Russian military cuts back on fule over price
MOSCOW, August 1 (RIA Novosti)
The Russian Armed Forces have to reduce the consumption of fuel and lubricants due to rising prices, Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Dmitry Bulgakov said on Monday.
Diesel fuel prices increased 50% and gasoline prices were up 30% since the fall of 2010, he said.
The military has procured enough fuel and lubricants for 2011 but because spending was higher than planned, the ministry will impose consumption quotas and conserve fuel and lubricants "wherever possible," the general said.
In particular, the number of standalone heating plants will be reduced, including by outsourcing them to commercial defense service contractors.
The savings will be used to compensate for rising fuel and lubricant prices.
That's a general problem and concerns economy in general, not specifically the military. Due to the way how export tariffs work in Russia, they are often completely divorced from the market situation. So when the prices are high and tariffs are low, oil companies export whatever they can -- which, unsurprisingly, leads to the fuel shortages and rising prices.
Given that the domestic price is high (e.g. US levels) this fetish of the producers to ship everything abroad is a psychological disorder and not market conditions. Russia seems to be afflicted with parasite oligarch traitors who try to sell it down the river day in and day out. Like "dissident martyr" oligarch Khodorkovsky. Your claim about the tariffs being decoupled from market conditions is a crock, they are adjusted monthly based on world oil prices. There is a lag but not some draconian abuse of virgin market innocents like you try to make it sound.Originally Posted by Khathi
Well, about stupid avarice of fat-cat capitalists trying to line their pockets as if there's no tomorrow I couldn't agree with you more. But nevertheless there should be some other mechanism -- maybe not economic, but socio-political -- that forces big businesses to export like crazy ignoring huge domestic demand.
Fuel prices are a huge issue for everyone these days, even the US Navy.
Read here for some interesting US DOD analysis and report on their current fuel/lubricants funding deficit: http://www.informationdissemination....questions.html
Austin, you might be interested in that link as well. There is excerpts from the US Navy alternative propulsion study there. Remember our discussion of nuclear-powered destroyers and whether they would be more or less economical on a Total Cost of Ownership basis? The link will have interesting numbers for you.
In constant FY2007 dollars, building a Navy surface combatant or amphibious ship with nuclear power rather than conventional power would add roughly $600 million to $800 million to its procurement cost.
For a small surface combatant, the procurement-cost increase was about $600 million.
For a medium-size combatant (defined as a ship with a displacement between 21,000 metric tons and 26,000 metric tons), the increase was about $600 million to about $700 million.
For an amphibious ship, the increase was about $800 million.TL;DR Oil prices would have to average $210-670 per barrel over the next 30 years for a nuclear-powered destroyer to be economical.Although nuclear-powered ships have higher procurement costs than conventionally powered ships, they have lower operating and support costs when fuel costs are taken into account.
A ship’s operational tempo and resulting level of energy use significantly influences the life-cycle cost break-even analysis. The higher the operational tempo and resulting level of energy use assumed for the ship, lower the cost of crude oil needed to break even on a life-cycle cost basis, and the more competitive nuclear power becomes in terms of total life-cycle cost.
The newly calculated life-cycle cost break-even cost-ranges, which supercede the break-even cost figures from the 2005 NR quick look analysis, are as follows:
- $210 per barrel to $670 per barrel for a small surface combatant;
- $70 per barrel to $225 per barrel for a medium-size surface combatant; and
- $210 per barrel to $290 per barrel for an amphibious ship. In each case, the
- lower dollar figure is for a high ship operating tempo, and the higher dollar figure is for a low ship operating tempo.
The life-cycle cost break-even analysis indicates that nuclear-power should be considered for near-term applications for medium-size surface combatants, and that life-cycle cost will not drive the selection of nuclear power for small surface combatants or amphibious ships. A nuclear-powered medium-size surface combatant is the most likely of the three ship types studied to prove economical, depending on the operating tempo that the ship actually experiences over its lifetime.
Some numbers on equipment procurement
http://www.interfax.ru/news.asp?id=201551
http://www.itartass-sib.ru/index.php...=45436-37.htmlRussian troops will recieve total of 120 tactical complexes "Iskander" said Deputy Defense Minister of Russia, Army General Dmitry Bulgakov.
"In 2010, the Armed Forces purchased six " Iskander''s", - said Bulgakov. Purchase of short-range missiles will be carried out within the state armaments program for 2011-2020, funding for which will be about 20 trillion rubles.
In addition to the "Iskander", according to Bulgakov, the Russian armed forces will receive 180 launchers for anti-missile system "Cornet", intended for use on military vehicles. "Purchased in 2010, 18 launchers, 13 combat vehicles. It is planned to procure up to 180 launchers and 360 vehicles" - said Bulgakov. In addition, in 2010, Russia purchased 36 152-millimeter self-propelled howitzers "MSTA-S", and there are plans to adopt another 574 such guns.
MOSCOW, August 1. / ITAR-TASS /. This year, two separate motorized rifle brigade of the Army of the Russian Federation will recieve more than 210 new and upgraded BTR-82A. This was reported by ITAR-TASS Russian Deputy Defense Minister, Army General Dmitry Bulgakov in occasion of the Day today Rear of the Armed Forces.
"In 2011, plan to get 83 new units and 134 modernized units of BTR-82A models, which will requip two motorized infantry brigades," - he said. "The machine is equipped with 30-mm cannon with stabilizer" - added the official.
He also said that this year troops will recieve about 9000 trucks. "In 2011, the planned supply of cars KAMAZ family - 795 units, Ural - 2000 units. In addition, the chairman of the Russian government decided to purchase more in 2011 and 2,000 units of Urals and 4,000 units of KAMAZ", - said General Bulgakov.
Can anyone please clarify for me what is happening with Zhukovsky fly center? This has been a hot topic lately generating a lot of dissatisfaction online.
Is Zhukovka being scrapped? where is the flight school being moved if it isn't. (also heard that most of the staff refuses to dislocate)
will this mean that VVS will only have one fly training center after this?
I really have very limited knowledge on the topic and would like to know from someone more knowledgeable.
Nice find indeed , that would make sense why the new Destroyer will be Nuclear powered as Life Cycle Cost of such capital ships would turn out to be cheaper.
Well one can argue the fossil fuel power Mistral is an expensive baby to operate
My thinking on fuel and life cycle cost for Russian Navy is they should work on two approaches Gas Trubine Engine/Propulsion and Nuclear Power.
Since Gas is an abundant commodity available with Russia smaller ships like Corvette/Frigate/Missile Boats can be powered by GT engine and bigger ships like Destroyer , LPD,Aircraft carrier be nuclear powered.
Other promising technology for conventional submarines like Tea-Kettle Reactor that can power small conventional submarines.
Did you misunderstand what I quoted?
A frigate/destroyer/cruiser with nuclear propulsion will be MORE EXPENSIVE to build and operate than a frigate/destroyer/cruiser with conventional propulsion.
A nuclear-propulsion destroyer will break-even with a conventional destroyer ONLY if oil prices stay above $210 per barrel over the entire life of the ship (and only at high deployment tempo, which the Russian Navy can't sustain anyway).
Isnt it the case that oil prices have doubled or even tripled since 2000 ? The chances are in the next 10 to 15 years the prices will just rise.
There is another aspect to it , conventional fuel powered ships needs to be fueled or be accompanied by a tanker when on long range mission , this would further get aggravated during crises when port visit may not be possible and not an option , hence the battle group of ships is as fast as the slowest ship in the armada , nuclear propulsion scores well on those tactical front besides the growing price of fuel.
Anyway, there's already a tacit assumption that the new destroyer (I love current classification that calls cruisers "destroyers"), the rumored "project 21956", would be nuclear (or, at least, Trotsenko wants them to be that). Yes, that'd probably would be costlier, but it would greatly simplify logistics and would allow the Navy to save on oilers. Remember all recent long-distance voyages -- there's always a fleet oiler in the group, which also have considerable cost to outfit and operate.
The Russian Navy: Not what to do but how to do it.
Konstantin Bogdanov, commentator with the Military-Industrial Courier, for RIA Novosti
Military analysts have mixed feelings on Navy Day in Russia. True, the Navy is doing better than before, but not as well as we'd like. And we haven't even scratched the surface of a host of systemic naval problems.
Meanwhile, new stories on the Navy abound. Not all of them are good, but some are worth discussing. Let's start with the most important and obvious issue.
Ocean fleet mirages
At last year's International Maritime Defense Show in St. Petersburg, Roman Trotsenko, president of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), told journalists that design work on Russia's new nuclear-powered aircraft carrier will begin in 2016. Construction could be completed by 2023.
Trotsenko said Russia is also going to build nuclear-powered destroyers. In fact, these are missile-equipped escort cruisers for an air capable strike group. Commissioning such ships can drastically change the image of the Russian fleet by turning it into a genuine ocean-faring force.
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov reacted calmly to this characterization, noting that Russia is conducting R&D on the new aircraft carrier and finding a place for it in the fleet but will not make a decision on construction before this initial phase is complete. Moreover, decisions on such issues are the prerogative of the country's top political leadership.
He said the state armaments program through 2020 does not provide for the construction of any aircraft carriers. This is perfectly understandable, because without modernizing Sevmash in Severodvinsk or building new dockyards on the Baltic (on the island of Kotlin, according to USC's plans) such projects are absolutely pointless.
It's fun to fantasize about nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, but they won't be enough to modernize squadrons. It would be much more realistic to build more of the ships that form the backbone of the Navy.
For example, there are the Project 22350 frigates, or the Admiral Gorshkov and its sister ship Admiral Kasatonov frigates. Construction of these ships has delayed again and again. These are strong but expensive ships. If our industry makes the necessary effort and receives regular funding, it could build 10 ships of this class, but this would all but exhaust the ship builders' capacity.
There are also less expensive alternatives to the Gorshkov - Project 11356M patrol ships, the younger brothers of the Indian frigates ordered in Russia. The Admiral Grigorovich is under construction. The Admiral Essen has been laid recently and another four similar ships are expected to be laid before the fall of 2012. Their purchase by the Russian fleet is more like a partial solution, but there doesn't seem to be an alternative - otherwise it will be impossible to increase the number of ships of this class.
There are also last-minute Project 20380 corvettes that incorporate cutting-edge stealth elements that significantly reduces its radar signature. The Steregushchy class ships are multi-role but their main mission is to protect territorial waters and economic interest zones, and to escort other ships.
All-purpose ships
It seems that the Navy is finally overcoming the Soviet-era incompatibility of weapon systems, when each project was armed and equipped anew. The new logic has produced the so-called UKSK - the multipurpose shipboard firing system. This is a modular weapon system designed to counter anti-ship and anti-submarine missiles as well as cruise missiles guided to surface targets. All these three types are part of the multi-purpose Kalibr system that may also be installed on submarines. A supersonic anti-ship cruise missile Onix will also become part of UKSK. Our designers and their Indian colleagues are developing the BrahMos missile on the basis of its export version Yakhont. Its perspective universal launchers may be equipped with air defense missiles.
Missile standardization is a smart tactical and economic measure. It will not only enhance the combat efficiency of the Navy but will also help the Defense Ministry to save considerable money on purchases, while the industry will be able to concentrate on standardized solutions.
Above and under water
The submarine fleet is in a difficult position. Construction of new Project 955 Borei ballistic missile submarines, equipped with the notorious Bulava missile, requires an enormous effort. Little progress has been made in decision-making on the building of the new generation Project 885 Yasen class nuclear-powered attack submarines after the commissioning of the Severodvinsk submarines.
There is no discussion of the designing and construction of the light and inexpensive nuclear-powered hunter to succeed the current submarines of the Projects 671RTM (K), 945 and 971, which are not going to last forever. It would be wrong to think that heavily armed Yasens will replace light hunters. It is impossible to build many submarines of this class because they are expensive and they won't cover all the gaps in our long submarine "fronts."
It is not quite clear what will happen with the Navy's air fleet. The Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, a menace to NATO squadrons, are being gradually phased out. Su-24 bombers will also become obsolete before long. Reports appeared about two weeks ago that the Navy may buy from the Irkut Corporation 12 heavy Su-30SM fighters equipped with Yakhont missiles to replace Su-24s. Regrettably, this is all the good news there is about the Navy's air fleet for now.
The need to face reality
Ship builders' Napoleonic plans are sometimes greatly at odd with how the defense order is carried out.
Indeed, Sevmash built the first Project 885 Severodvinsk submarine from the reserves of the 1990s. The budget paid 47 billion rubles for it at 2005 prices. According to Serdyukov, Sevmash fixed the price of 112 billion rubles for the next submarine of this class without batting an eyelid. There are serious problems with funding the purchase of submarine weapons - during public debates with Yury Solomonov, general designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering, Serdyukov complained about the growing prices of Bulava submarines.
There are also criminal cases. The recent embezzlement of funds allocated for the repairs of the Pyotr Veliky nuclear-powered cruiser has only emphasized the scale of the disorder that has been growing for years in shipbuilding and all the neglected naval repairs.
Nevertheless, Russia has already made some sensible decisions on upgrading its fleet. Suffice it to mention the cautious approach to new heavy warships, the rapid construction of medium-class ships for the Russian Navy on the basis of worked-out export projects and the long-awaited unification of naval armaments.
It seems that the Navy's leadership understands what needs to be done. Now it will have to decide how to do it. It should start by adjusting the defense order system so as to make pricing transparent and to guarantee strict quality control for supplied arms and equipment.
The views expressed in this article are the author's and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Congrats to rav Bogdaner for being Captain Obvious here.
There is a big problem with the whole "less conventional propulsion => less oilers" argument. As soon as cut down on the number of resupply ships, the cost of the remaining oilers/tenders rises exponentially. Small series = huge per unit cost.
And two things:
- Project 21956 is an export ship. It has a bunch of legacy system (like Rif-M, Fregat-MAE). That ship isn't going to be the new destroyer, I guarantee that. 8)
- If Americans can call a 14500 ton ship a "destroyer" and put it under a command of a Commander (O-5), then anything is possible.
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