resigned actually accused the Chinese of inserting their intelligence officers into the TL instead of sending them to help.
Another reason for many officers resigning was the purchase of the MiG-29s. Most of the higher officers of the TL were against the purchase of the MiG-29s from Russia, and instead wanted the TL to get Mirage 2000s or Su-27. This finally caused - just for example - a fierce quarrel between the CO of the Wing stationed at Meikhtila and his superiors. He was explaining that MiGs - which were initially built for Iraq - cost too much for no worth in exchange, and were sitting over ten years in storage. Besides, so he supposedly said, MiG-29s couldn't match Thai F-16s. As "thanks" for his advises, he was relieved of command, demoted and transferred to the Myitkyina AB. He then protested and resigned too. In order not to make things worse, the government officials then approached him and offered him a lucrative job in the UMEH (Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings).
In total, the TL remains not combat capable: hardly 10-20% of its aircraft are flyable – stress is on “flyable”, not fully combat operational – on average. This, despite the government supposedly spending as much as 50% of the BNP for "defence"! There are strong reasons to believe that the situation changed considerably solely due to the arrival of MiG-29s: namely, the type is heavily dependable on support from the ground, without which it cannot effectively operate. In April 2001, with Chinese support Myanmar has built a new radar station on Zadetkale Island (also known as St. Luke’s Island), near the maritime border with Thailand, but this site is simply too far away from the focal points along the long border where the new fighters could be needed to challenge RTAF’s air superiority.
Burma acquired a total of ten MiG-29s from Russia, in 2001, including two two-seaters. It appears the acquizition of the type caused a number of TL's officers to resign in protest for government failing to acquire other fighters, such like Mirage 2000 or Su-27s. The type is in service with a single squadron, based at Shante AB, near Meiktila, and was rarely seen in public. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)
[B][SIZE="4"]An End of the War?[/SIZE][/B]
The situation at Mae Sai was finally solved through negotiations, even if initially both sides deployed additional forces in the area: in mid-February 2001 the Thai Army, for example, reinforced the elements of the 1st Armoured Division by parts of the 2nd Cavalry Division – equipped with M-41 Stingray tanks and V-150 armoured cars. On 14 February the RTAF also deployed a number of F-16s to Chaing Mai AB, and these flew constant air combat patrols along the border for the following two weeks. The situation remained tense, and on 10 May 2001 RTAF F-16s attacked targets in Kyauket area, in the Shon State: according to Myanmar sources, several objects in the villages of Gawli and Lawsansaw – both almost directly on the Thai border - were hit by several “rockets” in two waves. Rangoon protested strongly against these attacks, threatening to “take appropriate action to protect its national sovereignty and territory integrity”. No additional strikes are known to have been flown by either air force: instead, a series of negotiations followed, in which the then new Thai government managed to decrease tensions.
The “body-count" after the battle for Border Post 9631 was never published by either side, but some Thai sources indicate that the Tahan Pran alone were responsible for the death of up to 80 Myanmar soldiers, while - in total – the Thai side suffered one dead and 37 injured soldiers, as well as three killed civilians and seven wounded. Official Thai sources claimed that also two women were killed in attacks of Myanmar artillery against Mae Sai. Capt. Songkarn Nilphan later claimed that nearly 100 Myanmar troops were killed during this battle: even if he confirmed that Thai troops reported finding only three bodies inside the Post 9631, the Thais believed that many other bodies were taken back to Myanmar. On the Myanmari side, Col. Kyaw Thein, a senior intelligence office, confirmed that the Myanmar Army lost 12 troops killed and 15 wounded during these “border skirmishes”, but that these casualties were suffered only during the fighting against the Shon rebels – not against the Thais.
Certain is, however, that the SLORC suffered a considerable blow on 20 February, when a Mi-17 helicopter carrying several key military officers was shot down by a MANPAD fired either by the rebels of the Karen National Union (KNU) or the Shon United Revolution Army (SURA). Among the killed was Lt.Gen. Tion Oo, chief of staff of the Myanmar Army and former Commander of the TL, Col. Thein Nyunt, the Minister of Progress of border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs, and Brig.Gen. Lun Maung. There are indications that the officers in question belonged to a fraction inside the SLORC junta, and that the helicopter was shot down for two reasons: a) because of fractional fighting, and b) because Lt.Gen. Tion Oo had to be “punished” after his plan and operations against Thailand failed.
[url]http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_346.shtml[/url][/quote]
[QUOTE=ruffneckzz;3428220]I know that Cambodia (and laos) is in between Thailand and Vietnam..
I just remembered hearing something about small clashes between Thai troops and vietnamese back in the days when vietnameses were in Cambodia. Maybe that never happened?
Just wondering if anybody here knows more about it.[/QUOTE]
At the village of Had Lek in Trat province(right on the Cambodian border) there used to be a monument commemorating a fierce battle between Royal Thai Marines and the PAVN back in the mid 80's.By all accounts the RTMC fought like lions to prevent being literally driven into the sea( find Ban Had Lek on a map and you'll see exactly what I'm talking about).It was an interesting monument made basically from small arms(both Thai and Vietnamese) and other munitions gathered from the battlfield,moulded together and set on top of a concrete bunker. I suppose as reflection of much changed relationships between Thailand,Cambodia and Vietnam the monument, and any other references to the battle have now been removed.
So the thais did battle the vietnamese..
Skyman.. Thank you.. that's exactly what I wanted to know.. very interesting..
Thanks to retrobob also
Also I knew about the history between thailand and myanmar during the 17th, 18th centuries but didn't know much about the latest conflicts.
I thought things were winding down? Is it true that Thailand seized the Ta Moan temples? I find it shameful that buddhist temples are being occupied by soldiers. [url]http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7539412.stm[/url]
[QUOTE=Skyman]The Battle at Border Post 9631[/QUOTE]
Very interesting read. I came to Thailand that month and remember reading about those “border skirmishes” in the Bangkok post but there was almost no details...at least I thought nothing of it :) (I guess that was the idea)
[QUOTE=signatory;3439466]Very interesting read. I came to Thailand that month and remember reading about those “border skirmishes” in the Bangkok post but there was almost no details...at least I thought nothing of it :) (I guess that was the idea)[/QUOTE]
Yeah, I guess that was the idea too. When the press in the skirmishes site see F-16 flaw and they said on their news channel that RTAF send F-16 to do the supersonic flypast to make the Burmese troops scare and RTAF said yes yes yes that what we are doing. rofl
I don't know about the detail also because there are no fighting detail here in Thailand.
Maybe both side see no reason why they need to fight since they want to continue import-export business again. :hug:
[QUOTE=DizBukHaPeter;3439410]I thought things were winding down? Is it true that Thailand seized the Ta Moan temples? I find it shameful that buddhist temples are being occupied by soldiers. [url]http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7539412.stm[/url][/QUOTE]
:) This temple even on the Tourism Authority of Thailand website listed as a Tourist attraction in Surin and it is a National Herritage for more than 75 years. The Cambodian official maybe misunderstanding. There are Thaharn Phran (The Black suite para military) base around that site for many many years because this temple is just one or two hundread meters from border. I think that thing in the BBC news can happens because Te Muean Temple is very close to the border. Thai and Cambidian people has a festival there every years. I think no serious, just misunderstanding. :hug:
[url]http://www.tourismthailand.org/attraction/surin-32-4083-1.html[/url]
But I want to highlight this sentense from DizBukHaPeter.
[B]I find it shameful that buddhist temples are being occupied by soldiers.[/B]
Both side should stop this stupidity soon. :-(
Photo from Manager.co.th.
[img]http://img368.imageshack.us/img368/9793/551000009888803rs8.jpg[/img]
[img]http://img365.imageshack.us/img365/5854/551000009888807qu9.jpg[/img]
[img]http://img80.imageshack.us/img80/5769/551000009888801mp9.jpg[/img]
[img]http://img390.imageshack.us/img390/3968/551000009888802az4.jpg[/img]
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BTW, 2008 is the Amazing Thailand Grand Sale Year. We make a lot of money from 2006 Coup when tanks in Bangkok became a hot tourist spot. We might do this again this time. Launching campaign like [b]'Come and Experience The Teste of War In The Amazing Thailand Year' with discount tourist package from Visa card.[/b] rofl rofl rofl rofl rofl rofl rofl rofl rofl
[img]http://img227.imageshack.us/img227/8240/visaea9.jpg[/img]
I also heard that the Cambodian invited Vietnamese and Chinese military advisers to oversee the situation, hear anything about this Skyman?
[QUOTE=DizBukHaPeter;3439814]I also heard that the Cambodian invited Vietnamese and Chinese military advisers to oversee the situation, hear anything about this Skyman?[/QUOTE]
There are news report on local Thai media said that, according to Thai intelligent, Cambodian army send the Vietnamese military advisor to the unit deployed around the border. Never heard about Chinese. :)
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[B][SIZE="4"][I]Thai FM clarifies troop deployment at Ta Muen Thom[/I][/SIZE][/B]
By Supalak Ganjanakhundee
The Nation
[B]The Thai foreign ministry defended on Monday the deployment of troops at the ruin of Ta Muen Thom temple in the Northeastern Thai province of Surin.
The troops have been over there for years, said the ministry's chief spokesman Tharit Charungvat.[/B]
However, Var Kimhong, chairman of the Cambodia Border Committee, told Agence France Pressethat Ta Muen is in Cambodia's territory.
[B]Cambodia also alleged that Thailand had occupied the ruin since 1998 by sending 70 Thai troops to protect the historical site.[/B]
The Thai foreign ministry, however, dismissed Cambodia's claim of alleged Thai encroachment.
Earlier, Thailand and Cambodia were also locked in a border military stand-off over the Preah Vihear Temple following the listing of this ancient Hindu ruin as a World Heritage site.
[B]Ta Muen Thom, the 13th-century Hindu temple situated on the Thai-Cambodian border, is a group of three pagodas.[/B]
The area is part of the disputed boundary where demarcation has not yet completed.
[B]According to Tharit, the presence of Thai troops should not be seen as a cause of conflict since both countries have armed forces to provide safety in the area.
"Thailand has not bosted the number of troops," he added.[/B]
[B]Commander of the Thai Armed Forces, Gen Boonsrang Niumpradit, yesterday called on Cambodia to pull back its troops from the area to avoid a further dispute.[/B]
But Cambodia's Defense Minister Tea Banh did not respond to the call, he said.
[B]According to Thai authorities, the Ta Muen complex is in Thai territory as evidenced by the Fine Arts Department's registration of the ancient ruin as a Thai national archeological site 73 years ago. [/B]
Meanwhile Thailand has nominated Prasat Ta Muen Thom, which becomes the latest border dispute with Cambodia, to be listed as a Unesco World Heritage site, Fine Arts Department director general Kriengkrai Sampatchalit said Monday.
[B]The Unesco is scheduled to consider the Thai nomination of the Prasat Ta Muen Thom and other Prasats in Surin, Buri Ram and Nakhon Ratchasima under "the Khmer Civilisation Route," in its meeting next year, he said. [/B]
[B]"It is true that the Prasat is located just about 100 metres from the border in the Thai soil. The Fine Arts Department has found and registered as one our Thai ancient items since 1935, or about 73 years ago," he said. [/B]
[B]The Thai side has since then renovated it and opened it for public long time ago, he said, adding the Cambodian government has acknowledged the renovation and all activities related to the place. [/B]
Kriengkrai also responded to a latest report last week that the Khmer troops tried to cross the border to visit the place, but the Thai army declined their attempt. The Khmer troops reportedly intended to station there.
[B]He said Prasat Ta Muen Thom has usually welcomed all visitors but the Thai army stepped in to take care of the Khmer visit because they came in uniform and were armed with weapons.[/B]
[url]http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/08/04/national/national_30079699.php[/url]
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Older news.
[SIZE="4"][I][B]Hun sen insists Thais must pull back first[/B][/I][/SIZE]
By The Nation, Agencies
Published on July 30, 2008
[B]Army chief says withdrawal will take time; govts still trying diplomacy[/B]
[B]Phnom Penh -Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen placed the ball firmly in Thailand's court over the Preah Vihear issue, saying it was up to Bangkok to decide on withdrawing troops from the border.[/B]
Speaking to reporters in Phnom Penh, Hun Sen indicated that Thailand would have to pull out first.
[B]"For us, there is no problem at all. The issue is that it is up to Thailand to decide to act. For us, [we are ready] any time," he said.
"The problem is the timing and how long it will take the Thai side to get a political decision from the govฌernment."[/B]
His comments came one day after Cambodian Foreign Minister Hor Namhong and his Thai counterpart Tej Bunnag held talks on Monday in Siem Reap with a handful of top milฌitary officials from both countries.
The two countries agreed in prinฌciple to a redeployment of troops from the area near the 11thcentury Preah Vihear temple, where thousands of soldiers have been facing off for two weeks. After about 12 hours of talks, the foreign ministers said they would ask their governments to redeploy the troops.
Although the territorial disฌpute was not solved, the two sides agreed to continue to use "utmost restraint" to avoid an armed confrontation and to continue discussions on a bilateral basis.
Thailand's Army chief conฌfirmed that any withdrawal from the border area would take time.
[B]"The resolution from the meeting between Cambodia and Thailand [on Monday] will help relieve tension and improve the situation," Anupong Paojinda said by phone.
"Reducing the troops at the border, however, needs an order from the govฌernment first."[/B]
But Thai Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej sought to reassure the public, telling reporters: "The Foreign Ministry is talking to the milฌitary. Everything is fine."
[B]"Both sides are convinced that the bilateral mechanism is still there for us to utilise," said Thai Foreign Ministry spokesman Tharit Charungvat.[/B]
Prior to the Siem Reap meeting, Cambodia had appealed to both Asean and the United Nations Security Council to intervene in the border row. More than 1,500 troops from the two countries have been disฌpatched to the area.
"We carry pens and pencils," said Tharit. "We cannot speak for those who carry guns and weapons."
[B][U]But Tharit claimed the Foreign Ministry had received assurances from the Thai military, which has a tendency to act independently of the government in Thailand, that they would avoid a confrontation at all costs.
"They confirmed that they said the first gunshot will not be from the Thai side, and if there is a first gunshot they will not immediately respond but investigate the source first," said the Thai foreign ministry spokesman, who attended the Siem Reap meeting.[/U][/B]
[url]http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/07/30/national/national_30079347.php[/url]
[IMG]http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3138/2724373996_22ac2cca25_o.jpg[/IMG]
