Here's a pretty nice interview with the head of the VDV:
Good discussion about how the reforms are going and the current state of affairs in our desantura.
Think of all the Mi-8 variants we're getting every year, ansat u, the new tender for light helis, mi-26, mi-28, ka-60, ka-52, ka-226 and some naval ka's
As for planes:
Bout 130 Su-34's already, planning about 200-250 if I remember correctly
The new Il-76 variant, we're getting a bit more than 100 of those
Of course the 150ish Pak Fa's
the Yak-130's bout 70 if I recall
Su 35's and (hopefully) Mig-35's should add another 100 or so.
That adds up pretty quickly.
And that estimate is with my sucky data and I've not included every planned purchase.
Also it says procure, so I assume deliveries will stretch into 2022-2023.
Guys with more time and accurate data feel free to correct
Here's a pretty nice interview with the head of the VDV:
Good discussion about how the reforms are going and the current state of affairs in our desantura.
As they already easily produce over 100 helicopters a year for Russia alone (Mi-8MTV-5, Mi-8AMTSh, and in the future Mi-383 and maybe Mi-46; Mi-26T2, Ka-226, Ansat, Ka-52, Mi-28N, Mi-28NM, maybe Ka-60, then there's also the Ka-52K and Ka-29 for the Mistral (though I hope they replace the Ka-29 with a proper, modern and usable transport helicopter, like the Ka-60 or a naval Mi-17V5/Mi-383 -edit: scratch that, looks like they already have a replacement in mind, the Ka-65, look here on the right, the second one under the Mi-383. About the size of a stretched-cabin Ka-60 and Ka-29, with a coax-rotor, and with much better and more useful accessibility than the Ka-29, like a mini Mi-383/improved Ka-60 with coax-rotor)) they will easily reach the number of 1000-1100 new helicopters in 10 years.
And reaching the number of new airplanes won't pose a problem either, as there are plenty of orders:
The 124 Su-34, 48 Su-35S, 24 Mig-29K, 18 Su-30SM that are ordered for now already make a confirmed 214 new aircraft.
And if they exercise a follow up order (as was announced as optional at the original deals) on the Su-35S (48 more) and the Su-30SM (another 18, for the Navy), that would bring the total number up to 280.
Then there's also (everything newly built, I'm only counting new planes here) 4 Su-30M2, 12 Su-27SM3, 10 An-140, 7 Let-L410, 67 (12+55) Yak-130 (just until 2015), 38 Il-476 (with probably more to come, they said they had a requirement for over 100, as well as that they will probably also launch production of An-70s and An-124s, but I will not count them here as there are no orders yet). So the firm orders in this second list are, for now: 138.
With potential for 55 (or even more) more Yak-130s after 2015, and 38-76 (for 2 or 3 batches of 38, or a total of 76-114, if the batch size of 38 has any meaning in their structure, which would also coincide with the "more than 100" statement) more Il-476, which would mean 93-131 new aircraft from 2015-2020 in Yak-130s and Il-476s alone.
So that is a confirmed 352 orders as of today, just on the types I remember being ordered, and a potential for a total of 511-549 new airplanes until 2020 in just the ones I mentioned above (follow up orders of the same size for the Su-35S, Su-30SM, Yak-130 and Il-476 for the 2015-2020 timeframe).
Then there's also the PAK-FA that they will probably order an initial batch of (they can easily get even 48-60 if serial production starts in 2016 and they produce 12 a year (2016,17,18,19(,20) = 4(5) years), maybe some additional (not mentioned above) Su-30SMs or Mig-29Ms for the Air Force...or a few other smaller (Il-214, An-140) or bigger (An-70, An-124) transport aircraft...who knows what kind of orders the next 5 years will bring. I also read something about new Su-25SMs or new Yak-130 attack variants, but I won't count that for now, as long as there are no firm orders.
But as you can see, the number of 600 new airplanes is very easy to reach until 2020, as it is already well over half by now. And just following up on the same orders would already bring the number over 500.
Last edited by Hyde; 03-01-2012 at 11:52 PM.
Sweet Hyde, thanks for the data. It does indeed seem that if we keep going like this (fingers crossed) we'll get there for sure in the end.
Hyde , Thanks for putting up that numbers thats so useful.
The Chopper Development Chart is interesting , There is a new 5th Gen Strike Chopper and Ka-65 , so the Ka-65 will replace the Ka-28/29 Naval ASW chopper ?
There is this new High Speed Chopper in R&D probably they would also see some initial production
Russian Navy buying Icelandic Gavia Autonomous Underwater Vehicle
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index...sk=view&id=360The Russian Navy is buying eight AUVs from Teledyne Gavia for a total of €19 millions. Three of the autonomous underwater vehicles will be delivered this. The remaining five will be delivered in 2013 and 2014 according to russian paper Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports.
Russia has no such UUS "home made" ?
Russian Defense Ministry Plans to Order Extra Borey & Yasen Nuclear Submarines for Russian Navy
http://www.navyrecognition.com/index...sk=view&id=362In addition to the 16 nuclear submarines purchase which is outlined by the state armament program for the period until 2020 the Russian Defense Ministry plans to buy four extra nuclear submarines.
Army general Nikolai Makarov said, "If there appears such possibility we will order two additional project 955 (Borey class) submarines of and two extra project 855 (Yasen class) submarines."
But i thought the deal was actually 10 of each a bit back, not 8 of each? Or am i just remembering wrongly?
I don't think you are. I remember this also.
Only 8 are financed.
Someone in the government recently said "maybe 10", but the military has been noncommittal about this. One the one hand, they don't want to tell their bosses that they are idiots who don't understand procurement, on the other hand, they can't exactly wave a magic wand and make it 10.
8 is a safe, firm number. 10 is just someone's random idea.
[LEFT][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Russia to bargain for Gabala with scan with on alternatives
Russia has been bargaining with Azerbaijan about a key station in its ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS). Should the negotiations fail, the station may be pulled out and replaced by a new one to be built in Russia. This meets the recently endorsed new approaches to BMEWS radar field configuration. [/FONT][/COLOR][/LEFT]
The growing appetite
[LEFT][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The case in point is the currently modernized Daryal-type BMEWS radar station (RS) located in the vicinity of Gabala, Azerbaijan. For Russia, Gabala is of strategic importance as controlling the sector to the south of its borders. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]“The talks on Gabala continue. The first round was quite constructive,” Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov told RIA Novosti Tuesday. “Soon we will agree with our Azerbaijani colleagues on the dates when the Russian delegation can leave for Azerbaijan for further talks.” [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Earlier Kommersant reported with reference to its sources in the Defense Ministry that Baku wants to increase the annual lease payment from $7 to $300 million. Just a few months ago, its appetite did not extend beyond $15 million[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]“This amount is exorbitant and totally unjustified; we will press for its considerable reduction. We still hope to come to an agreement,” a Defense Ministry source told Kommersant. According to another source, Russia might as well evacuate Gabala, “If Baku fails to moderate its appetite.”[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]For now, Gabala has an essential role to play, watching the strategically important southern sector (including possible missile launches from the Indian Ocean), and registering Iranian missile launches (also significant in the current geopolitical situation).[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]But a hypothetical and highly unlikely pullout scenario may still be on the cards, and then, as a stopgap, Russia will have to speedily commission the second stage of its new-generation RS near Armavir, Krasnodar Territory.[/FONT][/COLOR][/LEFT]
A hole-ridden net as inheritance
[LEFT][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]But how has it come about that the Russian BMEWS is dependent on a foreign state’s whims?[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The disposition of BMEWS radars in the USSR obeyed the language of art. 6 of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (1972), which prescribed to deploy outward-oriented BMEWS radars solely in the periphery of each country’s national territory. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]This explains why the radar field came to include stations at Mukachevo and Mys Khersones, Ukraine; Gabala, Azerbaijan; Skrunda, Latvia; and Sary-Shagan, Kazakhstan.[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]After 1991, this entire infrastructure was inherited by the newly independent countries that sprung up in the territory of the former USSR. Russia was left with one station near Olenegorsk, Kola Peninsula, one in Pechora and two abandoned projects – Mishelevka and Abalkovo – near Irkutsk. Oriented in the northwestern direction so that it might watch the airspace over Yakutia and beyond, Abalkovo, in addition to everything else, was being built in violation of the ABM Treaty, something that caused protracted squabbles with the United States.[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]To plug the hole in the Western sector, the military command speedily put back into service and licked into shape the Volga RS at Gantsevichi, Belarus. It had been under construction since 1981 with an eye to meeting the challenge posed by U.S.-owned Eurostrategic Pershing-2 missiles. But after the signing of the Treaty on the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (1987), it was no longer urgently needed to have the station and the project was allowed to drift. It again emerged as a priority after 1998: completed in a rush, the radar was put on combat duty in 2000. [/FONT][/COLOR][/LEFT]
Voronezh to replace Daryal
[LEFT][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Russia’s top military officials were greatly concerned about the situation where only the northern and northwestern sectors were protected, while the narrow sectors in the west and south were being leased and largely dependent on the stance of post-Soviet governments. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The potential for funding the national nuclear missile forces was stretched to the utmost both in the 1990s and thereafter. The Kremlin knew only too well that the deterrent was the sole thing that ensured Russia’s independence and territorial integrity even while the rest of the country was openly enthusiastic about the newly found Western allies. This is why the radar-field problem was addressed at the earliest opportunity. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The available BMEWS radars were in effect mammoth construction projects boasting huge reinforced-concrete shells, inside which active devices and equipment were installed. These ziggurats took a long time to build, which was followed by an equally protracted start-up period. Reorienting a station to another sector (let alone redeploying it to a different location) was out of the question. It was easier to blow it up and build a new one. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]A high depot readiness concept (HDR) was proposed as a new approach that envisaged the installation of easy-to-assemble frames for hanging large prefabricated radar modules. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]This made it possible to achieve three effects at once with the very first batch-produced Voronezh station.[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]First, the construction time was curtailed, as were the construction costs, which is of no small importance under present-day circumstances. According to available data, the turn-key cost of one Voronezh installation is 1.5 billion rubles in 2005 prices. Moreover, it takes 12 to 16 months to assemble 23 prefabricated units on a prepared site. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]To compare: Daryal-type radar like the one at Gabala is made up of 4,000 units of equipment. Its cost in comparable prices would amount to 19.8 billion rubles and the time span required for its construction under the most favorable conditions is anywhere between 5 and 6 years. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Second, the module approach provides for easy scaling and modernization. None of the former models lent themselves to modernization since numerous problems cropped up when it came to installing equipment and laying the service lines inside a shell. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Third, a new-generation station can be disassembled and redeployed to a new location relatively quickly. That is not a sign of HDR radars’ new mobility, but an option like this can be easily contemplated several years in advance. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]High depot readiness morphing into full readiness[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Currently Russia is operating three Voronezh-type HDR radars: Armavir, Lekhtusi (near St. Petersburg), and, since recently, Kaliningrad (this one will become fully operational only in 2014). The fourth radar of the same type is under construction at Mishelevka near Irkutsk on the site of a demolished Daryal shell. [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The fifth radar will actually be the second stage of Armavir, which is Russia’s main hope for the hypothetical eventuality of having to withdraw Gabala from the BMEWS. The first stage is going to handle the southwestern sector, while the second stage, to be built directly behind Gabala and next to its twin, will control the southern and southeastern sector.[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]In the meantime, the high depot readiness concept has been upgraded for more flexibility, with A.L. Mintz Radio Institute announcing its MARS project (Multifunctional Adaptive Radar System) also known as FDR RS (full depot readiness). [/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]This radar is being designed as a mobile and universal affair. As is cautiously specified, it is a “redeployable” model, which means that it is not a fully mobile vehicle-based radar, like those used by the air defense forces. Moreover, it should easily integrate with both the BMEWS and other related information systems involved in monitoring outer space, securing missile defense, and supporting non-strategic antimissile defenses, including ship-based components.[/FONT][/COLOR]
[*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Given this approach, Gabala will certainly retain its significance as an element of Russia’s BMEWS, but it will gradually lose its critical importance.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Upgraded Il-76 plane to make maiden flight in the summer
[LEFT][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Russia’s modernized Ilyushin Il-76MD-90A aircraft, also known as the Il-476, will conduct its maiden flight by the end of June, Ulyanovsk-based Aviastar aircraft maker said on Friday.[/FONT][/COLOR][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The Il-476 is an extensively modified variant of the Il-76 freighter, with new engines, reinforced wing, modernized cockpit, and heavier payload. The aircraft will be primarily built for the Russian Armed Forces and Emergencies Ministry.[/FONT][/COLOR][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]“Project 476 is our future,” Aviastar General Director Sergei Dementyev said.[/FONT][/COLOR][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Aviastar, which also manufactures super-heavy Antonov An-124 transport planes, expects to build up to ten of the Il-476 aircraft per year and is in talks with export customers including India and China as well as commercial customers.[/FONT][/COLOR][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]China canceled a contract agreed earlier with Russia for delivery of around 38 Il-76 transport and Il-78 tanker aircraft, after TAPO, the Uzbekistan-based Il-76 airframe producer said it could no longer deliver the airframes as production had slowed.[/FONT][/COLOR][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]Russia then had to move production to Aerostar in order to complete the Il-476 modification programs for the Russian Air Force.[/FONT][/COLOR][*******#010000][FONT=Georgia]The Russian Defense Ministry wants to buy up to 100 of the aircraft over ten years to replace existing Il-76s.