Operation Torch

[ronnieraygun]

(wiki)

Operation Torch (initially called Operation Gymnast) was the British-American invasion of French North Africa in World War II during the North African Campaign, started November 8, 1942.
The Soviet Union had pressed the United States and Britain to start operations in Europe, and open a second front to reduce the pressure of German forces on the Russian troops. While the American commanders favored Operation Sledgehammer, landing in Occupied Europe as soon as possible, the British commanders believed that such a course would end in disaster. An attack on French North Africa was proposed instead, which would clear the Axis from North Africa, improve naval control of the Mediterranean and prepare an invasion of Southern Europe in 1943. American President Roosevelt suspected the African operation would rule out an invasion of Europe in 1943 but agreed to support Churchill.
The Allies planned an Anglo-American invasion of northwestern Africa — Morocco and Algeria, territory nominally in the hands of the Vichy French government. The Vichy French had around 60,000 soldiers in Morocco as well as coastal artillery, a handful of tanks and aircraft, with ten or so warships and 11 submarines at Casablanca. The Allies believed that the Vichy French forces would not fight, partly because of information supplied by American Consul Robert Daniel Murphy in Algiers. However they harboured suspicions that the Vichy French navy would bear a grudge over the British action at Mers-el-Kebir (near Oran) in 1940. An assessment of the sympathies of the French forces in North Africa was essential, and plans were made to secure their cooperation, rather than resistance. The Allies intended to advance rapidly eastwards into Tunisia and attack the German forces in the rear. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was given command of the operation, and set up his headquarters in Gibraltar. The Allied Naval Commander of the Expeditionary Force would be Sir Andrew Cunningham; his deputy was Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay; Ramsay would plan the landing effort.

Preliminary contact

To gauge the feeling of the Vichy French forces, Murphy was appointed to the American consulate in Algeria. His covert mission was to determine the mood of the French forces and to make contact with elements that might support an Allied invasion. He succeeded in contacting a number of French officers, including General Charles Emmanuel Mast, the French commander-in-chief in Algiers. These officers were willing to support the Allies, but asked for a clandestine conference with a senior Allied General in Algeria. General Mark W. Clark, one of Eisenhower's senior commanders, was dispatched to Cherchell in Algeria aboard HMS Seraph, a submarine, and met with these Vichy French officers on 21 October, 1942.
The Allies also succeeded, with resistance help, in slipping French General Henri Giraud out of Vichy France by submarine (Seraph again), intending to offer him the post of commander in chief of French forces in North Africa after the invasion. However, Giraud would take no position lower than commander in chief of all the invading forces, a job already given to Dwight D. Eisenhower. When he was refused, he decided to remain "a spectator in this affair."

The Landings

The Allies planned a three-pronged amphibious landing to seize the key ports and airports of Morocco and Algeria simultaneously, targeting Casablanca, Oran and Algiers.
The Western Task Force (aimed at Casablanca) comprised American units, with Major General George Patton in command and Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt heading the naval operations. This Western Task Force consisted of the U.S. 2nd Armored Division, the U.S. 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions - 35,000 troops in all. They were transported directly from the United States.
The Center Task Force, aimed at Oran included the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, and the 1st Armored Division - 18,500 troops. They sailed from Britain and were commanded by Major-General Lloyd Fredendall, the naval forces being commanded by Commodore Thomas Troubridge.
The Eastern Task force, aimed at Algiers, was commanded by Lieutenant-General Kenneth Anderson and consisted of the British 78th and the US 34th Infantry Divisions - 20,000 troops. Naval forces were commanded by Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough.
Aerial operations were split into two, east of Cape Tenez in Algeria, with British aircraft under Air Marshal Sir William Welsh and west of Cape Tenez, all American aircraft under Major General Jimmy Doolittle, under the direct command of General Patton.

Casablanca

The aforementioned Western Task Force landed before daybreak on November 8, 1942 at three points: Safi, Morocco (Operation Blackstone), Fedala, Morocco (Operation Brushwood), and Mehdiya-Port Lyautey, Morocco (Operation Goalpost). Because it was hoped that the French wouldn't resist, there was no preliminary bombardment.
During the previous night, a coup attempt had been made by French General Bethouard, whose forces surrounded the villa of pro-Vichy General Auguste Paul Nogues. However, Nogues managed to telephone nearby Vichy forces which prevented Nogues's capture. In addition, the coup attempt alerted Nogues to the likelihood of an impending Allied amphibious invasion, and he immediately bolstered Vichy coastal defenses.
At Safi, Morocco, the landings were mostly successful. The landings were initially conducted without covering fire, hoping that the French might not resist at all. However, once the Allied transports were fired on by Vichy coastal batteries, the Allied ships returned fire. By the time Allied commanding General Harmon arrived, French snipers had pinned the assault troops (most of whom were in combat for the first time) on Safi's beaches. Most of the landings occurred behind schedule; air support from the carriers destroyed a French convoy of trucks intended to reinforce the defenses. Safi surrendered on the afternoon of November 8th. By November 10 the remaining defenders were pinned down and the bulk of Harmon's forces raced to join the siege of Casablanca.
Around Port-Lyautey, Morocco, the landing troops were uncertain of their position, and the second wave was delayed. This gave the Vichy defenders time to organize resistance, and the remaining landings were conducted under artillery bombardment. With the assistance of air support from the carriers, the troops pushed ahead and the objectives were captured.
Around Fedala, Morocco (the largest landing with 19,000 men), weather disrupted the landings. The landing beaches again came under Vichy fire after daybreak. U.S. General Patton landed at 8am and the beachheads were secured by later in the day. The Americans surrounded the port of Casablanca by November 10th, and the city surrendered an hour before the final assault was due to take place. Patton entered the city unopposed.
In general, Vichy French resistance in Morocco (apart from the coastal batteries) was sporadic. A strong squadron of the Vichy French navy at Casablanca, including the unfinished battleship Jean Bart, along with a number of cruisers and destroyers, made a sortie to oppose the landings but was defeated by superior firepower. Many French ships were lost, mainly running aground, and those that survived joined the Allies.

Oran

The Center Task Force was split between three beaches, two west of Oran and one east. Landings at the westernmost beach were delayed because of a French convoy which appeared while the minesweepers were clearing a path. Some delay and confusion, and damage to landing ships, was caused by the unexpected shallowness of water and sandbars; although periscope observations had been carried out, no reconnaissance parties had been landed on the beaches to determine local conditions. This would be in contrast to later amphibious assaults, such as Operation Overlord, in which considerable weight would be given to pre-invasion reconnaissance.
The US 1st Ranger Battalion landed east of Oran, and quickly captured the shore battery at Arzew. An attempt was made to land US infantry at the harbour directly, in order to quickly prevent destruction of the port facilities and scuttling of ships. The operation, code named Operation Reservist, failed as the two destroyers were shattered by crossfire from the French vessels there. The French Navy broke from the harbour and attacked the Allied invasion fleet, but were sunk or driven ashore.
French batteries and the invasion fleet exchanged fire throughout the 8th and 9th November, with French troops defending Oran and the surrounding area stubbornly. Heavy fire from the British battleships brought about the surrender on the 9th.

Airborne Landings

Torch saw the first major airborne assault carried out by the United States. The U.S. 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion flew all the way from Britain, over Spain, intending to drop near Oran and capture airfields at Tafarquay and Youk-Les-Bains. The drop was marked by navigational and communication problems with French forces on the ground, and the extreme range forced several aircraft to land in the desert. Nevertheless, both airports were captured, despite the 509th being widely scattered.

Algiers

Resistance and Coup

As agreed at Cherchell, starting at midnight and continuing through the early hours of November 8, as the invasion troops were approaching the shore, a group of 400 French resistance under the command of Henri d'Astier de La Vigerie and José Aboulker staged a coup in the city of Algiers. They seized key targets, including the telephone exchange, radio station, governor's house and the headquarters of 19th Corps.
Robert Murphy then drove to the residence of General Alphonse Juin, the senior French Army officer in North Africa, with some resistance fighters. While the resistance surrounded the house, making Juin effectively a prisoner, Murphy attempted to persuade him to side with the Allies. However he was treated to a surprise: Admiral François Darlan, the commander of all Vichy French forces, was in Algiers on a private visit. Juin insisted on contacting Darlan, and Murphy was unable to persuade either to side with the Allies. In the early morning the Vichy Gendarmerie arrived and released Juin and Darlan.
During the day Vichy troops lost their time retaking almost all the positions seized by the resistance during the coup, allowing the Allied landed forces to encircle Algiers with practically no opposition.

Invasion

The invasion was led by the US 34th Infantry with one brigade of the British 78th, the other acting as reserve. General Ryder, commander of the 34th, was given explicit command of the first wave, since it was believed that the French would react more favourably to an American commander than a British one. The landings were split between three beaches - two west of Algiers and one east. Some landings went to the wrong beaches, but this was immaterial since there was practically no French opposition; coastal batteries had been neutralized by French resistance. One French commander openly welcomed the Allies.
The only fighting took place in the port of Algiers itself, where in Operation Terminal two British destroyers attempted to land a party of US Rangers directly onto the dock, in order to prevent the French destroying port facilities and scuttling ships. Heavy artillery fire prevented one from landing, and drove the other from the docks after a few hours, leaving 250 of the infantry behind.
The landing troops pushed quickly inland; General Juin surrendered the city to the Allies at 6pm.

After the battle

Political results

It quickly became clear that Henri Giraud lacked the authority to take command of the French forces, as had been hoped. Moreover, he preferred to await in Gibraltar the result of the landing. Eisenhower, with the support of Roosevelt and Churchill, therefore made agreements with Admiral François Darlan that he would be given control if he joined the Allied side. This meant the Vichy regime was maintained in North Africa, with its Hitlerian laws and concentration camps for opponents. Consequently, Charles de Gaulle of the Free French, French resistants, along with Allied war correspondents, all responded with fury. The problem didn't vanish when a local French anti-Nazi, Ferdinand Bonnier de la Chapelle, murdered Darlan on December 24, 1942: Giraud was then installed in his place. But he maintained the Vichy regime and even arrested the Algiers resistance leaders of November 8, without any opposition from Murphy.
When Adolf Hitler found out what Admiral Darlan intended to do, he immediately ordered the occupation of Vichy France and reinforced German forces in Africa.
The Darlan-Giraud authority, initially resolutely Vichyist, was gradually forced to take part in the war effort against Nazi Germany, to democratize, to eliminate its principal head Vichyist rulers, and to eventually merge with the French national Committee of London. Months later, the "Comité Français de la Libération Nationale" (CFLN) born from this fusion passed under the authority of General de Gaulle (despite opposition from President Roosevelt), becoming the US- and British-recognized government of France.

Military consequences

On November 8 and 10, French Tunisian forces under the command of general Barré left the whole country open to the Germans, withdrawing to the Algerian border. Starting November 14, Juin ordered Barré to resist, but he waited until the 18th to begin fighting against the Germans. From then on the Tunisian army fought courageously despite its lack of equipment. The French were quickly helped by British forces.
After consolidating in French territory, the Allies struck into Tunisia. Forces in the British 1st Army under Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson almost reached Tunis before a counterattack at Djedeida by German troops under General Walther Nehring thrust them back. In January 1943, German troops under General Erwin Rommel retreating westwards from Libya reached Tunisia.
The British 8th Army in the East, commanded by General Bernard Montgomery, stopped around Tripoli to allow reinforcements to arrive and build up the Allied advantage. In the West the forces of General Anderson came under attack in February at Faïd Pass on the 14th and at Kasserine Pass on the 19th. The Allied forces retreated in disarray until heavy Allied reinforcements blunted the German advance on the 22nd.
General Harold Alexander arrived in Tunisia in late February to take command. The Germans attacked again in March, eastwards at Medenine on the 6th but were repulsed. Rommel counselled Hitler to allow a full retreat but was denied and on 9 March Rommel left Tunisia to be replaced by Jürgen von Arnim, who had to spread his forces over 100 miles of northern Tunisia.
These setbacks forced the Allies to consolidate their forces and develop their lines of communication and administration so that they could support a major attack. The 1st Army and the 8th Army then attacked the Germans. Hard fighting followed, but the Allies cut off the Germans from support by naval and air forces between Tunisia and Sicily. On 6 May, as the culmination of Operation Vulcan, the British took Tunis, and American forces reached Bizerte. By 13 May the Axis forces in Tunisia had surrendered.

[ronnieraygun]

(US Coast Guard role)

RATION TORCH: The Coast Guard and the Invasion of North Africa
by Robert M. Browning, Jr.

On 9 November 1942, Commander Roger C. Heimer (USCG) anxiously peered into the distance as word was passed that enemy aircraft were approaching. His vessel, the transport Samuel Chase (APA-26), for the past day had repelled sucessfully several enemy air attacks. Moments seemed like hours as everyone on the bridge strained to identify the planes. Finally they could be seen clearly, they were German dive bombers. As the dive bombers screamed out of the sky Heimer prepared Chase to get underway. His ship's gunners maintained a scathing fire on the aircraft as they released their bombs. Bombs missed the Chase on two separate occassions by just yards but they damaged the nearby transport Dempo. At dusk a torpedo plane approached the large Coast Guard transport. The plane came under immediate fire but banked behind an anchored British transport. With Chase now underway, Heimer began manuevering the nearly five hundred foot vessel in a narrow bay to avoid the aircraft. Coming from behind the transport the torpedo plane flew toward the Chase just over the water and released its torpedos. Heimer managed to steer the transport so that both torpedoes missed the stern by 100 yards. These tactical manuevers won the ship's crew high praise and Heimer a bronze star.

This was just one minor incident of the Coast Guard's involvement in the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. The invasion was the first offensive operation that the United States undertook against Germany during World War II and was then the largest amphibious operation ever undertaken. Dubbed Operation "Torch" this stategically important expedition allowed the Coast Guard with its unique experiences to play a significant role.

The campaign to capture North Africa was made necessary because by the summer of 1942, Adolf Hitler had suceeded in defeating most of Europe, was driving the Russian army toward Moscow and along with Italy controlled most of the Mediteranean. His forces had taken the French colonial possesions in North Africa and also Greece and Crete making the Aegean Sea unsafe for British ships. Because of these tremendous gains by the Axis powers and despite the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed in December 1941, to defeat Germany before Japan.

At a Christmas-time meeting the two decided to strike Germany in 1942. They discussed both direct and indirect approaches. Landings in Northern France were, however, impossible for more than a year due to the shortage of men and ships. The critical shortage of landing craft also stalled any invasion for months and caused the United States to redirect its ship building industry to the detriment of combat vessels in the Pacific.
While all the preparations were being made by the Allies the situation in North Africa remained a complicated issue. Morocco and Algeria were both French colonial posessions. The German Army, however, had occupied most of France since mid-1940 when France surrendered. The surrender provided that three-fifths of France be turned over to Germany. The French formed a new government at Vichy. The colonial posessions of France, however, remained free but still semi-loyal to France. With this uncertain relationship existing between the Vichy Government and the North African colonies, the United States had to be cautious. An unopposed landing would be prefered, but to broker this without the Vichy Goverment finding out was difficult. To complicate matters further, the French Navy, including several capital ships occupied ports in North Africa--their potential opposition to the Allied landing posed a grave threat to the success of the operation.

In July 1942, the Combined Chiefs of Staff made the decision to invade North Africa. Two months later an invasion force had been created and divided into three separate task forces. The all American Western Task Force carrying 35,000 troops was sceduled to land on the Atlantic coast of French Morocco and capture Casablanca and Port Lyautey. The Center Naval Task Force composed of British ships and 39,000 American troops was to capture Oran. The Eastern Task Force escorted by British warships comprised 23,000 British and 60,000 American Troops whose goal was the capture of Algiers.

Due to the immense size of the landings it was important that they be carefully coodinated and that everything run smoothly. The Coast Guard's primary role as it had been in the Guadalcanal campaign was to facilitate the landing of troops. During the planning stages of the operation several thousand Coast Guard and Navy men were trained to handle landing craft. They practiced landings at the newly created Amphibious Force Training Center at Little Creek, Virginia, and also at Solomons, Maryland. Army and Navy amphibious doctrine differed and the training allowed the differences to be hammered into one coodinated system. Over 3,000 men were trained to handle landing craft specifically for the impending invasion.
The initial objectives of Operation Torch were the capture of the major airfields and ports of North Africa. This would allow the allies to continue operations from the ground, from the air and from sea. It would also deny their use to the Germans. All this was to be accomplished within 24 hours in a three-pronged assault: an expedition to Morrocco and landings in Algeria.

The capture of Morocco was the job of the Western Task Force. Under the command of Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, it comprised nearly 100 ships. The ground units of the Western Task Force that went ashore in Morocco were under the command of Major General George S. Patton Jr. The task force was split into three groups for the initial landings. The principal objective was a major assault fourteen miles north of Casablanca at Fedala. This landing, carried out by the Center Attack Group, planned an advance on Casablanca and to later join with the forces landed from the Northern Attack Group that was making a secondary landing at Port Lyautey (Mehdia) sixty-five miles north of Casablanca. The Southern Attack group steamed southwest to make a third landing at Safi, 125 miles from Casablanca. This allowed the Allies to also move on Casablanca from the south.

The Center Attack Group was the most important of the three groups attacking Morocco. Twelve transports and three cargo vessels carried nearly 19,000 men and over 1700 vehicals for the assault. For the entire operation there were 3,000 men assigned to the landing craft. As the transport force steamed to Fedala it formed up into four columns--the Coast Guard manned ships Leonard Wood and Joseph T. Dickman headed two of the four transport columns. The majority of the men were scheduled to make landings at four separate beaches near the town the next day.

Shortly after 12 am on the 8th of November, Leonard Wood arrived at the staging area followed by the other transports and began loading the numerous landing craft for the assault. The landing would not be easy. The beaches were rocky, huge swells were frequent, and due to the long sloping beaches the transports had to lie far from shore to discharge troops. Special beach marking boats left the Leonard Wood and Joseph T. Dickman to locate and direct the landing craft to the areas safe for landing. These "scout boats" would show a light to seaward to guide the boats from the transports. Getting men and supplies to the beach in a timely manner were extremly important. Dickman's 35 landing craft were divided, half carrying troops ashore and half to carry supplies to the beach.

The Dickman carried over 1,400 men of the 3rd Division and the officers and men of Western Task Force Headquarters. The landing plans called for twenty extra boats from other vessels to supplement those from the Dickman. These craft became detached during the maneuvers and did not arrive before the initial waves left the transport. A reorganization of the landing schedule allowed a sufficient number of men and material to arrive at the beach assembly area without hardship to the landing. The destroyer Murphy (DD-603) covered the landing of Dickman's boats. The boats reached the beach within range of a battery north of Fedhala at Point Blondin. Upon reaching the beach, the fort became alert to their presence, began firing on the boats and struck the destroyer. The trip to the beach and the return trip was made under fire but not a single boat was lost.

As the Dickman unloaded men and supplies the batteries on the beach increasingly became a huge concern. They could potentially do extensive harm to the transports and mar the landing. Shortly after 5 am the cruiser Brooklyn (CL-40) was alerted to spotlights ashore and stood by to assist the landing if necessary. A few minor incidents occured but nothing to greatly alarm those on the beach. At day break, however, the shore batteries began to open fire--the first real sign that the French were not going to welcome the allies with open arms. The Brooklyn moved in to silence the batteries, manuevering just outside the transport area. In just over one hour the cruiser fired over 750 6-inch rounds, several times steaming into the waves of Dickman's landing boats and firing over the landing craft with each salvo. Other vessels also moved quickly to attack the shore batteries which were silenced and failed to do any real damage to the landing.

The Joseph T. Dickman performed well but the Leonard Wood had a much more difficult time during the landing. Her boats made the landing on Red 2 beach close to the city. The control destroyer Wilkes (DD-441) that was to mark the line of departure for the landing lay too far west of her correct position. The first four waves of landing craft steered for this vessel in complete darkness. The scout boat likewise added to the bad luck. While laying east of the beach where a rock reef began, the boat was approached by a mysterious craft thought to be hostile. The scout boat cut its cable to avoid the strange vessel and drifted to a position off the rocks. The first four boat waves which made up the initial assault were guided to the rocks by blinker and ran full force on them. The troops were disembarked over the rocks. Many of the boats were too damaged to return due to broken propellors, bent rudders and holes. Twenty-one of the thirty-two boats were lost in the landing. Others were lost due to shell fire or were broached by the surf after beaching.

The loss of the boats stalled the landing of men and equipment but getting the men to the beach was just the first task. Moving them beyond the beach was the next. To do this more effeciently the Coast Guard provided men for beachmaster duty. These officers and men not only helped supervise the unloading of the transports but acted as the beachead traffic cops to supervise the unloading of supplies on the beach. This was one of the most crucial jobs for the success of the assault. On the beach the soldiers were extremely vulernable and later in the day they came under fire from aircraft. One plane managed to strafe one of the Dickman's boats. Two of the boat's crew were wounded and engineman Paul Clark placed the men on board a destroyer and completed the boat's mission. He was awarded a Navy Cross for his actions. Another Coast Guardsman was awarded a silver star for the treatment of wounded on the beach.

The Coast Guard transports in the Center Attack Group worked all day to unload equipment and supplies for the men on the beaches. The trips to the beach were treacherous. The men in the boats have to contend with the fire from shore and the endless strafing from the air. Additionally boats were lost in the high and turbulent surf. Eventually the surf reached as much as twelve feet and the landings were made directly in Fedhala. For fifty hours without a break the Coast Guardsmen made steady trips to unload men and supplies, only stopping when their boats were lost. Chief Boatswain's Mate Harry E. Meekins from the Joseph T. Dickman stated that success was due to the fact that "most of us were surfmen from Coast Guard stations along the beaches . . . where we learned how to handle boats in all kinds of weather."

In Morocco the French forces never did staunchly resist. The greatest threat to the landing, the French naval vessels, never sortied from the harbor in Casablanca. The Battleship Massachussets, heavy cruisers and destroyers formed a covering group to neutralize them. Shelling the French vessels from sea they were quickly put out of action. The landing craft likewise found their greatest enemy to be the rocky beaches and the heavy surf rather than the enemy. A seaman 1st Class on board the Leonard Wood commented " The opposition was spotty. They'd fire at us until we got near them, and then the French would surrender. It was obviuos they didn't want to fight us."

While the landings were taking place off Morocco, the Coast Guard manned transport Samuel Chase under the command of Commander Roger C. Heimer (USCG) sailed with the Eastern Naval Task Force to attack Algiers. The British provided the naval vessels for this operation with the exception of four transports, one of them the Samuel Chase. The Eastern Task Force, carrying 72,000 officers and men, had followed the normal route for Malta-bound vessels in order to fool the enemy spotters. While in route a German submarine torpedoed the American Transport Thomas Stone and missed the Chase by 50 yards. Commander Heimer proposed to take the Stone in tow and likewise offered to take off the troops but each request was denied because the orders were clear--crippled vessels in the convoy were to be left behind.

The Chase was part of Group "Charlie" designated to land on four beaches twelve miles east of Algiers. The transports arrived just before midnight on 8 November. The Chase had her boats in the water in 55 minutes. The first waves of landing craft reached the beach fifteen minutes after midnight. By daybreak the boats were making steady trips to the beach with supplies and men. That afternoon the surf became rough and most of the boats from the transports were lost--according to Heimer because of their poor design.

While lying off Algeries the expedition's transports were attacked daily first by bombers and then by torpedo planes. The landing craft maintained their runs to the beach despite the attacks. The immense size of the Chase made her look formidable to the attacking aircraft and thus she received a disproportianate amount of the enemy's attention. The crewmen of the Coast Guard manned transport were commended by the British for their anti-aircraft defense and were credited with shooting down three planes. So intense was the fire that the British nicknamed the Chase the "Battleship"

Fierce French resistance never materialized. The French units in North Africa were divided between those loyal to the Vichy Government and the "Free French." The land forces, overall, made almost no resistence. The naval units offered the only opposition but could have contested the landings much more than they did. Most of the fighting was over by 11 November, at which time the Germans took over control of unoccupied France.

Operation TORCH proved to be the turning point in the Allies' war against Germany. After the loss of French Morocco, Germany remained on the defensive for the rest of the war. The capture of North Africa allowed the allies to begin to plan and prepare for than assault on Sicily where once again the Coast Guard would play a signifcant role in the amphibious landings.

Amphibious Landings

Amphibious landings are extremely complicated and take much coordination for sucess. The landings in North Africa were all begun within an hour of each other, were unprecidented in scale and began in total darkness on unfamiliar shores. Therefore to avoid problems and disaster, the organization for the invasion was meticuously planned from the beginning. The transports were loaded and arranged in such a way that the items needed for the initial assault were the most accesible. In total darkness the scout boats went in the water then followed all the other boats with the large tanklighters going into the water last. Within ninety minutes of the first boat touching the water the troops began climbing into the boats. After filling each landing craft they met at a rendezvous some distance from the transports and circled to wait for all the landing craft in the initial waves to proceed to the beach at one time. Just over two hours after the large transports had anchored the first three waves of the assault headed for the departure line where destroyers would follow them in for close support. At the departure line the boats were only fifteen minutes from the beach--the initial operation taking about four hours from start to finish.

Oran Harbor Operation

The only determined resistence to the Allied landings in North Africa occured in Oran Harbor. The capture of the harbor was part of the Center Task Force's missions. Here two ex-Coast Guard 250 ft. "Lake-class" cutters were lost in a duel with shore batteries and enemy vessels. Their mission was to force their way into the harbor at Oran with anti-sabotage teams to capture the city's forts and batteries along with the merchant vessels and wharves. Ten of these vessels were transfered to Great Britian under the Lend-Lease Act in 1941.

On 8 November, at 0300 the former cutter Ponchatrain, renamed the H.M.S. Hartland, and the Sebago, renamed the H.M.S. Walney steamed towards the harbor's defenses. Coming upon a boom, Walney broke through and proceeded to force her way through another. Steaming into the harbor she came under fire from fortifications, two destroyers, submarines and other small combatants. At point blank range the cutter was quickly destroyed, capsizing and sinking a few yards from the head of the harbor with tremendous casualties. Hartland did not fare better. Lost in the darkness, enemy searchlights illuminated her and she was mecilessly shelled until she sank in a blazing inferno. The operation cost the lives of over half of the officers and men on board these two vessels.

[ronnieraygun]

(combined ops)

This page provides details of Operation Torch - the invasion of North Africa. Churchill and his military advisers where concerned to remove the Vichy French from the territories they controlled on the North African coast before they fell into German hands. It was an American led operation under Eisenhower with substantial UK support.


The Allies decided to occupy Vichy French controlled North Africa thus denying the territory to the Axis forces. Churchill and his Combined Operations planners were closely involved with the Americans in working out the details of Operation Torch. There were many differences of opinion about timing, landing locations and the perceived reaction of the Vichy French forces to American as opposed to British forces. Churchill however accepted that TORCH was an American run project and he telegraphed President Roosevelt; 'In the whole of TORCH, military and political, I certainly consider myself your lieutenant, asking only to put my viewpoint plainly before you.'

On 1st November 1942, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Allied Expeditionary Force, Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Bart, GCB, reached the fortress of Gibraltar in the cruiser Scylla. Fours days later, Cunningham was joined by his Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had flown from England in a B-17 bomber through fog and rain. The Expeditionary Force headquarters, complete with joint Navy/Air Force operations room, were located in the old tunnels built into the Rock itself. They were airless, dank and dripping but completely immune to any bombardment. Only three days remained until the Allies launched the largest combined amphibious operation in the history of the warfare. Eisenhower considered the operation to be 'an undertaking of a quite desperate nature.'
After he left the Mediterranean Fleet Cunningham proved himself at the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He handled himself well and won the respect of Admiral Ernest King, probably one of the rudest commanders in the whole war. King was an Anglophobic, an attitude that was prevalent in the United States in the early 1920s.
Cunningham was asked privately by Eisenhower's Chief of Staff if he would be willing to serve as Naval C-in-C. Not wishing to put himself forward for the post he reported this to the First Sea Lord and said he 'would be most willing to serve.' In fact Cunningham had had enough of the committees and cocktail parties of Washington and he yearned to get back to fighting the war. He persuaded The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, that the proposed three separate Naval C-in-Cs for (1) the battle-fleet (2) the expeditionary force and (3) Gibraltar was unworkable and convinced him to support a single overall Naval C-in-C. It was a key contribution to Eisenhower's novel design for an integrated Allied command structure. On August 14 Cunningham was formally appointed Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force (ANCXF) with Vice-Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay as his Deputy. His Chief of Staff was Commodore R.M. Dick.
Eisenhower himself had never before commanded a major operation of war and was about to receive a baptism of fire. Apart from all the usual operational hazards there were other considerations for him to deal with. Would the Vichy French, whose territories the Allied force would invade, co-operate or resist?.... and what of the neutral Spain immediately north of Gibraltar? If it sided with Germany it could unleash its fury against the exposed airstrip and crowded anchorage at Gibraltar. These were major uncertainties but Eisenhower drew strength from the unflaggingly optimistic Naval C-in-C, Cunningham.

Ramsay had been responsible for the naval side of contingency planning for 'Sledgehammer,' the 1942 plan for limited re-entry to Continental Europe, and he had participated in a two-day tri-service study period on the operational problems of a large-scale opposed landing on the Cotentin peninsula (Normandy). It was Ramsay who took up the awesome responsibility of organising and running the vast naval movements required for TORCH. Cunningham did not finally return from Washington until mid-October apart from a twelve-day visit to England in September.
This time the Navy got it right. Ramsay planned everything while Cunningham gave him direction and the authority required to get things done. Certain prerequisites were laid down. Only troops trained in landings would go ashore. Only sailors trained in operating landing craft would carry the troops and their equipment ashore and only craft suitable for the purpose would be used. The Allies had the equipment, techniques and training to rehearse for the eventual invasion of Europe but this was, for the moment, a distant prospect. Most of the issues had been addressed prior to the war, spurred on by the Japanese invasion of China in 1937. The agency responsible for most of this endeavour was disbanded at the outbreak of the war and, in the haste and muddle of Norway, the rules and operations carefully laid down by the I.S.T.D.C. (Inter-Service Training and Development Centre) were completely ignored and would be again at Dakar. They would however be fully implemented for the first time in TORCH.
In January 1941 a Combined Training Centre was created under Captain J. Hughes-Hallett at Inveraray, Argyll, Scotland and another at Kabrit in Egypt in the canal zone. By February, no fewer than 5000 officers and ratings had been assigned to the manning of landing craft. This new role for the Royal Navy was somewhat disdained by the sea-going Navy who saw it as an undesirable diversion in their traditional career paths. Most were desperate to get back to sea duty. The initial training was hard, rigorous and realistic since it was essential that the landing craft crews were thoroughly proficient before they worked with soldiers on joint exercises. This was essential if the Army was to retain its traditional unquestioning faith in the Royal Navy's seamanship. The naval beach parties were selected and trained particularly carefully for theirs was the job of going ashore with the first assault wave and organizing the orderly flow of men and stores into the beachhead.
In October 1941 Roger Keyes was replaced as the head of Combined Operations by Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten. By the spring of 1942 Combined Operations had a virtual monopoly in the skills of amphibious command and this, together with Mountbatten's proven ability and diplomatic approach, led to his promotion to Vice-Admiral and to his appointment to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. These changes finally gave the command a seat at the very centre of power. Throughout 1942 the command's resources swelled under a massive expansion programme in preparation for the eventual invasion of Europe. In the spring of that year Mountbatten put into operation the conversion of an Armed Merchant Cruiser to act as a Headquarters ship for the landings. The Bulolo was the first, soon followed by the Largs, a former French Liner. Most of these developments were paralleled in the Untied States. The American's would employ them in both the Pacific and European conflicts although the they did not recognise the need for a headquarters ship until Torch had proved the accuracy of I.S.T.D.C.'s predictions on the need.
Throughout the first three years of the war Britain learned many painful lessons about amphibious landings notably from Dieppe. The plan for the invasion of North Africa identified the first three assault locations as Philippeville and Bone, Casablanca, and Oran and Algiers. However limited resources, and the Americans inability to supply sufficient ships for the landings, threatened to restrict the assault to Philippeville and Bone in the east of Algeria. Washington however took the view that the landings in Morocco should go ahead at the cost of all others, except Oran. This effectively removed the option of capturing Tunis with the aim of denying it to the Axis forces. Tunis was vital in restricting the Axis supply lines. If it fell to Rommel, the Axis forces would soon out-supply and outgun the Allies on both fronts. On the 5th of September 1941 the final compromise was reached after much negotiation for three landings at Casablanca, Algiers and Oran.

The landing forces were divided into:
Western Assault Force: Major-General George .S. Patton, 35000 American troops. Objective Casablanca in French Morocco.
Central Task Force: Major-General Lloyd R. Fredendall, 18500 American troops building up to 39000. Objective Oran.
Eastern Task Force: Lieutenant-General K.A.N. Anderson, 20000 troops in the first wave, half American and half British. Objective Algiers.
All these commanders reported directly to Eisenhower.
The Naval Task forces were:
Western Naval Task Force: All United States Navy vessels. 3 battleships, 5 carriers, 7 cruisers, 38 destroyers, 8 fleet minesweepers, five tankers commanded by Rear Admiral H. Kent Hewitt with an accompanying Assault Force of 91 vessels including 23 'combat loaders' same as LSIs.
Central Naval Task Force: Under Commodore T H Troubridge with the Largs, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers, 2 anti-aircraft ships, thirteen destroyers, six corvettes, eight minesweepers and various ancillary craft as well as the landing force.
Eastern Task Force: Under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Harold Burrough with the Bulolo, 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers, 3 anti-aircraft ships, a gun monitor, 13 destroyers, 3 submarines, 3 sloops, seven minesweepers and seven corvettes. As well as the landing forces..
All three Naval Task Forces were under the direct command of Admiral Cunningham.
The Air operations were divided into two areas:
Eastern Air Command: Everything east of Cape Tenez in Algeria, with British aircraft commanded by Air Marshal Sir William Welsh operating under the air and naval liaison system.
Western Air Command: Everything west of Cape Tenez in Algeria. All American aircraft under Major-General James Doolittle. Under direct command of General Patton.
Final operational orders were issued between the 3rd and 20th October 1942 in eight parts for the naval operation
Ton 1 - issued 3rd October. Outlined the strategic plan.
Ton 2 - issued 8th October, detailed the routing and scheduling of convoys, escort an task forces outwards from Britain and the forward assembly area on the Bay of Algiers.
Ton 3 - issued 8th October, detailed the tactical instructions for the landings.
Ton 4 - issued 8th October, detailed submarine screens to cover the landings.
Ton 5 -8, were issued over the remaining period and dealt with various redeployments and convoy arrangements to follow once the initial lodgements had been won.
~ The Convoys ~
To ensure the ships arrived on time in the assembly area at Gibraltar Admiral Ramsay, the author of the plan, issued Ton 2 with carefully calculated tables of convoy routes complete with lettered routing positions.
The first convoys left the Clyde on 2nd October. The first troop convoy left on 22nd October with others following on 26th October and 1st November. The last convoy was due in Gibraltar on the 4th November. The covering warships left their respective bases between the 20th and 30th October. The concern over U boat attacks didn't materialise since their command in Germany failed to realise the significance of the convoys despite spotting two leaving their bases. In the Mediterranean U-Boats were engaging, at this critical time, a convoy en route from Sierra Leone to Britain... so they too missed the naval build-up.
As some 340 ships converged on Gibraltar the Allies had one last vain attempt to persuade the Vichy French to join the Allies or at least not interfere with the landings. On the 5th November the whole operation hung in the balance as the entire force passed through the Straits of Gibraltar in just 33 hours. This involved the smaller vessels diverting to Gibraltar and refuelling which demanded a flexible and fast refuelling programme.
On 7th November R.A.F. reconnaissance patrols commenced along a line between the east coast of Spain and the Bonifacio Strait (Between Sardinia and Corsica) in order to detect any threatening moves by the Italian fleet; and north and west of Dakar in French West Africa to give early warning of any northward move towards Admiral Hewitt's task force by French warships. All the while Coastal Command aircraft were flying anti-U-boat operations and reconnaissance sorties over Italian and French naval bases.
The Torch landings were opposed by Vichy French forces numbering 120,000 in French North Africa. They were mostly native rank and file with French Officers supported by 500 aircraft and a sizeable Naval fleet at Toulon. Their army and air force both suffered from obsolete equipment but the Navy posed a great threat in the collective mind of the Allied commanders. Its firepower could wreak havoc on any landing it chose to oppose. The Italian fleet also presented a threat but it suffered from low morale, irresolute leadership and a lack of fuel oil. Finally there was the Luftwaffe in Italy and North Africa which had the potential to inflict serious damage. Up to the 7th November the German Naval High Command still believed the TORCH armada was a Malta-bound convoy.
The Allied convoys came together at prearranged locations guided by infra-red signal beams from Royal Navy submarines.
~ Algiers ~
At Algiers, Burrough put ashore the American 34th Infantry Division under Major-General Charles W. Ryder, one brigade of the British 78th Infantry Division, and No 1 and 6 Commandos. A second brigade of 78th Division acted as a floating reserve. The landing operations were directed jointly by Burrough, Ryder and Air Commodore G.M. Evelegh from the headquarters ship Bulolo. The Invasion plan was staged as two landings (A and B) west of Algiers, and one (C) to the east. (Photo courtesy of 'Mac' McCurdy shows a group of Americans attached to No 6 Commando. It was taken in North Africa probably in November or December of ’42. Four of them were volunteers from L Co of the 133rd regiment of the 34th “Red Bull” Infantry Division.)
In the last hour of 7th November, the landing forces were launched from their mother ships, in a moderate swell, a new moon and a westward current of about 4 knots. There were three sectors;
The 'A' sector landing went according to plan with 7230 soldiers of the British 11th Infantry Brigade (78th Division) and a reconnaissance squadron. There was no French resistance.
The 'B' sector landing consisted of Regimental Combat Teams of the American 34th Infantry Division and the British No1 and No 6 Commandos, 5420 strong in all, landing on five separate beaches. Some ships were pushed out of position by a force 3 breeze resulting in modification to the disembarkation procedure. Some landings went in on the wrong beaches but there were no repercussions since there was no French resistance; in fact the French commander openly welcomed the invading forces. Fleet Air Arm aircraft secured the Blida airfields surrender at 0930 hours.
'C' sector fared the worst. There was fog over the beaches as 6000 soldiers of the 39th Regimental Combat Team of the 34th Infantry Division and five troops of Commandos landed. Thankfully there was no resistance apart from a few rounds fired from a coastal defence battery which was quickly silenced by the Commandos.
The only fighting took place within the port of Algiers itself when two destroyers attempted to put ashore a party of American infantry to prevent the French from scuttling ships and sabotaging the dock installations. Heavy shells badly damaged one destroyer but the second got through and disembarked her landing party. This destroyer was pounded severely by coastal defence batteries and field artillery for four hours before she was compelled to put to sea leaving 250 Americans on shore. She was sunk the next day under tow. From daylight on the 8th November the four carriers provided air cover over the invasion area while reinforcements swelled the lodgements. The spearheads quickly thrust inland despite resistance by a handful of forts and coastal defence batteries. At 1100 R.A.F. Hurricanes from Gibraltar flew into Maison Blanche airfield after its capture by the Americans. In the afternoon of the 8th General Ryder agreed a local cease-fire with General Juin who represented the absent Admiral Darlan who was in Algiers visiting a sick son.
The Eastern Sector was secured by the end of the day just as German bombers arrived to attack the shipping off the coast.


This badge, together with the Stars and Stripes of the USA was worn by RAF Servicing Commando Unit 3201 when part of Operation Torch near Algiers in North Africa. The American flag, about 3 inches by 5 inches, was worn by British forces to appease the French. The Combined Ops badge was about 2 and a half inches in diameter.
~ Oran ~
The Oran landings were directed by Commodore T. H. Troubridge, R.N., Major-General Llyod R. Fredenhall and Major-General James Doolittle (Commanding the Allied Western Air Command) on the Largs. The landings were supported by a battleship, three carriers, an anti-aircraft ship and nine destroyers acting as a covering force in the event of Italian Navy interference.
In the early hours of 8th November the weather at Oran was calm with good visibility. However, the westerly winds were having a disconcerting effect on the landings.
X Sector, some 30 miles west of Oran was delayed by a French convoy getting in the way of the minesweepers clearing the path for the landing forces of Task Force Green comprising 2250 soldiers, plus tanks and trucks of the American 1st Armoured Division with a navy escort. The landings began half an hour late because of the French convoy and went in at 0130 hours. The unexpected shallowness of the beaches resulted in damage to ten of the thirteen assault wave landing craft which left only three operational. Through the same 50 yard wide stretch of sandy cove over 3000 soldiers came through over the next three days along with 458 tanks and trucks.
Y Sector was 20 miles closer to Oran. 5262 soldiers of the 26th Regimental Combat Team of the American 1st Infantry Division were put ashore by landing craft in the bay of Les Abdalouses. Delays were experienced caused by problems with the disembarkation landers on the Monarch of Bermuda and a sandbank which damaged the landing crafts' rudders and propellers as they bludgeoned their way through it. A northerly swell caused grief as many craft broached on top of the bar. Most of these delays could have been avoided if Headquarters had allowed beach reconnaissance parties instead of submarine periscope observations.
East of Oran was Z Sector. The landings here comprised 10,472 soldiers of the 1st US Ranger Battalion, the 16th and 18th Regimental Combat Teams of the 1st Infantry Division and the Western Column of Combat Command B of the 1st Armoured Division. The assault wave went ashore at 0016 hours from 68 landing craft on beaches Green, White and Red south of Arzeu, a little port beneath a rocky headland and overlooked by the Fort de le Pointe.
Here, as at Algiers, the landings were bloodily repulsed at the centre when HMS Walney and Heartland, flying under dual flags, attempted to land US Rangers in the harbour at Algiers. They broke through the harbour boom at 0310, but the Walney was reduced to a flaming hulk by a French sloop and crossfire from other vessels. She later sank. Heartland was shattered at point-blank range by a French destroyer after which three French destroyers put to sea in an attempt to engage the powerful covering force near the landings. Two of them quickly succumbed to the accurate fire of HMS Aurora. The sloop responsible for the sinking of HMS Walney, attacked the shipping off Y Sector but was sunk by HMS Brilliant. The remaining destroyer sortied out the following day with a second destroyer and were both driven ashore after being engaged by the Aurora and Jamaica.
Throughout the 9th November the French and Allied forces lobbed fire between the taskforce and the coast while French troops stoutly defended the approached to Oran. Aircraft from HMS Furious consisting of Seafires, Albacores and Sea Hurricanes, attacked two airfields destroying 70 aircraft. At noon that day Task Force Red from the Z sector beaches took Tafaraoui and 28 British and American Spitfires flew in shortly afterwards. The French Air Force attacked the last four aircraft with Dewoitine DW 250 fighters, shooting down one Spitfire for the loss of three aircraft. It was not until 1600 that the armour of Task Force Green from X Sector beaches fought through to take the second airfield at La Senia. Meanwhile, the American 1st Infantry was slowed by tough resistance at St Cloud on the road from Arzeu to Oran. It took a bombardment of the coastal batteries by Rodney, Aurora and Jamaica to bring about the final surrender of Oran to the Allies.
The other landings on the coast of Morocco were complicated by heavy Atlantic swells and fierce but short-lived fighting against the French Navy and Army. Casablanca fell early on 11th November. It is important to note that because of the lack of a headquarters ship at Casablanca, General Patton was helplessly carried away because the warship he was on was needed to repel a French naval attack just as he was about to go ashore.
~ Post Landings ~
Following the Allied capture of French North Africa a deal was struck with the highly influential Admiral Darlan who was recognized as High Commissioner for North Africa. All French North African territories (except Tunisia) aligned themselves to the Allied side, which included the French Naval base at Dakar and the powerful French Naval squadron stationed there. The terms were criticized in the House of Commons as having truck with a collaborator and thereby betraying the United Nations cause. However Eisenhower saw it only as a secure base to his rear relieving him of the need to provide precious troops for a full occupation of French North Africa.
This defection prompted Hitler to order German troops into the unoccupied zone of France. On 27th November the Germans attempted to seize the French fleet at Toulon, but as Darlan had promised in 1940, the fleet scuttled itself. In all one battleship, two battle-cruisers, four heavy and three light cruisers, 24 destroyers and sixteen submarines were placed beyond use.
The entire campaign to capture primary targets only took three days and was swiftly followed by the dispersal of the Allied fleet as the Royal Navy stripped its assets and redeployed them to the hard-pressed Atlantic convoy routes.
Bone was occupied on the 12th November in a joint operation by the British 3rd Parachute Battalion and the 6th Commando from two destroyers. By this time the Luftwaffe in Tunisia had reached a total of 81 fighters and 28 dive-bombers and there were a handful of parachute troops and panzer-grenadiers on the ground. Shortly afterwards JU-52s began landing troops at the rate of 750 a day and at sea armaments poured in including the formidable Tigers, the dreaded '88' anti-aircraft/anti-tank gun, field artillery and transport poured in despite interference from the Maltese based British aircraft and submarines.
On the 16th November, General Nehring arrived to command the defence of Tunisia. With logistics problems choking the Allied army, under the British General Kenneth Anderson, the Germans gained valuable time. By the 22nd November, Anderson's 1st Army was ready to launch a major assault on Tunis but by then the German/Italian forces were strong enough to defeat it. December rains turned the roads and tracks into a quagmire forcing the postponement of a planned renewed Allied offensive. There was stalemate. On the 8th December General von Arnim replaced Nehring but both sides failed to break the stalemate

[ronnieraygun]

http://www.airgroup4.com/bombing.htm



During OPERATION TORCH, the Ranger was joined with 4 escort carriers, the USS Santee, USS Suwanee, USS Sangamon and USS Chenango, for the North African engagement. At the time OPERATION TORCH was considered the most ambitious naval operation yet conducted in the European-African theater.

A sailor points at a submarine periscope spotted after two torpedoes were launched at the USS Ranger during OPERATION TORCH.

The Ranger responds to the submarine sighting by laying down a barrage of fire. The arrow marks a smoke ring created by a 5-inch gun.

The Ranger fires explosive shells and 50-caliber tracer bullets at submarine location.

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  Operation Torch Map - November, 1942
  
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  French battleship Jean Bart sank in port.

  
  
  

  A Piper Cub preparing to take off from the Ranger during OPERATION TORCH. The pilot is Captain Ford A. Allcorn, the passenger Captain Brenton A. DeVall.

  
  
  

  Ranger plane handlers push an SBD Dauntless dive-bomber into takeoff position after it has just landed from a strike on French North Africa.

  
  
  

  Ranger mechanics and ordnance-men check an SBD dive-bomber after a strike on French North Africa.

Launching F4F Wildcats from the Ranger, 1943.

(Photo by Bill Wade, AG-4).

[ronnieraygun]

http://www.nzshipmarine.com/newpage15.aspx

[ronnieraygun]

[mas36]

A very good read, thanks for sharing. I've always been interested in the "Operation Torch" campaign as it seems to be one of the least understood when compared to "D-Day" and "Dragoon".

In my opinion, this operation was a result of some of the worst wartime political maneuvering by our then-president F.D.Roosevelt. I believe we're partly to blame for the US casualties in this operation.

The fact that FDR and his silly Sec. of State Cordell Hull were, by and large pro-Petain, only added to the insanity which followed during the Casablanca talks. It was certainly something which baffled Churchill who, as much as he was sometimes annoyed by Gen. de Gaulle, understood then the dire need for a unified French command. However, because of FDR's and Hull's great dislike for de Gaulle, they tended to favor Vichy associated officers like Giraud and Darlan, which only made the fiasco turn into a major embarassment.

I also believe FDR could have acted with a clearer mind without Cordell Hull yapping and whining about de Gaulle the whole time. I know many people admire Hull becuase he gave the famous retort to the Japanese ambassador after Pearl Harbor, but personally I think his behaviour towards Gen. de Gaulle and the Free French bordered on psychopathic.

Instead of giving the Free French under Gen. de Gaulle immediate recognition and support, like Churchill had done, FDR squandered valuable time and lives by insisting diplomatic relations with Vichy be continued via Murphy and Leahy, in the crazy belief that somehow they could persuade Petain to rejoin the Allied cause.

Simon Betheon's book, "Allies at War", described this scene very well. One of the best books I've read concerning the animosity, confusions and misunderstandings between Gen. de Gaulle, Churchill, and FDR. Most interesting in this book, is the description of recently declassified documents showing that even Eisenhower could no longer put up with FDR's constant complaining about de Gaulle, to the point that he secretly told those around him to ignore any further requests by the president in regards to the Free French leader, thus the only time that Eisenhower disobeyed a direct order from his president.

[a_very_ex_STAB]

Thanks for that it was an interesting read. One of my great uncles took part in Operation Torch but sadly he did not return from the subsequent fighting in Tunisia.