Reply With QuoteTest targets yes. Real targets no. The S-300 family has not participated in any armed conflicts.Originally Posted by Ai caramba
Does anyone here know if the S-400 had any real kill?
Test targets yes. Real targets no. The S-300 family has not participated in any armed conflicts.
Thank you void, how fast does it travel in m/s? It is mach 12 right?
How fast does what travel? The missiles or the targets? The missile speeds (and max target speeds) for the S-300 family are found here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S-300_(missile)#Missiles
The missile! What´s the difference between the missile speed and that of the target?
Thanks again.
A missile can hit a target going much faster than the missile itself. The missile doesn't need to be going at 4000m/s to hit a ballistic target travelling at that speed. Anyway, all the available info you want is on the linked wikipedia article.
Air Forces Monthly March 2012 issue ( via AndyB/BRF )
Ka-52 AM Co-axial Alligator
http://www.mediafire.com/?ntn8wauf2u9t5z1
S-500 is in fully accordance to the terms
[FONT=Verdana]Concern PVO "Almaz - Antey" carries out anti-aircraft missile system, the new generation C-500 is fully in accordance with the terms specified in the state armaments program through 2020 (LG-2020), announced today the official representative of the group Yury Baikov.
Saggitarius - New command and control system for Marines
Marines test new items at the landfill, "Meadow" (Leningrad region)., Where there are artillery units 98 Guards Airborne Division from Ivanovo.
Military doctors to use new Kamaz mobile hospitalImproved management of complex intelligence and communications (KRUS) "Archer" provides solutions to key command, control, communications and information transfer, individual and group navigation and detection of coordinate measurement and recognition of targets, generate data for use in small arms.
More than 40 military doctors to take part in the collection at the Training Ground "Prudboy" in the Volgograd region, "Interfax-AVN," the press service of the Southern Military District.
RIA Novosti military commentator Konstantin Bogdanov
Submarines: The quite bulwark of the Russian Navy
The Russian submarine fleet is marking its 106th anniversary perhaps not in the best of shapes. Nevertheless, its role today is more important than ever. Today it appears to be fulfilling what might even be called a crucial role.Russia has not even managed to hold onto the position held by the Soviet Union in terms of the number of surface ships and their combat potential (add to that the fact that back then the Soviet Navy was objectively weaker than the American Navy already). The submarine fleet was handed a dubious legacy from the Soviet Union. But the submarine forces, although hit hard after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, have managed to retain far greater potential for recovery than the surface fleet.Military submarines, which officially became part of the Russian Navy back in March 1906, have become the backbone of the Navy and are now its chief asymmetric weapon.
Delfin and others
A lot of time has elapsed since March 1906 when by Nicholas II’s resolution, which subsequently became a Marine Department order, the Russian Imperial Navy acquired a submarine fleet.
Yet the first submarine, called the Delfin, had joined the Baltic Fleet even earlier – in 1904. Since the category of submarine combat vessel did not exist, the Delfin was initially listed as a torpedo boat.
The Delfin and a number of other boats were even sent by rail to Vladivostok, where they were deployed on a number of sea missions during the Russo-Japanese war of 1905.
The role of submarines has been steadily rising ever since, despite the sporadic attempts at building up the surface fleet. The glory days of the “silent service” were the latter stages of the Soviet Union, during the 1970s and 1980s.
A fleet swimming against the tide
The country’s surface ships in fact had very limited combat exposure during World War II and what experience they did have was far from successful, if you take into account the Tallinn crossing of 1941 and the Black Sea tragedy of 1942.
The few successes scored by surface ships could not hide the fact that even if the “quiet service” was no more successful than the rest of the Navy, at least it looked more like a regular balanced unit. On the Baltic Sea, underwater warfare went on for years, while on the Black Sea the surface fleet received several painful hits from the German air force and did not display much activity. It was only on the Northern Fleet that the daring torpedo boats sailed to the west to meet the polar convoys. The submarine force operated in parallel: going on sea missions and duty patrols, engaging in communication sessions, trying to break through anti-submarine defenses, and returning home.
When the war ended, instead of getting better the situation for the Navy in fact deteriorated further. Not only were NATO forces superior to the Soviet Navy, but NATO’s shipbuilding capacity was head and shoulders above that of the Soviet shipyards (and this is without even counting the inevitable falling behind in technology).
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the father of the Soviet ocean fleet (who was in office from 1956 to 1985), promoted the concept of an “anti-carrier force”: the main attack core of the Soviet Navy was to neutralize the main fighting core of NATO’s naval force – its aircraft carrier groups.
In the triad of anti-carrier forces (surface, underwater and airborne) the submarines took pride of place. The nuclear anti-ship submarines became the main strike force at sea. Surface carriers armed with heavy anti-ship missiles were less combat capable than their underwater cousins, while naval missile-carrying aircraft were not strictly speaking a means of gaining control of the seas.
The 1960s saw the start of the race between the “city busters”: the Soviet Navy began competing with the American fleet for domination of naval strategic nuclear forces. Missile-carrying submarines on patrol duty cruised around the target areas, waiting for the command to strike. They were closely stalked by enemy boats tasked with thwarting their mission.
Duels over the bottomless depths occasionally ended in clashes. On March 20, 1992, the K-407 missile-carrying submarine collided with the U.S. submarine Grayling, which had been eavesdropping on its Soviet counterpart. Earlier, in May 1981, the K-211 missile-carrying submarine had also had a brush with an unidentified boat while returning to base. On February 11, 1992, the Russian Project 945 hunter-killer submarine (believed to be the K-239) when trying to surface collided with the U.S. submarine Baton Rouge, which had been spying on it, and had lost its trail.
Unable to challenge the U.S. surface ships to any meaningful extent, the Soviet Navy was forced to move underwater. This is not strictly speaking true, since heavy missile-carrying cruisers and large anti-submarine ships regularly plied the oceans. But the emphasis shifted: with the surface force falling behind, the nuclear submarines started assuming an increasingly important role.
In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union managed to get past the tight system of export control and succeeded in importing milling machines capable of producing submarine propellers with a much better surface quality, which helped the main defect of Soviet submarines – their high noise level – to be overcome.
The next generation of submarines was also on its way. Some of the plans for them are currently being implemented: the frequently redesigned Project 955 Borei class submarine and the Project 885 multi-purpose Yasen-class submarine.
Into the 21st century
Submarines today are still the asymmetric weapon of the Russian Navy, almost to an even greater degree than before 1991. The massive collapse of Russia’s presence in the world’s oceans has led to the mass decommissioning of warships.
The boats suffered too, and quantitatively perhaps even more so, but the active surface force is now so diminished that the role of the submarines can only keep growing. In the long run, it is they who will bear the main burden of combat service.
Venturing out into the oceans is now decidedly difficult: despite cutbacks, the U.S. Navy is still capable of squeezing out anyone who encroaches on Washington’s naval might. Competing with the United States in terms of the number of nuclear anti-aircraft carriers escorted by missile-carrying cruisers is impossible. It is equally impossible to compete in operations in remote theaters: both in terms of provision of ships and overseas bases.
But that is on the surface. Underwater, Russia’s chances are different, although still not that bright. Below the surface Russian submariners are perfectly capable of putting up a fight against any potential opponents. The equipment available to them (and that under development) makes the outcome of underwater warfare far less predictable than on the surface.
Russia may not have the money to build a large ocean-going fleet. That is the historical fate of Russian shipbuilding: it is too weak to manufacture ships on a commercial, batch-produced basis. Its bases and repair facilities are equally under strength – the Soviet and Russian navies have both had to deal with the same kinds of problems for 100 to 150 years.
As for the submarines, they have been with us since the Russian Empire, maintaining Russia’s naval tradition by being the backbone of the Navy. They are likely to remain so for a long time – if not forever.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20120320/172287461.html
The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Bulava missile in for more tests
A series of test launches for the Bulava intercontinental missile are planned for the summer, a source at the Russian Navy said on Tuesday.
Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said earlier in the day the Bulava will enter service in October.
It was not immediately clear how many launches will be conducted or whether their outcome could affect the plans to adopt the missile.
Russian experts have questioned how wise it is to adopt the troubled Bulava missile for service, suggesting it would cause more security problems than it would solve.
Military analyst Viktor Baranets said it was a “reckless” and “dangerous” move since the missile was underdeveloped.“In its current form the missile could be even more dangerous for the [Russian] navy than for an enemy navy,” he said.
President Dmitry Medvedev said in late December that the Bulava SLBM flight tests were completed and it will now be adopted for service with the Russian Navy.
Russia successfully test launched two Bulava missiles on December 23.Only 11 of 18 or 19 test launches of the troubled Bulava have been officially declared successful.
However, some analysts suggest that in reality the number of failures is considerably higher. Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer said that of the Bulava's first 12 test launches, only one was entirely successful.
Despite several previous failures officially blamed on manufacturing faults, the Russian military has insisted that there is no alternative to the Bulava.
The Bulava (SS-NX-30) SLBM, developed by the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (since 1998), carries up to 10 MIRV warheads and has a range of over 8,000 kilometers (5,000 miles). The three-stage ballistic missile is designed for deployment on Borey-class nuclear submarines.
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120320/172285922.html
Russian Air Force adopts new cruise missile
A new cruise missile has entered service with the Russian Air Force’s strategic long-range arms division, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said on Tuesday.
He did not provide any details, only saying it was an air-launched long range missile.
AF chief Col Gen Alexander Zelin previously said the new cruise missile was developed by the Taktitcheskoye Raketnoye Vooruzhenie (Tactical Missile) defense corporation and that its specifications were secret. He said the new missiles would also be installed in fifth-generation fighters.
Douglas Barrie, an air warfare analyst at the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, said the new weapon was likely to be “either the Kh-555 or Kh-101/102.”
The Kh-555 is a new conventionally-armed variant of the Kh-55 nuclear-armed cruise missile, which has been in service since the 1984 on Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers.
Kh-101 is a stealthy nuclear armed cruise-missile under development by the Raduga design bureau, along with a conventionally-armed variant (Kh-102). Globalsecurity.org claims the weapon was test-fired in October 1998. Some reports claim the weapon is itself a derivative of Kh-555.
Serdyukov also said Russia’s fleet of Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers will be modernized.
Defense Ministry spokesman Vladimir Drik earlier said the AF’s strategic long-range arms division will receive more than 10 modernized Tu-160M Blackjack bombers by 2020.
The new bombers will be adapted to carry advanced cruise missiles and bombs.
Zelin said in January the AF will soon deploy an advanced tactical air-to-air missile that will greatly enhance its operational effectiveness. The missile will be carried by MiG-31BM Foxhound supersonic interceptors/fighters and will subsequently be used by other warplanes.
Zelin did not identify the missile but experts believe it could be the K-37M, also known as RVV-BD, or AA-X-13 Arrow as it is known to NATO.
The K-prefix denotes a weapon in development while the M indicates a modification. An export variant of the weapon, known as RVV-BD, was shown at MAKS 2011. The BD suffix may stand for the Russian words bolshoi dalnosti, or long range.
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20120320/172284223.html
http://www.lifenews.ru/news/86184
Laying of Fourth Borei delayed again.
As i have said before, no way in hell they are going to reach the planned number of Borey's before 2020. I wonder if 4'th will get a hull plug for the extra 4 tubes, or will it be made more compact?
Also, Borey length is reported to be 170 m, but i have read the actuall number is lower, more around 163 m. Any truth to that?
Isn't the 4th Borey St. Nickolas in building or I mix something?
4th Borey more looks like new submarine according to paralay compilation:
Supposedly project 955.3 will be deeply modernized and that it will be implemented most of the ideas embodied in the original version of the 955 project: in the nose - a large spherical antenna, side-board torpedo tubes and tower bow rudders. In addition, the likely number of SLBM "Bulava" will be increased to 20 instead of 16 as in the previous two versions.
Main propulsion ship was to include the new CTS-6 reactor with thermal power of 200 MW, steam turbine plant a new, common to all 4-th generation. Actually, the 09550 projects and 09551, because of the complexities of technical and, above all, a financial nature, have been using slightly improved power equipment of Boats third generation with steam-generating plant OK-650V heat capacity of 190 MW steam turbine block "Azurite-90."
but its unconfirmed...
Let's pray they not.
Russia considering Cyber defence network (also including info on Russian DARPA)
The Russian government is considering setting up a dedicated cyber-security command, responsible for protecting the armed forces' information systems, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said on Wednesday."We are currently discussing the question of setting up a cyber-security command," said Rogozin, who has responsibility for Russia's military-industrial complex. "This is in connection with guaranteeing information for the armed forces, and also the state infrastructure as a whole," he said.Definitely not at this rate. Constant negotiations on prices. Have they even fixed Yasen's price yet?
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