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Thread: Canadian Armed Forces, Forces canadiennes

  1. #106
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    Awesome pictures dude! Hopeing to get that vest sooner then later looks sick!

    Thanks for posting these.

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    The last flight of first canadian CH-113 Labrador after 41 years of full service and duty (SAR) in 2004









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    CH-149 of Canadian Search & Rescue (SAR) with a crash boat

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    I found an article about Mi-17KF for canadian forces and CH-47D/F for 2009-2011. Mulroney sold our CH-47D in 1991 , just because he said isn't necessary....and now our gouvernement lease-to-buy CH-47D from U.S army stock(2009) and new CH-47F from boeing(2011)

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    Back in 1991, Canada’s Mulroney government sold the country’s CH-47 Chinook medium-lift helicopter fleet to the Dutch. They cost a lot to maintain and operate, and Canada didn’t need them anyway. Or so they thought. Fast forward to 2002, then 2006. Canada has had boots on the ground in Afghanistan for several years now, but doesn’t have any helicopters capable of operating in the hot and/or high-altitude environment of southern Afghanistan. Its CH-146 Griffons (Bell 412s) can’t carry useful loads in that environment, its ancient CH-124 Sea Kings are falling apart, its CH-148 Cyclones (H-92 Superhawks) are ordered but not yet manufactured, and its 14 new search-and-rescue CH-149 Cormorants are few in number, are based on the EH101’s civil model rather than its military model, and were consuming spares at a torrid rate before being grounded for an extended period due to maintenance & safety issues. To support its 2,000 or so troops in Afghanistan, therefore, Canada has to rely on favors from US, British, Australian, Polish, and (irony of ironies) Dutch pilots flying CH-47 Chinooks.
    When DID covered Canada’s “emergency” purchases for Operation Archer back in November 2005, DID made a strong point of noting the absence of medium-lift helicopters from that list. It should have come as a relief, therefore, to learn in June 2006 that the Canadian government had announced a CDN$ 4.7 billion program to purchase 16 “medium-heavy” helicopters for military and “disaster response” roles.
    It should have, but it didn’t. DID explains the Afghan situation on the ground, the RFP, the options – and the problem. Now, almost 2 years after the program was announced, a sole-source RFP has been issued…



    • Cemetary Sideroad: On the Ground in Afghanistan
    • Bring It All Back: The New Helicopter Competition
    • Looking for a Place to Happen: The Problem [updated]
    • We’ll Go Too: Updates [new]
    • Escape Is at Hand for the Travellin’ Man: Additional Readings & Sources [updated]

      Cemetary Sideroad: On the Ground in Afghanistan ISAF, S. Afghanistan
      (click to view full)

      Canada is still operating as part of NATO’s ISAF force, as part of a group under British command tasked with the south-western provinces of Kandahar, Helmand and Uruzgan. Canadian Task Force Orion is based in Kandahar, and in 2006 its commander Lt. Col. Ian Hope was quoted by Canadian defence think-tank CASR as saying that:
      “It is quite possible [this lack of transport helicopters] has cost limbs, if not more, because we have had to sustain [resupply troops in remote areas using vehicles] on the ground,” said Lt-Col Ian Hope, who commands [Task Force Orion]. “That has produced a risk that would be reduced if we could take helicopter flights. It does not take a military tactician to know this. We have mitigated the risks. Losses have been reduced, but not yet to zero.”
      CH-47 Chinook

      Canada’s senior logistician in Kandahar Lt. Col. John Conrad added that Canada’s Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) are located along roads and dirt tracks where the Taliban and its commanders in Quetta, Pakistan often send suicide bombers, or places mines and other explosives because American, British, and Dutch Chinook transport helicopters are seldom available for such missions:
      “The convoys are now in harm’s way almost daily because supplies have to follow the infantry and we have had to send those supplies by land…. We bid on [available coalition helicopter support], but it is like coming to a potluck. Everyone brings a dish and, instead of potato salad, we come with a jug of water. [our allies] help us when they can, but we are at the end of [their priority] list [unless the requirement is close air support or MEDEVAC].”
      Indeed, the government’s own June 2006 announcement recognized this when it stated that:
      “To date Canada has relied on allied or coalition forces to provide this type of helicopter transport while deployed. This limits the Canadian Forces’ ability to conduct independent operations, and also means when unavailable, troops must opt for ground transportation, placing them at greater risk of ambushes, land mines and improvised explosive devices.”
      Bring It All Back: The New Helicopter Competition
      Dutch CH-47
      (click to view full)

      According to the broad DND announcement, The estimated total project cost for this aircraft acquisition is C$ 2 billion (USD $ 1.78 billion at current conversion), plus an estimated contract value of C$ 2.7 billion (USD $2.4 billion) for 20 years of in-service support – a contract to be competed by the winning contractor, with work largely to be done in Canada by Canadian mechanics and contractors. As with other contracts in the series, the winning contractor will be expected to provide total industrial offsets equal to at least 100% of the contract value.
      The Canadian DND also seem to have a specific platform in mind, as they’re using a competitive process known as an Advance Contract Award Notice (ACAN):
      The ACAN process permits the Government to identify an intended contract award winner (in this case, the Boeing CH-47 Chinook) based on the mandatory capabilities and detailed market research conducted by the Department. Industry is then given the opportunity to respond, should they feel they have an aircraft that meets this criteria. If no supplier submits a statement of capabilities that meets the requirements set out in the ACAN during its posting period of 30 calendar days, then the competitive requirements of the government’s contracting policy have been met and the government’s choice is bought. If a valid statement of capabilities is received then a fully competitive process will be run.
      So, what are those required capabilities?
    • Internal – Cabin space to accommodate an infantry platoon (30 soldiers) with full combat equipment, including weapons, body armour, rucksacks, rations and communications (4,763 kg/ 10,550 lbs.).


    • External – Lift multiple loads, including a lightweight field howitzer (Canada recently bought the M777) and associated equipment (minimum of 5,443 kg/ 12,000 lbs.).


    • Hot and High – Accomplish the lift and range parameters defined above, at altitudes and temperatures up to 1,220 m/ 4,000 ft above sea level and 35 C / 95 F degrees.


    • Range – Minimum of 100 km/ 60 miles with either the internal or external load described as above and at the temperatures and altitudes defined.


    • Aircraft certification – Aircraft must be certified to aviation certification standards recognized by Canada by the contract award date.


    • Fleet size – Minimum fleet of 16 aircraft, sufficient to sustain a minimum of three deployed helicopters in addition to maintenance, test and evaluation, and training at two main operating bases.


    • Delivery – Delivery date of first aircraft must be no later than 36 months after contract award and final aircraft delivery no later than 60 months after contract award.

    The Canadian Department of Public Safety is also part of the purchasing process, as they expect the aircraft to be used to respond to natural or man-made disasters. This is not exactly a vote of confidence in the EH101/CH-149 Cormorant Search and Rescue helicopters, though the fleet of 15 is a small number for a country Canada’s size.
    Looking for a Place to Happen – The Problem
    Afghan Mi-17 Hip
    (click to view full)

    The issue is simple – the last clause re: delivery. With troops on the ground right now who need these capabilities, delivery in 36-60 months will not meet the needs of Canada’s fighting men and women in harm’s way. A need their commanding officers have openly stated as a priority. Contrast Canada’s approach to Australia’s more proactive stance, for instance.
    Worse, the DND has found that delivery of the CH-47F Chinooks will not be complete until 2012.
    Canadian defense think-tank CASR points out that two potential solutions exist to this dilemma. One is the possible solution DID covered in November 2005 – buy Mi-17 helicopters, the same type used by the Afghan Air Force. A Russian trade delegation made that precise offer during their March 2006 visit to Canada, and a Canadian company named Kelowna Flightcraft is already cooperating with the Mil factory in Kazan to produce Mi-17KF Kittiwakes with fully Westernized avionics and rear loading ramps.
    Mi-17KF

    The Mi-17s aren’t a substitute for the Chinook. Their load is 24 fully-equipped troops, with an external sling load of 3,000 kg, vs. the stated Canadian requirement of 30 troops and 5,443 kg. On the other hand, their cost is about 1/8 that of a new CH-47 Chinook and deliveries would be rapid. They would create a temporary solution, one which could later be repurposed later to other military or even civilian rescue or disaster-related roles as Chinooks become available.
    The second potential solution is advocated by Lt-Col James Dorschner (US Army Reserve, Ret.), a Special Correspondent for Jane’s Defense Weekly. The deal involves Boeing’s CHAPS (Cargo Helicopter Alternate Procurement Strategy) program, which is associated with the US Army’s new CH-47F buy:
    ”...the CHAPS program allows third parties to buy US Army CH-47Ds (already earmarked for ‘remanufacture’ into advanced CH-47Fs) for roughly US $15 M each. This amount is about half the price of a new-build CH-47D and much less than a ‘new-build’ CH-47F. This more modern Chinook, is selling for about US $35 to 40 million each.
    Under the CHAPS arrangement, the money from US Army CH-47D-model aircraft, sold by Boeing, can be used to ‘top up’ the Army funding which has already been budgeted for CH-47F remanufacture. The added revenue will allow the Army to buy a brand new CH-47F for each ‘D sold. An aircraft purchased under CHAPS will, of course, be overhauled and upgraded to the latest CH-47D-model standards by Boeing prior to delivery…. all ‘Third Party’ purchases are handled as a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS), rather than the usual Foreign Military Sale (FMS).”
    In other words, much faster, less complicated, win/win for both militaries. Dorschner notes that Egypt was the first customer to sign up for CHAPS CH-47s, with Australia expected to follow shortly. The Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and Great Britain may be next.
    Using CHAPS as a starting point, Dorschner contends that Canada could field a small force of 4-5 Chinooks to Afghanistan before the end of the current NATO deployment, eventually growing its CHAPS fleet to 9-12 aircraft before the new Chinooks arrive in numbers. At that point, the CHAPS Chinooks could be sent back to be refurbished as CH-47Fs themselves.
    The question is, can CHAPS be invoked by a country that doesn’t already have earlier-version CH-47s – and if they don’t, are any airframe available on the global market?
    Either near-term option could work. What’s clear, however, is that the usual bureaucratic response of yawning or snarling won’t be enough. Unless some kind of near-term option is found and implemented, this USD $4.2 billion program risks facing more intense hostile fire than the Canadian boots or hearts on the ground showing courage in the fight.
    We’ll Go Too: Updates & Timeline
    Afghanistan drop-off
    (click to view full)

    April 21/08: Canada makes a separate official request for 6 CH-47D Chinooks from the USA, with a total price tag of up to USD$ 375 million. See “Let’s Stay Engaged: CH-47D Chinooks for Canada’s Afghan Mission.”
    April 7/08: Canada’s Ministry of Public Works and Government Services announces a March 2008 RFP to Boeing for 16 CH-47F Chinook helicopters, plus 20 years of associated in-service support (ISS), with an extension option for the life expectancy of the aircraft. The Government expects to award a contract for the medium-to-heavy lift helicopter in fall 2008, and the usual rules concerning 100% industrial offsets apply.
    In the wake of Parliamentary reports and political pressure, Canada’s ongoing involvement in Afghanistan is predicated in part on the acquisition of medium battlefield support helicopters. The CH-47F Chinooks’ delivery time will not meet that need, however, and so the release adds that:
    “This procurement is not being undertaken to meet the government’s short-term requirements in Afghanistan – this is being done through a separate process – but rather to re-equip the Canadian Forces over the longer-term…. “
    March 20/08: Jane’s Defense Weekly reports that Canada has negotiated the purchase of 6 ex-US Army Boeing CH-47D Chinook medium-lift helicopters for use in Afghanistan, but has no way of supporting the aircraft in theatre. “The Canadian Department of National Defence (DND) declined to comment on the acquisition negotiations, stating only that “the department is currently examining a number of options.”
    June 28/06: Canada’s government announces the Medium-to Heavy-Lift Helicopter initiative. DND release.
    Escape Is at Hand for the Travellin’ Man: Additional Readings & Sources











    • StrategyPage (March 5/08) – Chinook Replaces Blackhawk in Combat. “For the last two decades, the U.S. Army used the its UH-60 “Blackhawk” helicopter for combat assault missions, while the larger CH-47 “Chinook” was used just for moving cargo. But the army found that, in the high altitudes of Afghanistan, the more powerful CH-47 was often the only way to go in the thin mountain air. While doing that, the army found that the CH-47 made an excellent assault helicopter. In many ways, it was superior to the UH-60, mainly because the CH-47 carries more troops and moves faster and farther.”










    • CTV (March 14/06) – Canada loans Dutch comrades armoured vehicles. Canada has loaned its Dutch comrades five heavily-armoured Nyala patrol vehicles for use in southern Afghanistan…. While there is no specific exchange outlined in the memorandum between the two countries, the Dutch Defence ministry noted Canadian troops need help getting around the far-flung desert battlefield and have put forward routine access to CH-47 Chinook helicopters. [Maj. Luc] Gaudet was asked whether it was a formal exchange. “Yes and no,” he replied.

    [CENTER] This article is a free sample taken from our database of more than 180 detailed analyses of defense programs and contracting trends. To see what we're already covering, check our list of Focus and Spotlight articles. For full access to the complete Defense Industry Insider knowledge base, subscribe today for less than $50 a month. Content updated daily!
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    [FONT=Arial][SIZE=3]Since 2001 ,canadian airfield Bagotville and Cold Lake said they're ready to be send in Afghanistan. O'gonnor said that in 2006 [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Times New Roman, Times, serif][SIZE=-1][FONT=Arial][SIZE=3]“I can deny it because no one’s...brought it across my desk”. Few day later he said the canadian gouvernment has the prossibility to send Six CF-18 between 2008-2009

    Don't forget canada sent 26x CF-18 in Gulf war 1991 and Kosovo in 1999 with more 600hours of combat. So why this time canada don't send CF-18 in Afghanistan , we have the fighter and experience munition and for sure the airfield of Kandahar so why canada don't send minimum six CF-18 for escort our troops from Ambush and any sort of situation.


    Here an article from 2007, Toronto Star


    [/SIZE][/FONT][/SIZE][/FONT]
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    CF-18 jets are mission-ready TheStar.com - News - CF-18 jets are mission-ready
    Documents show deployment plans to Afghanistan set, but orders unlikely

    February 19, 2007
    Bruce Campion-Smith
    OTTAWA BUREAU
    OTTAWA–Canada's air force has detailed plans to deploy six CF-18s fighter jets to Kandahar, even to the point of predicting how many so-called "smart" bombs would be needed for a six-month air campaign battling insurgents, documents show.
    Defence officials say they have no intention of sending the fighters overseas. But military memos and orders obtained by the Toronto Star make it clear that extensive planning has laid the groundwork for a deployment should the Conservative government give the okay.
    "With respect to the current situation ... there are no plans at this point in time do so," Lt.-Col. John Blakeley, director of air force public affairs, said last Friday.
    But just over a year ago – as Canada's army units made the move to Kandahar from Kabul – it seemed certain the air force's front-line fighter would be deployed to join them in an operation expected to cost $18 million, documents obtained under the Access to Information Act show.
    In January 2006, air force headquarters in Winnipeg sent out an order to the two CF-18 bases at Bagotville, Que., and Cold Lake, Alta., regarding "deployment to Kandahar."
    "The purpose of this (message) is to co-ordinate deployment milestones that will ensure the directed fighter preparedness posture is achieved and maintained," it said.
    The order laid out some of the requirements for the Kandahar operation, such as parking space for six of the sleek fighters with a spot where another jet could undergo maintenance work.
    The documents also reveal that planners predicted how many sorties the jets would be flying each day as well as how many precision-guided bombs would be used in a six-month deployment, although those details have been censored.
    The documents detail the "weapons on hand," including a selection of laser-guided bombs weighing up to 907 kilograms.
    One memo, marked secret, discusses the need for air-to-air refuelling to get the jets from their bases in Alberta and Quebec to Afghanistan.
    Among the papers is a presentation totalling about 45 pages on the threats that would face the fighter team in Afghanistan with topics that include narcotics, the "opposing military force," rockets and mortars, convoy ambush, roadside bombs, kidnappings and suicide bombers, although details on each have been blanked out.
    The documents also stress the need for positive identification to avoid "collateral damage" to allied troops. Five Canadian soldiers have already been killed in Afghanistan in friendly fire incidents involving American jets.
    Air force rules made clear that CF-18 jet jockeys would have to "visually acquire their targets and have the flexibility to deliver ordinance in lower flight regimes to avoid fratricide."
    The air force convened a two-day meeting in Winnipeg in November 2005 involving air staff from across the country to discuss issues "related to preparation, deployment, employment and force sustainment of an eventual fighter force supporting the Afghan theatre of operations" reads one memo.
    A 14-member military team was to head to Afghanistan in April 2006, to scout out the Kandahar airfield for the unfolding CF-18 deployment.
    Blakeley couldn't say whether that trip ever went ahead. But he said it's common for planners to develop contingency plans for possible operations.
    The deployment, planned for sometime after May 2006, never took place and now seems to have been shelved indefinitely.
    Today, a CF-18 deployment remains a sensitive topic for senior federal government officials who fear the public may perceive Canadian jets in Afghanistan as an escalation of Canada's involvement in a divisive mission.
    And because British, Dutch and U.S. fighters are already providing air support for allied troops in southern Afghanistan, it's unlikely Canadian fighter pilots will be called on to show off their skills, defence officials say.
    Canada has about 2,600 troops in Afghanistan, with most based in the volatile Kandahar region.



    [FONT=Times New Roman, Times, serif][SIZE=-1]
    [/SIZE][/FONT]

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    What are these?

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    Quote Originally Posted by RoyB View Post
    What are these?
    What do you mean about "what are these" ?

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    Zang Za San Chong Nyon Ho from North Korea, escorted by HMCS Ville de Québec




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    The Canadian naval task group comprising (from left to right) the frigate HMCS Toronto, the destroyer HMCS Iroquois, the frigate HMCS Charlottetown, and the replenishment ship HMCS Preserver

    AOR HMCS Protecteur



    HMCS FREDERICTON (right), HMCS IROQUOIS (centre forward), HMCS REGINA (left) and HMNZS Te Mana ( A New Zealand warship positioned rear) sail in a diamond formation in the Arabian Gulf.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Factanonverba View Post
    What do you mean about "what are these" ?
    he's referring to the M113A2 TUA or "TLAV" as it is commonly called in the CF

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    Does anyone know why they choose not to mount smoke grenade launchers of any kind on the G-wagens?

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    Canadian soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion of Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry board a Marine Corps CH-53 Super Stallion helicopter during an assault operation as part of Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)


    Large Canadian,Australian,South Korea and U.S Fleet during
    Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)



    U.S and Canadian vessels during RIMPAC

    Two Canadian vessels escort a U.S Aircraft carrier

    Last edited by Factanonverba; 10-16-2008 at 04:18 PM.

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