The Ultramar War

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The Portuguese Colonial War, Ultramar War ("Overseas War") or, among some guerrilla sympathizers, Guinea-Bissauan Revolution, was fought between Portugal's military and the emerging nationalist movements in Portugal's African colonies between 1961 and 1974. During the 1960s various armed independence movements became active in these areas, most notably in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea. An increasingly expensive military effort costing up to half its government's revenue forced Portugal to withdraw: it was unable to defeat the guerrillas, and the fighting ended in a high-priced stalemate.
The conflict began in Angola on 4 February, 1961, in an area called the Zona Sublevada do Norte (ZSN or the Rebel Zone of the North), consisting of the provinces of Zaire, Uíge and Cuanza Norte. The liberation movements wanted national self-determination, while for the Portuguese, their belief in a multi-racial, assimilated overseas empire justified going to war to prevent its breakup. As the war progressed, Portugal rapidly increased its mobilized forces. By the early 1970s it had reached the limit of its military capacity. Growing popular discontent over the war led to the Carnation Revolution on 25 April, 1974 in Lisbon, Portugal, an event which changed Portugal's political direction and allowed the war to end. Portugal's new leaders began a process of democratic change at home and acceptance of its former colonies' independence abroad.
Portugal had been the first European power to establish a colony in Africa when it captured Ceuta in 1415 and now it was the last to leave. The departure of the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique isolated Rhodesia, leading to the end of its white minority rule.

Political context


Portuguese colonies in Africa by the time of the Colonial War


There had always been opposition and resistance movements in the European colonies in Africa and Asia. During the twentieth century, nationalist feelings were strengthened by World War I and World War II. Many soldiers who fought in these conflicts were recruited in the colonies and were aware of the paradox of their colonial masters celebrating victory at the same time as their native lands lay under foreign rule.
Following World War II the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, encouraged — both ideologically and materially — the formation of nationalist resistance groups. At first the United States offered to support the nationalists in Angola but backed down when Portugal threatened to leave NATO. The nationalists then sought money, expertise and weapons from the Soviet Union, Cuba and China.
It is in this context that the Asian-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955. The conference presented a forum for the colonies, most of them newly independent and facing the same problem - pressure to align with one or the other superpower in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the conference the colonies were presented with an alternative. They could band together as the so-called Third World and work both to preserve the balance of power in Cold War relations and to use their new sense of independence for their own benefit by becoming an influence zone of their own. This would lessen the effect of the colonial and neo-colonial powers on the colonies, and increased their sense of unity and desire to support each other in their relationships with the other powers.

FAP's heli operating in an African theatre during the Overseas War


In the late 1950s, the Portuguese Armed Forces saw themselves confronted with the paradox generated by the dictatorial regime of Estado Novo that had been in power since 1926: on the one hand, the policy of Portuguese neutrality in World War II placed the Portuguese Armed Forces out of the way of a possible East-West conflict; on the other hand, the regime felt the increased responsibility of the keeping Portugal's vast overseas territories under control. There the postwar tension approached the level of the separatist fights in the colonies of the Imperial Europe. With all this, the same leaders that declared Portugal neutral in the war for the European liberation, chose to have Portugal join the military structure of NATO, in a subtle desire to ally with the victors. This was to the detriment of military preparations against nationalist threats in Portugal's colonial territories that the political regime considered essential for the survival of the nation.
This integration of Portugal in the Atlantic Alliance would form a military élite that would become essential during the planning and implementation of the operations during the Overseas War. This "NATO generation" would ascend quickly to the highest political positions and military command without having to provide evidence of loyalty to the regime. The Colonial War would establish, in this way, a split between the military structure -- heavily influenced by the western powers with democratic governments -- and the political power of the regime. Some analysts see the "Botelho Moniz côup as the beginning of this rupture, the origin of a lapse on the part of the regime to keep up a unique command center, an armed force prepared for threats of conflict in the colonies. This situation would cause, as would be verified later, a lack of coordination between the three general staffs (Army, Air force and Navy).

Armed conflict


Angola


Portuguese soldiers in Angola.


Main article: Angolan War of Independence
In Angola, the rebellion of the ZSN was taken up by the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), which changed its name to Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) in 1962. On February 4 1961, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola took credit for the attack on the prison of Luanda, where seven policemen were killed. On March 15, 1961, the UPA, in a tribal attack, started the massacre of white populations and black workers born in other regions of Angola. This region would be retaken by large military operations that, however, would not stop the spread of the guerrilla actions to other regions of Angola, such as Cabinda, the east, the southeast and the central plateaus.

Guinea-Bissau

PAIGC emblem



A PAIGC soldier with an AK-47



PAIGC's checkpoint in 1974


In Guinea-Bissau, the Marxist African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) started fighting in January 1963. Its guerrilla fighters attacked the Portuguese headquarters in Tite, located to the south of Bissau, the capital, near the Corubal river . Similar actions quickly spread across the entire colony, requiring a strong response from the Portuguese forces.
The war in Guinea placed face to face Amílcar Cabral, the leader of PAIGC, and António de Spínola, the Portuguese general responsible for the local military operations. In 1965 the war spread to the eastern part of the country and in that same year the PAIGC carried out attacks in the north of the country where at the time only the minor guerrilla movement, the Front for the Liberation and Independence of Guinea (FLING), was fighting. By that time, the PAIGC started receiving military support from the Socialist Bloc, mainly from Cuba, a support that would last until the end of the war.
In Guinea the Portuguese troops mainly took a defensive position, limiting themselves to keeping the territories they already held. This kind of action was particularly devastating to the Portuguese troops who were constantly attacked by the forces of the PAIGC. They were also demoralized by the steady growth of the influence of the liberation supporters among the population that was being recruited in large numbers by the PAIGC.
With some strategic changes by António Spínola in the late 1960s, the Portuguese forces gained momentum and, taking the offensive, became a much more effective force. Between 1968 and 1972, the Portuguese forces took control of the situation and sometimes carried attacks against the PAIGC positions. At this time the Portuguese forces were also adopting subversive means to counter the insurgents, attacking the political structure of the nationalist movement. This strategy culminated in the assassination of Amílcar Cabral in January 1973. Nonetheless, the PAIGC continued to fight back and pushed the Portuguese forces to the limit. This became even more visible after PAIGC received anti-aircraft weapons provided by the Soviets, especially the SA-7 rocket launchers, thus undermining the Portuguese air superiority.

Mozambique

Mozambique was the last territory to start the war of liberation. Its nationalist movement was led by the Marxist-Leninist Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), which carried out the first attack against Portuguese targets on September 24 1964, in Chai, province of Cabo Delgado. The fighting later spread to Niassa, Tete at the centre of the country. A report from Battalion No. 558 of the Portuguese army makes references to violent actions, also in Cabo Delgado, on August 21 1964.
On November 16 of the same year, the Portuguese troops suffered their first losses fighting in the north of the country, in the region of Xilama. By this time, the size of the guerrilla movement had substantially increased; this, along with the low numbers of Portuguese troops and colonists, allowed a steady increase in FRELIMO's strength. It quickly started moving south in the direction of Meponda and Mandimba, linking to Tete with the aid of Malawi.
Until 1967 the FRELIMO showed less interest in Tete region, putting its efforts on the two northernmost districts of the country where the use of landmines became very common. In the region of Niassa, FRELIMO's intention was to create a free corridor to Zambézia. Until April 1970, the military activity of FRELIMO increased steadily, mainly due to the strategic work of Samora Machel in the region of Cabo Delgado.

Role of the Organisation of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded May 1963. Its basic principles were co-operation between African nations and solidarity between African peoples. Another important objective of the OAU was an end to all forms of colonialism in Africa. This became the major objective of the organization in its first years and soon OAU pressure led to the situation in the Portuguese colonies being brought up at the UN Security Council.
The OAU established a committee based in Dar es Salaam, with representatives from Ethiopia, Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Tanzania, Zaire, Guinea, Senegal and Nigeria, to support African liberation movements. The support provided by the committee included military training and weapon supplies.
The OAU also took action in order to promote the international acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), composed by the FNLA. This support was transferred to the MPLA and to its leader, Agostinho Neto in 1967. In November of 1972, both movements were recognized by the OAU in order to promote their merger. After 1964, the OAU recognized PAIGC as the legitimate representatives of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and in 1965 recognised FRELIMO for Mozambique.

Opposition

The government presented as a general consensus that the colonies were a part of the national unity, closer to overseas provinces than to true colonies. The communists were the first party to oppose the official view, since they saw the Portuguese presence in the colonies as an act against the colonies' right to self determination. During its 5th Congress, in 1957, the illegal Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was the first political organization to demand the immediate and total independence of the colonies. However, being the only truly organized opposition movement, the PCP had to play two roles. One role was that of a communist party with an anti-colonialist position; the other role was to be a cohesive force drawing together a broad spectrum of opposing parties. Therefore it had to accede to views that didn't reflect its true anticolonial position.
Several opposition figures outside the PCP also had anticolonial opinions, such as the candidates to the fraudulent presidential elections, like Norton de Matos (in 1949), Quintão Meireles (in 1951) and Humberto Delgado (in 1958). The communist candidates had, obviously, the same positions. Among them were Rui Luís Gomes and Arlindo Vicente, the first would not be allowed to participate in the election and the second would support Delgado in 1958.
After the electoral fraud of 1958, Humberto Delgado formed the Movimento Nacional Independente (MNI, translated as the Independent National Movement) that, in October of 1960, agreed that there was a need to prepare the people in the colonies, before giving them the right of self-determination. Despite this, no detailed policies for achieving this goal were set out.
In 1961, the nº8 of the Military Tribune had as its title "Let's end the war of Angola". The authors were linked to the Juntas de Acção Patriótica (JAP), supporters of Humberto Delgado, and responsible for the attack on the barracks of Beja. The National Liberation Front of Angola (FPLN), founded in December 1962, attacked the conciliatory positions. The official feeling of the Portuguese state, despite all this, was the same: Portugal had inalienable and legitimate rights over the colonies and this was what was transmitted through the media and through the state propaganda.
In April 1964, the Directory of Democratic-Social Action presented a political solution rather than a military one. In agreement with this initiative in 1966, Mário Soares suggested there should be a referendum on the overseas policy Portugal should follow, and that the referendum should be preceded by a national discussion to take place in the six months prior to the referendum.
The end of Salazar's rule in 1968, due to illness, did not prompt any change in the political panorama. The radicalization of the opposition movements started with the younger people who also felt victimized by the continuation of the war. The universities played a key role in the spread of this position. Several magazines and newspapers were created, such as Cadernos Circunstância, Cadernos Necessários, Tempo e Modo, and Polémica that supported this view. It was in this environment that the Armed Revolutionary Action (ARA), the armed branch of the Portuguese Communist party created in the late 1960s, and the Revolutionary Brigades (BR), a left-wing organization, became an important force of resistance against the war, carrying out multiple sabotages and bombings against military targets. The ARA began its military actions in October of 1970, keeping them up until August of 1972. The major actions were the attack on the Tancos air base that destroyed several helicopters on March 8 1971, and the attack on the NATO headquarters at Oeiras in October of the same year. The BR, on its side, began armed actions on 7 November 1971, with the sabotage of the NATO base at Pinhal de Armeiro, the last action being carried out 9 April 1974, against the Niassa ship which was preparing to leave Lisboa with troops to be deployed in Guinea. The BR acted even in the colonies, placing a bomb in the Military Command of Bissau on 22 February1974.
Furthermore, the alliance of the business and financial sectors, middle classes and worker's movements made an important mark on the policy of the regime in 1973. They now were supporting the independence of the colonies, a few months before the Carnation Revolution.

Economic consequences of the war


Evolution of the expenditure of the Portuguese state with the military during the war


The State Budget during the 1960s and the 1970s clearly expressed the Portuguese financial sacrifice in order to keep fighting in Africa. Obviously the country's expenditure on the armed forces ballooned since the beginning of the war in 1961. The expenses were divided into ordinary and extraordinary ones; the latter were the main factor in the huge increase in the military budget, making war in the colonies a severe financial burden. Since the rise of Marcello Caetano, after Salazar's incapability, spending on military forces increased even further.

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Portuguese Colonial Wars: Guiné 1960-1974

In our days, Portugal is a small country, but it should be remembered that once before it was both, the first and the last of the great European colonial powers. Discoveries inspired by Henry the Navigator in the 15th and early 16th Century turned Portugal in what was for several centuries the world’s third largest empire, which military fought numerous wars, most of which are forgotten in the English-speaking world today. Although the Portuguese sources are extensive, they are usually (and quite understandably) written in Portuguese, and thus inaccessible to the outsiders.

While there is no intention this article to discuss the Portuguese colonial politics, for orientation purposes several basic facts should be described. For example, from the early 1950s the Portuguese colonial doctrine was that the overseas territories were not “colonies”, but rather integral parts of Portugal, or “overseas provinces” – with special laws suited to their particular level of development, but ruled from Lisbon. It should also be mentioned, that at the time Portugal was ruled by Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar: although he was always denying that his regime was totalitarian, today all authoritative sources have little doubts about Salazar’s right-wing and authoritarian posture, about the fact that there was only a show of a national assembly in Lisbon, as well as that all the opposition was suppressed by the secret police (Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado, or PIDE).

The Portuguese prided themselves on their racial tolerance – and to some degree degree this claim was justified: even if there was a kind of racial segregation there were no such official laws like segregation in the USA, or the Apartheid regulations in South Africa. All African provinces retained their own customs, languages, and religions, and had a considerable number of so-called “assimilados”, Africans who had learned Portuguese, accepted Christianity, shown that they could provide for themselves and their families – but also signed the declaration of loyalty: as such, they were granted all the privileges and liabilities of Portuguese citizenship.

For such reasons, as well as due to the fact that during the 500 years they were in Africa the Portuguese experienced revolts and even invasions but always won through in the end, when a series of uprisings developed in their overseas provinces in the early 1960s, they were slow to recognize the signs of the time. Namely, it was exactly these “assimilados” who became aware of what was happening in other African colonies, and who became sympathetic to the cause of the African nationalism, especially as the Portuguese colonies increasingly became surrounded by independent countries: the Portuguese were to need 13 years to realize what was actually going on.





FAP in Africa, 1960
The Portuguese Air Force (“FAP”) was officially founded as a separate branch of military in 1952, and played a crucial role during the wars in the Portuguese-Guinea, Angola, and Mozambique.

The basic unit of the FAP at the time was a wing = Esquadra. With few exceptions, each Esquadra flew a different type of aircraft, but later in the 1960s, several wings equipped with various types were organized as well. The most important Esquadras of the 1950s and 1960s were:

- Esquadra 10, Republic F-47
- Esquadra 11, Republic F-47
- Esquadra 20, Republic F-84G and Lockheed T-33A
- Esquadra 21, Republic F-84G Thunderjet
- Esquadra 31, North American T-6, Dornier Do.27, and Auster
- Esquadra 32, Junkers Ju-52, Nord 1505 Noratlas
- Esquadra 33, Aerospatiale SA.316B
- Esquadra 61, Lockheed PV-2 and Lockheed P2V-5
- Esquadra 62, Lockheed PV-2
- Esquadra 51, North American F-86F
- Esquadra 52, North American F-86F
- Esquadra 81, C-47
- Esquadra 82, DC-6
- Esquadra 91, Lockheed PV-2, Douglsa B-26, Fiat G.91R-4
- Esquadra 92, Nord 1505 Noratlas
- Esquadra 93, Republic F-84G
- Esquadra 94, Aerospatiale SA.316B

During various wars in Africa, squadron-sized detachments were established at several airfields in Angola, Guiné and Mozambique. Various references designate these as Esquadras or Esquadrons. The most important such units of the 1960s and 1970s were:

- Esquadra 101, PV-2s in Beira, Mozambique
- Esquadra 102, Noratlas in Beira, Mozambique
- Esquadra 103, PV-2s in Beira, Mozambique
- Esquadra 131, DC-6s in Portela, Portugal
- Esquadra 132, Boeing 707-3F5C, in Portela, Portugal
- Esquadra 121, Do.27s in Bissau/Bissalanca, Guiné, later Fiat G.91s
- Esquadra 122, SA.316Bs in Bissau/Bissalanca, Guiné
- Esquadra 123, Noratlas and Do.27, in Bissau/Bissalanca, Guiné
- Esquadra 501, T-6 and Do.27 in Nacala, Angola
- Esquadra 502, Fiat G.91R-4 in Nacala, Angola
- Esquadra 503, SA.316B, in Nacala, Angola
- Esquadra 701, T-6s, Do.27s and Cessna 185, in Tete, Mozambique
- Esquadra 702, Fiat G.91R-4 in Tete, Mozambique
- Esquadra 703, SA.316B and SA.330B Puma, in Tete, Mozambique
- Esquadra 801, C-47s in Lorenco Marques, Angola

Exact history of each of FAP units might be quite problematic to track – at least on the basis of English-language literature only: the FAP had a very flexible structure, and was deploying whole Esquadrons and, even more so, detachments (Esquadrillhas = Flights) from various Esquadras at relatively different airfields as available and necessary at the given point in time. Airfields and bases were spread over very different parts of the metropolitan and overseas territories; units and their detachments were shifted from one place to the other at short notice. It did happen several times for a single squadron to have flights deployed on three or even four of territories over extended periods of times. Correspondingly, the organisational structure of the air force appears complex.

The basis of the entire designation and organizational system was the nomenclature of main Portuguese airfields. On the top of this hierarchy were “Basas Aereas” – fully developed military airfields, with permanently-based FAP units. These were:

- BA.1 Lisbon Sintra, Portugal
- BA.2 Ota, Portugal (given up at an unknown date)
- BA.3 Tancos, Portugal (given up at an unknown date)
- BA.4 Lajes, Azores
- BA.5 Monte Real, Portugal
- BA.6 Montijo, Portugal
- BA.7. S. Jacinto, Portugal
- BA.8 originally planned to be built at Beira, in Mozambique
- BA.9 Luanda, Angola
- BA.10 Beira, Mozambique
- BA.11 Beja, Portugal
- BA.12 Bissau/Bissalanca, Guiné

Next most important were so-called “Aeródromo Base”: intermediate airfields, not built for, but used (also) for military purposes. In the 1960s and 1970s, these were:

- AB.1 at Cabo Verde, Guiné
- AB.2, Bissau/Bissalanca, Guiné, transformed to BA.12
- AB.3, Negage, Angola
- AB.4, Henrique de Carvalho, Angola
- AB.5, Nacala, Mozambique
- AB.6, Villa Cabral, later Nova Freixo, Mozambique
- AB.7, Tete, Mozambique
- AB.8, Lorenco Marques, Mozambique
- AB.9, Luanda, Angola, later BA.9
- AB.10, Beira, Mozambique, later BA.10
- AB.12 Bissau/Bissalanca, Guiné

Finally, there were transit airfields, Aeródromo de Transito (ATs), and forward airfields, Aeródromo de Manobras (AMs), about which much less is known. Cabo Verde, at Sal Island, is known to have been AT.1 until 1975, while in Guiné there were at least six AMs (at least three with paved runways), at Aldeia Formosa, Bafatá, Bubaque, Cufar, Nova Lamego, and Tite. Each airfield was guarded by a squadron of the Policia Aérea – FAP military police.

Correspondingly, the service history of various types in FAP is full of interesting anecdotes and usually quite problematic to reconstruct.

A classic example is that of Douglas C-47 Dakota transports in Portugal. The first aircraft of this type was “acquired” by Portuguese during the World War II, when – time and again – various US and British Dakotas were forced to land in Portugal due to technical problems. While most of these were permitted to leave after repairs, some were interned: at least a single C-47, possibly two, was taken up by the predecessor of the later Transportes Aéreos Militares (TAM), and served as VIP-transport until at least 1958. By that year at least five additional aircraft were acquired from DETA (a small airline in Portuguese Mozambique).

As of 1960, when the uprising in Guiné began, the five or six C-47s available to FAP were distributed between following units:

- Esquadra 81, based in Lisbon, Portugal
- EICPAC (Heavy Training Transport Squadron), based in Luanda, Angola
- ELTS (Medevac Transport Squadron), based in Lisbon, Portugal

By 1971, the FAP operated 18 Dakotas, obtained from very different sources. Four of these were in Angola (only two operational), ten in Mozambique (only four operational), and two with Esquadron 123 in Guiné (reinforced to three by March 1974). While the main task of Portuguese C-47s was transportation, they were also used for reconnaissance, instruction, search and rescue, and MEDEVAC-purposes, while a single example was deployed as a make-shift bomber during the war in Guiné as well.

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One of two (later three) Dakotas the FAP deployed in Guiné, was 6163, depicted here. The plane was eventually left behind and later served with the air force of Guinea Bissau (other sources indicated it was handed over to Angola, where it served with the Angolan air force). One of these three Portuguese Dakotas was modified as a make-shift bomber, and used for attacking PAIGC-bases. This artwork depicts it as wearing the insignia of 801 Esquadra, a black Pegasus on shield in Light Blue and Black, with "801" superimposed on a white circle on the top of insignia. There is no photographic evidence that this Dakota - "6163" - ever wore such insignia, but several others did. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Other types were obtained in a more direct manner. One example were 12 P2V-5 Neptunes, purchased from the Royal Netherlands Navy, in 1960. They entered service with the Esquadron 61, at Montijo, and remained based there until retirement, even if small detachments were periodically deployed to various other airfields – including Bissau/Bissalanca.

Most of Portuguese aircraft were venerable – but effective – types of US origin. By 1960, the FAP had more than 20.000 men and 150 aircraft in Africa. These included North American T-6 Harvards, Lockheed PV2 Harpoons, and Lockheed P2V Neptunes, but there were also more modern Republic F-84 Thunderjets and North American F-86G Sabres. Also, the transport air arm operated some 66 Nord 1505 Noratlas, Douglas C-47s and C-54/DC-6s, and Boeing 707 transports, as well as a small number of Austers and Do.27s. Although it is frequently said that some 85 Aerospatiale SA.316B Alouette II and SA.330 Puma helicopters were under the Army control, they actually belonged to the FAP as well, yet the air force worked in close and direct cooperation with the Army, functioning much like the Luftwaffe during the WWII.

Aside from aircraft and helicopters, the FAP included also Paratroopers in their structure – much to the dislike of some in the Portuguese Army. The “Caçadores-Paraquedistas” (literally “Hunter-Paratroops”) were an élite force used as the ground arm of the Air Force, deployed in detachments on each air force base. At the beginning of the war in Angola they were dropped from transports such as the Douglas C-54 Skymaster or the Nord Noratlas but as the Alouette III helicopters became available in larger numbers they began to work as heliborne troops. With the Alouette III having five seats the standard companies of Cacadores-Paraquedistas were based on groups of 25 men, that were carried in five helicopters. The heli-attacks of Paratroopers were made in close coordination and co-operation with other FAP units, with support jet and propeller aircraft. Another form of air support was given by specially equipped helicopters known as “heli-cannons” or “Lobo Mau”: these were Alouette IIIs equipped with a 20mm cannon mounted on the port side of the fuselage, where the left doors were removed. Heli-cannons worked as cover and close-support for the Allouette IIIs used as transports.

The versatille SA.316B Alouette III bore the brunt of Portuguese COIN wars in Africa: it could be said that the Portuguese operations in Guiné, Mozambique and Angola were "helicopter-oriented". Wherever the ground troops were sent, the helicopters led or transported them, flew reconnaissance and liaison, CASEVAC/MEDEVAC and other missions. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)


Insurgency in Guiné
The Portuguese Guinea – “Guiné” in Portuguese - was the poorest and the least populated Portuguese colony in Africa, but was considered important because of its strategic position, serving as a connection between the colonies in Angola and Mozambique, and also as administrative station. Relatively small, marsh-infested and intersected by several rivers, Guiné was also encircled by states sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and so became the place where the dissent against the colonial rule was strongest. Already in 1956 the Independence Party of Cap Verde (PAIGC) was founded by Amilcar Cabral, a Marxist, and in 1959 it organized a strike in Bissau: the Portuguese police opened fire and the situation escalated into a catastrophe with 50 dead and over 100 injured.

Like many other colonies in Africa at the time, Portuguese Guinea certainly lacked a capability even for a limited form of self-government, and PAIGC was rather an idea with a pretty pompous name than a serious political movement: Lisbon always invested only the bare minimum of capital in her colonies and gave little in return for the ample flow of natural resources from Africa. The population suffered as a result, and the harsh crushing of the protests had to result in the outbreak of an outright uprising.

Being predominantly occupied with the fighting in Angola and Mozambique, the Portuguese were caught by surprise: very early, they concluded they could not win this war. By the time, namely, run by the PAIGC’s military wing, Forcas Armadas Revolucionarias de Povo (FARC), the insurgents were a no rag-tag group: trained in Algeria, Cuba, USSR, and China, they were relatively well organized and supplied. They fought in small and very mobile groups, partially consisting from the national regular force (the “People’s Army”) and the district guerrilla force (the “People’s Guerillas”). PAIGC fighters were mainly armed with different carbines, ubiquitous AK-47s, some Breda light machine guns, but also Thompsons and – later – Cuban-supplied bazookas, 82mm mortars, and Chinese recoilless rifles. Their units carried all their supplies, ammunition, and weapons, although as the fighting intensified, immense transportation difficulties forced the FARP to organize its own naval service, based in the Republic of Guiné. In the face of such opposition, nevertheless, Lisbon could not give up because of potential effects on the situation in the other colonies.

PAIGC Logo. (via Wikipedia)


An Air Force Mosaic
The war in Guiné began in earnest in August 1961, when - after a series of requests by the PAIGC for the Portuguese to leave the Guiné, and in the light of insurgency operations with growing intensity, as well as because of the almost simultaneous outbreak of the fighting in Angola – the Portuguese began deploying units of the FAP to Bissalanca airfield (designated AB.5, for “Aeródromo-Base”: an airfield considered an intermediate FAP base), in Bissau, in order to reinforce the T-6 Texans already stationed there.

The first serious attacks against police stations and other objects in Buba, Tite, and Falacunda were undertaken by PAIGC (but also a rival movement known as FLING, which disappeared soon after), in January 1963. At the time, the Portuguese had only two companies of troops, and few North American T-6 Texans based in Bissau/Bissalanca (BA.12). Stationed at the same airfield since August 1961 was also the “Detachment 52”, equipped with eight F-86Fs (serials 5307, 5314, 5322, 5326, 5354, 5356, 5361, and 5362) of the Esquadra 51, usually based at the Basa Aerea 5, in Monte Real, in Portugal. The transfer of these Sabres via Gando (Canary Islands) and Sal (Cabo Verde Islands) run under the codename “Operation Atlas”.

The task of the Detachment 52 was close-air-support (CAS) for the Army in Guine, and Sabres saw much combat. By 1964, when they were returned to Portugal due to US pressure, they flew 577 sorties, of which 430 were of ground attack and close air support nature. In the course of these operations, FAP Sabres suffered two losses: in August 1962, 5314 overshot the runway during emergency landing with bombs still attached on underwing hardpoints and burned out, while in May 1963, 5322 was shot down by guerrilla (pilot ejected safely and was recovered shortly after). Several others suffered combat damage of various degree, but were subsequently repaired.

Two other FAP units were to deploy in Bissau/Bissalanca in the 1960s. One was a flight (“Esquadrillha”) of Esquadron 121 “Cafeteiras”, equipped with Do.27K-2s. The other were actually several different flights from Esquadron 123, equipped with Do.27s, C-47s, and Noratlas transports.

An F-86F from Esquadra 51 / Detachment 52, based at AB2 - Bissau / Bissalanca in 1962-1963. This plane was part of the first batch of F-86Fs deployed in Guiné in 1961 and was used in ground attack operations. 5322 was shot down by enemy ground fire in May 1963. (all artworks copyright Pedro Alvin & ACIG.org, all rights reserved)


Battle of Como Island
In early 1964 the rebels captured the Como Island: a counterattack by the Portuguese Army was swiftly repulsed and even the appearance of the F-86Fs from Bissau could not change the outcome of the battle. Quite on the contrary, soon enough it became almost impossible for the Portuguese troops to operate anywhere in Guinea far from their well-fortified bases. Little was done also in the sense of organized anti-guerilla war: only few colons were moved to safer places under control of the regular army, and nothing undertaken in order to distrub the connection between the local population and the guerilla. The war was thus developing negatively for the Portuguese right from the start.

As it became clear that a better-organized operation was needed in order to liberate the Como Island the Portuguese prepared the “Operation Tridente”, which was to involve the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. Eventually, the battle was fierce and the progress very slow, with the Portuguese suffering heavy casualties to enemy action, disease, and malnutrition. After 71 days of tough and bitter fighting the island was cleared of rebel forces - at a terrible price. In the course of the Operation Tridente the FAP flew no less but 851 combat sorties, as follows:

- F-86Fs: 73
- T-6: 141
- Do.27: 180
- Auster: 46
- Alouette III: 323
- PV-2 Neptune: 16
- C-47/Dakota: 2

This massive effort was in vain. Barely two months later the rebels recaptured some of their positions on the Como Island, as the Portuguese had to re-deploy their forces to fight elsewhere. This time, there was no Portuguese counterattack: due to the PAIGC establishing new important positions in the south of Guiné, especially on the Cantanhez and Quitafine Peninsulas, where considerable contingents of the Portuguese Army at Catió and Bedanda were encircled and put under a siege, Como lost much of its strategic importance.

Besides, in October 1964 the FAP was forced to pull out all of the – meanwhile 16 – F-86Fs it had at Bissalanca, due to the severe pressure from the USA: Washington was complaining that Portugal was endangering the NATO’s defences of the European Atlantic coast due to the deployment of Sabres to Africa, and their use for COIN Operations. Strangely enough, the USA did not complain about the deployment of F-84Gs to Angola, but the presence of Sabres in the Guiné was obviously disturbing for one reason or the other.

The Portuguese experienced similar problems with deployment of their P2V-5 Neptunes as well. These were originally obtained to replace the aeging fleet of PV-2 Harpoons, as maritime patrol and anti-submarine aircraft. Due to US pressure, they could not be permanently deployed in Africa, and were based in BA.6. Nevertheless, time and again small detachments were sent to Guiné and Angola as necessary. One of best known such deployments was Operation “Resgate”, undertaken in December 1965, when two Neptunes forward deployed at Sal (Cape Verde) were sent to Bissalanca, loaded with 350kg bombs. After delivering a highly successful attack against PAIGC positions, however, both planes had to return to BA.6, due to US reaction.

Map of what is today Guinea-Bissau - formerly a part of Portuguese Guiné province. The sole large airfield available to the FAP in the area was that in Bissau/Bissalanca. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003 software)


Fiat’s Tigers
The decision to withdraw Sabres from Guiné has left the FAP without any jet-fighters in Bissalanca for quite some time, unless the government in Lisbon could establish connections to Germany and Italy, in order to obtain replacements that could be used in colonial conflicts it was fighting in Africa. Interestingly, only Germany – which was mainly supportive for different African independence movements (especially that in Algeria) – finally proved ready to sell some ex-Luftwaffe Fiat G.91R-4 reconnaissance fighters to Portugal, albeit under condition that these would be used on the Portuguese territory only. The Portuguese agreed and after getting their Fiats, the FAP deployed them from 1966 onwards in the overseas territories, declaring that these were their national territory!

The Fiat G.91s was soon to become one of the most important FAP assets in the colonies. The type was dependable, easy to maintain, designed to take-off and land on short or ill-prepared runways, and had a good strike capability. The G.91R-4 was armed with four 12.7mm machine guns, and could also carry three cameras in a specially designed nose, which offered a much needed photo-reconnaissance capability. Aside from this, the type was compatible with almost all the bombs and unguided rockets in Portuguese arsenal.

Fiat G.91R-4 from Esquadra 121, based at BA12 - Bissau / Bissalanca in the period 1966 - 1973. The plane shows the "tropical" light blue scheme used in the Fiats by the most part of its use in Guiné.


PAIGC on Advance
By 1967, PAIGC claimed 147 attacks against army camps and barracks, as well as 22 attacks against different airfields, and setting 476 ambushes, as well as control over two thirds of Guiné and 50% of the population. Soon enough it started operating in larger groups, the attacks of which were ranging all over the country. The Portuguese were not to admit a defeat, however: the FAP reinforced the BA.12, in Bissau/Bissalanca, by lengthening the runway, and deploying two additional Esquadrillhas of the 121 Escadron. One of these, nick-named “Roncos”, was equipped with T-6Gs, while the other was “Tigres”, equipped with Fiat G.91R-4 fighter-bombers. Additional Do.27s arrived to reinforce the already busy Esquadron 123.

The main task of these aircraft were close-support and interdiction strikes against supply routes. Most of air strikes were undertaken early in the morning: the aircraft would first deploy to forward airstrips and refuel. The crews could get up-to-date briefings about the situation on the ground, and then start their attacks after covering the shortest possible distances.


Mar Verde
From 1967 the situation changed considerably, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), officially provided its full support to the PAIGC, de-facto recognising this organisation as an official representation of Guiné’s population. FARP was subsequently reinforced by additional weapons, and - on 19 February 1968 - launched one of its first direct operations against Portuguese bases, raiding the Bissalanca airport, center of FAP operations in the country, albeit with unknown results.

The Portuguese reaction to these developments was instalment of António Spínola as a new governor of Guiné. Spínola launched an intensive campaign of building schools, hospitals, housing, and roads, in an effort to improve the living conditions of the local population. Until then, communications – even the most basic roads - were almost non-existent in Guinea. To improve the means of communication, 12 SA.316B Alouette III helicopters were permanently deployed, in order to support the civilians. Several of these helicopters – so-called “Lobo Mau”(s) – were equipped with 20mm cannons, carried in the rear cabin and fired over the side.

Simultaneously, more intensive and energic anti-guerrilla operations were initiated, as Spínola moved the emphasis of all military operations into areas held by the guerrilla. From 1970 the G.91s started using napalm-filled fire-bombs, defoliants and herbicides, especially along the newly-built or existing roads, so to decrease the danger of ambushes, as well as interdict the flow of supplies. Nevertheless, Spínola simultaneously negotiated with Sekou Touré, the President of the neighbouring Republic Guinea, trying to ascertain help and support, as well as to effect the release of Portuguese PoWs and hostages held by the guerrilla, held imprisoned in Conakry.

These negotiations ended without a success, and the Portuguese were finally forced to start a serious COIN-war: the units already deployed in the field were reinforced by additional troops, flown in by DC-6s of the Transportes Aéreos Militares (TAM), and also several Noratlas transports were permanently stationed at BA.12, in order to be available for local operations.

A series of attacks against villages along the borders to Guinea and Senegal followed, resulting in considerable reverses for the PAIGC and FARP. On 22 November 1972, 400 Colonial troops, lead by Portuguese officers, launched the operation “Mar Verde” by landing in Conakry. In a successful attack they liberated a number of PoWs, including several FAP crews, captured when their aircraft were shot down during the previous battles. Contrary to what could be expected, however, this operation had very negative results, then it was not to cause an uprising against president Touré, but also the support for PAIGC from the USSR and Cuba – via Nigeria – increased. Meanwhile, namely, the rebels were given several Il-14s to their disposal, which flew supplies and ammunition from Senegal. Already in 1969 the crew of one of these aircraft landed directly in Bissalanca due to a navigational mistake. In the same year, the FARP was supplied with Soviet-made PT-76 tanks as well as 122mm multiple-rocket launchers, and deployed its first mechanized units in combat.


Nigerian MiGs and SA-7s
In 1972 the Rebels acquired a number of heavy machine guns (HMGs) calibre 12.7mm, which proved exceptionally useful for air defence against FAP aircraft and helicopters. Soon after, the first reports became known about the FARP forming an own air force, equipped with several MiG-17s, flown by East-European pilots, and based in Conakry.

Contemporary reports indicated that five MiG-17s and two MiG-15UTIS were delivered to the rebels. Such deliveries were never confirmed, however. Most likely, these reports were a cover for the deployment of Nigerian Air Force (NAF) MiG-17s to Conakry. These fighters are known to have operated over parts of Guiné along the border to Guinea-Bissau, already in 1971, and to have flown several attacks against Portuguese troops as well.

Who flew Nigerian MiGs, and whether they were later indeed delivered to PAIGC authorities, remains unknown: the Nigerians have still had very few pilots at the time, and only few foreign mercenaries remained in that country after the end of the war in Biafra. It is unlikely that the FARP had any pilots qualified to fly these jets before 1973, when a group of six students is known to have been prepared for training on MiG-15s and MiG-17s. Certain is only that at the time two Soviet-flown Mil Mi-4 helicopters became operational inside eastern Guiné.

The FAP took these new threats very seriously. A battery of Crotale SAMs was purchased in France to defend the Bissau/Bissalanca airport against a possible MiG-17-attack – but never deployed in Guiné. The Fiats flew a number of combat air patrols in the area where Mi-4-activity was reported, already since 1968, when the Portuguese press reported an encounter between two FAP fighter-bombers and two MiG-17s for the first time. Such reports were never confirmed by Portuguese authorities: FAP-pilots also never detected any of helicopters. This was not surprising, then the radar coverage of large parts of the country was non-existent. Finally, by April 1974, the Portuguese considered a purchase of 12 Dassault Mirage III interceptors from France, with intention of stationing these in Guiné.

Certainly, in 1973, the rebels have got their first batch of Soviet-made SA-7 MANPADs, and these were immediately rushed to the battlefield. Already on 23 March 1973, two FAP G.91s were shot down by SA-7s, followed – six weeks later - by another Fiat, and a Do.27K-2. The loss of three G.91s came as a terrible blow to the FAP, even more so as this caused the Portuguese to stop deploying helicopters and propeller-driven aircraft in combat areas. From that time onwards only G.91s were used in combat, and even they were permitted to operate only at tree-top levels, with the pilots being ordered to permanently monitor the skies for possible SA-7 launches.

The disappearance of the FAP from the skies of the Guiné was a heavy blow for the morale of the Portuguese Army troops: these now knew they would get no helicopter support for casualty-evacuation, nor for gunfire support, and also the appeasing sound of the Fiats flying CAS-sorties would not be heard overhead. Moreover, the Portuguese morale was in decline after Spínola’s departure in 1972. These negative developments finally enabled the FARP to attack and capture Guiledje, an important military base commanding supply routes.

A Fiat G.91R-4 from Esquadra 121, based at BA12 - Bissau / Bissalanca in the period 1973 - 1974. After the PAIGC started using SA-7 Strela MANPADs the FAP camouflaged its Fiats in this dark green "anti-radiation" paint, developed by personnel of the OGMA (Oficina Geral de Material Aeronáutico) facilities in Portugal. This camouflage was to become widespread between all aircraft used in the Portuguese colonies in the mid-1970s. How far this was sucessful remains unknown.


A Self-Inflicted Defeat
In September 1973 the PAIGC – although having its leader, Cabral, assassinated (not by the Portuguese, but by a disgruntled former member of the PAIGC’s Supreme Council), and still far away from being able to really lead the country – declared the Portuguese Guinea for an independent republic. The situation on the ground was actually equalized: successful Portuguese operations (organized and conducted with far more vigour and better manner than in Angola, or – especially – Mozambique) caused losses to the rebels, but these were hitting back hard too.

In the end it was the social, financial and political situation of Portugal that decided the final outcome of this war: by 1974 Portugal was on the verge of bankruptcy. After the coup in 1974, the new government in Lisbon opened negotiations with PAIGC, which resulted with agreement about the pullout of all Portuguese troops.

On 10 October 1974, Guinea-Bissau declared independence, and already five days later the last Portuguese soldiers have left the country. During the last few days numerous Portuguese civilians were evacuated with the help of TAM and chartered civilian transport aircraft. During the eleven years of war in Portuguese-Guinea, 1.875 Portuguese and colonial soldiers were killed, while the PAIGC and FARP – which claimed the downing of 21 FAP aircraft – lost some 6.000.

Under the given circumstances, the Portuguese were forced to leave much of their equipment back: several of their Noratlas, Do.27s, and Alouette IIIs were to form the basis for the new Air Force of Guinea-Bissau. The new nation was soon to turn to the USSR and Cuba for more support: its subsequent development, however, is another story...

When the threat of SA-7s suddenly emerged, in March 1973, the FAP was taken by surprise, and suffered a loss of three Fiat G.91R-4s, as well as one Do.27K-2 within a short period of time. Portuguese reaction was sober, nevertheless, with all the aircraft participating in operations near the combat zone being overpainted in IR-Green colour that helped decrease the IR-signature of the aircraft. The Do.27K-2 depicted here is serialled 3470: this was the serial of the Dornier shot down by PAIGC in spring 1973. It remains unclear, however, if the plane already wore this camouflage pattern by the time, or the usual "peacetime" livery of aluminium, white and day-glo orange. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

[ronnieraygun]

When the Portuguese arrived in Africa late in the 15th century, they were the first European colonial power to establish itself on the continent. When they left in 1974, they were among the last to leave. The last fifteen years of this long and unhappy sojourn were marked by unrelenting guerilla warfare throughout the African colonies. Portugal was ruled by a dictatorship that dated back to the 1920s. Faced with monetary, diplomatic, and human costs that no small, relatively poor country could long bear and with the seeming success of France's operations in Algeria before it, Portugal's saw aviation as the key to the preservation of its overseas territories and its claims to a place among the world's first-rate powers.
Portugal was something of an accidental colonial power in Africa. Portuguese sailors first stopped in Africa for water during their great trading voyages to the Orient. They returned for slaves, a traditional feature of the African economy that could be used to fill the labor needs of Portugal's Brazilian plantations. The slaves were supplied by a powerful, native kingdom, Bakongo, in what is now northern Angola and far southwestern Congo. At first, Bakongo could meet the demand by selling prisoners of war it had taken in day-to-day disputes with its neighbors. But the swelling demand from Brazil soon depleted the supply of prisoners and forced Bakongo into more and more wars. As the number of its enemies grew, Bakongo needed more modern weapons, especially guns, which in turn had to paid for with still more slaves. It was a vicious circle. Inevitably, the Bakongo state became over-extended, suffered reverses on the battlefield, and suffered dissension at home. Within 50 years or so, the kingdom had collapsed and its great cities had been swallowed by the jungle. Almost reluctantly, Portugal took charge of the country in order to protect its watering stations and its source of slaves. The Portuguese made little attempt to colonize the territory, and, as the demand for slaves waned and the routes to the East lost their crucial importance in the world economy, the colonies gradually lost their importance to the home country. By the middle of the nineteenth century, all but autonomous.
So things stayed until the early 1930s. In May 1926, rightwing army officers overthrew the Portuguese government and, in 1932, installed António Salazar as de jure prime minister and de facto dictator, a position he retained until 1968. Salazar had a rather old-fashioned notion of what constituted the wealth of nations, and his single-party New State and infamous secret police (Polícia Internacional de Defesa de Estado or PIDE) saw to it that he never heard anything more up-to-date. For Salazar, colonies were what made a modern nation great. Colonies provided captive markets for home-produced goods, ready sources of cheap raw materials and foodstuffs, and an outlet for the homeland's surplus population. Accordingly, from 1930 on, Salazar did all he could to integrate the African colonies into the nation. He encouraged colonization on a large scale, using generous subsidies, free housing, and land grants as inducements. For the first time, Portuguese settlers began to arrive in large numbers in Angola and Mozambique.
While African- and European-born residents of the territories enjoyed theoretical equality as citizens of the Portuguese state, and while the ideological, doctrinaire racism of Anglo-Dutch southern Africa was rare, Africans had many legitimate grievances. Chief among these was the practice of extorting involuntary, uncompensated labor from indigenous citizens. Until 1962, when it was belatedly abolished, the colonial administration justified this part-time slavery by pointing to the cash taxes that European and well-to-do African citizens paid. The rural African could not pay in money, so, the argument went, he paid in kind. The reasoning was entirely specious, of course. The burden imposed on subsistence farmers and day laborers was in actuality enormous compared to the modest assessments paid by those who had money. The arrival of European colonists in large numbers during the '30s made the plight of rural poor considerably worse. Europeans expected a European-style road and rail infrastructure. This greatly expanded the demand for conscript labor and led to ever longer periods of servitude. What might once have been an insulting inconvenience lasting a few days could now bring ruin, impoverishment, and death upon the African small holder and his family. Forced labor might now consume up to up to six months out of every year, effectively halving his already meager annual income. Well-to-do Africans also had increasing cause for complaint. The influx of government-subsidized Europeans greatly diminished the status of the European-educated, Portuguese-speaking native population. In the colonies' long years of near autonomy, assimilados—African merchants, physicians, teachers, and civil servants—had become prominent in local government and commerce, on a par with the as yet rare European colonial. Now, they found themselves shouldered aside by less capable, poorly educated, yet extremely arrogant immigrants who enjoyed government preferment. Though exempt from forced labor themselves, by virtue of their education and cash incomes, they soon faced endless petty humiliations that were no less galling for being less extreme than those meted out in Johannisburg. By the late 1950s, the disaffected masses were ripe for revolt, and the assimilados were ready to lead them.
The dictatorship in Lisbon responded to these stirrings in predictably short-sighted and violent fashion. It gave the PIDE and army a free hand to instititute repressive measures. But it was too late for rounding up dissidents and breaking strikes, especially given recent events in Algeria and the Congo. In 1961, repression provoked a large-scale rising in Angola. Guerillas from the outlawed MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) attacked police barracks and prisons across northern Angola, in hopes of freeing the political prisoners that the PIDE had seized. Their example inspired spontaneous attacks on rural government offices, isolated European-owned plantations, and Catholic missions. Four hundred Portuguese were killed. Wealthy Europeans fled, while panicky poor and lower middle-class Portuguese formed vigilante squads and indiscriminately terrorized their African neighbors. Often these groups operated with the connivance of police and army units. As many as 40,000 Africans were killed. Rebellions quickly sprang up in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique as well.
Portugal found itself ill-equipped for this sudden and unexpected crisis. It was now a poor nation, with a small population. Captive markets had not produced the bonanza that Salazar's economic theories predicted, and the colonial subsidies now made the colonies a drain on the treasury, even without the added expense of combat. There was little spare cash for armaments and little spare manpower for the army. The war zones were far from the home country, and transport was woefully inadequate. The dictatorship was not particularly popular either in Europe or in the United States, so no extraordinary aid could be looked for from either quarter. Yet aid for the insurgents would undoubtedly be plentiful, given the newly independent African states that now surrounded Portuguese holdings and the readiness of Russia and China to supply arms to insurgent movements.


Like the French before them, the Portuguese turned to World War-2 aircraft in their search for effective antiguerilla weapons. The air force had a number of Lockheed-Vega PV-2 Harpoon light patrol bombers that were tasked with antisubmarine operations along the coasts of Portugal and the Azores. They were totally obsolete in their intended role and thus unlikely to be missed if diverted from their official NATO role. But they were well suited to counter-insurgency duties. The basic PV-2 carried five, forward-firing .50-cal machine guns, two in the upper nose and three in an undernose gun pack. The PV-2D model, of which the service had two, carried eight guns, all grouped in the lower nose. Both models could accomodate up to 3000 lbs of bombs internally and up to eight 5-in HVAR rockets and napalm tanks under the wings. All defensive armament was removed to save weight. Air force officials also noted the success of France's armed, T-6 "Tomcats" in Algeria. Fighting was then winding down in Algeria, and the elderly Tomcats were being replaced by more modern T-28 "Fennecs" and AD-4 Skyraiders. So the Portuguese were able to obtain large numbers of fully armed, ex-Armée de l'Air aircraft. They received some Federal German Luftwaffe T-6Gs as well and armed them at the central air-force maintenance base. With four 7.92-mm machine guns in under wing pods and 37-mm MATRA SNEB rocket packs, the T-6s were particularly useful for supporting infantry patrols in contact with small, insurgent bands and for convoy escort. But they suffered heavily during attacks on guerilla bases, where Soviet 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine guns were often encountered.






Unlike the French, the Portuguese had to rely heavily on their jet fighters for COIN operations. Portugal had approximately 125 F-84G Thunderjets (serial numbers 5101-5225) and 65 North American F-86F Sabres (5301-5365) on hand when the rebellion began, and it could not afford to buy additional combat aircraft purely for use in the colonies. The F-84Gs were the first to go to Africa. The two squadrons at Air Base 2, in Ota, were transferred to Air Base 9 in Luanda, Angola shortly after the start of hostilities. They remained there for the next 16 years. Detachments occasionally operated in Mozambique as well. When the Thunderjets stood down in 1974, they were the last operational examples of their type in the world.


F-86Fs were sent to Guinea-Bissau in 1961. Eight aircraft—5307, 5314, 5322, 5326, 5354, 5356, 5361, and 5362—were sent initially, in "Operation Atlas." One or two others may have followed later. As Detachment 52, they operated out of Bissalanca air base at Bissau in support of army units and naval Fuzileiros (marines). The F-86s flew 577 sorties, using bombs, napalm, and Matra and HVAR rockets. Portugal was secretive about losses, but it appears that they were relatively light. Sabre 5314 was destroyed when it overran the runway during an emergency landing, and 5322 was shot down by ground fire in 1963 (the pilot ejected and was rescued). Many aircraft suffered varying degrees of damage.


This reliance on their jets placed the Portuguese in an uncomfortable position vis à vis their principle ally, the United States. All the aircraft were American, and all had been supplied under the American military aid programs. The US supplied the aircraft on the understanding that they would be dedicated to NATO for the defense of Europe. By diverting them to the colonies, Portugal was, in American eyes, in breach of contract. Portugal was, moreover, compromising NATO security and embarassing the United States at a time when it was trying to establish good relations with newly independent African states. The US blocked shipments of replacements and spares and kept up a constant barrage of protests and diplomatic pressure. By October 1964, Portugal had to withdraw the Sabres from Bissau. The F-84s were overlooked somehow. Perhaps, having made its point over the Sabres, Washington chose to turn a blind eye. Or possibly the F-84s were so manifestly obsolete that they weren't considered worth worrying about.


To replace the F-86s in Guinea-Bissau and provide fighter-bombers for Mozambique, the Portuguese obtained the FIAT G.91R/4, a European aircraft with a European engine. The G.91 was a small, light- weight aircraft that could operate from roads or grass fields. It had been developed as the standard tactical fighter-bomber for all NATO air forces, but, in the event, only Germany placed it in service. The R/4 model had originally been earmarked for Greece and Turkey, but both nations had rejected it before delivery. Since 50 Greek aircraft had already been completed, Germany agreed to add them to its order. The R/4s were never really satisfactory in Luftwaffe service, however. They were armed with four .50-cal machine guns rather than the 30-mm DEFA cannon standard on German airplanes, and they had various detail differences that made them hard to support. When Portugal went looking for new fighters, the R/4s were officially assigned as advanced trainers and seldom flown. In 1966, Germany transfered 40 of the aircraft (5401-5440) to Portugal. Many were immediately despatched—still in their Luftwaffe camouflage—to Guinea-Bissau. Others served in Mozambique and, on occasion, in Angola, sporting a new, tropical grey finish.


By 1964, both the Harpoons and the F-84s were getting old, and spares were hard to come by. As a replacement, Portugal settled on a by now famous COIN type, the B-26 Invader. Invaders had served with distinction in Laos, Vietnam, and the nearby Congo. But by the time the Portuguese started shopping for them, they were already well past their prime. A rash of wing-spar failures had grounded B-26 fleets world wide, and the corrective, re-sparring programs were at best partial successes. More importnatly, the aircraft had by now become closely associated with clandestine operations and shady arms deals. The mere presence of a B-26 was likely to attract unwelcomepress, customs, and diplomatic attention. Nevertheless, Portugal commissioned various Swiss, French, and American intermediaries to buy aircraft for service in Angola. Aircraft were obtained from various sources, refurbished in the US, in Tucson, AZ, and ferried to Portugal via Canada. The Portuguese air force's central maintenance facility, OGMA, then fitted armament and brought the aircraft up to military standards. The rear cockpit canopy was replaced with a metal fairing, different radios were fitted, and extra fuel tanks were installed in the bomb bay. Several B-26C models were converted to B-type strafers at the same time.


US authorities were at first slow to act against what was essentially an illegal arms-smuggling operation. But they launched an investigation shortly after the seventh aircraft was despatched. There were arrests, questions in the UN, and more bad publicity than Portugal wanted. This, combined with the fact that only seven aircraft had gotten past US Customs, caused the government to give up plans for deploying the B-26 in Angola. Instead, they were used for miscellaneous and experimental duties in metropolitan Portugal. By 1971, however, the deteriorating war situation caused the authorities to reconsider their decision. All available airplanes were desperately needed. Six B-26s were thus sent to Angola to replace the four surviving F-84s. They thus became the only combat airplanes remaining in Luanda. The Invader was generally successful in angola. it had the range for long, armed reconaissance missions from a central base, and it carried an effective armament. They proved reliable, and only one was damaged by ground fire.
While the attack aircraft usually get most of the attention, transport and utility aircraft play, if anything, an even more critical role in counterinsurgency campaigns. The war in Africa was no exception. It placed heavy demands on Portuguese logistics and infrastructure. Transport aircraft were much in demand, given the distances involved and the vulnerability of surface transport to ambush and mines. The 1930s-vintage Ju-52/Amiot AAC-1 formed half of the Portuguese transport fleet as late as 1960, the rest being C-47s. While fiscal realities guaranteed that the bulk of the troops and matériel would have to go out to the colonies by sea no matter what the air force procurement system did. These airplanes were clearly inadequate for the multitude of remaining transport tasks. A weeks-long ocean voyage was not an option for the ever growing numbers of casualties that had to be repatriated. For this purpose, the Portuguese assembled a small fleet of piston-engined DC-6 airliners. Some attempts were made to purchase Boeing 707 jets, but these were blocked by the American government. To replace the Ju-52s in the in-country transport and paratrooping role, the air force purchased twin-boom, Nord Noratlas transports—6 surplus Nord 2502-As purchased in 1960 from the French airline UAT and 6 turbojet-boosted 2501-Fs bought direct from the manufacturer in 1962. The aircraft were immediately despatched to Air Base 9 at Luanda, Angola and Air Base 10 at Beira, Mozambique. Nineteen additional Nord 2501-D aircraft were purchased in 1968, probably from Armée de l'air surplus stocks.
Like the French, the Portuguese quickly saw a need for a light, STOL utility transport in anti-guerilla operations, something larger than the Auster AOP types they already had but smaller than the C-47. The DHC-3 Otter was the preferred solution. It could accomodate a crew of two and ten passengers or a substantial cargo load, and it was one of the types offered through the US Mutual Defense Aid Program (MDAP). But American opposition to Portugal's colonial policy made MDAP funding impossible, and Portugal could not afford the aircraft on its own. Accordingly, the government turned once again to France. The MH1521 Broussard STOL transport was available in large numbers with the end of the Algerian war. It had half the power of the Canadian airplane and half the payload (pilot and five passengers), but it was available at an affordable price. Portugal purchased an initial five, with more planned for later.


Unfortunately, the Broussards were old and well-worn, as well as cheap. One was lost almost immediately to ground fire over Angola. The others suffered a series of accidents that greatly limited there time in service. All were soon withdrawn. In desperation, the Portuguese turned to the only available STOL type that offered any improvement in payload over the Austers, the Dornier Do-27. The Dornier was essentially a light aircraft. It was powered by a 270-hp Lycoming. Yet, with 200 hp less than the Broussard, it lifted an equivalent payload, 6-8 passengers and crew. It was also rugged, versatile, and, with the simple, horizontally opposed Lycoming engine, economical to operate. After extensive tests, Portugal ordered 16 Do-27Ks, essentially the Luftwaffe's Do27A-4 with a strengthened, wide-track undercarriage, extra fuel tanks, and underwing hard points. These hard points allowed the aircraft to serve in a FAC (Forward Air Control) role with smoke-marker rockets or in the light close-support role with an 18-round pod of 37-mm MATRA SNEB rockets under each wing (interestingly, this rocket was also adapted for use in the standard, infantry bazooka of the Portuguese army). All aircraft were painted in standard Portuguese colors: bare-metal wings and grey fuselage with a white top and a blue cheat line. A second batch of 24 Do-27K-2s was received in 1962, all in overall aluminum finish. Finally, from 1963 on, as the German army and air force began to retire the Do-27, the German government passed many of the aircraft on to Portugal. In all, 106 Do-27A-1, A-3s, A-4s, and B-1s were taken on charge. All retained their German finish, generally NATO-standard Green and grey camouflage, sometimes with bright, day-glo orange cowls or wing tips.


The Dorniers proved popular and highly successful in use, though losses were comparatively heavy. Though vulnerable to ground fire, the rocket-armed Do-27Ks were useful close-support aircraft. But they were in increasingly short supply (11 were lost in action). Several attempts were thus made to arm the German-surplus aircraft, all of which lacked the wing hardpoints that made rocket armament possible. A number of Do-27A-1 and A-4 aircraft were fitted with fuselage racks for two 50-kg bombs and used in action, but the modification does not appear to have been successful enough for gneral adoption. A K-1 was given an experimental door mounting for a 1200 round-per-minute MG42 machine gun and successfully tested using a circling, gunship-style flight path. Though this would have been the easiest way of arming the Do-27As, it was not accepted for service use. In any case, the Do-27s days as a viable combat aircraft were clearly numbered by the late '60s. Light aircraft could not survive in the face of the increasingly common 12.7-mm machine gun fire.


Like all governments in the counterinsurgency era, Portugal made extensive use of helicopters. Both the Sud-Aviation Alouette II and Alouette III saw service in the colonies, primarily in the casualty evacuation role. Gunships were never used, doubtless because budgetary constraints made the limited number of helicopters too valuable to risk in operations that could be handled by fixed-wing airplanes.


The risks of combat flying over the Portuguese colonies escalated dramatically in the late '60s and early '70s, largely because the Soviet SA-7 Strela shoulder-fired missile finally became generally available in the guerilla-controlled hinterland. The SA-7 was a short-range missile designed to home in on the infrared radiation emitted by hot tailpipe of a low-flying jet fighter. The seeker's performance was marginal—it could only attack from the rear, for instance, and could only home on the hot exhaust gas and tailpipe, not on the cooler surrounding metal. It was thus thought that piston-engined aircraft would be largely immune. While the exhausts might well be hotter, they were substantially smaller, were often shrouded by the wing, and were rapidly cooled by air streaming back from the propeller. This assumption proved disastrously wrong. The SA-7 proved extremely capable when it came to detectng the exhaust systems of piston aircraft, and, while high-performance jets could outfly the relatively low-performance Strela if warned in time, piston-engined types were almost always hit before they couldreact. Large aircraft, like the B-26 and PV-2, might survive a hit, because the warhead was small. But Do-27s and T-6s were invariably doomed. Losses among these types increased alarmingly.


To counter this threat, Portuguese scientists invented a special, "anti-radiation" paint that was supposed to absorb the infrared emissions, smooth out the hot spots, and thus make the aircraft harder to distinguish and harder to lock on to. This dead-flat, olive drab was used in conjunction with tiny, 20-cm, low-visibility, low-reflectivity roundels. Most (but not all) serving Portuguese piston-engined aircraft— including B-26s, T-6s, C-47s, Noratlases, and Do-27s—were repainted to the new standard shortly before Portugal withdrew.




The enormous sacrifices that the Portuguese dictatorship demanded of its subjects proved too much for the people, the economy, and—most importantly—the army. By the 1970s, the Portuguese armed services were largely made up of disaffected conscripts who fiercely opposed continuing the war. Senior commanders became less and less confident of their ability to control their men. General Spinola, the most successful commander in the colonial wars, pressed the government for an immediate ceasefire, to preserve the unity of the army and respect for the chain of command. In 1974, after his entreaties were rebuffed, he and his supporters mounted a coup, and, intentionally or not, launched a revolution that ended authoritarian rule in western Europe

[ronnieraygun]

http://espacoetereo.no.sapo.pt/

[mmelo]

Hi,

Very nice article! Almost every portuguese has a relative that went to the Ultramar war, I think it was there that we (portuguese) learned how to fight rebels as good as we do it now.

Thank's for sharing

MMelo

[Kilo]

alguém tem o "mapa" onde aparecem Portugal e as colónias sobrepostas sobre o mapa da Europa ?

era um mapa de propaganda do Estado Novo: "Portugal é maior que a Europa"

[Atlantic Friend]

Grandola, vila morena....

[mmelo]

Por acaso já tive mas era num livro de história... no pc não

Agora somos grandes mas é de espirito e não de tamanho

MMelo

[Kilo]

One of the best books around about the Portuguese war in Africa:

Preview: http://www.amazon.com/gp/reader/0313...70417-5260735#

Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese Way of War, 1961-1974 (Contributions in Military Studies) (Hardcover)
by John P. Cann

Book Description
The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous wars.

About the Author
JOHN P. CANN, a former naval flight officer and retired captain, served both on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and subsequently on that of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Review
“Cann, who served in the Pentagon, lays out the story with an eye to contrasts with U.S. policy. His study...is concise and useful.”
Choice

“The book will be embraced in Portugal, where the parade of celebrations marking the five-century anniversary of Portugal's maritime expansion prepared audiences for Cann's reinterpretation of the colonial war experience in a more positive light.”
African History

Review
"This is a splendid book on a little known subject. Captain Dr. John P. Cann presents a thorough and unbiased study of the Portuguese Campaigns in Africa, 1961-1974. He read many books, examined reports, interviewed people involved in the operations and, retaining the main points, related them in an outstanding way. In the end, his book results in a comprehensive study, unparalleled by any books published in Portugal or elsewhere...Captain Dr. Cann deserves to be commended for a well-done work."
General J.M. Bethencourt Rodrigues Former Army Chief of Staff, Angola and former Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces and Governor of Guine

"A fascinating and comprehensive account on the Portuguese-African Campaigns...Through careful research and a balanced presentation of oral history, Captain Dr. Cann shows how a counterinsurgency war could be fought. To my knowledge, this is the best book in English on the subject."
Brigadier-General Renato F. Marques Pinto Former Chief of Military Intelligence, Angola and former Army Chief of Staff, Mozambique

[Lancero]

(...) operation “Mar Verde” Contrary to what could be expected, however, this operation had very negative results


The situation on the ground was actually equalized: successful Portuguese operations (organized and conducted with far more vigour and better manner than in Angola, or – especially – Mozambique)

There's a few thing I don't agree with in this article. I only outlined two of them from a quick read.
Ronnieraygun, could you please give us the source to/from this article?

Much appreciated.

[ronnieraygun]

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_350.shtml

Sources & Bibliography

Additional information and updates for this feature were kindly provided by Jose Matos, Pedro Alvin, and Patrik.

Extended excerpts from this article were published in the book "AFRICAN MiGs", SHI Publications, Vienna (Austria), 2004, (ISBN: 3-200-00088-0).

- "MODERN AFRICAN WARS 2: ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE 1961-74", by Peter Abbott and Manuel Rodriguez, Osprey's Men-At-Arms Series No.202, Osprey 1988, 1989, 1995, UK (ISBN: 0-85045-843-9)

- "THE CHOPPER BOYS", by Al J. Venter, in association with Neall Ellis and Richard Wood, by Ashanti Publishing Ltd., Gibraltar, reprinted by Greenhill Books, UK (ISBN: 1-85367-177-0)

- "AIR WARS AND AIRCRAFT; A Detailed Record of Air Combat, 1945 to the Present", by Victor Flintham, Arms and Armour Press, 1989, UK (ISBN: 0-85368-779-X)

[Boina verde]

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...ad.php?t=90354

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...ad.php?t=76322