The Battle Of Chosin Reservoir - at Yudam-ni
This battle on frigid ground remains one of the most infamous engagements of the Korean War.
By Gina DiNicolo
It was Thanksgiving 1950 at North Korea?s Chosin Reservoir, and nighttime
temperatures plunged to 30 degrees below zero. The ground was frozen solid.
Night fell at 4:30 p.m., and light did not return for nearly 16 hours. This was
an inhospitable place, even for the battle-tested men of the 1st Marine Division
and the Army?s 7th Infantry Division, some of whom had fought through the worst
of World War II.
Five months earlier, on June 25, the North Korean People?s Army (NKPA) invaded
South Korea, shattering the five-year-old peace. President Truman?s response was
swift and decisive, as was that of the newly formed United Nations. U.S. air and
sea assets were committed immediately, and ground troops were committed June 30.
Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur was put in charge of the U.N. Command, which
included combat and medical units from 22 nations.
At first, the NKPA moved down the Korean Peninsula with relative ease. But on
Sept. 15, MacArthur launched his brilliant amphibious landing of X Corps at
Inch?on, deep behind enemy lines. The landing of the 1st Marine Division opened
the door for an allied victory. The Army?s 7th Infantry Division came ashore and
fought beside the Marines to recapture Seoul. Within weeks, the North Koreans
were pushed back across the 38th parallel.
Once there, American and U.N. leadership, civilian and military alike, decided
to keep fighting all the way to the Yalu River, North Korea?s border with China,
intending to destroy the NKPA and unify the two Koreas under South Korean
President Syngman Rhee. The allies were on the offensive, and most believed they
would be home by Christmas. But Chinese leaders, with a large standing army,
warned more than once they would intervene if U.N. forces crossed the 38th
Not Ready for War
The U.S. military was not ready for a ground war. After World War II and the
debut of the atomic bomb, the Army and Marine Corps were rapidly demobilized.
Equipment budgets were slashed. In its new role as a peacekeeping force, the
Army of June 1950 was ill-equipped, understrength, and poorly trained. The
Marine Corps, suffering a similar lack of resources, had continued to train for
As the Marine Corps and Army prepared to cross the 38th parallel, MacArthur
ordered Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker?s Eighth U.S. Army up the west side of the
peninsula. MacArthur divided X Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond,
landing the 1st Marine Division (under Maj. Gen. O.P. Smith) at Wonsan on Oct.
26 and the Army?s 7th Infantry Division (commanded by Maj. Gen. David G. Barr)
at Iwon on Oct. 29. The Army?s 7th Infantry Division was least prepared for war.
It had been *****ped of many experienced officers and NCOS to fill the three
divisions that first deployed to Korea.
Although orders changed many times, the plan was for the Marines to attack from
Yudam-ni at the Chosin Reservoir, moving north and west, and ultimately meet the
Eighth U.S. Army and cut off the NKPA in a pincer movement. The 31st Regimental
Combat Team (RCT), composed of elements of the 7th Division, would attack
northward along the east side of the Chosin. The 3rd Infantry Division (under
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Soule) would hold the areas of Wonson and Hungnam and keep
the roads open.
These forces would not have communication with one another ? X Corps and Eighth
U.S. Army had a mountain range between them, while the reservoir separated the
Marines from the 31st RCT. MacArthur?s commanders were outraged that the forces
were divided ? and therefore vulnerable ? but their protests accomplished
First Enemy Engagements
As the allied forces moved north, the Chinese first hit them in early November.
Aerial reconnaissance pilots reported Chinese forces massing on the Yalu, and by
mid-November, Chinese strength at the Yalu was estimated at 300,000, but
MacArthur discounted these reports.
These early battles were intense but brief; the Chinese retreated into the hills
as quickly as they appeared. The Chinese Communist Forces? (CCF?s) first
offensive tested allied capability and put the Eighth U.S. Army and X Corps in
check until the Chinese were ready for a more massive engagement. This tactic of
pulling back lured the Americans deeper into enemy territory. Time was on
China?s side: While American units moved through North Korea, a pleasant October
autumn became an early, bitterly cold winter.
Uneasy about the Chinese threat, Smith moved the 1st Marine Division north
carefully, keeping his units close together to avoid being separated. He
stockpiled supplies and ammunition and stationed units along the division?s main
supply route (MSR) to keep it open. In all but ignoring MacArthur?s order for
speed, Smith incensed Almond.
Col. Lewis B. ?Chesty? Puller, commander of the 1st Marines, would hold the MSR.
His 1st Battalion held Chinhung-ni at the base of the Fuchilin Pass; the 2nd
Battalion was with Puller at Koto-ri, 11 miles up the road; the 3rd Battalion
would support Smith?s headquarters at Hagaru-ri, at the base of the reservoir.
The 31st RCT, East of Chosin
On the east side of the reservoir, the 5th Marines (under Lt. Col. Raymond L.
Murray) protected the Marines? right flank until they were relieved by Army Lt.
Col. Don Faith?s 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry. Before moving toward Yudam-ni to
join the 7th Marines, Murray warned Faith about the enemy presence and advised
him to keep his forces tight.
By Nov. 27, more elements of the 31st RCT, commanded by Army Col. Alan D.
MacLean, arrived east of the reservoir. The 31st RCT was hastily thrown together
? composed of whichever units could move to replace the 5th Marines soonest.
These included the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, the 3rd Battalion of the
31st Infantry, the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 31st Tank Company.
The 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry never made it to the reservoir.
Faith moved his men far forward to occupy the area left by the 5th Marines ? an
area too large for one battalion. The remainder of the 31st RCT set up a second
perimeter to the south. Again, forces were divided with an enemy threat present.
The perimeters were loose, but MacLean planned to attack first thing in the
morning. Few seemed worried about the dangerous situation for one night; men of
the 31st RCT later said they didn?t believe the warnings about the Chinese.
Meanwhile, Smith continued north from Koto-ri and established his command post
at Hagaru-ri. He ordered air*****s scratched from the frozen earth there and at
Koto-ri. His solid protection of the MSR and the air*****s would prove crucial
to the breakout of the Marines and soldiers.
Over in the west, unknown to X Corps, a massive force of 18 Chinese divisions
had attacked the Eighth U.S. Army on Nov. 25 and nearly destroyed it. Within two
days it was in full retreat, but for the moment, MacArthur kept his commanders
in the east in the dark.
Surprised by the Chinese
On Nov. 27, the reunited 5th and 7th Marine Regiments began their attack north
from Yudam-ni. They quickly ran into enemy resistance. The 7th Marines
commander, Col. Homer L. Litzenburg Jr., sent Fox 2/7 to hold the high ground at
Toktong Pass. The subsequent success of the fighting withdrawal depended on the
tenacity of the young company commander, Marine Capt. William Barber, and his
men holding this crucial piece of ground.
That night, as temperatures plunged well below zero in the rugged mountains of
North Korea, three Chinese divisions sounded horns, whistles, and bugles and
attacked the 5th and 7th Marine regiments at the reservoir. Smith?s worst fears
became reality. That same night, MacLean?s men were jarred awake by more
noisemakers as two Chinese divisions breached their perimeter. With all other
officers in the area dead or wounded, Marine Capt. Ed Stamford, a World War II
veteran and pilot attached to Faith with a team of four Marines as his tactical
air control party, took command of A Company. Though not an infantryman, he
rallied the company to repel the attack.
When MacArthur got reports of the ferocious Chinese assault, he decided on Nov.
29 that X Corps would withdraw to Hungnam while the weakened Eighth U.S. Army
would try to hold P?yongyang. His late call proved fatal, and during the next
two weeks, Marines and soldiers fought day and night to break out of the trap
the Chinese had set.
The CCF surrounded everybody ? the 11th Marines, the division?s artillery, and
the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni; Fox Company at Toktong Pass; Smith and his
men at Hagaru-ri; Puller at Koto-ri; and the 31st RCT east of Chosin. They
attacked late at night and retreated to the mountains during the day when deadly
American close-air support was on the scene. Forward air controllers like
Stamford would direct these attacks with barely functioning radios. X Corps
might have been lost but for Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force pilots performing
bombing runs, close-air support, supply and ammunition drops, and the evacuation
of thousands of wounded.
The 31st RCT continued to take heavy fire, and casualties mounted. The
unbearable cold and frostbite took its toll. MacLean was injured, captured, and
later reported dead; Faith was in charge. Though he was a World War II veteran
with no combat experience, his men describe him today as a charismatic leader
who worked hard to get everyone out alive.
After four nights and five days of mounting casualties with no relief or rescue
in sight, Faith decided the 31st RCT would fight its way out. He radioed Smith
at Hagaru-ri and asked for support. MacArthur and Barr also had talked to Smith
about sending a team to rescue the 31st RCT (which had become known as Task
Force Faith). But Smith?s situation was not much better. Under constant enemy
attack, he had everyone ? including cooks and engineers ? on the line holding
the perimeter. Diverting support to the east would probably spell the loss of
Hagaru-ri, which in turn would mean the end of the 5th and 7th Marines. Faith
was on his own.
Faith?s plan was to move out as soon as air support was available Dec. 1. Clouds
kept the unit in place until around 1 p.m., leaving less than four hours of
daylight. The breakout moved quickly at first, then came under heavy fire and
hit enemy roadblocks. Young officers pulled even younger soldiers together to
continue the fight. NCOs like Cpl. George Pryor (the units were so jumbled up,
the men thought he was a captain) rallied soldiers looking for leaders. It was
the only way they would get out alive.
Command and control were lost, and Task Force Faith was fighting its way out in
small pieces. Lending to the confusion, communication was by voice only ?
Stamford had the only working radio, and his was feverishly calling for air
strikes and support. Ammo was low. Pilots tried to resupply the column, but some
air drops drifted over to the enemy. Bullets rained down on the column. Soldiers
took cover and returned fire as best they could, but they were surrounded.
Stamford continued to call in air strikes, with the enemy so close that some
Americans were hit by napalm.
After about 4 miles, the column halted. The lead drivers were dead. Faith lay in
a jeep dying, and his task force died with him. Organization broke down, and it
was every man for himself. The enemy continued to close and kept firing.
Officers and soldiers grabbed what wounded they could and fought their way out
of what had become a death trap. Some played dead and escaped later. Those who
did not get out were killed or captured.
Many who made it out headed across the frozen, unprotected Chosin Reservoir.
Over the next several days, hundreds walked, crawled, or were dragged across the
ice to the Marines? perimeter 4 1/2 miles away at Hagaru-ri. A group of Marine
volunteers and a Navy hospital corpsman led by Marine 1st Motor Transport
Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Olin Beall spent several days out on the ice; they
brought in about 320 soldiers in two days.
Some members of Task Force Faith made it to Hagaru-ri on their own. One
survivor, 1st Lt. John Gray, remembers a vigilant and suspicious Marine at the
perimeter asking him for the password. After days of combat on the other side of
the reservoir, who knew? The sergeant then asked Gray the location of several
cities such as Dubuque, Des Moines, and Sioux City. Luckily, Gray knew his
geography, and he and his men were welcomed into the perimeter.
A total of about 1,050 of 31st RCT?s 2,500 had survived. About 385 were
considered able-bodied and fought at Hagaru-ri and all the way to the sea. Barr,
devastated by the loss of his men, was relieved of command shortly after Chosin.
Many Army veterans believe that if the 31st RCT had not held and engaged two
Chinese divisions for nearly five days, those fresh enemy units could have been
deployed against the Marines at Hagaru-ri ? potentially disastrous for the 1st
Marine Division. This is disputed by Marines.
Attack in Another Direction
Meanwhile, Smith had heard about MacArthur?s order to withdraw on Nov. 30 and
reportedly huffed, ?It took them two days to decide this.? He ordered his 5th
and 7th Marines to pull back to Hagaru-ri. This would not be easy: They were
still surrounded at Yudam-ni, and the MSR was interrupted and full of enemy
A reporter with Smith in Hagaru-ri labeled the Marine operation a retreat. Smith
patiently explained that because they were surrounded and there was no rear,
?retreat? was inaccurate: They would have to fight their way out. People back
home read, ?Retreat, hell, we?re just attacking in another direction.? Though
not in Smith?s style, this was the perfect description of the Marines? problem
and their solution, and he never denied the quote.
The reporters also wanted time with the legendary Puller, who obliged with a
highly quotable assessment of the situation: ?We?ve been looking for the enemy
for several days now. We finally found them. We?re surrounded. That simplifies
our problem of finding these people and killing them.?
Back at Yudam-ni, Murray and Litzenburg decided to move by road during the day.
Daylight gave them the advantage of air and artillery support. During the days
and nights of battle, Barber and his company were alone (except for the enemy)
at Toktong Pass. For the movement south, the pass had to be held, and Marine Lt.
Col. Raymond G. Davis? 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was going to relieve Barber
and secure it.
Davis and his men were the first unit out of Yudam-ni. They traveled over the
rough, steep terrain in dark, bitter cold ? something the Chinese would not
expect ? and made it undetected by the enemy. Davis found that Barber and his
men had held for five days despite relentless attacks. Casualties were high: Of
200 men, 26 had been killed, 89 wounded, and three were missing. Air drops of
ammo proved invaluable.
Once Davis? men secured Toktong Pass, the 5th and 7th fought their way to
Hagaru-ri. It took them 79 hours to travel 14 miles carrying the wounded and
most of their equipment, but on Dec. 3, they entered the Hagaru-ri perimeter.
Prisoner-of-war (POW) interrogations ? extremely reliable at this point in the
war ? indicated at least seven CCF divisions near Hagaru-ri. The Chinese knew
its strategic location was key to Marine Corps success breaking out.
Once in Hagaru-ri, the 5th, 7th, and other units rested, regrouped, and prepared
for their next move, south to Koto-ri. Air Force C-46s and C-47s and other U.N.
aircraft began evacuation of about 4,300 wounded and frostbite victims. Smith
gave the dead priority, which again outraged Almond, though Smith was adamant
that fallen Marines held a special place and would be flown out first. About 140
were flown to Japan, while more than 500 replacement combat Marines were flown
Koto-ri, Fuchilin, Hungnam
On Dec. 6, the men at Hagaru-ri began their 9-mile, 38-hour fight to Koto-ri.
Despite CCF control of the road and many roadblocks, the lead units moved
through and kept the road open for Hagaru-ri?s rear guard. About 10,000 men and
1,000 vehicles reached the relative safety of Koto-ri. Once within the Koto-ri
perimeter, most of the 1st Marine Division again was reunited. More wounded were
evacuated from the Koto-ri air*****, and X Corps prepared for the 43-mile fight
to the sea.
Chinese pows revealed that Fuchilin Pass would be the site of a major enemy
attack. A CCF division lay in wait, three other CCF divisions were in the area,
and another two were held in reserve. Lt. Col. Donald M. Schmuck?s 1st
Battalion, 1st Marines holding Chinhung-ni was rested and ready to go. On the
snowy night of Dec. 8, they surprised the Chinese.
Fuchilin Pass was the enemy?s last major offensive during the Chosin campaign.
The CCF had overextended its supply lines, and its soldiers were suffering from
the cold and lack of food. The enemy would continue to launch minor assaults,
but they were minimal compared to the force with which the CCF struck at the
Smith and his men reached Hungnam on Dec. 11, and by Dec. 15, Navy ships
transported them south. Smith?s insight and careful, deliberate style made him
the ideal commanding general for Chosin. He was fortunate to have talented,
experienced leadership from Puller, Murray, Litzenburg, Davis, and others. While
his men fought together like a machine, it was his uncommon understanding of the
situation ? and a certain amount of luck ? that ensured the story of Chosin
Reservoir would become part of American military lore.
?Gina DiNicolo is a retired Marine Corps officer and a 1984 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Currently, she writes and edits for the 50th Anniversary of the
Korean War Commemoration Committee. For additional information about events
related to the Korean War anniversary, visit TROA?s links page,
Minister of Propaganda
man thats true hell,cold ,outgunned,outmanned.
The battle of Chosin Reservoir at Yudam-ni
The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, successfully used the characteristics of the offense during the breakout operation from Yudam-ni to relieve Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, at Toktong Pass, Chosin Reservoir (also known as Changjin Reservoir), Korea, December 1-3, 1950.
A whirlwind of events occurred during the opening months of the Korean War. Among these events was the invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950 by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), which crossed the 38th Parallel and pushed the Republic of Korea (ROK) forces into a small perimeter surrounding the southern port town of Pusan. The Marines were ordered to Pusan to help defend the perimeter. After four weeks of combat, when the situation was under control, the Marines were embarked on naval ships for the brilliant turning movement, the amphibious landing at Inchon.
With the successes gained from Pusan and Inchon, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the U.S. 8th Army and ROK forces to pursue the fleeing NKPA. The U.S. 8th Army would operate in western Korea, and X Corps in eastern Korea--both with orders to cut off the NKPA's effort to flee to the north. The 1st Marine Division, attached to the X Corps, landed at the northeastern port of Wonsan on October 25, 1950 for operations that would take UN forces north toward the Yalu River, which was the border of Manchuria and Communist China (see Map 1).
The plan was to move the X Corps north of the Chosin Reservoir to cut off the retreating NPKA and any Chinese Communists Forces (CCF) already in the country or moving south from Manchuria. The 1st Marine Division, attached to X Corps, was composed of the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marine Regiments.
The 1st RCT (Regimental Combat Team) had engaged the NKPA south and west of Wonsan and had alerted all the elements of the X Corps that hostile forces were in the area. The Chinese forces used guerrilla warfare tactics. With little artillery and no air support, the Chinese used heavy mortars and machine guns but relied mostly on the infantryman. With the respect for U.S. air power and the devastating effects of artillery, the Chinese generally fought at night and sought tactical penetrations into command, logistical and supporting arms systems of UN forces. The Chinese actions and tactics against the Marines were initially successful because the Marines were using scattered company defensive positions instead of tight battalion perimeters.
As the X Corps moved north, the scheme of maneuver was to have the 1st Marine Division move west of the Chosin Reservoir and U.S. Army units move east of the reservoir. The division also had the responsibility of securing the main supply route (MSR) along the route north. Unknown to the X Corps, the CCF had encircled UN forces and were waiting for orders to begin an attack that was to destroy X Corps.
The 1st Marine Division's 5th and 7th RCTs were in Yudam-ni, defending a large perimeter of approximately four miles in circumference and cautiously moving closer to the Yalu when the CCF attacked. Although the Marines knew that CCFs were in the area and had made previous contact with them, intelligence reports did not report or estimate accurately the size of the force, or relate that overwhelming CCFs had attacked the 8th Army in western Korea.
When CCFs launched the first attack on November 27, 1950, the Marines fought as individual companies and battalions against human-wave assault tactics. The Marine situation was tenuous at best. Two CCF divisions attacked from the northwest of the Marines' perimeter, and a third division had encircled the southeast, blocking the MSR and trapping two rifle companies and associated attachments in non-mutual supportive positions (see Map 2).
Company C of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, short one platoon, was approximately four miles south of Yudam-ni. Four miles farther south on the MSR, Company F (2d Battalion) in Toktong Pass was at full strength in a more isolated position, reinforced by heavy machine guns and an 81mm mortar section from the weapons company. Prior to the attacks the night of November 27-28, Company F's commander--knowing that he was on his own without hope of making it to the regimental perimeter until the following day--formed a tight perimeter. At 0230, the CCF attacked on a 270-degree arc (three fourths of the company perimeter). With one platoon initially overrun, the reserve elements fought and tenuously held the perimeter. By 0630, November 28, the Chinese had received so many casualties that the attack could no longer be considered organized.
As the RCT commanders at Yudam-ni consolidated their lines and realigned forces into one main perimeter, 1st Marine Division Commander General Oliver Smith ordered them to attack south toward Hagaru-ri to reopen the MSR as well as rescue Company C, 1st Battalion, and Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines. At 1015 on November 28, the rescue attempt for the two companies stranded on the MSR to Hagaru-ri commenced. Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis's 1st Battalion attempted first to reach Company C from Yudam-ni. After five hours of fighting, marching, and climbing, 1st Battalion was still about one mile from Company C. In a rapid envelopment to the west, the battalion's Company B moved with the aid of close air support and 81mm mortars fires and succeeded in pushing to the perimeter and enabling the withdrawal of Company C. Company F was supposed to fight north along the MSR and link up with 1st Battalion. This was not possible, however, with the number of casualties that Company F had suffered and the number of Chinese forces in the area. The RCT commander--not wanting to have an entire battalion surrounded by enemy forces--ordered that 1st Battalion return to the main perimeter. The relief force returned at 2110.
The RCT commanders believed that all forces were required for the defense of the perimeter, but they were also required to mount another relief effort for Company F. In a second attempt to accomplish this relief, the commanders formed a composite battalion of the units in reserve within the perimeter at Yudam-ni. At 0800 on November 29, the composite battalion moved south on the MSR but was hit with heavy machine-gun fire 300 yards outside the perimeter. The Marines could plainly see the CCF on the ridgelines but continued to fight south. After attacking 4,500 yards south along the MSR, Marine planes dropped messages to the composite battalion and the regimental headquarters, informing them that the enemy was entrenched in a formidable force on both sides of the MSR. After consideration at the regimental headquarters, the relief force was ordered to return to the main perimeter before it could be surrounded.
Company F survived a third night on Toktong Pass. One Marine was wounded; three CCF companies perished.
When the composite battalion did not function as expected, General Smith ordered that 5th Regiment take charge of protecting the Yudam-ni perimeter and that 7th Regiment conduct operations to clear the MSR to Hagaru-ri. The "March to the Sea" had begun. The manner in which the withdrawal was conducted is an important element of the Marine Corps' legacy.
As the two RCT commanders planned the reorganization and redeployment of forces, the regiments formed a second composite battalion to cover the weak portions of the perimeter. Additionally, as the battalions maneuvered--reforming the perimeter and breakout force--there was little contact from the CCF. It is likely that this was a tactical failure of the CCF on a grand scale, especially since the Marines were vulnerable and made all the movements during daylight hours.
The decision was made that 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, would attack over land instead of down the MSR and relieve Company F from the east. The remainder of the 7th RCT would pave a way for all other forces, including the wounded, vehicles, and equipment to move south from the Yudam-ni perimeter.
Early on December 1, the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines relieved 1st Battalion, 7th Marines in place, to allow it to carry out the assigned mission of relieving Company F. The initial breakout took an enormous amount of effort to create the gap in the CCF lines, which was not secured until 1930 on December 1, 1950. Lieutenant Colonel Davis evacuated his dead and wounded to the main perimeter. One additional company was attached to his battalion at the last moment because of the day's combat losses. This battalion cut the last physical ties with Marine units at Yudam-ni and attacked east and south.
The planning process for 1st Battalion's march to Toktong Pass was swift. The concept of operations and scheme of maneuver was developed and approved in approximately 20 minutes. The plan was to take two 81mm mortars and six heavy machine guns, each manned with double crews so they could carry enough ammunition. It was also decided that all Marines would carry their sleeping bags, an extra bandolier of small arms ammunition, and extra stretchers--initially to carry ammunition and then casualties. The Marines in the battalion reserve and headquarters company carded an extra 81mm mortar round. Extra radios were carried with the unit, ensuring duplication of assets and positive communications with the Yudam-ni perimeter. Other mission considerations were that all wounded and sick would remain with the main breakout force. These Marines would drive the vehicles and provide convoy security.
At 2100 on December 1, catching the enemy off guard, 1st Battalion broke out of the perimeter and headed east and south in the effort to relieve Company F at Toktong Pass (see Map 3). After a day of fighting, reorganizing, absorbing replacements, issuing orders, evacuating wounded, and neither sleeping nor eating a hot meal, the mission continued. The effects of the combat were pushing the Marines to the end of their mental and physical endurance.
The night of December 1, 1950 was dark, and the temperature was 16 degrees below zero. Land navigation was difficult, particularly in the deep draws and valleys that 1st Battalion, 7th Marines crossed. The lead elements were losing sight of the guiding star when they descended from the ridges. Also, during this phase of the movement, the column was drifting toward the enemy lines, which 1st Battalion was trying to avoid. The leaders noticed the problem, and passed the word to the front to change course, but it was not effective. Many, if not all the Marines, had the hoods of their parkas over their heads and were fighting the internal battles of fear and exhaustion as well as the dangerous environment around them. Lieutenant Colonel Davis attempted to use artillery fire and white phosphorus rounds on designated hills to help guide the movement. This technique did not produce the desired results. Davis then personally ran to the head of the column to orient movement on the correct azimuth of attack.
All the Marines were exhausted, including the leaders. When issuing orders or directions, Davis insisted that the company commanders repeat all orders to make sure they were what he desired and that he had, in fact, issued the orders accurately.
Small arms fire increased as the battalion drifted toward the enemy. The order to prepare for an attack of the enemy position was issued and promptly executed. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, had caught the enemy off guard again and destroyed a platoon-sized outpost with only a few Marines wounded. As the battalion was reorganizing for continued movement toward Company F, men began collapsing from fatigue. The effort to get them moving again required the direct action and leadership of the officers and NCOs. The battalion continued to move unchecked until Colonel Davis rested his battalion after 20 hours of combat and movement.
During the time 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was moving overland, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was attacking south on the MSR (see Map 4). The pressure that 3d Battalion maintained on the CCF, and the fact that it probably appeared to be a much more lucrative objective to the CCF, enabled 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, to move as effectively as it did. Also, since the perimeter at Yudam-ni was shrinking, the CCF probably thought they could take decisive action and destroy the Marines in the perimeter as well as the units moving on the MSR.
After the brief respite, 1st Battalion continued the attack toward Company F. Correcting for the drift toward enemy lines, the relief force had closed to one and one half miles from the beleaguered company's position. The radios that 1st Battalion, 7th Marines carried and used were not functioning properly or were out of range of Company F and the main force at Yudam-ni. The 1st Battalion, was unable to contact Company F to ensure that the 81mm mortars or heavy machine guns did not fire on the relief force. The 1st Battalion, continued to march toward Company F's perimeter, and radio contact was finally established.
A final attack was mounted--again with the aid of close air support and 81ram mortar fires--and Company B reached the Company F perimeter at 1125 on December 2, 1950. Company B ate an air-dropped meal and immediately continued the attack west to the high ground that would lead to securing Toktong Pass. Company A pushed out and secured a perimeter to the east of Company F's perimeter (see Map 3).
In an attempt to entice the enemy to move and reveal their positions in and around Toktong Pass, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, started warming fires. The Chinese were not expecting an attack from troops who were warming themselves; 1st Battalion changed tactics again and launched three simultaneous attacks on three different CCF strong points. The surprise attained by this action caught the CCF off guard. They fell back, running in the direction of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which was within a mile of Toktong Pass along the MSR. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, then called an air strike, which was the leading factor in a CCF regiment's complete elimination.
The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, reached Hagaru-ri at 1900 on December 3, 1950. Behind the battalion leading the way were vehicles loaded with wounded and dead, artillery howitzers, a tank and the remainder of two Marine regimental combat teams. The last elements of the rear guard from Yudam-ni entered the Hagaru-ri perimeter at 1400 on December 4, 1950. Thus, the 1st Marine Division was united, with the exception of the two infantry battalions that were to the south at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ni.
Overcoming numerous obstacles--including continuous attacks, the relentless cold, a blown bridge in a narrow mountain pass and a 78-mile march to the sea--the 1st Marine Division and all included forces, the majority of the equipment, wounded and dead were evacuated on naval shipping at the port of Hungham. The campaign ended when UN forces destroyed the entire port facility in a great explosion.
As commander of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Davis used the characteristics of the offense during the breakout operation from Yudam-ni to relieve Company F, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division, at Toktong Pass. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, describes the characteristics of the offense as the combination of surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity.
Davis achieved surprise on numerous occasions during December 1-3, 1950 by "striking the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is not physically or mentally ready." (FM 100-5, p. 7-1). A prime example is when 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, continued the breakout attack force from Yudam-ni in a direction other than south on the MSR. The battalion gained freedom of action when it encountered CCFs and attacked from a direction the CCF was not anticipating. The most decisive surprise during the entire action was when the battalion conducted three simultaneous attacks from Company F's position on Toktong Pass. This was most decisive because it enabled 1st Battalion to secure the entire pass and drive the preponderance of the enemy force into the direction of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.
Three significant reasons that helped achieve surprise for 1st Battalion: First, if detected during the breakout, CCF may have assumed that the battalion was actually other CCF forces, because the Marines were in the CCF rear areas. Second. CCF commanders may have thought that one battalion would contribute little against their CCF actions. Third, when the battalion did attack, it was in a direction opposite of the CCF defenses--that is, in the rear or flank of the enemy. The CCF focus was the destruction of the main Marine force at Yudam-ni and the denial of the use of the MSR to the UN forces.
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Colonel Davis achieved concentration of his forces during the breakout by massing the effects of his battalion formation and weapon systems as well as exploiting the success from his actions (FM 100-5, p. 7-2). Concentrating his force, he attacked CCF units during the overland march by using combined arms, close air support, mortars, and machineguns. The effective combination of these weapon systems reduced the number of individual infantrymen required and saved the force. countless casualties. "Speed, security, and deception are essential to successful concentration ..." which Colonel Davis constantly ensured by keeping the battalion moving after the breakout and after attacking the enemy outposts (FM 100-5, p. 7-2). Ensuring that the battalion moved on the correct azimuth of advance also attained speed. The best example of deception is the warming fires in the perimeter that were started before the simultaneous attack of the enemy outposts. Additionally, Davis made a conscious decision to leave the sick and wounded men at Yudam-ni, doubled up on the crew-served weapons crews, and instructed his battalion that the movement was to be conducted in silence. All of these issues added to the security of the force.
Tempo is "the rate of speed of military action; controlling or altering that rate is essential for maintaining the initiative" (FM 100-5, p. 7-2). Davis maintained the tempo during the breakout of the Yudam-ni perimeter by keeping his lead company up front, even though the Marines were exhausted from the fight to pass through the CCF lines. Stopping to move another company forward would have permitted the CCF to maneuver, delay, or block the operation. After the attack on the CCF outpost, Lieutenant Colonel Davis kept the battalion moving. In addition to being a force protection issue, the Marines probably would have frozen from the sweat that formed during the attack, but Davis kept moving and maintained the initiative and tempo over CCF forces. This action also aided in the security of the force by not remaining in a position that the CCF knew of. Resting the Marines and permitting the battalion to sleep maintained the tempo because the rested Marines were able to regain their momentum in a few hours. Colonel Davis rested and fed his Marines before launching another attack on the CCF defensive outposts in Toktong Pass. Davis constantly adjusted the tempo and succeeded in keeping the CCF off balance.
"Audacity is a key component of any successful offensive action. (FM 100-5, p. 7-3) The entire plan of allowing an infantry battalion to move overland in the mountains of North Korea, operating independently of its parent unit, is bold--particularly if the maneuver unit becomes decisively engaged. Company F's building of warming fires in its positions, along with the unexpected launching of three simultaneous attacks, demonstrates the effective application of the characteristics of the offense.
(1) Graphics used in this article are from Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951, The United States Army in the Korean War, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1990.
Captain Douglas G. Schaffer is a company commander in 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, at 29 Palms, Calif. When he wrote this article, he was attending the Infantry Captains Career Course at Fort Benning.
2003 U.S. Army Infantry School
Another topic with different story on Chosin posted Hist2004