Reply With Quotewow. so much for that.
the whole "three decade old tank" statements are pretty inaccurate though
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/n...p?newsid=10149No more Arjuns for Indian Army
5 Jul 2008, 1540 hrs IST,PTI
[COLOR=blue! important][COLOR=blue! important]NEW [COLOR=blue! important]DELHI[/COLOR][/COLOR][/COLOR]: As doubts over viability of the three-decade-old Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) are being raised, the Army has indicated it would place no more orders than 124 already made to Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi, sounding the death knell of the DRDO project.
"Army will no more place orders for Arjun beyond 124 that was already contracted. That is because Army is now looking 20 years ahead and wants a futuristic MBT," Lt Gen Dalip Bharadwaj, Army Director General (Mechanised Infantry), said here.
Though Bharadwaj discounted suggestions that it would mean the end of DRDO's Arjun project that began in 1972, he did point out induction of more Arjun MBTs at this stage would only mean [COLOR=blue! important][COLOR=blue! important]India[/COLOR][/COLOR] lagging behind in the technological race in armoured fighting vehicles.
"Arjun is a contemporary tank and may be used in the next decade or so, but not for a technologically advanced, next generation warfare some two decades hence," Bhardwaj said on the sidelines of an interactive session with defence private industry at CII.
After 36 years into its design and development, Arjun had as recently as in December 2007 failed winter trials, as stated in a Parliamentary report. It is yet to go through crucial comparative trials with Russian tanks, a mandatory process before induction into Army.
With uncertainty looming over Arjun tanks, Army has already increased its orders for Russian T-90 tanks by another 330 last year, over and above the 1000 it had ordered, clearly indicating T-90s would be the MBT of Indian Army for the next decade.
Chennai-based Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) had last year handed over 14 Arjuns to the Army for trials, but they were returned with a list of defects in its fire control systems, inaccuracy of guns, low speeds in tactical areas such as deserts and inability to operate in temperatures above 50 degrees Celsius.
This summer too Army and the DRDO took out Arjuns for trials, but the results were yet to be made public. Meanwhile, the Defence Ministry claimed it suspected an effort at "sabotaging" Arjun tanks, though reasons for the suspicion were not spelt out by Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh.
The DRDO's new project 'Tank-X' too did not find favour with the Army. "Tank-X is a hybrid of T-90 and T-72, which are both contemporary technology tanks. There is no point in having technologically obsolete tanks for warfare two decades hence," the DG (Mechanised Forces) said.
Bharadwaj also announced that the Army, along with CII, would organise a two-day international technology seminar on Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) and Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) here on July 22 and 23 to discuss global challenges in designing, developing and producing FMBT and FICV.
To be inaugurated by Defence Minister A K Antony and Rao Inderjit Singh, Bhardwaj said the seminar would debate the kind of MBT Army needed, considering that might of the military was judged by both deterrent and offensive capabilities of Mechanised Forces and on the quality and quantity of equipment.
"Time has come to reassess our requirements. We are at the threshold of formulating qualitative requirements of FMBT and FICV. This is the future, as it takes about a decade for completing the process of designing and being ready with a prototype of FMBT and FICV. It could take another 5 to 10 years to finally induct futuristic MBTs and ICVs into the forces," he said.
The meeting would also provide defence planners, [COLOR=blue! important][COLOR=blue! important]end-users[/COLOR][/COLOR], scientists and both private and public defence manufacturers a holistic view of applicability of tanks, be they heavy, medium or light, and wheeled or tracked in modern warfare.
"Considering [COLOR=blue! important][COLOR=blue! important]India's[/COLOR][/COLOR] expanding strategic reach and widening global standing as a military power, future armoured vehicles should be capable of performing roles during out-of-area contingencies beyond its territorial boundaries," Bharadwaj said.
The meet would also try to provide defence industry an insight into Mechanised Forces' aspirations and try to gauge their capability to meet Army's future requirements.
Apart from looking at varying global perceptions on use of armoured vehicles, the seminar would identify critical emerging [COLOR=blue! important][COLOR=blue! important]technologies[/COLOR][/COLOR] in the field to meet Army's requirements of FMBT and FICV.
Already, seven foreign countries have confirmed their participation in the seminar including US, Israel, Russia, Germany, UK and France.
wow. so much for that.
the whole "three decade old tank" statements are pretty inaccurate though
DEAD
http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/n...p?newsid=10147Army`s search for future MBT sounds deathknell for ArjunNew Delhi, July 05: As doubts over viability of the three-decade-old Arjun Main Battle Tank (MBT) are being raised, the Army has indicated it would place no more orders than 124 already made to Heavy Vehicles Factory, Avadi, sounding the deathknell of the DRDO project.
"Army will no more place orders for Arjun beyond 124 that was already contracted. That is because Army is now looking 20 years ahead and wants a futuristic MBT," Lt Gen Dalip Bharadwaj, Army Director General (mechanised infantry), said here.
Though Bharadwaj discounted suggestions that it would mean the end of DRDO's Arjun project that began in 1972, he did point out induction of more 'Arjun' MBTs at this stage would only mean India lagging behind in the technological race in armoured fighting vehicles.
"Arjun is a contemporary tank and may be used in the next decade or so, but not for a technologically advanced, next generation warfare some two decades hence," Bhardwaj said on the sidelines of an interactive session with defence private industry at CII.
After 36 years into its design and development, Arjun had as recently as in December 2007 failed winter trials, as stated in a parliamentary report. It is yet to go through crucial comparative trials with Russian tanks, a mandatory process before induction into Army.
With uncertainty looming over Arjun tanks, army has already increased its orders for Russian T-90 tanks by another 330 last year, over and above the 1000 it had ordered, clearly indicating T-90s would be the MBT of Indian Army for the next decade.
Chennai-based Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment (CVRDE) had last year handed over 14 Arjuns to the Army for trials, but they were returned with a list of defects in its fire control systems, inaccuracy of guns, low speeds in tactical areas such as deserts and inability to operate in temperatures above 50 degrees celsius.
This summer too Army and the DRDO took out Arjuns for trials, but the results were yet to be made public. Meanwhile, the defence ministry claimed it suspected an effort at "sabotaging" Arjun tanks, though reasons for the suspicion were not spelt out by Minister of State for Defence Production Rao Inderjit Singh.
The DRDO's new project 'Tank-X' too did not find favour with the Army. "Tank-X is a hybrid of T-90 and T-72, which are both contemporary technology tanks. There is no point in having technologically obsolete tanks for warfare two decades hence," the DG (mechanised forces) said.
Bharadwaj also announced that the Army, along with CII, would organise a two-day international technology seminar on Future Main Battle Tank (FMBT) and Future Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) here on July 22 and 23 to discuss global challenges in designing, developing and producing FMBT and FICV.
To be inaugurated by Defence Minister A K Antony and Rao Inderjit Singh, Bhardwaj said the seminar would debate the kind of MBT Army needed, considering that might of the military was judged by both deterrent and offensive capabilities of mechanised forces and on the quality and quantity of equipment.
"Time has come to reassess our requirements. We are at the threshold of formulating qualitative requirements of FMBT and FICV. This is the future, as it takes about a decade for completing the process of designing and being ready with a prototype of FMBT and FICV. It could take another 5 to 10 years to finally induct futuristic MBTs and ICVs into the forces," he said.
The meeting would also provide defence planners, end-users, scientists and both private and public defence manufacturers a holistic view of applicability of tanks, be they heavy, medium or light, and wheeled or tracked in modern warfare.
"Considering India's expanding strategic reach and widening global standing as a military power, future armoured vehicles should be capable of performing roles during out-of-area contingencies beyond its territorial boundaries," Bharadwaj said.
The meet would also try to provide defence industry an insight into mechanised forces' aspirations and try to gauge their capability to meet Army's future requirements.
Apart from looking at varying global perceptions on use of armoured vehicles, the seminar would identify critical emerging technologies in the field to meet Army's requirements of FMBT and FICV.
Already, seven foreign countries have confirmed their participation in the seminar including US, Israel, Russia, Germany, UK and France.
Bureau Report
One it should have been inducted long time back, its too late now. Second Corruption znd kickbacks, locally made weapons give you ziltch while imported one's give good money and women from Arms manufacturersOriginally Posted by TheRussian1
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080714/113937663.htmlRussian Army officers visit mountain combat center in India
15:44|14/ 07/ 2008
MOSCOW, July 14 (RIA Novosti) - A delegation of Russian Ground Forces officers will learn about training troops for mountain warfare during a two-week trip to India that started on Monday, a spokesman for the Russian military said.
Deputy commander Lt. Gen. Valery Yevnevich, along with officers from Russia's mountain brigades and the Far Eastern Military Command officer training school, will visit a training center in Jammu and Kashmir, India's northernmost state, "to see how the Indian troops train for mountainous operations," Col. Igor Konashenkov said.
The visit, which runs until July 30, was agreed in Moscow on June 24 by India's Chief of Army Staff, General Deepak Kapoor, and Russia's Ground Forces commander, Gen. Alexei Maslov, as part of an extensive military cooperation program.
Russia began deploying two mountain brigades in the North Caucasus last year, near the mountainous border with Georgia. The two brigades are made up of contract soldiers, totaling about 4,500 personnel.
The Indian Army has 10 divisions dedicated to mountain warfare and another infantry division earmarked for high-altitude operations. They are deployed in strategically important areas along the borders with its traditional rivals, Pakistan and China. India and Russia have a long history of military cooperation, which goes back almost half a century. The existing Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation program, which lasts until 2010, includes up to 200 projects worth about $18 billion in all, according to Russia's Defense Ministry.
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles...er-inches.htmlFARNBOROUGH 2008: Indian carrierborne MiG handover inches closer
Anatoly Belov, designer general of the Russian MiG Aircraft Corporation, says the first MiG-29K and MiG-29KUB aircraft will soon be delivered to the Indian Navy, more than 12 months later than the original scheduled handover.
In January 2004, MiG won a contract to supply twelve single-seat MiG-29K aircraft and four MiG-29KUB trainers, as well as simulators and spare parts. Two of the aircraft were originally due to be delivered to the Indian Navy in June 2007 and six more in November 2007, with deliveries to be completed by 2009.
But the MiG-29KUB did not make its first flight until January 2007 and the MiG-29K did not take to the air until June 2007, so the first four deliveries were pushed back to May 2008 – a deadline that was missed.
MiG is to responsible for training pilots and maintenance personnel, and for aftersales support
and servicing. There is an option in the contract for a further 30 aircraft.
The MiG-29K is the first variant in what MiG refer to as a “new unified family of MiG-29 multi-role fighters”. These variants are based on the improved airframe of the
MiG-29M (Design Bureau designation 9-15) and have a high degree of commonality in structure, power plant, avionics and weapons systems.
The MiG-29K (9-41) was developed for the Indian Navy, and is based on the MiG-29M with increased internal fuel capacity, and digital fly-by-wire control system with other features borrowed from MiG’s original carrierborne design, the MiG-29K (9-31), cancelled in 1993. It has the same folding wing, strengthened undercarriage, tailhook and large dorsal airbrake.
The aircraft has a MIL STD 1553B based open architecture avionics system, a Fazotron-NIIP Zhuk-ME radar with a slotted planar array, and is powered by new RD-33MK engines with FADEC. The aircraft features OBOGS in the shape of a locally developed BKDU-130 oxygen generator system, and also includes Israeli EW equipment and a French Sigma-95 GPS receiver and TopSight helmet-mounted targeting system.
Both the single-seat MiG-29K (9-41) and the two-seat MiG-29KUB (9-47) have a new two-seat forward fuselage, with an extended two-seat canopy, though the single-seat aircraft has an extra fuel tank/avionics bay in place of the rear cockpit.
The aircraft are being delivered to serve aboard the former Russian navy aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, now being refitted in Russia for the Indian Navy. The Gorshkov has been berthed at the Sevmash shipyard in northern Russia for 12 years, and its modernisation and conversion programme has been fraught with problems, delays and cost growth.
The 44,570 tonne ship, which will be named Vikramaditya in Indian service, will not be completed until 2010, after which it is expected to have to undergo 18 months of sea trials. The carrier will also embark Kamov Ka-27 ‘Helix-A’ and Ka-31 ‘Helix-B’ anti-submarine and AEW helicopters.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/...ow/3221985.cmsUnderground expressway proposed between Siliguri & Sikkim
11 Jul, 2008, 1221 hrs IST, PTI
GAGTOK: Sikkim's overdependence on the vital National Highway 31A for connectivity with the rest of the country may soon be addressed with an overseas construction company proposing to build a state of the art underground expressway between Sevoke in West Bengal and Gangtok by 2012.
In the first of its kind road infrastructure for the North-East, US-based construction major 'Star universal Resources Company' has proposed to build the 53 km expressway having tunnels and bridges between Sevoke and Gangtok, official sources said.
It would built at the estimated cost of Rs 1550 crore to be borne by the company itself under private-public -partnership (PPP), the sources said.
The proposed expressway between Coronation bridge (Bag Pul) at Sevoke to Gangtok would have two pairs of tunnels of about 100 square km each of which one pair would be used for road traffic and the other standard broad gauge railway tracks, they said.
The mega project, for which the memorandum of understanding (mou) would be signed between Sikkim Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling and the Star Universal Resource company at Gangtok on July 15, would be built on the build-operate-transfer (BOT) basis, the sources said.
As per the MoU, the developers would be responsible for construction and maintenance of the expressway for a period of 45 years from the date of the signing of the agreement between the two parties, they said.
http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/14/stor...1459181500.htm‘Both India and China respect McMahon Line’
Raktima Bose
Plans are in the pipeline to upgrade Chabua airbase
“No aerial intrusion by China in the recent past”
CHABUA (ASSAM): “There has been no aerial intrusion by our Chinese counterparts in the recent past and both of us respect the McMahon Line,” Air Commodore S. Harpal Singh, Commander of the Chabua Air Force station has said. He ruled out any imminent air threat from China.
He, however, said, “India need not worry in the case of an air threat from China as the Indian Air Force is strengthening its fleet and crew in the northeast.”
Located at a strategic position from where the Chinese border is — 180 km away — and the Myanmar border (80 km east), the Chabua station lies within a 500-km diameter of four Chinese airbases on the other side of the border.
Defence spokesperson Group Captain R.K. Das said: “Plans are in the pipeline to upgrade the Chabua airbase by April 2009 when it is expected to get a squadron of Sukhoi-30s, strengthening the already existing fleet of 26 MiG-21s there.”
He said the basic infrastructure was available at all air bases under the Eastern Command.
On the frequent accidents involving MiG-21s, Group Captain Das said: “The IAF has got 10 squadrons of MiG-21, which is higher than any other model of fighter jets, so it is obvious that cases of MiG-21 accidents will be higher than others.” He, however, agreed that there was a need to modernise the IAF’s fighter fleet and said the global tender floated to procure 126 combat jets worth $10 billion would cater to that need.
MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti military commentator Ilya Kramnik) - The leasing by India of a Project 971 nuclear submarine built in Komsomolsk-on-Amur is the latest hot news.
The agreement, whose significance for Russian-Indian cooperation has yet to be assessed, could have a profound impact on the balance of forces in the region.
Russia's role in creating the Indian submarine fleet is hard to overestimate - Soviet/Russian-built vessels have been its core since the 1970s. Of the current 16 Indian submarines on duty, 12 were built in the Soviet Union or Russia, including two 641 Project and ten 877EKM Project submarines (NATO reporting names Foxtrot and Kilo). The four other submarines are German Project 209 diesel SSs, which India built under license.
Combined with a strong surface force and aircraft, this submarine fleet gives India control of the adjacent seas and makes it the strongest naval power in South Asia. But, with broad ocean expanses to cover, the Indian top brass have always wanted a force capable of operating away from home. Its surface component must have large combat ships, such as aircraft carriers, and its submarine fleet must include nuclear-powered vessels.
The Indian Navy got its first nuclear submarine in January 1988. It was the Soviet K-43, a Project 670 type ship built in 1967 (NATO reporting name Charlie). The boat, equipped with torpedoes and anti-ship missiles, was leased out to India and renamed the Chakra. It stayed within the force until March 1991. India asked for an extension of the lease but the U.S. forced the Soviet leadership to refuse the request.
Chakra had a seminal effect on the Indian navy, producing a generation of senior naval officers, including several admirals. The experience gave India tactical and technical expertise essential for a national nuclear submarine project.
Such a project, code-named ATV (or Advanced Technology Vessel) and involving Russian engineers, got off the ground 30 years ago. The construction of India's first SSN, sources say, began in the mid-2000s and is expected to be completed by 2010. India is reportedly planning to build between three and six SSNs in the next decade, with a displacement of 5,000 to 6,000 tons each, and fitted out with a combination of missiles and torpedoes.
However, even if the ATV type craft is fitted out by 2010, it will need between three and four years to gain sea experience. This prompted the Indian leadership to raise the lease issue once again, focusing negotiations on a multi-role SSN, Project 971 Shchuka-B, known in the West as Akula, then under construction in Komsomolsk-on-Amur. Like the previous Indian SSN, it was re-christened Chakra. On June 11, 2008, it started dockside trials. The submarine is expected to be handed over to India in the autumn of 2009.
The lease contract was signed in 2004 by Russia's then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov during his visit to India. The price of a 10-year lease was fixed at $650 million. A special training centre was built at Sosnovy Bor and has since produced three Indian relief crews. The centre also looks to a busy future: it will train crews for Indian-built SSNs.
The deal gives India a credible combat unit and reinforces its navy appreciably. All experts, including Western ones, agree that Project 971 boats have a low noise profile and run quietly. In that respect they are considered the equal of the improved American Los-Angeles class SSNs and, according to some specialists, even surpass them and compare with the more modern Sea Wolf and Virginia class.
Apart from a low acoustic profile, Project 971 submarines also pack a hefty punch. Their armaments consist of four 650mm torpedo tubes, with 12 torpedoes, and four 533mm tubes, with 28 torpedoes. Torpedoes can be replaced with submarine mines, cruise missiles, rocket-assisted torpedoes, and a variety of other submersibles. The exact complement is not known. The main mystery is whether or not India will receive Shkval rocket-assisted torpedoes and long-range cruise missiles. Some sources say the submarine carries Club missiles.
Will Russia benefit from the transfer? Views are divided, but the general consensus seems to be positive. If we give the official rhetoric on Russian-Indian relations a rest, and concentrate on the real state of affairs, we'll see that India is Russia's strategic partner, and the positions of both on a great many international issues coincide. India's closest neighbor and rival of long-standing, Pakistan, is allied with the United States and has been supported by it militarily for a long time now.
The stationing of an Indian submarine in the region will require a further strengthening of both Pakistan's naval forces - with reinforcements from the U.S. - and of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, which will divert U.S. forces from other areas. The Indian-built nuclear submarines expected to go into service in the next few years will further contribute to that trend.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
http://livefist.blogspot.com/2008/07...y-october.htmlFORCE Mag: LCH prototype by October
FORCE Magazine has this interesting piece by Prasun Sengupta about HAL's Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) in its new issue. Till I gather more inputs on the LCH, as some had asked for, here Force's piece in full:
Anyone from the Ministry of Defence-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) who has been associated with the tedious and long-drawn process of designing, developing and series-producing the ‘Dhruv’ advanced light helicopter will tell you that this 4.4-tonne multi-role light medium twin-engined design does not represent a zero-sum game, that it is possible to wrap a slim, tandem-seat fuselage around the existing powerplant, transmission and rotor systems of this proven helicopter and derive two distinct derivatives: a light combat helicopter (LCH) optimised for high-altitude warfare; and an armed aeroscout capable of operating in the plains (for operating in tandem with fast-moving mechanised and armoured formations) and over the jungle terrain in support of special operations forces and also taking part in combat search-and-rescue operations. Yet, as of now, only the Indian Air Force (IAF) has committed to placing limited firm orders for the LCH, while Army HQ has refused to even examine the LCH’s obvious potential as an armed light observation helicopter (LOH), preferring instead to separately procure single-engined LOHs of an altogether new design of foreign origin. As things now stand, both the IAF and the Army have projected a requirement for 187 LOHs of which the majority will go to the Army. All these will be delivered during the 11th (2007-2012) and 12th (2012-2017) Defence Plans.
The LCH programme took off in early 2003 when the IAF ‘verbally’ pledged three billion rupees to HAL for designing and developing the helicopter over a 24-month period. The 5.5-tonne, twin-engined LCH at that time was conceptualised as being optimised for all-weather observation and counter-insurgency operations at high altitudes. It would also be armed and equipped with weapons and nose-mounted mission sensors to intercept unmanned aerial vehicles, escort heliborne special operations forces, provide offensive firepower for ground operations urban terrain/built-up areas and for combat search-and-rescue operations, and undertake anti-armour operations. The airframe was to feature a narrow fuselage housing a pilot and a gunner/co-pilot in tandem configuration. The glass cockpit and windshield was required to have armour protection against 12.7mm armour-piercing rounds. Optronic sensors, including a FLIR/thermal imager and laser rangefinder/designator, were to be installed inside a nose-mounted gimballed payload assembly developed by the DRDO’s Dehra Dun-based IRDE facility. The electronic warfare suite was to include a DRDO-developed radar warning receiver, plus chaff/flare dispensers and a missile approach warning system. Things began to move in October 2006 when the MoD released initial R&D funds to HAL and authorised the IAF’s projected procurement request for 65 LCHs. As per present plans, HAL is due to roll out the first of three LCH prototypes this October, with initial operational clearance being granted by March 2010, and full certification of airworthiness being granted by January 2011, 25 months after the LCH’s first flight.
Though the LCH is derived from the ‘Dhruv’ and will carry the same weapons package now being qualified on board the armed ‘Dhruv’ (that have been ordered by the Army for its projected Combat Aviation Brigade), the IAF has specified a top speed 25kph higher to allow it to run down and kill snooping UAVs if necessary. To make the LCH a survivable platform, HAL is following Nato’s MIL-STD-1290 crashworthiness standard, is designing its own impact absorbing landing gear and will improve on the Dhruv’s ballistic tolerance with up to 100kg of composite-/ceramics-based modular armour, whose positioning is based on an IAF study of the areas most likely to suffer bullet damage. The tandem-seat cockpits will each have twin side-by-side AMLCDs, will be NVG-compatible, will provide NBC protection to the crew, and will have a helmet-mounted targeting system co-developed by HAL and Israel’s Elbit Systems. The LCH will be capable of operating at heights of up to 6,000 metres or 18,000 feet, and will be powered by twin Ardiden 1H (1,200shp TM333-2C2 Shakti) engines co-developed by HAL and Turbomecca. The main and tail rotor blades will be of all-composite construction, with the main rotor blade tips featuring BERP-style sections for increased cruise speed. The LCH’s armaments suite will comprise a THL-20 chin-mounted turret containing a 20mm Nexter Systems-built M-621 gun firing at a rate of 800 rounds per minute, stub-wing-mounted Forges de Zeebrugge-built LAU-FZ-231 launchers carrying 2.75-inch rockets, MBDA-built Mistral ATAM air-to-air missiles, or the DRDO-developed Nag anti-armour guided-missiles, which will have a maximum engagement range of 6km and will use a nose-mounted millimeter-wave radar for target acquisition-sum-homing. The LCH’s four-axis auto-hover and digital automatic flight control system have been developed in-house, while the Bangalore-based DARE is developing along with EADS the defensive aids suite. DARE has also developed in-house the digital mission computer and pylon interface boxes. The flight control actuator system has been co-developed by HAL and the UK-based APPH.
For the LOH requirements of the Army and IAF, HAL recently proposed a lighter LCH-derived platform that will feature a roof-mounted stabilised optronic turret housing an integrated long-range observation system comprising a thermal imager, laser rangefinder and daylight TV. This variant of the LCH will bear a strong resemblance to Japan’s Kawasaki OH-1 Ninja armed LOH.
IAF removes hi-tech radars as 8 Sukhois leave for exercise with US
New Delhi | Monday, Jul 7 2008 IST
In a bid to maintain operational secrecy, the Indian Force have removed hi-tech multiple aerial target tracking raders from its eight Sukhoi 30 fighters before they left for the United States to participate in the 'Red Flag' air warfare exercise with NATO forces.
Highly placed sources said here that the NIIP N001 radars, providing some ability for air-to-ground attack and to track and engage multiple aerial targets simultaneously were removed in a bid to maintain secrecy about the ability of the equipment during the air warfare exercise for which IAF was invited this year. An Air Force spokesperson, however, maintained that there was nothing secret about the avionics and equipment mounted on the SU 30 MK I and its equipment was fully functional. ''We are not playing a game of hide-and-seek,'' he added.
The Indian Air Force would be participating in a multinational Air Exercise, ‘Ex - Red Flag 08’ at the invitation of United States Air Force (USAF), scheduled to be held at Nellis Air Force Base in the US from August 9 to 23. The IAF contingent today left for the exercise. The IAF would participate in the exercise with eight SU-30 MK-I aircraft, two IL-78 air to air refuellers and one IL-76 transport aircraft. The contingent would comprise 156 personnel below officers rank and 91 officers (inclusive of 10 members of ‘Garud’ IAF Special Forces team). Exercise Red Flag is a multinational air exercise that is held thrice a year at Nellis Air Force base, USA. The IAF would be participating in the Exercise alongside South Korean Air Force with F-15K and the French Air Force with their latest Rafale aircraft, apart from the USAF. Red Flag was originally conceived in 1975 by USAF with an advanced aerial combat training format with an aim to ensure that pilots are trained well enough to survive in air combat and win air battles. The exercise holds tremendous learning opportunity for all the participating Air Forces. Prior to the main Exercise at Nellis, the IAF contingent would be working up at Mountain Home Air Base in Idaho, US from July 17 till August 8. The IAF contingent would reach the US via Doha (Qatar), Chorlu (Turkey), Mont de Marsan (France) and Lages (Portugal) before reaching mainland USA and Mountain Home airbase.
-- (UNI) -- 07DI39.
http://www.netindia123.com/showdetai...ercise+with+US
NICE!!
Adux, i heard India is beefing up the security of its assets in A-stan by sending in large numbers, something like special forces! is that true?
i cant find any link or any source on this news!
RAW’s investments in supporting the Northern Alliance paid off. India’s political influence and intelligence capabilities grew significantly. For example, RAW is thought to have become the first intelligence service to have detected the so-called “Airlift of Evil” —the U.S.-sanctioned Pakistani evacuation of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda from the city of Kunduz in November 2002.
Extremely good articleAt the same time, India has succeeded in consolidating its presence. Farkhor, India’s only military base outside its territory, is thought to have been in a state of full operational readiness since last year, offering New Delhi’s armed forces unprecedented strategic reach. Afghanistan’s membership of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement will strengthen its trade ties with India, which is now the largest regional donor to that country’s reconstruction programme.
http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/09/stor...0955191000.htm
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JG09Df02.html
By Sudha Ramachandran
BANGALORE - The suicide bomber who crashed an explosive-laden car into the Indian Embassy in the Afghan capital Kabul on Monday not only killed 41 people and injured more than 140, he sent a powerful message to Delhi that its significant presence and growing influence in Afghanistan through its reconstruction projects are now in the firing line.
Among the dead were four Indians, including Defense Attache Brigadier R D Mehta, diplomat Venkateswara Rao and two guards at the embassy, who were personnel of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police - a paramilitary outfit. The attack is said to be among the deadliest in Kabul since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.
The Indian Embassy stands near Afghanistan's Interior Ministry in
a busy part of Kabul. Intelligence sources had apparently warned of an attack on the mission this week and security had been upgraded. Yet the suicide bomber and his explosive-filled vehicle were able to reach the gates unhindered.
The attack comes within the context of spiraling violence in the country, including the capital. More US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops were killed in Afghanistan in June than in any other month since military operations began in 2001. Forty-five soldiers, including 27 American, 13 British, two Canadian, one Polish, one Romanian and one Hungarian, were killed during the month. Coalition fatalities in June in Afghanistan, for the first time, exceeded coalition fatalities in Iraq.
In April 27, militants opened fire on President Hamid Karzai at an annual military parade in Kabul, killing a legislator and two other Afghans. Last month, in a brazen attack, the Taliban stormed a jail in Kandahar, freeing hundreds of prisoners.
The Taliban issued a statement denying responsibility for Monday's attack. But few in India or Afghanistan are convinced. The Taliban generally claim responsibility for attacks against international or Afghan troops and deny their hand in attacks in which victims are mainly Afghan civilians. Most of the victims of Monday's blast were Afghan civilians; many had lined up for visas to travel to India.
Indian experts say that the needle of suspicion points to the Taliban and its backers in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan's intelligence agency. This is the view in Kabul as well. While Afghanistan's Interior Ministry said the "attack was carried out in coordination and consultation with an active intelligence service in the region" - alluding to the ISI - Karzai said the bombing was the work of the "enemies of Afghanistan-India friendship", an implicit reference to Pakistan.
Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani was quick to deny the allegations, saying that Pakistan "needed a stable Afghanistan".
India and Afghanistan enjoy a close relationship nowadays, a matter that irks their common neighbor and traditional foe, Pakistan.
India and Pakistan have vied for influence in Afghanistan for decades. In the 1990s, with the Pakistan-backed Taliban in power, Islamabad's influence peaked. Then in a reversal of fortune, India, which backed the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the years the Taliban were in power, saw its fortunes improve in Kabul, even as Islamabad's influence touched a nadir.
With its old friends in the Northern Alliance in power and an India-educated Karzai at the helm, India's influence has grown significantly in recent years.
It has pledged about US$750 million to Afghanistan's reconstruction since 2002 and is today the fifth-largest bilateral donor in Afghanistan after the United States, Britain, Japan and Germany. This places India among the big players in the country.
India is involved in an array of projects, ranging from providing food to children to improving infrastructure. It is constructing the 218-kilometer Zaranj-Delaram road, the Afghan parliament and a power transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri to Kabul and a substation in Kabul. It is repairing and reconstructing the Salma Dam in the western province of Herat at a cost of $109.3 million and building telephone exchanges linking 11 provinces to Kabul. It has supplied hundreds of buses and mini-buses. India is training bureaucrats and is providing over 3,000 Afghans with skills to earn a livelihood in carpentry, plumbing and masonry.
Hundreds of Afghans have been given scholarships to study in India. India is providing food assistance in the form of high-protein biscuits to 1.4 million school children daily.
"India's reconstruction strategy was designed to win over every sector of Afghan society, give India a high profile with Afghans, gain the maximum political advantage and, of course, undercut Pakistani influence," the BBC quoted analyst Ahmed Rashid as saying,
India's role in road construction is improving its access to Afghanistan and beyond to Central Asia. The Zaranj-Delaram project, for instance, will run from the Iranian border to Delaram, which lies on Afghanistan's Garland Highway. The Garland Highway connects several of the country's key cities. India can offload shiploads of goods at Iran's Chabahar port and then send the consignments overland through the Zaranj-Delaram highway and the Garland Highway to cities across Afghanistan.
Approximately 3,000-4,000 Indian nationals are working on reconstruction projects across Afghanistan.
Pakistan, which has denied India overland access to Afghanistan, is annoyed that the road construction will provide India with a land route to Afghanistan. India believes that the ISI has used the Taliban to strike at Indian activity in Afghanistan. India's road projects - Zaranj-Delaram in particular - have come under repeated Taliban fire, the most recent being a suicide attack in April that left seven people, including four Indians, dead.
India's engagement in Afghanistan has helped it exert its soft power in Afghanistan. It is seen as a country that is working at changing the daily lives of Afghans, committed to capacity-building of Afghans rather than engaged in winning contracts for Indian business. India is seen as contributing to the building of democracy in Afghanistan.
Then there is the popularity of Bollywood films and Indian television soaps in Afghanistan, which have won India many hearts in this country - and the Taliban's ire.
Pakistan has done its utmost to restrict Indian influence. It put its foot down on allowing Indian troops into the country, but contrary to Islamabad's expectations, this might have worked in India's favor.
India's engagement in Afghanistan has not been tainted by military operations gone awry. Unlike other powers in Afghanistan, whose reconstruction work has been sullied by indiscriminate bombing and killing of civilians, India is seen as working for the Afghan people.
So great is Pakistan's concern of India's presence in Afghanistan that it raised strong objections to India setting up consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. It has accused India of using these consulates, which border Pakistan, to support "terrorist activities" inside Pakistan. The Indian consulate at Jalalabad has been a target of at least a couple of grenade attacks, the most recent last December.
Monday's attack was the first time the Indian Embassy has been targeted since the fall of the Taliban. But the embassy building was in the crosshairs of the Taliban even in the 1990s. The building was a "favorite target of the Taliban" between 1996 and 2001, when it was in power.
"So intense were the rocket attacks on the embassy at a time when the Taliban were inching closer to Kabul waging bloody fights against the Northern Alliance forces led by legendary leader [Ahmad Shah] Massoud that [Indian] officials had decided to construct a heavily fortified bunker right inside the embassy premises. So specific was the targeting of the Indian Embassy that the officials used to leave their cars and other vehicles parked inside the Indonesian Embassy, which is next to the Indian Embassy, to keep them safe from the Taliban rockets," reports the Times of India.
The embassy was closed on September 26, 1996 - a few hours before the Taliban entered Kabul, to be reopened on December 22, 2001 - the day Karzai was sworn in as president.
Over the past few years, the ISI and its surrogates in the Taliban have sought to cut India's influence through intimidation and attacks on Indian engineers and construction workers. Now with the attack on the embassy, they have signaled that they are stepping up their battle against India. It marks a major escalation in terrorist attacks not only against India's presence in Afghanistan but against New Delhi's Afghan policy.
India has reiterated that the attacks will not weaken its mission to help in Afghanistan's reconstruction. In New Delhi, the Ministry of External Affairs commented, "Such acts of terror will not deter us from fulfilling our commitments to the government and people of Afghanistan."
And already there are calls in India for troops to be sent to Afghanistan. An editorial in the influential English daily, India Express, says, "After the Kabul bombing, India must come to terms with an important question that it has avoided debating so far. New Delhi cannot continue to expand its economic and diplomatic activity in Afghanistan, while avoiding a commensurate increase in its military presence there. For too long, New Delhi has deferred to Pakistani and American sensitivities about raising India's strategic profile in Afghanistan."
A military presence in Afghanistan might increase India's profile and add to its stature as a growing power in the region. But it will end up being bracketed with the Americans in Afghanistan, an image it would do well to avoid. It would work against the country's long-term interests in the region, jeopardizing the enormous goodwill it has earned to date.
Troops in Afghanistan would push India into the Afghan quagmire. This might be what the ISI was gunning for when they attacked the Indian embassy on Monday.
Sudha Ramachandran is an independent journalist/researcher based in Bangalore.
(Copyright 2008 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Stratfor: Deadly Precedents in Kabul
A July 7 attack on the Indian Embassy in the Afghan capital of Kabul that killed two high-level diplomats has all the signs of a targeted assassination versus a strike aimed at the building itself with the goal of incurring a high body count.
The morning of July 7, 2008, began normally enough at the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Afghan citizens began to queue up on the dusty street outside the fortified compound in hopes of obtaining a visa, while shopkeepers nearby offered refreshments, visa photos and other administrative services to the aspiring visa applicants. One by one, the Indian employees of the embassy began to arrive at work and pass through security checks at the gate.
At around 8:30 a.m, as two embassy vehicles were in the process of entering the compound, the stillness of the morning was shattered when a suicide operative rammed his Toyota Corolla into the second of the two embassy vehicles and then activated the powerful improvised explosive device (IED) concealed in his car. The powerful blast destroyed the two embassy vehicles and blew the gates off the embassy’s outer perimeter. The blast killed at least 58 people and injured more than 140. Among those killed in the attack were two high-level diplomats: Indian Defense Attache Brig. Gen. Ravi Dutt Mehta and the embassy’s Political and Information Counselor, Vadapalli Venkateswara Rao. The blast also killed two Indo-Tibetan Border Police security officers, a local Afghan employee of the embassy and some 10 local police officers assigned to guard the facility. Several other Indian employees were injured in the attack, as were two foreign diplomats and several security personnel as signed to the adjacent Indonesian Embassy. Among those hit the hardest were the people standing in the visa line.
A Taliban spokesman, Zabiullah Mujahid, denied that the group was involved in the attack. However, it is not uncommon for the Taliban to deny responsibility for attacks that kill a large number of civilians, as they did in the Feb. 17, 2008, suicide attack in Kandahar that killed more than 100 people. The use of a suicide operative in the attack is a clear indication that it was conducted by the Taliban or their al Qaeda brethren, and the fact that the attack was conducted in Kabul — where a non-Afghan would stand out — would make the Taliban the most likely suspects, though it is quite possible they had assistance from al Qaeda or Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI).
The explosive device was powerful, but it was not the type of very large device one would use in an earnest attempt to destroy a building. Due to the size of the device and the identity of the victims, it is quite possible that this attack was a targeted assassination attempt and not an effort to destroy the embassy itself. The attack was well-executed and effective, and there are several lessons that can be drawn from it.
Target Selection
The Indian Embassy is a logical target for the Taliban to strike for variety of reasons. Perhaps the most significant reason is the history of India’s involvement in Afghanistan. New Delhi has long sought close relationships with the government of Afghanistan as a way to encircle and pressure India’s rival Pakistan. To this end, India has been one of the largest international supporters of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government. The government of India was also heavily involved in supporting the Northern Alliance as it fought against the government of the Taliban — which was very much a creature of the Pakistani ISI. The Indian government saw support of the Northern Alliance as a way to keep a check on Pakistani influence in the region.
While a number of Taliban attacks in recent years have killed or injured Indian engineers and workers involved in Indian-financed reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, this is the first time an Indian diplomatic post has been the target of a large-scale attack, even though India maintains consulates inside Afghanistan in locations such as Jalalabad, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif and even Kandahar.
While Monday’s attack was the first attack of this scale against an Indian diplomatic target in Afghanistan, small-scale attacks have occurred before. In December 2007, the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad was targeted by a small-scale attack when two small explosive devices were hurled at the building during the night. The consulate in Kandahar was targeted by a similar attack in October 2006, when a man threw two hand grenades at the building from a motorbike.
Another reason for the Taliban to target the Indians is the Kashmir issue. The Pakistani ISI has long been supportive of Kashmiri militant groups, groups which have demonstrated links to al Qaeda and the global jihadist network. The Taliban government in Afghanistan was also supportive of Kashmiri militant groups. This support was clearly reflected in events such as the 1999 hijacking of Air India flight 814, in which Kashmiri militants landed the aircraft in Kandahar and held the passengers until the Indian government agreed to release a group of the militants’ imprisoned colleagues. The prisoners included a Pakistani cleric named Maulana Masood Azhar, founder of the militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), who had been arrested in Kashmir and imprisoned in India, and JeM operative Omar Saeed Sheik, who has been convicted in Pakistan and sentenced to death for his involvement in the murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. The Indian government claims that Taliban fighters have fought alongside Kashmiri militant groups, and this long history means that there is absolutely no love lost between the Taliban and the Indian government. Of course, the ISI, al Qaeda, and Kashmiri militant groups also have strong motives for attacking Indian interests in Afghanistan, and it is possible they were somehow involved.
In any event, the targeting of Indian interests appears to be part of a concerted effort. On July 8, a remotely detonated IED was discovered on a bus carrying a group of Indian construction workers to a road construction site in Afghanistan’s Nimroz province. There have been several Taliban attacks on Indian construction crews working to build roads in Nimroz province since the efforts began in 2004. These attacks include two suicide attacks this year, one in April the other in June, that resulted in the deaths of three Indians.
Soft Target?
One final reason that might help explain the targeting of the Indian Embassy is that, by nature of its location and construction, it is more vulnerable to an attack than the embassies of high-profile coalition countries like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. The embassy had very little standoff separating the building from the outer perimeter wall, and as we have previously discussed, the critical element in keeping a facility like an embassy safe from large vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) is standoff — keeping the device far from the building.
Of course, the Indians realized the vulnerability of their facility and were concerned about recent intelligence indicating a possible attack. On May 27, the Indian Embassy sent out a security advisory to Indian citizens warning of suicide attacks and compound invasions directed against high-profile facilities in Kabul. Ironically, the advisory was signed by Brig. Gen. R.D. Mehta, the defense attache killed in the attack. In June, the U.S. Embassy also issued a Warden Message noting a threat to Afghan officials and coalition personnel in the greater Kabul area, but it was not as specific as the Indian warning.
Within the last month, security at the Indian Embassy had been augmented with the addition of a substantial sand-filled outer layer to its perimeter fence. Judging from the photos of the scene, the augmented wall performed fairly well, with most of the damage occurring to the gate — which was literally blown away — and the portion of the building adjacent to the gate. This is where more than a few feet of standoff distance would have been very helpful.{But, it would still not have saved Brig. Mehta & Shri VV Rao}
Since the days of castles and knights, gates have always been the most vulnerable area of a wall and a natural place to target an attack. In more recent years, we have seen attacks directed at the gates of hardened diplomatic facilities, such as the VBIED attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998, and the armed assault on the U.S. Consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in December 2004.
Targeted Assassination?
In addition to being a target itself, the gate at a secure facility also serves as a choke point. Security procedures can also leave potential targets vulnerable to attack as the targets enter the facility, or as they wait outside for security to screen their vehicle prior to entry. Many larger facilities will have a secure sally port area inside the gate where vehicles are screened for explosive devices, but in a facility with very little standoff there is often not room for such an area, and vehicles are checked on the street prior to entering the gate.
During this time, the vehicles are vulnerable to attack. Because of this, motorcades transporting high-profile persons normally contact the facility by radio and ask to have the gate cleared so that they can enter quickly and avoid having to sit on the street where they are vulnerable. Such motorcades normally use vehicles that have been checked for explosive devices and then continuously watched to ensure no such device has been placed on or in the vehicle. This means that they do not need to stop to have their vehicles checked by security at the gate. That said, the gate is still a choke point along the route of the motorcade, and the vehicle is vulnerable to attack as it slows down to make the turn into the gate. This window of opportunity can be amplified if the gate personnel are not particularly on the ball and it takes them a bit of time to open the gate.
That the bombing occurred as a vehicle was entering the facility raises the possibility that the attack at the Indian Embassy was not directed at the facility in general, but was a specifically targeted assassination. Another factor that points in that direction is that the attack was conducted at 8:30 a.m. local time, when some of the first diplomats were arriving at the embassy, rather than later in the day when more of the embassy staff (including the ambassador) would have been present. Also, although the device was quite powerful, it was not really large enough to have taken down the embassy building. If the attackers were attempting to destroy the embassy, they would likely have planned to use a larger device like those used in VBIED attacks against similar targets in places like Iraq. And make no mistake, the Taliban has been consistently moving toward the al Qaeda in Iraq modus operandi over the past few years.
The possibility of a targeted attack is also raised when one considers that the individuals killed in the attack were two senior embassy officers — the defense attache, who by his very job is an intelligence officer, and the political counselor — a position often used as cover for a senior intelligence officer. Even if the political counselor in this case was not an intelligence officer, he might have been mistaken for one by the attackers. If the two regularly rode together to work on a predictable schedule (for a 9 a.m. Monday staff meeting, for example), they could have posed a very tempting target for a potential attacker.
Of course this could all be coincidence. The two senior diplomats killed could simply have been at the wrong place at the wrong time. The timing of the attack could have been because the morning rush hour provided the attackers an opportunity to get their VBIED past the roadblocks and to the target site. Also, the attackers could have chosen to attack a building with a smaller rather than a larger device to ensure they made it to the particular target since they were more concerned about symbolism than destruction. However, that seems to be a lot of chance, and an intentional assassination would seem to be more probable at this point.
Disturbing precedent
If the attack was a targeted assassination and not a series of coincidental events (or erroneous reports), it sets a dangerous precedent. First, the attack was very well-orchestrated. The plotters conducted their preoperational surveillance and planned their attack without detection (though the warning issued by the Indian Embassy last month could be evidence of an operational security leak). However, in spite of the warning, the attack team was able to gain the element of tactical surprise. They were also able to amass explosives, construct the VBIED and deliver it to the attack site on time and without detection. The device also functioned as intended, and the operative did not get cold feet and bail out on the operation. These steps are not as easy to successfully execute as they might seem, especially when one considers that the Indian Embassy is located in the heart of Kabul just down the street from, and in sight of, the Afghan Interior Ministry. Operating in the hea rt of Kabul is a far cry from pulling off an attack in a location such as Kandahar, where the population is either sympathetic to or afraid of the Taliban.
But by its very nature, the Indian Embassy would be an easy site to conduct surveillance on. In addition to the aforementioned merchants in the vicinity (a perennial favorite cover for surveillance operatives), there was also the visa line itself. Standing in a visa line provides a wonderful opportunity to loiter in front of an embassy for a prolonged period of time — perhaps hours — in order to observe security, monitor the arrivals of VIPs and generally watch what happens there.
Unfortunately, in spite of the warning of a potential attack and the increased physical security at the embassy, it is unlikely that the Indian government employed countersurveillance teams around their embassy.
While physical security upgrades are important and necessary, they can result in a false sense of security. The bottom line is that if potential attackers are permitted to conduct surveillance, they will be able to find vulnerabilities in security measures and procedures. With the Taliban demonstrating the ability to conduct sophisticated attacks in Kabul, perhaps with al Qaeda or ISI assistance in this case, other potential targets would be well advised to implement robust countersurveillance programs and deny the Taliban operatives carte blanche to conduct surveillance.
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