I think the nuclear bomb would have been used on Berlin if am not mistaken the Enola Gay flight's over Japan was around that time as time as well ..
Still Hitler made some right belters of mistakes by attacking Russia and changing bombing tactics in the UK from airfields to Cities ..
Even though some in the Ranks questioned his mentality they dared not speak out .. if he had left it to his Military maybe things would have been very different ,.,
No point opening up a new front when the other isn't secure
Last edited by timetraveller; 12-07-2009 at 01:40 PM.
Something else to be noted is that there were many plots to kill Hitler during the war, with very high ranking officials involved. So if Hitler were to die of natural causes, Germany's next actions would likely be similar to what the conspirators had wanted.
we can monday morning quarterback it all we what for we where not there to here what is really going on with the western leaders..
Mr Churchhill did not want the soviets to go farther into germany ..after the german was in pow camps some of the higher ranking german officers felt like Patton would be the best officer to lead them back on another try at the russian army with regeared with american weapons and tanks and supplies to fight the russian army again to kick them out of germany and back to there pre war borders with germany .. for Patton was like Churchill when it came to the russian and there army for he did not trust them as far as he could see them .. in everybook i have ever read about Patton he did not trust the soviets to keep there end of the deal ..
Some friends and I were talking about this the other day. Our general consensus what that another invasion would've eventually occurred later and succeeded. An Allied incursion into occupied France was an inevitability at that point in the war, anyway.
It will depend upon just how badly the pooch was screwed at Normandy, but it is possible. The Western Allies have until September or so in 1944 to try again if they want, although getting the political momentum behind it may be difficult. (Wasn't Roosevelt up for re-election in November 1944)? There really are only 3 locations that they can land though - Normandy where the Germans are alert for a repeat, Calais where the defences are strongest and the South, where Dragoon may or may not have gone ahead (although I suspect not if Overlord was a disaster).
I think it is very doubtful that the Western Allies would have had the stomach for another landing attempt within the next year, should D-Day have failed. Especially so, if it had failed in a very desastrous manner. The subsequent loss of morals would likely have been more than just considerable.
In my opinion, the best possible ending for WWII would have happened if the Western allies had stepped down from their demand of a conditionless German surrender to all sides, and had adopted a more Realpolitik-like approach, especially with the prospect of an almighty Stalin headed Sovietunion ruling Europe in mind. If they had considered to offer Germany a merciful peace (mainly guaranteeing a souvereign German nation, various conditions regarding limitations of the armed forces and some territorial losses notwithstanding) on the condition that the NS regime abdictates, the war might, in my opinion, have ended in late summer or early autumn 1944, perhaps even through the Stauffenberg assassination attempt (in the success of which especially Roosevelt showed no interest in the real world, on the contrary). So, had a failed D-Day attempt led to this change in policy, it might even have been a good thing.
Alas, the likelihood of this happening, especially under the presidency of FDR, was next to zero. So, I suspect that without a large presence of Western Allied troops in Europe (other than those bottled up in Italy), the end of the war would have been largely a matter between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. In this scenario, the German armed forces would have had more troops available to confront Stalin's army, and they would have fought with doubled desperation since there would have been no comparatively easy way out in the west. The results would have been most likely still a victory of the Red Army (especially with the ongoing logistical support through the Western Allies), but after much more grim fighting than actually took place. Even more grim fighting, that is.
There is one joker scenario I could think of: After a defeat of the Allied D-Day effort, and with the corresponding loss of face of especially the US Army, Stalin, freed from the prospect of a race into Germany, might have (suddenly and secretly) offered Germany a separate, and comparatively merciful peace. It sounds crazy at first, but this might have been a truly farsighted gambit from the Soviet side, who would have had a chance to acquire the desired hegemony over Europe with much less fighting, and portray themselves as a merciful, and hence morally superior power while doing so - especially in light of being the "innocent victim of Nazi aggression" and an ongoing implacable stance of the Western powers against Germany, mostly symbolized by their cruel strategy of terror bombing. The idea here is Stalin's possible realisation that, one, it isn't strictly necessary to crush Germany to dominate Europe (once the Wehrmacht would have been completely or mostly demobilised, Germany, with countless Soviet armored divisions at its border, would have been pretty much in the Soviet sphere of control), and two, that it does not really matter so much that a separate peace would annoy (piss-off actually) the United States of America, because a breach and subsequent confrontation with them is essentially unavoidable. Had Germany accepted this offer (and they would have been very tempted, especially the Wehrmacht leadership) the war might also have ended sooner than it did. However, the long-term effects for Europe might have been not so good - in some respects this scenario might be the most insidious one. It is impossible to say how likely it is that Stalin would have chosen such original a path, but I do not consider it an impossibility.
A well argued set of points Katsune.
Hitler's personality was well known, and there was no way he'd enter negotiations for a separate peace agreement with the western allies. His reaction to Himmlers secret negotiations was example enough, his belief in survival of the fittest and the order to systematically destroy German infrastructure. (what was left of it)
Which leaves the only option of him being assassinated, which came very close ... a number of times. The danger here being that more competent but just as fanatical Nazi' leaders are put into power and give the wehrmacht its freedom to manoeuvre once again.
The allies had learned the lesson from WW1. There could not be a half assed solution or peace treaty. Victory must be so complete and devastating that no "stab in the back" myth could arise again.
If Overlord were to fail, I believe Ike would have tendered his resignation as HMFIC, SHAEF. Whether or not it would have been accepted is another guess. If it were not, I think Churchill's plan/desire to launch an invasion through Greece/the Balkans may have had more support and maybe even attempted as a secondary effort/feint. But the main assault would still have been southern France.
Depending on the condition of the troops pulled off the beaches and the amount of invasion craft and other equipment salvaged, I think it would be almost another 6-8 months before another landing could have been attempted, at least one of any scale. Units would have to be refilled, refitted and retrained. Logistics would have to be re-upped and a new supply plan for D+ would have to be worked out. Airborne units (if they were to be re-fitted at all, Ike did not become a fan of the ABN until AFTER their performance in Normandy) would need lift capabilities which might have been stretched thin after a Normandy debacle (Air lift plagued the original Market Garden and that was w/o a defeat.).
In the end the war would probably have lasted another year or two, but I don't think the outcome would have changed much. The campaign in the Pacific would certainly have slowed because of the "Germany 1st" strategy, but I don't know if any Marines would have been diverted as has been mentioned. If anything Army units would have been chopped from MacArthur and his campaign to re-take the Philippines would have been stalled for longer.
Hum...one issue. Shoah! With the USSR being past Ukraine in june 1944 and having discovered a part of Hitler's antics, the "moral blow" would have been non-existent.
What people do not realize is that, a good chunk of the soviet war force had a loss in their inner cercle. It was a personnal matter for them and no matter what Stalin might have thought about a machiavelian deal, that was not going to sink down well.
So...
Sorry, I disagree.Originally Posted by Kilgor
1) Hitler's personality was not at all adverse to negotiations, his problem with Himmler came solely through the fact that the "loyal Heinrich" had attempted to negotiate behind his back. Hitler was ordering the destruction of German infrastructure mainly in the East against the Soviets - and those same Soviets had done worse with their own infrastructure when the Germans had advanced into their territory. They had even destroyed crops and live stock and had left their own population to starve. As far as their own POWs in German hands were concerned, Soviet attitude was that there are no such - only traitors would led themselves taken captive. I am not at all sure that the Germans were the greatest fanatics in this war.
2) "The allies" had learned sh1t out of WWI.
3) The German dagger in the back myth is overstated, it's virtually a dagger-in-the-back-myth myth that has arisen. In fact, you see similiar dagger in the back legends arise after many wars (American Civil War, French in Algeria, Americans in Vietnam, Soviets in Afghanistan, and you will probably see something like this rise among Americans after the present engagements in Iraq/Afghanistan are over). It's simply that people tend to be devastated when they are suddenly confronted with the circumstance that all their suffering and all their sacrifices where in complete vain and the desire to explain this somehow gives rise to said myths. In any case, Hitler did not rise to power in Germany because of such a dagger in the back legend - that is a myth.
Your idea that a war is best ended by crushing the enemy, grinding him into dust and humiliating him as thoroughly as possible is profoundly wrong - that is in fact the worst way to end a war and the best seed for the next one. Even if not it usually leaves a people traumatized for generations - usually with bad side-effects. It has worked in Germany's case mainly because of shame due to the Holocaust, and because the Germans themselves are a rather well natured people with an unusally strong wish to behave morally. But even if your theory would be true, it would be still no excuse for crushing one of Europes great peoples and dividing up the continent with the utterly immoral Stalin led Sovietunion, a state, whose toralitarism and militarism were second to none, and whose agressive behaviour (Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia Lithuania, Moldovia were its victims before the German invasion, remember?) was obvious and played a role in bringing the whole gargantuan armed conflict known as the European part of WWII about in the first place.
@KoTeMoRe:
The whole idea with Stalin's "machiavelian deal" (as you put it) was just an idea, of course, and perhaps not even a very probable one. But I came to realize that history is full of surprises and both Hitler and Stalin were occasionally good for something like that. As far as your apparent suspicion is concerned that Stalin could not have dared to start negotiations with Germany, even if he had wanted to, because doing so would have pissed off Chukov at al...I don't know. Usually he had the Sovietunion, Red Army and all pretty well in his grasp. True, his iron hold may have waned over the war years, but still I doubt that he really had to live in fear. I would suspect that his inner circle may have grumbled over such a decision (outside of Stalins hearing distance), but would not have failed to obey.