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The risk of an Indonesian military attack against Australia
The subject of this assessment is the risk of a military conflict between Indonesia and Australia. For the purpose of analysis, this topic will draw upon six categories of conflict, the first being the risk of a major war between Indonesia and Australia such as an invasion or an attempt to capture a significant portion of Australian territory. The second will include a major military clash between the two countries short of the threat of invasion, such as a major war that includes Australian allies such as Papua New Guinea, East Timor, Singapore and Malaysia. In this instance Australian sovereignty is not the target of attack. The third category includes the risk of conflict resulting from a partial break up of Indonesia, such as the attempted independence of a province such as Ambon or Irian Jaya. The fourth category involves the risk of a low intensity war between Indonesia and Australia. The fifth category involves conflict brought about by Indonesia restricting the sea lanes of communication running through Indonesia and otherwise threatening the freedom of passage. The final category involves the risk of violence resulting from civil disturbance within Indonesia that threatens the safety of Australian nationals in Indonesia. The purpose of these categories is to analyse the effect of various types of conflict that differ in scale and intensity in order to judge along a scale of conflict.
The first category involves the risk of a major war between Australia and Indonesia, with the Indonesian objective being the seizure of a significant portion of Australian territory. The objective would be the movement and sustainment of Indonesian military units that would occupy Australian mainland territory. An assessment of the risk of this happening is based around the military capability possessed by Indonesia as well as the response capability possessed by Australia. This also needs to factor the effect involvement of allies will play, as well as the level and nature of political motivation possessed by the Indonesian leadership to carry out such an operation.
While the Indonesian military (TNI) looks formidable on paper, with a total manpower of about 290,000, especially when compared to that of Australia, which has 50,000 personnel, the real issue is what forces Indonesia can move to Australia in support of military operations. The necessity to safely cross the sea-air gap means Indonesia needs to establish sea and air superiority across the sea-air gap, and air superiority over the beach head(s) and occupied territory, or at least deny Australian superiority. This means for Indonesia to pose a credible threat of Invasion would require the sea and air lift to move an invasion force and sustain it on Australian territory, as well as sea and air units to dominate the sea-air gap and escort those forces to Australian territory.
Indonesia has sufficient sea lift to move two light infantry battalions in a single lift. Indonesia’s primary air lift consists of seven to eight operational C-130’s, which is less than sufficient to move an airborne battalion in a single lift. Given the distances involved, additional troop landings could not be expected within 48 hours, meaning Indonesia could not move more than a single light infantry brigade in a single lift. The Australian Army maintains three operationally viable brigades that could respond to a landing (1, 3 and 7 bde), with 1 bde being an armored/mechanised formation, 1 bde air mobile and 7 bde motorised, with all three are capable of rapidly responding to a landing on Australian territory. Australia’s forces have sufficient numbers to outnumber an initial Indonesian landing by 3:1, which current doctrine considers necessary to attack a defending force. The Armoured brigade in particular would be particularly adept at counter attacking an Indonesian landing force. The result is Indonesia does not possess a sufficient troop lift capability to undertake a major landing with the objective of seizing Australian territory.
The structure of Indonesia’s logistic network is based around their military districts and are intended to support military operations on their own territory. This is not compatible with what would be required to support a military formation on Australian territory as the logistic network does not allow for the extension of forces that are a distance form Indonesian territory. Indonesia therefore does not possess the logistic support that would be required to support an invasion.
The Indonesian Air Force’s combat capability is based around ten F-16’s and 12 F-5’s, neither of which have sufficient range to operate over Australian territory, nor do they have beyond visual range missile that would be necessary to compete with the RAAF’s three squadrons of F/A-18’s. Indonesian forces would also lack radar coverage over Australia, meaning Indonesia would have no means to control Australian airspace, where as the RAAF would have the use of local microwave radars, over the horizon radars and in the near future, airborne early warning aircraft. This severely restricts TNI’s ability to dominate the sea-air gap and protect Indonesian forces in Australia from air attack.
The Indonesian Navy have no ships capable of providing credible air defence, or possess a credible anti-submarine warfare capability. This will leave them lightly vulnerable to attack from Australian submarine and air attack from F-111’s, despite the fact that the RAAF can only currently keep between nine and fifteen of the aircraft operational.
Indonesia not only has an insufficient troop lift capability to invade Australia, it has no real means of providing logistic support to an attacking force in Australia, or protect that force en route to Australia. Australia’s sea, air and land forces are adequately capable of dealing with an Indonesian invasion.
An Indonesian invasion would not only face military defeat, but would result in political and economic isolation due to undertaking such a blatantly aggressive action. Given Indonesia’s currently fragile political and economic position, such isolation, in addition to the effect of military defeat would result in the collapse of the current government, which is a reasonable assumption given the effect the economic and East Timor crises had on the Suherto/Habbibi government.
It can therefore be assessed that the chances of an Indonesian invasion would be minimal to zero given the lack of political will, as well as the lack of a credible military capability, with the current risk being within the capability of the Australian Defence Force to counter. For this risk to become credible, Indonesia would require the procurement of a substantially greater sea lift capability, a greatly improved logistic support capability, land units capable of operating on Australian territory, a sea and air escort capability that can dominate the sea-air gap, long range command, control, communications and intelligence gathering, as well as gain the political motivation to undertake such an attack. These procurements are easily monitorable given Australia’s current intelligence capability and operations. This involves diplomatic activity to judge the political motives behind such procurements, like what occurred with the previously planned procurement of an amphibious assault ship and Su-30 aircraft from Russia, as well as defence based intelligence such as the Defence Intelligence Organisation, Defence Signals Directorate and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service. Current arrangements, as well as the extent of the Indonesian military upgrade that would be required, would detect an Indonesian military build up in time to allow for Australia to take defensive measures.
Required Australian measures to respond to the risk of invasion lies initially in warding off the chance of human error involving intelligence gathering and assessment, which could fail to interpret the nature of the threat posed by an Indonesian military upgrade. This could result in an Indonesian military upgrade that is not countered by Australia. This is particularly a problem when peaceful relations exist, as the favourable diplomatic position means it is seen that Indonesia lacks the motive to attack and is therefore no threat, despite an upgrade of TNI.
In addition to proper intelligence gathering capability to detect and assess the development of an Indonesian threat, the Australian Defence Force needs to possess the ability to rapidly expand from its current size in order to match and sufficiently counter an upgrade of TNI. Diplomatic activity also needs to be undertaken in order to create a political climate that means Indonesia would not seek to invade in the first instance. This would include the creation and maintenance of alliances, such as what exists with Anzus, to act as a deterrence, as well as to encourage friendly relations with Indonesia so that an invasion, or attack of any kind, is not considered.
The second category of threat involves a major war between Australia and Indonesia, short of an invasion. This could involve an Indonesian attack to cause significant damage to Australian industry, resources or population, or a major regional war between Indonesia and other regional states in which Australia becomes involved. Such an attack
A substantial attack upon Australia with the objective of causing significant damage, but without the occupation of territory would be substantially easier to undertake, as the logistic problems with moving and supporting a large ground deployment across the sea-air gap is avoided. To undertake such an operation, Indonesia would require a long range air strike capability in order to strike into Australian airspace, as well as a command, control, communications and intelligence capability to support the Indonesian Air Force. An air strike capability alone would be sufficient to pose a credible threat. Additional forces that would be of value would include submarines to attack shipping in Australian waters, including RAN and commercial shipping. Such submarines would also be capable of launching land attack cruise missiles, creating the ability to strike anywhere along Australia’s coastline. This capability can be extended to Indonesian naval shipping, although the increased vulnerability of surface ships to counter attack makes them somewhat less suitable.
As stated earlier, Indonesia does not possess any combat aircraft with sufficient range to effectively operate over Australian territory. This severely restricts Indonesia’s capacity to launch substantial attacks upon Australian territory. The Indonesian Navy has two submarines that could be used to launch cruise missiles, but possess no such missiles. The Indonesian Navy also possesses no ships that could operate such missiles.
From this we can see Indonesia is severely limited in how they could launch a major attack upon Australia. In order to do so, Indonesia would need additional long range aircraft, inflight refueling aircraft, capable ships and submarines as well as sufficient ordnance to undertake a major attack. Initial signs of such a procurement have recently occurred, with an Indonesian attempt to purchase twelve Su-30 aircraft from Russia. Such aircraft would possess the capability to attack into Australian territory, although the small numbers does result in a limited capability.
In order to reduce the risk such an attack would pose, Australia would need the capability to detect air and sea attacks at the earliest possible stage in order to preemptively destroy the platforms launching the attacks, or to defensively respond to such attacks. This can currently be successfully undertaken, especially given Indonesia’s current lack of the required capabilities. The current RAAF fighter fleet provide adequate air defence capability to respond to currently credible air attacks, and the F-111 fleet maintains the ability to preemptively attack offensive Indonesian units before they can attack. The RAN currently maintains a sufficient submarine, surface and air based anti-submarine warfare capability to counter the currently small fleet of Indonesian submarines. Australia therefore currently possesses the necessary capabilities to deal with such an attack.
Similar to what is experienced with the previous scenario, Indonesia would require the procurement of additional systems in order to possess a credible means of launching a substantial attack upon Australia. While this capability would be far easier to gain than what would be required for an invasion, it still requires a significant period of time to acquire the necessary systems, and become proficient in their use. This would be detectable by Australian intelligence agencies and allow for Australia to develop sufficient capabilities to defend against the threat. Once again, this involved an additional risk in that Indonesian procurements may be made, but might not be recognised as being a threat that warrants Australian action, or Australian counter purchases may not be made in sufficient time. To avoid this risk the ADF needs a sufficient capability to deal with the current threat, as well as allow for a margin of error that will provide sufficient time to take additional action.
The risk of a major war not only involves an attack upon Australia, but upon other states neighbouring Indonesia, as they are all hold alliances and defence agreements with Australia. Such an attack could be launched upon Papua New Guinea, Malaysia or Singapore, and would be more feasible than an attack upon Australia due to their closer proximity, with two of the countries sharing a common border. Attacks could involve air strikes, with the shorter range meaning Indonesia could effectively use a wider array of aircraft, as well as cross border land attacks that have the intention of seizing limited pieces of territory, or just to cause disruption, damage and confusion. In the case of Singapore particularly, there is the risk of naval blockade due to their confined geographic position.
In these instances there is a greater likelihood of attack due to the fact that such operations are far more feasible and within the capability of TNI. This means the warning time for such an attack would be considerably reduced than what is faced with the previously mentioned threats. As there is little additional procurement required to create a threat, a rapid change in the regional political situation such as what could occur following a coup or through the threat of internal rebellion would result in the rapid rise of a credible threat that would warrant immediate action. The political instability within Indonesia which has been demonstrated since the 1997 economic crisis, in addition to numerous breakaway movements such as in Aech, Ambon and Irian Jaya highlight that this is a credible threat which warrants contingency planning.
As Australia is not being directly threatened, there is not the need to manage this contingency single handed, but rather operate within a partnership consisting of other regional states. Current alliances have resulted in cross training which will allow the various militaries to operate together effectively, as well as provide a deterrent against Indonesian military action. The Five Power Defence Agreement was aimed specifically at Indonesia when it was initially formulated.
As Australia would not be directly threatened, it is not Australia’s primary responsibility to counter the threat. Australian military capabilities would be better served in providing a strike capability that could operate within Indonesian territory that could act as a deterrent, as well as target offensive Indonesian forces. This would best be served with a long range sea and air strike capability, which can attack at range and over a wide area. This can currently be undertaken with the RAAF’s fleet of F-111’s and its submarine arm. The short notice that such a threat could materialize does however mean these forces need to maintain an operational level of readiness, which in the past has not been demonstrated, with the F-111 fleet being recently grounded due to maintenance problems, and the submarines delayed into service due to construction problems and problems with the fire control system.
The greatest leeway that could be granted here is for these ADF assets to be made operational within the time it takes TNI to deploy their forces within the region. This requires a sufficient intelligence capability to detect these troop movements, as well as the ability to interpret these warning signs in time. Past experiences such as the Falklands and Gulf War have shown this can not be relied upon. The ADF therefore needs to keep its primary deterrent capabilities on short notice to deploy in order to operate as an effective deterrent and minimise the risk such an attack would involve.
The risk of such an attack can be further reduced by encouraging a stable political situation within Indonesia and within the region as a whole. This can be done my maintaining a stable economic system within Indonesia, maintain favourable diplomatic activity and encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes between regional states.
A third category of risk includes a low intensity conflict between Indonesia and Australia. Such a conflict would not be based around major exchanges, but the use of light air attacks, and special forces that conduct sabotage operations against Australian military, economic and other civil targets such as mines, offshore oil and gas platforms and infrastructure. This could also be expanded to include limited interdiction of shipping in Australian waters or the mining of local shipping lanes.
Such operations could be undertaken without any sophisticated weaponry. Private boats could be used in infiltrate special forces personnel into the country, as well as attack local shipping. This is a very low tech and cheap way to attack Australia that does not require an extensive build up of forces or a great deal of build up time to arrange. The objective would not be to cause military defeat, but harassment which results in economic and social disruption, loss of life, or to undermine the Australian government.
The nature of such a campaign means it can be undertaken on very short notice, and is the most feasible means Indonesia would have to attack Australia, and has been considered the most plausible threat that Australia could face. As with the previous category, all that is required for a threat to emerge is the political motivation within Indonesia, meaning Australia needs to maintain the capability to counter this threat on a permanent basis and have it available on short notice.
A fourth category of threat involves the disruption of shipping through the Indonesian archipelago. As Indonesia contains a number of major straits, such as the Malacca Strait, which are of great importance to international shipping, especially oil shipments between the Middle East and Asia. The disruption of these straits would result in serious economic disruption to the whole Asian region, as well as result in the diversion of shipping south of Australia, resulting in Australia being required to monitor these new shipping lanes to ensure their security.
Such disruption could result from a deliberate action from the Indonesian government, the effect of a regional war, or even piracy that is staged from Indonesian territory.
To deal with this threat, Australia needs to contend with the effects of a regional war, as per the previously mentioned cases, and requires a multinational response rather than a purely Australian response due to the scope of the threat. The threat of piracy is a more credible threat due to the fact that it is currently being undertaken, and can be undertaken regardless of regional political relations. This requires a combined law enforcement effort between Australia and Indonesia, as well as other countries within the region. in the event of shipping having to be diverted south of Australia, there will be a need to monitor these shipping lanes independently and provide for their security.
A fifth category of conflict involves the threat to Australian nationals within Indonesia. In the event of internal violence within Indonesia, such as what was experienced during the Asian economic crisis, or the result of internal rebellion, there will be a need to conduct an evacuation of Australian nationals. This would require a transport capability to move the nationals out of the country, as well as a sufficient security element to protect those transport assets. Such an operation could consist of purely an evacuation, or an opposed operation involving Australian hostages. Recent history with similar operations that have been undertaken have highlighted the need for sea and air lift in order to conduct the evacuation, as well as small troop numbers for local security. In the event of a hostage situation, there is an additional need to transport troops that would conduct an opposed landing and rescue.
The requirement to evacuate nationals can arise in very short order, allowing no time for additional procurement of weapons and equipment. Australia therefore needs to maintain the necessary capabilities to conduct such operations on a permanent basis, and keep them on high readiness levels.
Conclusion
An Indonesian threat can involve varying scales of conflict ranging from a major war aimed at seizing Australian territory to low intensity conflict and a threat to Australian nationals. The scale of this threat is determined by the existence of a political motive to conduct such attacks or allow a breakdown in law and order, as well as the existence of the necessary forces to undertake such operations, or the time it would take to acquire such capabilities.
There is currently no threat of invasion or major attack on Australia due to the lack of the necessary capabilities to undertake such an operation, meaning there is no current risk. To minimise the risk in the future there is a need to monitor Indonesian military procurements to judge the nature of the procurement as well as the capability it provides, and the Indonesian political and diplomatic situation. The Australian Defence Force also needs the ability to rapidly expand in the future in order to adapt and account for any modernisation that occurs within TNI so that Australia maintains the necessary capabilities to prevent a successful attack. The threat posed by a regional war, low intensity warfare and the threat posed to Australia nationals poses a greater risk, particularly for the lower levels of conflict, which warrant an immediate capability in order to respond. This requires the maintenance of a deterrent capability, sea and air lift, local security forces, a limited force to conduct opposed landings overseas, as well as local troops and surveillance systems to monitor minor attacks upon Australia. In addition to this, there is the need to maintain a capable intelligence gathering capability that would be required to detect changes in the regional military and political disposition, and changes of intent. Finally, there is the need to have a force that can be expanded upon in order to adapt to an increase in the regional threat.
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