Reply With QuoteSeems like there is always something more urgent to defense budgets on... at least until Ohio-class becomes either obsolete or too worn out.
U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy
U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy
Sep 3, 2009
Bill Sweetman/Omaha, Neb.
The Obama administration's Quadrennial Defense Review and a parallel review of U.S. nuclear posture could give the go-ahead to two long-debated programs: a next-generation missile-launching submarine (SSBN) and a new nuclear warhead.
If so, it will be a relief to nuclear insiders who worry that the topic of deterrence has been ignored for too long in the U.S., while nations like France, the U.K., Russia and China outpace U.S. modernization plans.
"It's been the better part of two decades since most of us in the Defense Dept. invested the necessary time in the topic of strategic deterrence," Lt. Gen. Kevin Chilton, leader of U.S. Strategic Command, said here in July, kicking off the biggest conference in years on the subject, the U.S. Stratcom Deterrence Symposium.
"We've allowed an entire generation to skip class. We've allowed our understanding to plateau--but it turned out that the plateau was a ledge, and we've stayed too long on that ledge."
The Obama administration entered office with a commitment to reduce the "numbers, roles and emphasis" associated with nuclear weapons and start the world on a "path to zero." Arms negotiations with Russia have restarted and there is renewed emphasis on non-proliferation measures such as test bans and controls on fissile material.
But at the same time, some planners, theorists in deterrence and military leaders are concerned that there is a new nuclear calculus that U.S. leadership's actions may not reflect. As John Hamre, former deputy Defense secretary and now president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, puts it, "We [in the U.S.] don't think nuclear weapons are useful. We think they are dangerous. But most countries think they are useful."
Indeed they are. Vice Adm. Robert Harward, deputy commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, reported on a five-day Joint Operating Environment war game held last November. It reflected some probabilities: That rising nuclear powers might be willing to use tactical nuclear weapons, and that both state and non-state actors "would not view nuclear weapons as a first resort, but might not see them as a last resort." The result: "The presence of nuclear weapons brought on operational paralysis."
Adds Frank Miller, a former arms policy official under the George W. Bush administration: "Iran and North Korea are not using nuclear weapons to deter U.S. nuclear weapons; they are using them to deter our conventional forces."
It is not only rogue states and new nuclear powers that are developing weapons. Russia and China, with all three "new nuke" states on its borders, have programs for delivery vehicles and new warheads. Later this year, France will become the first nation to publicly field a nuclear warhead--the TNA (airborne nuclear warhead) for the ASMP--A air-launched missile--that has been designed and developed without nuclear testing. The TNO oceanic warhead for the submarine-launched M51 follows next year. Despite a current debate, the U.K.'s decision to develop a nuclear warhead (also without testing), together with a new missile submarine class, stands as official policy.
The U.S. is reviewing its nuclear posture. The Clinton administration renounced nuclear testing in 1996 and directed the Energy Dept.'s national laboratories to find ways to measure the reliability of stockpiled weapons, and develop new warheads, without testing.
This has been accomplished and the labs are confident that a new Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) can be developed, but Congress routinely blocks spending on it.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Director George Miller comments: "There is an increasingly rare group of people who have developed a nuclear weapon and added it to the stockpile." He adds, "I read that the three of us"--Miller and his counterparts at Sandia and Los Alamos Laboratories--"have certified the stockpile, but what we do is assess it and tell people, and there are reasons why those assessment letters are classified." In the current "stewardship" program "there are a lot of issues that have tested our mettle and we see more looming on the horizon."
Veteran technologist John Foster, who started at Livermore in 1948, is more direct. "If the labs are not permitted to practice design, then the development of any warhead can't assume competence and proficiency, and a credible deterrent cannot be maintained."
RRW opponents argue that concerns over the aging of warheads are overstated--after all, the life of plutonium is pretty well unlimited--but lab directors are not so sure.
Livermore's Miller calls a nuclear warhead "a wonderful chemistry experiment" in which, over time, low-level radiation from the plutonium "pit" affects almost every component in the system. Old technology is another issue. Sandia Director Tom Hunter's reaction to a call to rebuild one warhead subsystem was that "I was being asked how much it would cost to make an eight-track player."
If there is one big upside to the development of an RRW, aside from hedging against unexpected aging issues, it is summed up as "surety." A great deal of the cost of sustaining nuclear weapons has to do with safeguarding against accidents and theft. But if the weapon were made inherently safer (for instance, by using even more insensitive explosives) and virtually impossible to exploit if stolen, it would be much easier to handle.
Work along these lines has proceeded in the U.K. In a 2005 interview, Livermore Weapons Director Bruce Goodwin remarked that work at the U.K.'s Atomic Weapons Establishment was "vibrant" and aimed at fielding a comprehensive test ban treaty-compliant warhead. He referred to the U.K.'s emphasis on what he called a "smug bomb," known formally as the High Surety Warhead.
Goodwin also said U.S.-U.K. cooperation was closer at the time than it had been for years. Since late 2008, AWE Management Ltd., which operates the U.K. research center, has been majority U.S.-owned, with Lockheed Martin and Jacobs Engineering holding one-third each.
A new deterrent posture could include conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs), a new factor in deterrence, but so far more dangerous to careers than to adversaries. Asked about CBMs at the Space and Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, Ala., in August, Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded: "You want to see the scar tissue?"
The case for CBMs is strong. "The only systems that we have that can get to the fight in minutes have been nuclear warheads," Cartwright says. "Is that prudent? It is relevant, in that the enemy believes we will use it." Air Force Gen. (ret.) Eugene Habiger, involved in the CBM effort, notes, however, "a 1,000-lb. conventional warhead with a few meters CEP (circular error probable) has the same effect as 50 kilotons at 3,000 ft."
CBM, Habiger told the Omaha conference, "was a great idea. The Navy calculated that they could provide 100 CBMs for $500 million. But Stratcom didn't get the regional [commanders-in-chief] involved to persuade the secretaries of State and Defense that we needed it, and that was a great way to kill it."
However, as Cartwright noted, the initial CBM--Conventional Trident--is being brought to a point where it could be fielded within 18 months (as Congress directed). Also, tests being conducted in "four to five months" will demonstrate technologies to deal with "ambiguity issues"--the problem of demonstrating that a missile launch is not nuclear. "That's seen as more of a way forward."
CBM at least begins to respond to another important question: Are nuclear weapons a credible deterrent against a chemical or biological threat? "Is it credible to use the threat of a nuclear warhead against a chemical attack that kills 1,000 people?"
Hamre asks, adding, "It's not helpful to have policies based on your own confusion."
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Seems like there is always something more urgent to defense budgets on... at least until Ohio-class becomes either obsolete or too worn out.
I hadn't hear about France's TNA (airborne nuclear warhead) or the ASMP (A air-launched missile)
Reminds me of the Skybolt (GAM-87A)
I think if we start now, it won't be so expensive.Originally Posted by domokun
Wow, that got me remembering watching the USS Ohio being built at EB and realizing that was thirty years ago! Sheesh… Yep, we need a new SSBN class soon.
It looks to me like the UK's "modernization plans" consist mainly of disarnament. Aren't they talking about scrapping their nukes to save money?If so, it will be a relief to nuclear insiders who worry that the topic of deterrence has been ignored for too long in the U.S., while nations like France, the U.K., Russia and China outpace U.S. modernization plans.
The debate in the UK has centred around the question of whether to replace Trident or not. The government has been largely leaning towards a replacement programme but have been putting off any detailed discussion, such as "replace with what".
I suspect that with the credit crunch and recession the question of replacement will be raised again.
I think some think tank promoted that idea.
I think I'm right in saying Blair's idea was to reduce but not eliminate the UK nuclear stockpile.
Blair: Retain UK Nuclear Weapons
Partly the debate in the UK has been characterized by those that want to scrap everything either for ideological reasons and/or economy. There is however, a strong argument that is perhaps growing that says that there should not be cuts in funding but the money should be diverted to other areas, e.g. to support land forces in Afghanistan.
Many see Trident as "useless" except as a deterrent. After all the subs don't attack other subs or ships and don't fire missiles at land targets. Tridents just hide...
I recently saw a suggestion that Trident should be replaced by hunter killer nuke subs that carry nuclear tipped tomahawk missiles. This could be the deterrent. However, it was stated that this could not be done for technical reasons. No explanation and I am curious about this. On my list of things to research when I have a moment.
That is an odd argument. We can launch Tomahawks from subs. In fact our SSGNs carry quite a few Tomahawks and at one time there was a nuclear Tomahawk. Don't know if this is permitted under INF agreement though.
Tomahawks aren't terribly fast, though. I would think something like the big Russian supersonic cruise missiles would be more survivable.
Does the UK have any land based ICBMs?
Nope, but they had plans to build there own MRBM's back in the 1950's, but were canceled because of venerability and cost, so decided to go with stand-off missiles for the V-Bombers instead.
Last edited by Shadowstorm; 09-15-2009 at 05:52 PM.
The "technical" problem may of course be INF agreement! The UK have never had their own land based ICBMs as far I know. I think blue streak was to be such but was cancelled. We did of course house US land based cruise missiles for a while. The UK did have air launched nuclear bombs and rockets at one point but these were phased out a long time ago in favour of sub based systems.
Nope, no land based missiles. RAF has (or at least had) tactical nukes for aircraft, but that is another thing.
Subsonic cruise missile relatively easy target for defense when compared ballistic missiles.
Last edited by domokun; 09-15-2009 at 05:41 PM. Reason: little change
Here's some information about the Blue Streak MRBM.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Streak_missile
http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaver...luestreak.html
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/f...age_rocket.htm
Many thanks, everybody.
I know at one time the UK was interested in the Skybolt (GAM-87A), which would have been an medium-range ballistic missile
The history of Skybolt on Wiki makes for interesting reading. I did not know that Polaris came of the "Skybolt crisis".
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