Protests in Syria - Discussion Thread

[EITAN88]

Unconfirmed reports of rocket fire in the Daraa Governorate.


Indeed it seems that as soon as Assad manages to put out a "fire", another two suddenly appear... he probably doesn't have the adequate amount of forces to quell them all at once.

[IconOfEvi]

Taking Aleppo is a smart move...of course, the problem would be in the end finding volunteers who will go in to maintain the fight in the meat grinder. Assad has to commit forces well out of proportion to the FSA if he wants to merely break even on the siege of the city. Aleppo is damned huge, and very urban. Short of house to house fighting or incendiary/chemical weapons, he won't win. More RPGs and MANPADS are getting to the FSA it seems, finally. Combined with IEDs, taking armor into the city is nearly a death sentence.

The FSA could use work on a lot of its tactics too though. Currently, they don't seem to be trying to capture armor, rather they're more content to destroy it and then dance on the remains. As also mentioned earlier, they dont use one of their greatest advantages - night - at all. Most of Assad's army isn't active at night, as as far as I know, they have little to no night vision equipment. The ring around Aleppo isn't very deep nor shored up - little skirmisher units of some pickups could easily sneak isolated artillery batteries. Another issue I have is they're not really going after airbases or motor pools. Even destroying Fitters and Fencers on the ground would do a lot of good for them...especially considering if they hit bases, then Assad will have to divert even MORE units. Probably an ever better coup would be destroying helicopters, esp the transport Hips.

The defections already hit Assad's army very hard. The FSA should know they must exploit this by trying to take as much ground as possible, while denying supplies and mobility to Assad. If I was them, I'd try to get as many of the MANPAD guys sneaking along country routes, waiting for transport helos to pass over. They dont do much good just having one or two in a couple blocks on an aircraft already on the attack mission. Though one of you brought up an interesting point about training camps in Turkey...we could be seeing much more 'professional' FSA troops start to filter in soon. Then Assad would be really ****ed. But as said, his goal is Lakatia.

[ISNJH]

Hizbollah has had a presence in Syria since before the uprising (Hizbollah SCUD units).

The main factor in a preemptive Israeli strike is whether Assad is going to let those SCUDs cross into Lebanon.

Yes I know Hezbollah has had a presence in Syria from the beginning but the fact that they are now having to take an active part in fighting to backup Assad shows that the government no longer has the strength to fight the opposition on its own and Hezbollah is forced now to play their hand..

Also by finally coming fully outright in fighting against the FSA should Assad's government fall and a new government come into power I expect the new government will want to take revenge against Hezbollah and offer help to Lebanon in taking on Hezbollah and disarming it which could see a massive flare up in Lebanon in next few years..

[EITAN88]

Yes I know Hezbollah has had a presence in Syria from the beginning but the fact that they are now having to take an active part in fighting to backup Assad shows that the government no longer has the strength to fight the opposition on its own and Hezbollah is forced now to play their hand..

Also by finally coming fully outright in fighting against the FSA should Assad's government fall and a new government come into power I expect the new government will want to take revenge against Hezbollah and offer help to Lebanon in taking on Hezbollah and disarming it which could see a massive flare up in Lebanon in next few years..

Hizbollah knows very well that any Sunni dominated regime that might rise in Syria is very unlikely to be friendly to them and to their patrons in Teheran.

That's why Hizbollah is backing Assad 100% in words and actions... simply no other choice as far as they are concerned.

I'm rather surprised Lebanon hasn't already followed Syria but it's only a matter of time I think.

[kalerab]

In Lebanon, unlike in Syria, no one wants war. Not Hariri, not Nasrallah, not Berri, not Aoun, no one. As long as they manage to keep their areas of influence at least partially calm they will, hopefully, avoid armed confrontation. But Nasrallah cut off from his supply lifeline may do very stupid thing. Just like in 2008 when cretin nearly started another civil war.

[EITAN88]

In Lebanon, unlike in Syria, no one wants war. Not Hariri, not Nasrallah, not Berri, not Aoun, no one. As long as they manage to keep their areas of influence at least partially calm they will, hopefully, avoid armed confrontation. But Nasrallah cut off from his supply lifeline may do very stupid thing. Just like in 2008 when cretin nearly started another civil war.

As you yourself admit, it's not always a question of 'wanting'.

[kalerab]

SYRIA: GUESTS OF THE WARLORD

Abu Ibrahim is a big bear of a man in his early forties. He wears flip-flops and a T-shirt and tracksuit pants, and shuffles because of a sniper bullet in his left leg, fired by Syrian government forces; another bullet went through his right foot not long ago, and his face is scarred from an explosion caused when an assailant tried to kill him with a grenade. He keeps a pistol tucked into the waistband of his tracksuit pants. His men are loyal and watchful and one of them never leaves his side. He told me that he used to be a “fruit merchant.” Now, Abu Ibrahim is one of the chieftains of the war in Syria’s strategic northern Aleppo province, where a decisive military confrontation seems to be beginning.
Recently, I was introduced to Abu Ibrahim by a Syrian friend who lives near Azaz, a town located amidst olive and pistachio orchards about two miles from the Turkish border and a dozen miles north of the city of Aleppo, which Abu Ibrahim rules, in loose coördination with two other rebel leaders, each with their own contingent of fighters and political inclinations. Last week, the rebels wrested Azaz from Army control in a fierce and prolonged battle. A swathe of shot-up and destroyed buildings, with a few incinerated tanks, runs through the town—a sad spectacle, mostly deserted of civilians. A tenuous calm reigns.
In what used to be the town’s ruling Baath party headquarters, Abu Ibrahim, a shy man who until now has attempted to avoid the limelight, spoke of his concerns about other rebel leaders who were trying to steer Syria’s revolution towards extremism—and of his own preference for political moderation and openness. To drive his point home, he said, smilingly, that he hoped one day to visit the United States; that he wanted a “real democracy” in Syria; and that he would even agree to diplomatic relations with Israel—“as long as they return the Golan Heights.”

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...#ixzz21y7uhGBs

I doubt he will be popular with that opinion.

[Bloo]

Activists say army pounds opposition-held areas with heavy artillery, as rebels make gains in countryside.

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middle...325133518.html

Assad moves out of countryside into the cities, FSA makes gains in countryside. Assad moves from cities into countryside, FSA makes gains in cities. A dilemma for regime loyalists it seems.

[StateMachine]

In Lebanon, unlike in Syria, no one wants war. Not Hariri, not Nasrallah, not Berri, not Aoun, no one. As long as they manage to keep their areas of influence at least partially calm they will, hopefully, avoid armed confrontation. But Nasrallah cut off from his supply lifeline may do very stupid thing. Just like in 2008 when cretin nearly started another civil war.

Wasn't it the Siniora gov that tried to start that war when they decided to go uproot the Hezbollah's secure communications network?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_conflict_in_Lebanon

[ISNJH]

Also with Hezbolla being drawn into open conflict and crossing the border into Syria with weapons it means they are drawing on their supplies of weapons inside Lebanon and if they loose in Syria those weapons and munitions are not going to be easy to replace with no longer a friendly government to act as a channel of weapons and supplies from Iran.. thus Hezbolla will be weakened further by this conflict esp if they send their best fighters into Syria.

[kalerab]

Wasn't it the Siniora gov that tried to start that war when they decided to go uproot the Hezbollah's secure communications network?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_conflict_in_Lebanon

Are you really trying to say that removal of illegal communication network is the same as bringing militias to Beirut and mt. Lebanon who shoots at anything that moves?

[IconOfEvi]

Wasn't it the Siniora gov that tried to start that war when they decided to go uproot the Hezbollah's secure communications network?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2008_conflict_in_Lebanon

The problem with this is now explain what law allowed Hez to have its own military and secure network across a sovereign nation's territory...

[m4rs75]

More data about the Syrian forces:

Syrian Army

MBT: 4.950

1.500-1.700 T-72/T-72M;

1.000 T-62K/T-62M;

2.250 T-55/T-55MV (some in store)

RECCE: 590 BRDM-2

AIFV: up to 2.450 BMP-1/BMP-2/BMP-3

APC (W): 1.500

500 BTR-152;

1.000 BTR-50/BTR-60/BTR-70

ARTY: up to 3.440+

SP: 500+

122mm: 450+

400 2S1 Carnation (Gvosdik);

50+ D-30 (mounted on T34/85 chassis);

152mm: 50 2S3 (Akatsiya)

TOWED: 2.030

122mm: 1.150

500 D-30;

150 (M-30) M1938;

500 in store (no given designation);

130mm: 700-800 M-46;

152mm: 70 D-20/ML-20 M1937;

180mm: 10 S23

MRL: up to 500

107mm: up to 200 Type-63;

122mm: up to 300 BM-21 (Grad)

MOR: 410+

82mm;

120mm: circa 400 M-1943;

160mm: M-160 (hundreds);

240mm: up to 10 M-240

AT:

MSL: 2.600

SP: 410 9P133 BRDM-2 Sagger

MANPATS: 2.190+

150 AT-4 9K111 Spigot;

40 AT-5 9K113 Spandrel;

AT-7 9K115 Saxhorn;

800 AT-10 9K116 Stabber;

1.000 AT-14 9M133 Kornet;

200 Milan

RL:

73mm: RPG-7 Knout;

105mm: RPG-29

AD:

SAM: 4.184+

SP: 84

14 SA-8 Gecko;

20 SA-9 Gaskin;

20 SA-11 Gadfly;

30 SA-13 Gopher

MANPAD: 4.100+

4.000+ SA-7 Grail/SA-18 Grouse (Igla);

100 SA-14 Gremlin

GUNS: 1.225+

SP: ZSU-23-4

TOWED:

23mm: 600 ZU-23;

37mm: M-1939;

57mm: 600 S-60;

100mm: 25 KS-19

MSL:

TACTICAL:

SSM: 94+

18 Scud-B/Scud-C/Scud-D;

30 look-a-like;

18 FROG-7;

18+ SS-21 Tochka (Scarab);

4 SS-C-1B Sepal;

6 SS-C-3 Styx

(ε850 SSM msl total)

Syrian Navy

FRIGATES: 2 Petya III each with 1 triple 533mm ASTT (3 eff.) with SAET-60 HWT, 4 RBU 2500 Smerch 1 (64 eff.)†, 2 76mm twin gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS: 21

PFM: 10 Osa I/II each with 4 single each with 1 SS-N-2C Styx tactical SSM

PFI: 11

8 Zhuk less than 100 tonnes;

ε3 Tir each with 2 single with C-802 (CSS-N-8) Saccade tactical SSM

MINE COUNTERMEASURES: 5

MSC: 1 Natya;

MSI: 3 Yevgenya;

MSO: 1 T-43 (FSU)

AMPHIBIOUS LSM: 3 Polnochny B (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT: 3

2 AGOR;
1 TRG

HELICOPTER: 13 atk hel

ASW: 13

2 Ka-28 (Ka-27PL) Helix A (air force manpower);
11 Mi-14 Haze

Syrian Air Force

AIRCRAFT: 555 combat capable

FTR: 150+

40+ MiG-29A Fulcrum;

30 MiG-25 Foxbat;

80 MiG-23MLD Flogger

FGA: 289

20 Su-24 Fencer;
60 MiG-23BN Flogger H;

159 MiG-21H;
50 Su-22 (Su-17M-2) Fitter D

RECCE: 48

8 MiG-25R Foxbat;

40 MiG-21 H/J

TPT: 22

1 An-24 Coke;

6 An-26 Curl;

2 Falcon 20;

1 Falcon 900;

4 Il-76 Candid;

2 PA-31 Navajo;

6 Yak-40 Codling

TRG: 139

70 L-39 Albatros (40 armed);

35 MBB-223 Flamingo (basic);

6 MFI-17 Mushshak;

20 MiG-21U Mongol A;

6 MiG-23UM;

2 MiG-25U Foxbat

HELICOPTER:

ATK: 71

36 Mi-25 Hind D;

35 SA-342L Gazelle

SPT: 120

100 Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) Hip H/Mi-8 Hip;

20 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

MSL:

ASM: AS-7 Kerry; HOT

AAM: AA-10 Alamo; AA-2 Atoll; AA-6 Acrid; AA-7 Apex; AA-8 Aphid

Syrian Air Defence Command

AD:

SAM: 4.707

SP: 195 SA-6 Gainful

TOWED: 468

320 SA-2 Guideline;

148 SA-3 Goa

STATIC/SHELTER: 44 SA-5 Gammon

MANPAD: 4.000 SA-7A Grail/SA-7B Grail

Some data about the Syrian forces:

Syrian Army

Active: 220.000 (incl conscripts)

3 Corps HQ

Armd: 7 div (each: 3 armd; 1 mech; 1 arty bde)

Tk: 1 indep regt

Mech: 3 div (under strength) (each: 1 armd, 2 mech, 1 arty bde)

Inf: 4 indep bde

SF: 1 div (10 SF gp)

Arty: 2 indep bde

AT: 2 indep bde

SSM: 1 (Coastal Def) bde with SS-C-1B Sepal and SS-C-3 Styx; 1 bde (3 SSM bn with FROG-7); 1 bde (3 SSM bn with SS-21); 1 bde (3 SSM bn with Scud-B/-C)

Border Guard: 1 indep bde

Security: 1 div (Republican Guard) (3 armd, 1 mech, 1 arty bde)

Reserve: 280.000

Armd: 1 div HQ; 4 bde; 2 regt

Inf: 31 regt

Arty: 3 regt

Conscription: 30 months

Syrian Navy

Active: 5.000; Reserve: 4.000

Bases: Latakia, Tartus, Minet el-Baida

Syrian Air Force

Active: 30.000; Reserve: 10.000

Ftr: 4 sqn with MiG-25 Foxbat; 4 sqn with MiG-23 MLD Flogger; 3 sqn with MiG-29A Fulcrum A

FGA: 2 sqn with MiG-23BN Flogger H; 1 sqn with Su-24 Fencer; 5 sqn with Su-22 (Su-17M-2) Fitter D; 7 sqn with MiG-21 Fishbed

Recce: 4 sqn with MiG-21H Fishbed/MiG-21J Fishbed; MiG-25R Foxbat

Tpt: sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Falcon 20; Falcon 900; Il-76 Candid; Yak-40 Codling; Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) Hip H/Mi-8 Hip; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

Atk hel: 3 sqns with Mi-25 Hind D; SA-342L Gazelle

Trg: PA-31 Navajo; L-39 Albatros; MBB-223 Flamingo (basic); MFI-17 Mushshak; MiG-21U Mongol A; MiG-23UM; MiG-25U Foxbat

Flying hours: 15 to 25 hrs/year on FGA/ftr; 70 hrs/year; 50 hrs/year on MBB-223 Flamingo trg ac

Syrian Air Defence Command

Active: 40.000; Reserve: 20.000

AD: 2 div (total: 25 AD bde (total: 150 SAM bty with total of 148 SA-3 Goa; 195 SA-6 Gainful; 320 SA-2 Guideline, some ADA bty with total of 4.000 SA-7A Grail/SA-7B Grail))

SAM: 2 regt (each: 2 SAM bn (each: 2 SAM bty with total of 44 SA-5 Gammon))

Paramilitary

Gendarmerie: 8.000

Ministry of Interior

Workers’ Militia: ε100.000

People’s Army (Ba’ath Party)

[m4rs75]

Libya rebels move onto Syrian battlefield
By Jomana Karadsheh, CNN
July 28, 2012

Tripoli, Libya (CNN) -- Their war for freedom in Libya may be over, but almost a year after they won the battle for the Libyan capital, a group of fighters have a new battlefield: Syria.

Under the command of one of Libya's most well known rebel commanders, Al-Mahdi al-Harati, more than 30 Libyan fighters have made their way into Syria to support the Free Syrian Army rebels in their war against President Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Al-Harati, who commanded the Tripoli Revolutionary brigade -- which was the first group of rebels to enter the Libyan capital last August -- has been in Syria for months leading some of his former men and Syrian military defectors who have joined his "Liwaa al-Umma" or "The Banner of the Nation" brigade.

Recent YouTube videos show at least two different Syrian rebel factions announcing that they are part of the Liwa al-Umma.

http://edition.cnn.com/2012/07/28/wo...ers/index.html

[Genotype]

Very informative video interview, via Skype with Luke Harding (Guardian journalist) first hand from the Aleppo frontline:

What struck me is how close the opposition and Free Syrian Army and the government positions are. They were really about 1.5km apart from each other. I was with the FSA in their forward post in a place called Anadan. and we sort of climbed, not exactly to the roof because there were snipers, but we climbed to the sort of second storey and peered out through binoculars and we could see two tanks in the afternoon haze. There was a big military base ahead. And the building itself had been used by the regime until about a month ago, when the Free Syrian army swept into town and drove them out. It was a rather hilarious sort of Italian-style Villa. Mortars had taken great chunks out of the balustrading, and there was a swimming pool around the back which was untouched.

The Syrian regime haven't given in, they've got tanks, they've reinforced their positions inside Aleppo, they have helicopter gunships which you see in the sky above the city every single day flying missions. And yet the rebels are surprisingly confident, they think they're winning. They've only got light arms but we've seen in recent weeks, not only did they manage to blow up four members of Bashar Al-Assad's military security command in Damascus, they've also been increasingly effective. And what they've been doing is rather cleverly is targeting the army's supply chains, blowing up fuel tankers and trucks carrying provisions, trying to degrade the army. I talked to one commander over the weekend and I said "How can you possibly win in these circumstances?". He said "the army is like a sick man, it's dying from inside", "they're getting an injection in the arm from Russia, but the patient is dying". And what you have to understand about Syria and this uprising is that much of the country, I wouldn't say all and most social groups, again not all, it enjoys broad popular support. From intellectuals, I met some students from Aleppo university who are also fighting now, they've joined the free Syrian army, and from ordinary guys, painters, decorators and so on. They basically hate the regime and they're not thinking about future agendas, they just want to bring Bashar Al-Assad down. My sense is eventually they will, though not in weeks probably but months, I really think they will prevail.

On the oft-raised issue of sectarianism:

Bashar al-Assad is saying to his sort of core Alawite base this is almost like a Rwanda moment. You have to fight with the regime because otherwise the Sunnis will take over and kill you all and I think it's certainly true to a degree that the Alawi comunity has coalesced around this idea, that this has been a sort of existential struggle for them. Having said that I met a fascinating Alawite activist who joined the revolution from Latakia, which is in Assad's homeland. He said: 'Actually in Latakia half of the population there don't support the regime, they're against the regime.' There are a lot of Alawite activists who have opposed this regime and suffered for it so the picture is complex. The wider aspect of this is the Free Syrian Army ...is almost a sort of peasant army if you like, people from the countryside, people from the cities too, middle classes too but there is bourgeoise, people who have profited from the regime, who are happy with the status quo, who don't like the fighting, are not especially enamoured with the revolution. The picture is delicate but the overwhelming sense among most Syrians certainly, certainly 70 or 80% is they want this regime to go.

On the Syrian National Council's proposal for a transitional government:

In Syria no one is really talking about post-Assad scenarios, no one is talking about what sort of transitional government there might be. I mean this is being done in Washington and other kind of Salons. Here it's more basic, people are trying to stay alive, people are fighting, dying ...the regime's still here, it hasn't gone. At the moment there's one great task that's uniting the opposition here and that's to bring down the army, to bring down Bashar al-Assad and I think until that happens it's sort of speculative. But having said that, a lot of people do say 'we want a civil government'. I mean they are really fed up with this idea that this is somehow an Islamist revolution that they are terrorists, that the opposition here are linked to al-Qaida. They say that that is just not true, it's nonsense. They want a civilian revolution as they put it and a civilian government but what shape that government might be at this stage, who knows.

Full interview here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature...&v=blFJpYNL9EI