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C-7 it's P4 nice work.
WWII - France: battle of the Somme June 1940 (Part I)
Background:
May 1940 is disastrous for the French army. Half of French forces have disapeared trapped in Belgium and the North of France. The 9 British divisions have sailed back, the 22 Belgian divisions and the 8 Dutch divisions have capitulated.
After the disasters of May 1940, the second part of the battle of France is going to begin. The battle of despair.
On front of the remaining French forces, the Germans have 88 infantry divisions, 6 motorized divisions and 10 panzerdivions with 2117 tanks.
The general Weygand could gather 40 incomplete French infantry divisions and have built 3 armored divisions, with everything he could find, which divisions are new with the gathering of several groups.
That makes 600 tanks so the equivalent of 2 panzerdivisions but far to be as efficient because the best tanks (S35 Samoa and Renault B1 bis) are few and the training is minimum. Several tank groups remain dispached in French units.
The other 20 French infantry divisions are dehind the Maginot line which has never been crossed; and on front of Italy which is about to declare war to France.
The Luftwaffe can engage 3000 planes. The Armée de l'Air has only 1000 remaining planes.
The unbalance of forces is massive and estimated to 1 vs 3, much more if you count the German reserves.
To solve the problem of the panzerdivion's deep raids in the rear of the lines, the general Weygand have adopted a new tactic. Each defensive point is organized as a autonomus strong point full of artillery, antitanks and weapons with all the supply inside or as close as possible. Those strong points called 'hedge' are positioned in woods, villages, natural protections, like spots in a 10 to 20 km deep defensive line. The gaps between each point are not intended to be defended. The goal is to stop the German infantry and the German supply but, if necessary, let the panzers go without any supply or infantry support (while still hit the tanks by flank fires). Then, attack deeper those tanks with flank attacks using the 3 new French tank divisions.
The ground is not favourable for the defense. It's flat, with soft hills, between Virmeu and l'Amiénois, then the panzers will find the Sancerre plateau where the ground will be very favourable for manoevers.
The Somme and Aisne rivers are not obstacle. The Ailette and the canals are easier to defend though.
The date of the offensive is set for the 31th of May but is delayed one week by the Germans to complete several decimated units and strengthen the attack.
The enormous material and numerical German superiority allow them to engage a mass attack. They decide to gather all their means for the attack.
The tanks must pierce in the deepth while the infantry must occupy and clean the ground. The attack must be conduct in to stage: break the front line on the Somme with Von Block army group, then attack on Champagne with the Von Runstedt army group.
The totality of this group must take the French army in the rear with a wide surounding move from Dole and Pontarlier. The group Von Block will then open like a hand fan to take Paris and Troyes.
The battle of Amien.
South of Amien the 16th infantry division (16th DI) covers a front 14 to 20 km wide. Its soldiers are mostly from Burgundy, Morvand, Bresse, and are 29 to 32 year old.
The division is comanded by the general Mordant, this unit has been transfered from Alsase and had only 4 days to organize its position on what the German call pompously the 'Weygand line'.
There are numerous villages in the area, the 3 infantry regiment (29th, 56th, 89th RI) of the division are dispached on several strong points in woods and villages.
20 anti-tank guns miss to the 16th DI to make a normal donation. They are replaced by 15 75 mm guns. The artillery (six groups of 75 mm and five batteries of 155 mm) is dispached in the rear of the strong points. Several 75 mm come to re-enforce the strong points who miss 25 and 47 mm anti-tank guns.
The 16th DI is also supported by the 12th batalion of tanks (30 Renault R35 light tanks)
Thus the 16th DI apply scrupulously the general Weygan's directives concerning the defence in the deepth.
This division strong of 18000 men is going to sustain the shock of the 14th Panzercorp of general Von Wietersheim. This one is composed of the 9th and 10th Panzerdivisions, the 13th armored division, the 9th infantry division and the elite Grossdeutchland armored division. Thus the army group gather a total of 428 tanks and 64000 soldiers vs 18000 French infantrymen.
During the night of the 4th to 5th of June the German artillery rage on French positions. Near 3:45 AM the ennemy fire become more intense and looks like a preparation of attack. At Dury in the 56th RI's sector, shells fall on villages and sourounding areas. A fighter of the previous war note that it worth Verdun 1916.
Crunched by the German's 105 and 150 mm, Saint-Fuscien disapear in the smoke and Cagny, South of the 16th DI sector, also recieve a storm of fire.
The Germans use smoke shells to blind the French. At dawn, the action of the aviation is added to artillery's actions. About 30 German bombers drop their bombs on the rear of the strong points of Grattepanche, Oresmaux, Saint-Sauflieu. The general Mordant whose PC is at Essertaux ask in vain for French hunters to intervene.
At 4:00, the 5th of June, artillery silents, replaced by the sound of automatic weapons showing that the German tanks and infantry have reached the advanced French positions.
The 14th panzercorp put its main effort on the North-East of Vers-sur-Selles, kept by Vasta batalion of the 29th RI. About 50 panzers advance through a heavy artificial smog. No indication show the existance of the mine field installed the previous evening at 10PM.
6 panzers blow up. 2 others go through between two woods and are destroyed by a 25 mm gun. A 9th tank is stopped 30 metters away by another 25 mm gun.
Nevertheless the ennemy open a breach in the anti-tank boom. A wave of tanks followed by infantry attack the position. The captain Greffet commandant of the position is killed. Lieutnant Garnung who replace him is killed as well and the lieutnant Guillot is severly wounded. The machine gun sections endure heavy losses. Nevertheless the enemy can't take advantage of his success. The comandant Vasta keep the cohesion of his batailion and on the right side, the 25mm anti-tanks of lieutnant Maigret destroy 10 panzers. Lieutnant Maigret is killed during this action, the soldier Dessauge keep the shooting and destroy 9 other panzers with his 25 mm.
On front of such a fierce resistance, the Germans give up every actions against this sector.
At 3:00, on front of Dury kept by several element of the 56th RI, the panzers spring up on front of the strong point. The 47 mm piece of lieutnant Dock destroy two. Other panzers try to circle Dury East but fall on the 47 of Boulley: 5 are destroyed and a 6th blows up on a mine.
The infantry then try to attack Dury. The lieutnant Gruère and his men let them approach 300 metters then open fire. Decimated by French fire the ennemy flow back and let numerous men on the ground.
The German effort go now on the North exit of Dury and the castle. The shock is tough because the assault is conducted by considerable forces. The resistance of the French delay the advance of the ennemy but the section of lieutnant Bertrand is erased. In spite of their enormous numerical superiority the Germans can't bite in the opposite positions. Their losses are heavy. At 11:00 the 5th of June they stop their attack, flow back and leave their deads on the ground.
East of Dury the 1st batalion of the 56th RI is engaged in severe fights.
Sergent Viallate:
« at 6:45 each man reach his position. Tanks are storming. I make fire on tanks with machine guns with perforating bullets, then, since we can't do better, we go deep in the bottom of our holes to let the tanks go but with the clear intent to stop the infantry which will follow. Tank go over us and kill several men with bullets and grenades in the deepth of our holes then at 7:30 the infantry attack our lines. We open fire with all our weapons and we kill quite a lot but more importantly: we stop them »
The panzers, seeing that they are not followed by the infantry turn back and attack the French position. Two sections are crunched by the panzers. Nevertheless other sections keep on the fight. The captain Dastullung who keep the West part of the Renard-Payen wood destroy 7 tanks and nail the infantry on the ground. At Petit-Cagny the section of lieutnant Guignard destroy one tank. Every assaults are stopped.
The Germans attack the sector of Saint-Fuscien, defended by the 89th RI. The strong points of lieutnant Pradat and sergent-chef Fabry, supported by a 25 mm and a 47 mm anti-tank gun destroy 10 tanks. Then the 75 mm unmask and fire at sight on panzers who circle the position. Three are on fire, another one is destroyed by a 60 mm mortar shell, the ennemy is in ruin and flow back leaving numerous dead on the ground.
But the panzers, avoiding villages, woods and strong points pour around Rumigny and engage the fight against the artillery batteries. The 2nd group of 351th Artillery Regiment endure the shock of the panzers. The captain Varille react with a outstanding sang-froid. He make a half turn with his pieces and order a fire at will.
The tanks are near 400 metters. Five are in fire.
Circling Saint-Fuscien East, the panzers go on to Bon-Air and Sains and destroy two batteries of the 306th RA. Nevertheless a dozen panzers are destroyed. In the same sector the panzers attack the Cambos farm defended by two 47 mm guns. 11 panzer are destroyed but the ennemy finally destroy the two 47mm piece. The 5th battery of the 306th RA also destroy 5 panzers. The 6th battery loose a good part of its forces machine-guned and guned by the panzers who go on front of Camon wood without stopping.
The 7th and 8th battery of the 37th RA, in position near Rumigny and Grattepanche are destroyed by German tanks.
About 40 remaining tanks still advance and are 400 metters to Grattepanche. The captain Reichel make move his 4th piece to have better sight and open fire at will. One tanks is touched and in fire, the others ruch to the battery. This one fire a accelerated rate, several tanks are destroyed, other tanks crunch the battery under their tracks.
At the border of Grattepanche the situation is equally critical. A 75 mm of the 315 RA and the 81mm mortars of lieutnant Dedieu make uninterrupted fires on the panzers until they fall out of amunitions. Then the infantrymen of the 56th RI go back in the village where close combats start. The lieutnant Feuillet take a machine gun from a German he've killed to shoot at the Germans. The Germans run away of the village.
German tanks attak Saint-Sauflieu and Oresmaux defended by groups of the 56th RI and two batteries of the 37th RA. The 75 mm make the panzers run away and destroy several.
150 new panzers threaten again the batteries of the 237th RA at Bon-Air and at the Camon wood. Six tanks are destroyed and burn on front of French positions.
All in all 400 panzers are now between French strong points and deep inside the French lines. That's time for French tanks to enter the dance.
Renault R35 tank
The 16th DI can only oppose 30 R35 tanks from the 12th BCC. They enter in action at 9:30 and push back several panzer groups.
In the afternoon of the 5th of june, the battery of Bon-Air and Camon wood are attacked for the 3rd time by the panzers. About 150 tanks pop up in free ground. The French artillery fire metucously in the heap. Some go as close as 200 metters. Other tanks don't approach the position but many defenders have been killed. Guner Maillot ask in his last breath to his lieutnant if he've done his duty well.
In spite the tank attacks on the batteries, in spite air bombings and in spite local actions on strong point, the ennemy doesn't make noticable progess during the afternoon of the 5th. The defenders of Dury, who have fired the hell with all weapons since 5:00 AM; and whose amunitions stocks are selling out, push back every assaults.
At 6:30 PM the French tanks of the 12 BCC counter-attack and push away several ennemy groups. The German tanks who have been deep in the plain are alone and are under the fire of the first element of the 24th DI settled behing the 16th DI.
Several are destoyed.
That's the flow back for the German tanks the evening of the 5th.
As the evidence of the efficiency of the 16th DI resistance.
« our tanks were really wellcomed by a hell of a fire. In a wink the first ones are in fire. The situation had really nothing enjoying. It should be our artillery to talk eye to eye with the French. Their defenses are really too strong. It's only noon and we haven't seen any infantry and supply since the morning. The day will be long and nobody know how many ennemy fires will separate us from our supply line. We already must save our amunitions. Because this day, everything is possible, even a French tank counter-attack » write Von Jugenfeld.
Amasingly the defender, isolated in their strong points, wonder the same questions
« our troops hooked on the ground, don't give up one foot. Circling the strong points, villages and woods, the German tanks infiltrate the gaps. Shooted on the flanks and sometime knocked out and put in fire. The German infantry can't follow. But we are engaged, the tanks come to the 2nd position of our army. The French line is now a set of little fortress, each of them fighting for its own count. Must we hope? The line hasn't moved. But tomorow the air bombing will restart. Who will bring us the supply and fresh troops? We're firing without interuption since the morning. New divisions? Tank divisions? Which ones? »
« in those ruined French villages, the French resisted to the last one » write Karl von Stackelberg.
The 6th of June, 2nd day of the offensive, the ennemy re-enforce the Saint-Fuscien/Rumigny axis and resume attacks everywhere. The 89th RI still hold the line near Noye but Cagny is going to fall. At Rumigny, during the morning the Germans succeed to enter the west part of the village where they destroy some 75 guns of the 37th RA. Nevertheless the resistance keep on around the PC of colonel Bourquin. At noon the panzers assault the position. The 75 of the 37th RA and the infantrymen of the 56th RI make this attack fail. But everywhere the panzers succeed to advance. The afternoon of the 6th, the 16th DI has made his duty and is given the order to retreart and let the place for the 24th DI which is settled in 2nd layer.
The defender of Saint-Sauflieu and Hébécourt can let the place but Dury and Rumigny are sourounded and resist heroically to the run out of amunissions.
At 5:45 PM the fights go on doggedly. At Dury the last defenders must surrender after amunission run out. At Rumigny each German infantry attempts are pushed back. But at 6:30 the sound of the tracks in the village. That's the hell. In spite the losses, the moral of the defenders doesn't weaken. The tanks make several concentrated assaults, while the French infantry try to break and attack the offender in the back. But the last machine-gun loader is emptied by adjudant Darbon, all resistance is impossible. It's 7:00 PM, it's uninterupted fights since the previous day 5:00 of the morning.
« that's the night write Pierre Vassel. Two enormous fires light up the landscape. That's Dury and Rumigny, martyr villages, deadly wonded in this severe hardship ».
The resistance go on at Estrée-sur-Noye up to 10:00 PM. Grossdeutchland division supported by tanks endure heavy losses. Oresmaux endure a artillery storm of 300 shells in few minutes. The village still fight late in the night. Several panzers are again destroyed.
The 7th of June, at 2:00, the general Mordant, chief of the 16th DI, leave his PC, it's now the 24th DI which is in contact with the ennemy. The remaining men of the debris of the 16th DI keep on the fight with the 24th DI.
The 24th DI, under the comandship of général Voirin, has set a system of resistance in the deepth in villages and woods. Still the system of strong points with infantry, artillery, anti-tank guns. In every villages barricades are set, roads are cut. The 78th RI close the direction Estrées/Epagny. The 63th RI occupy the central sector of Essertaux, Flers, Berny wood. The 50th RI cut the road Amien/Beauvais. The artillery (21th and 221th RA) dispach its 75 and 155 mm guns in several sectors in the rear. Its mission is to shoot at sight on the tanks which penetrate the positions. The means of the 24th DI has been weakly re-inforced by the batteries of the 16th DI and elements of the 29th RI.
In spite the weakness of its means, the 24th DI oppose a do-or-die resistance to the 14th panzerkorps, itself weakened by the previous fights against the 16th DI.
In the morning of the 7th, the 63th and 78th RI push back the assaults at Essertaux, Flers and Berny wood.
Grossdeutchland division supported by pansers can't go through. A tenth of tanks are destroyed on front of French positions. The Germans attack the Perdriamont wood but also meet a solid resistance. A compagnie of the 12th BCC, reduced to 10 R35 tanks, hunt the Germans out of the wood. A new ennemy assault at Flers break the defense but can't go further. A 41mm and a 75mm gun at the exit of Flers destroy numerous panzers. A 25 mm gun attacked by 4 panzers destroy one, others run back.
Nevertheless the German infantry still attack. Entire sections attack in close ranks and rush to assault singing!
Automatic weapons kill a lot of them but are destroyed the one after the other one by tank's fires. Around 6:00 PM, the defense of Flers is no more than commandant Laffont, two under-officers and 60 men. Sourounded everywhere he order a bayonet charge to break. « Allez les gars, pour la France »
He and almost all his men are killed. That's the end of the resistance of Flers strong point.
At Quennetot wood the infantrymen of the 50th RI don't let the ennemy bite the ground. Ennemy's assault are brocken then pusshed back by a counter-attack of several R35 tanks.
The 8th and 9th of June the 24th DI continue the fights with the same bitterness.
The decimated 14th panzerkorps can't push in the French positions in spite some local successes.
The German comandship decide to stop the offensive in this sector.
The German general von Block is worried.
« hard days with a lot of crisis. It seems that we are stopped. I go once more to the 14th panzerkorps's PC and 9th panzerdivions's to have a better sight of the situation.
It's outstanding to aknowledge that the 16th and 24th French infantry divisions which are opposed to us could stop a full panzer army group during 5 days! I decide with a heavy heart to remove the 14th panzerkorps from the south of Amiens and to engage it behind the 16th panzerkorps near Péronne to pierce with a massive armored arrow in the direction of Creil/Compiègne. Kleist will take the comandship of the two panzerkorps. Thus, such a armored mass will bring the army ahead between Amiens and Peronne »
The people of the area talked about a panzer cimetry on the Dury plateau.
The general von Block must confess that the 14th panzerkorps have lost 196 tanks south of Amiens against the 16th and 24th DI! A real bloodshed. 136 are the credit of the 16th DI and 60 to the 24th DI.
The 10th panzerdivision has only 60 tanks left on 180. The potential of the 14th panzerkorps is reduced to 45% for the tanks and 60% for the infantry.
The German general von Reichenau, comandant of the 6th German army write: « the French troops engaged on the Somme in June 1940 fought like lions! »
Bleeded lions. The 16th and 24th DI have lost 70% and 60% of their staff in this battle.
To continue here: The battle of the Somme (Part II)
http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums...d.php?t=123562
Last edited by c-eight; 11-12-2007 at 04:29 AM.
C-7 it's P4 nice work.
Nah, check it out
Nice work.
I'm curious about the picure of the R35 you've posted though. I might be wrong but this doesn't look like a vehicle in french service (e.g. the gun barrel)
The above might be in so far misleading as it portrays the battle of France as "heroic, poor French fighting desperately against a superior invader who has oh so many tanks and men and what not" - which is one of the common myths of WWII.
It should be more explicetly pointed out that, at the beginning of the "Western Campaign", France was neither surprised (it had declared the war itself and that many months before, remember?) nor ill prepared, nor inferior as far as material was concerned. On the contrary: the French armed forces orginally had slightly more men, more reserves of men, more and larger tanks and almost double as many artillery guns as the Germans had. Only as far as aircraft was concerned was the Wehrmacht superior and even that would not have been so if the British had used more of their planes in France than they did.
Plus, the Germans had to move and to attack whereas the French hoped that their role of defender would gave them an additional and edge, one that might grant them a decisive victory. The swift and crushing defeat came as a complete surprise to them (and frankly to quite a few on the German side as well).
Of course, the article points out: "Half of French forces have disapeared trapped in Belgium and the North of France. The 9 British divisions have sailed back, the 22 Belgian divisions and the 8 Dutch divisions have capitulated." All that however had to be achieved first and there was a bit of fighting involved to do so. The article however is mentioning it only casually, as if no real effort was needed.
So far my comments. Should the intention of the above be to show to some Americans that the French did actually fight in WWII and not run once some approaching Germans shot in the air - well, there is nothing wrong to enlighten people who actually think that. But for Germans that clarification is not really needed.
Originally Posted by Kitsune
France had 104 divisions, Britain had 10 divisions
Germany had 141 divisions
British and French had 13 700 guns, German 14 000 guns
British and French had 3 200 tanks, German 3 000 tanks
British and French had 2 000 planes, German 4 000 planes
French DCA was crappy, German DCA was the strongest of the world with the very good Flak
All is said.
This has been discussed many times before and still the myth remains. France was not beaten by so called German material quantity or quality nor was it beaten by "surrendering" soldiers who wanted to go back to the cafe, wine and mistresses.
Years of political and military decay, Poor military leadership and defeatism at the highest levels and something also about facing the well organized and led German Army.
@Guerrier_Franc:
I quote from this site which, despite being wikipedia, has got things quite right as far as I can tell (meaning that it coincides with other sources I consider to be reliable): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France
Forces and dispositions
Germany
Germany deployed about three million men for the battle. Because between 1919 and 1935 no conscription had been allowed by the Treaty of Versailles, in May 1940 only 79 divisions out of a total of 157 raised had completed their training; another fourteen were nevertheless directly committed to battle, mainly in Army Group C and against the Netherlands. Beside this total of 93 front-line divisions (ten armoured, six motorised) there were also 39 OKH reserve divisions in the West, about a third of which would not be committed to battle. About a quarter of the combat troops consisted of veterans from the First World War, older than forty.
The German forces in the West would in May and June deploy some 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns, including matériel reserves committed; about 7,500 artillery pieces were available with an ammunition stock for six weeks of fighting. The Luftwaffe divided its forces into two groups. 1,815 combat, 487 Transport and 50 Glider aircraft were deployed to support Army Group B, while a further 3,286 combat aircraft were deployed to support Army Group A and C.[17]
The German Army was divided into three army groups:
Army Group A commanded by Gerd von Rundstedt, composed of 45½ divisions including seven armoured, was to execute the decisive movement, cutting a "Sichelschnitt" — not the official name of the operation but the translation in German of a phrase after the events coined by Winston Churchill[18] as "Sickle Cut" (and even earlier "armoured scythe stroke"[19]) — through the Allied defenses in the Ardennes. It consisted of three armies: the Fourth, Twelfth and Sixteenth. It had three Panzer corps; one, XV Army Corps, had been allocated to the Fourth Army, but the other two — XXXXI Army Corps including the 2nd Motorised Infantry Division and XIX Army Corps — were united, together with XIV Army Corps of two motorised infantry divisions, on a special independent operational level in Panzergruppe Kleist. This was done to better coordinate the approach march to the Meuse river; once bridgeheads had been established they had again to be divided among Twelfth and Sixteenth Army and Panzergruppe Kleist abolished.
Army Group B under Fedor von Bock, composed of 29½ divisions including three armoured, was tasked with advancing through the Low Countries and luring the northern units of the Allied armies into a pocket. It consisted of the Eighteenth and Sixth Army.
Army Group C, composed of 19 divisions under Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, was charged with preventing a flanking movement from the east, and with launching small holding attacks against the Maginot Line and the upper Rhine. It consisted of the First and Seventh Army.
Allies
Because of a low birthrate that had even further declined during the First World War, France had a severe manpower shortage relative to the total population — which furthermore was only half of that of Germany. To compensate France had mobilised about a third of the male population between the ages of 20 and 45, bringing the strength of its armed forces to over six million men, more than the entire German Wehrmacht of 5.4 million. Only 2.2 million of these served in army units in the north though, but the total was brought to over 3.3 million by the British, Belgian and Dutch forces in that area. On 10 May there were 93 French, 22 Belgian, 10 British and 9 Dutch divisions in the North, for a total of 134. Six of these were armoured divisions, 24 motorised divisions. Twenty-two more were being trained or assembled on an emergency basis during the campaign (not counting the reconstituted units), among which two Polish (see Polish Army in France (1940)) and one Czech division. Beside full divisions the Allies had many independent smaller infantry units: the Dutch had the equivalent of about eight divisions in independent brigades and battalions; the French had 29 independent Fortress Infantry Regiments. Of the French divisions eighteen were manned by colonial volunteer troops; nineteen consisted of "B-divisions", once fully trained units that however had a large number of men over thirty and needed retraining after mobilisation. The best trained Allied forces were the British divisions, fully motorised and having a large percentage of professional soldiers; the worst the very poorly equipped Dutch troops.
The Allied forces deployed an organic strength of about 3,100 modern tanks and self-propelled guns on 10 May; another 1,200 were committed to battle in new units or from the materièl reserves; also 1,500 obsolete FT-17 tanks were sent to the front for a total of about 5,800. They had about 14,000 pieces of artillery. Enjoying thus a clear numerical superiority on the ground,[20] the Allies suffered from an inferiority in the air: the French Armee de l'Air had 1,562 aircraft, and RAF Fighter Command committed 680 machines, while Bomber Command could contribute some 392 aircraft to operations.[21] Most of the Allied aircraft were of an obsolete type, among the fighter force only the British Hawker Hurricane and the French Dewoitine D.520 could contend with the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 on something approaching equal terms.[22] At the beginning of Fall Rot, French aviation industry had reached a considerable output, and estimated the matériel reserve at nearly 2,000. However, a chronic lack of parts crippled this stocked fleet. Only 29% (599) of the aircraft were serviceable, of which 170 were bombers.[23]
The French forces in the north had three Army Groups: the Second and the Third defended the Maginot Line in the east; the First Army Group under Gaston-Henri Billotte was situated in the west and had to execute a swing movement into the Low Countries. At the coast was the 7th Army, reinforced by a Cavalry armoured division, that had to move to the Netherlands via Antwerp; then came nine divisions of the BEF, which had to position itself to the right of the Belgian army in the Dyle Line; next was the First Army that had to hold the Gembloux Gap, reinforced by two Cavalry armoured divisions and having an Infantry armoured division in reserve. The most southern to move was the Ninth Army, which had to cover the entire Meuse sector, between Namur and Sedan. At Sedan, the Second Army would form the "hinge" and remain entrenched.
The First Army Group had 35 French divisions; the total of 40 divisions of the other Allies in its sector brought their forces equal in number to the combined German forces of Army Group A and B. However, the former only had to confront the 18 divisions of the Ninth and Second Armies, and thus would have a large local superiority. To reinforce a threatened sector Gamelin had sixteen strategic reserve divisions available on General Headquarters level, two of them armoured. These were "reserve" divisions in the operational sense only, in fact consisting of high quality troops — most of them had been active divisions in peace time — and thus not comparable to the German reserve divisions that were half-trained. Confusingly, all mobilised French divisions were officially classified as A or B "reserve divisions", although most of them served directly in the front armies.
In any case, your statement about the alleged superiority of German manpower is not quite correct, especially the circumstance that the military build-up had begun in earnest only in May 1935 caused dire problems since there was only a comparable low percentage of the population that had military training. Also, your opinion that Germany had more artillery than France is wrong, it was indeed only about half as much as the French had. And finally this legend about the so called superiority of German equipment (since its equipment was all shiny and new while France's was allegedly WWI stuff, some even think that France had "disarmed" after the Great War) is just that: a legend. There was indeed stuff in the French army that was obsolete but by no means most of it since France had seen to keep its armed forces strong and up to date, on the other hand, some of the material the Germans had was untried and still had bugs.
Or in short: at the beginning of the Western Campaign the outcome was by no means obvious. On the contrary the Western Allies could (and often did) expect with some justification that they would deal a crushing defeat to the German force within a short time.
good work.
that was the case in beginning June for the battle of the Somme. That's what the article is about.
yeah the article probably have something to do with correcting some myth.
This period is very little known even in France: it was intense but short and one never speak much about defeat.
But we can notice that the french were still quite fast to react after the disaster of May and that the hedge/hedgehog tactic was probably the right one against Blitzkrieg.
But in June, after having lost half of its army in Belgium, the situation of France was desperate.
How could those soldiers fight so well in such a desperate situation is beyong me.
I note that Rommel killed all the blacks he captured. what a b@stard.
Interesting. Just in the past year, I've heard of a book being published detailing exactly that: very many black colonial POWs in the French army being executed shortly after their capture. If I find the title/author, I will post it here immediately.
Ooops!! I understood: "C-7: it's P4's nice work"C-7 it's P4 nice work.
Now I understand: C-7, its P4. Nice work.
Hello P4sorry to have slap you
***
In fact France needed time to adapt to the Blitzkrieg. It seems that at the Somme it was the case but too late. Time was a notion the Germans did not let to anybody with their blitzkrieg. Too many mistakes made previously, too much losses in May.
As simple as that IMO. Some have lectured nice theories of the sword stronger than the shield at that time, bla, bla, bla.
The blitzkrieg wasn't that hard to defeat when you have undertood one or two things, as shown at Hanut/Gembloux in May; and as shown later on the Russian font.
Now imagine something: the same tactic as on the Somme but in May.
A front 2/3 shorter thanks to the Maginot line and a french army at least twice stronger (tanks mainly)
Thus a defense line full of strong point spots 120 km deep, instead of 20 km on the Somme!
I doubt the Germans would have crossed this hell.
In short: May 1940 was a major f***-up french side where everything went wrong. (It does not remove any credit to the Germans though).
I wouldnt be too surprised after the occupation of western parts of Germany to force war repayments by the French army their colonial troops were a particularly visible sign of national defeat. (the fact that German women saw exotic foreigners with money and food and kept dating them didnt help German mens pride much either)
Add to that Nazi racial propaganda and some notable defensive battles from African soldiers that must have really dented some Germans pride so the attitude to their prisoners wouldnt have been very forgiving in some cases!
I dont know how widespread it was since enough Colonial troops survived to reach labour camps, not that they had an easy time there either.
how many of these divisions were actually deployed against France?
Excellent article despite some grammatical mistakes. And Kitsune is obviously a troll whose only intent is to bash France. Most of French tanks were either obsolete or not in a battle-ready state at the onset of the war.
And C-8 makes sure you put the reference to the article. There's a copyright issue involved.
Last edited by LordTyphus; 11-14-2007 at 05:06 AM.
Hmmm, he is not wrong when you take forces at the start of the German offensive... but c8 describes the Battle of the Somme, which takes place after the encirclement of our left wing (Dunkerques, end of may 1940), at which time the strategical blunders of the High Command (Gamelin and co, Petain's protégés ) had reduced the French forces to the 40 divisions C8 speaks of (I guess Kitsune may have missed the point). The fact is that Weygand designed the "Hedgehog tactics" which was to become commonplace in the later phases of WW2 (the Wehrmacht put it to good use on the Eastern front). In his description of the 1940 campaign, Yves Buffetaut insists that the French Army, by te time of teh battle of the Somme, was of high morale, and they fought with incredible gallantry at the start of the battle, inflicting the highest losses of the Germans since the strt of the war agaisnt a 3 to 1 forces ratio.
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